

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FILES

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of
Singapore, Tuesday, April 10, 1973, at 11:13 a.m.
- 12:18 p.m.

State Department review completed pages
4-18

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

DOS Review Completed.

MORI/CDF C03230306 pages 4-18

Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew
Ambassador Monteiro

Prime Minister Lee: I would like to congratulate you on your achievement.
No one thought it was possible.

President Nixon: The toughest decision was the bombing in December. What
did you think at the time?

Prime Minister Lee: I thought it would lead to peace at the end of January.
The problem now is to maintain the peace.

President Nixon: Re-entering Southeast Asia will be very tough. There is
enormous pressure on us.

Prime Minister Lee: The mass media have a silent conspiracy to keep up
the mood of withdrawal. U. S. technology has made it a small world, and
it is ironic that now you have the death wish of losing your influence in that
smaller world.

President Nixon: This applies not only to Southeast Asia. The same people
want us out of Europe too. It is the death wish of the ruling groups in the
West.

Prime Minister Lee: The leaders are not so bad. What is bad is the leaders
of public opinion. They don't understand the implications of their thinking.
If the United States removes her last soldier from Europe, what is left?

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President Nixon: What should we do in Southeast Asia?

Prime Minister Lee: You must create the impression that your policy will prevail despite the cacophony of voices. You have withdrawn in an honorable way giving South Vietnam a chance -- a better than even chance. South Vietnam has a chance if they don't rely on a purely military solution. The right strategy is to try to win the Communists away from the North. Give them a share of power in the municipal level. There must now be a debate in Hanoi between rehabilitation and infiltration.

President Nixon: Do we require a stick as well as a carrot?

Prime Minister Lee: Yes. It is hard to know how they assess the U. S. domestic situation. If I were they, I would play it safe. But then I am not them. Hence, there is the need for a stick and not only a carrot.

President Nixon: I don't want to leave any doubts. With respect to the intellectual class in this country, we face a disturbing softness and weakness. There is a desire to withdraw everywhere. Heath, Home and Carrington are strong men, so is Pompidou. The present time requires a strong, vigorous leadership to maintain a credible defense.

Prime Minister Lee: You are the anchor man of the non-Communist world.

President Nixon: The Japanese and the Germans could do it but they won't be allowed to. If we cave, everything will come apart. If we had come back dishonored, we would have lost the trust of our friends and the respect of our adversaries. We can't turn away from the things that need doing. We must leaven PRC and Soviet policies toward their neighbors. But in order for that game to work we must engage in strong policies. Dr. Kissinger and I strongly believe this. There are no other two people who believe this more strongly.

Prime Minister Lee: If South Vietnam sticks, this whole policy will bring on a change of mood. Americans cannot go on being self-pitying. A weak America is dangerous for the whole world.

President Nixon: What do you think of the Japanese? A people with their history won't be content to make transistor radios.

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Prime Minister Lee: Look at the difference between the Japanese and the Germans. The Japanese claim a great power role, the Germans don't. I don't want the Japanese to conduct an independent policy. It must be interwoven with the rest of the world. If they get an independent policy, they will be a joker in the cards.

President Nixon:[Jokingly] You are getting to be an economic problem for us.

Prime Minister Lee: We went into textiles only to sop up unemployment.

President Nixon: What do you think of Indonesia?

Prime Minister Lee: It would be better if they spread the benefits beyond Jakarta. The Generals in power are acquiring wealth. In Islam wealth comes with power.

President Nixon: Are we pursuing a correct policy towards China?

Prime Minister Lee: If Chou and Mao live long enough, the line could be set for a decade. Their main preoccupation is with the Russians. The Chinamen know that Americans have a conscience; the Russians do not. Thus they are very careful not to antagonize them.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH SINGAPORE PRIME MINISTER
LEE KUAN YEW

Tuesday, April 10, 1973
11:00 a.m. (30 minutes)
The Oval Office

From: Henry A. Kissinger

I. PURPOSE

To reassure Prime Minister Lee as regards U.S. intentions in Asia.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS PLAN

- A. Background: Prime Minister Lee is making an unofficial visit to the U.S. March 25-April 11. He is delivering a series of lectures at Lehigh University and Eckerd College (Florida), which he believes helps him to keep abreast of academic and social trends in the U.S. (which he believes are going distinctly downhill), and find the intellectual stimulation he likes. He has sought meetings with a variety of ranking U.S. Government leaders in addition to yourself in order to appraise U.S. longer term intentions in Asia and the Pacific. (The Vice President is giving him a luncheon, and Lee is meeting with the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, the Director of CIA, World Bank President McNamara, former Secretary Connally, and myself.) 25X1
Lee's last visit to the U.S. was in November 1970, also private, at which time he met with you and you hosted a stag dinner for him.

Additional background is at Tab A. A briefing memorandum from Deputy Secretary of State Rush is at Tab B.

- B. Participants. Prime Minister Lee, Ambassador Monteiro, Henry A. Kissinger 25X1
- C. Press Plan: Full photo opportunity. The meeting will be routinely announced; Mr. Ziegler will brief the press following the meeting.

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III. TALKING POINTS

1. Congratulate Prime Minister Lee on his landslide election victory last September.
2. Express appreciation for the position Lee has taken on Asian security: that the U.S. effort in Vietnam has convinced Asians that Communism is not the wave of the future, and that a continued U.S. military presence will be necessary to the security of Asia for some time to come. (You may wish to take particular note of his joint statement with Thai Prime Minister Thanom in Bangkok a month ago calling for a continued U.S. military presence in that country.)
3. Give Lee your assessment of the prospects for stability in Indochina, and ask him for his appraisal of the outlook there.
4. Tell Lee we believe the settlement will stick if the agreement is observed scrupulously (and that we will use military and economic inducements in this connection), and welcome whatever assistance Singapore may be able to contribute to Indochina reconstruction.
5. Give Lee your appraisal of new emerging diplomatic patterns in Asia and the world, and assure him that the U.S. intends to continue to play a vital balancing role in Asia and the Pacific and will maintain the mix of ground, naval, and air forces necessary to make that role effective.
6. Express appreciation for Singapore's cooperation as regards Seventh Fleet ship visits to Singapore, and say that -- so long as Singapore desires they continue -- we will continue to show the flag there. You may also wish to mention our intention to continue our use of Singapore's excellent naval and air repair facilities.
7. Ask Prime Minister Lee for his assessment of the prospects for Southeast Asian regional cooperation on security and economic matters (particularly the Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA) and ASEAN). In particular, what thoughts does he have as to the effect on FPDA of the Australian intent to withdraw its forces by 1975-76.

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BACKGROUND

Lee has long held that the security of Singapore, a small island city-state, can be maintained best if the great powers will maintain a balance between their presences in the region. Expounding this strategy before the National Press Club here in Washington April 6, Lee noted that an effective great power presence in the region necessitated a military force there--and somewhat offhandedly suggested that each great power might keep a naval task force in the area. His rationale for this strategy is that a balanced presence in the region between the U.S. and the USSR would preclude the need for the small and medium-sized nations that make up the region to align themselves with one superpower or the other, or, if only one superpower were present, for these nations to become overly dependent on it.

Probably principally for this reason, Lee has little regard for Malaysia Prime Minister Razak's neutralization scheme for Southeast Asia--certainly as any near-term solution to the region's security needs. Singapore's agreeing in November 1971 at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting to explore Razak's neutralization proposal was probably more to avoid causing Razak a substantial loss of face. Singapore, like its other three ASEAN partners, has since been cool to Razak's interest in pursuing the idea.

As to the Five Power Defense Arrangement for Singapore and Malaysia (in which the Australia, New Zealand, and the UK are also partners), Lee continues to find value in the agreement. Thus, he was disturbed when told by the Australian Government recently that Prime Minister Whitlam had decided to pull all Australian forces out of the FPDA by 1975-76. He believes this may have a destabilizing effect on Malaysia. He thinks there is little he can do to deter Whitlam, but hopes that the U.S. presence in the region will provide the necessary security.

As regards the U.S. reduction of forces in Asia, Lee holds--as he told the National Press Club here on April 6--that we will decrease our force presence in such a way that will not be destabilizing. In the case of Thailand, he made his views clear in a joint statement with Thai Prime Minister Thanom during a visit to Bangkok in January when he said that a substantial continued U.S. military presence in that country would be necessary. (Lee looks on Thailand as an essential buffer against Communist penetration into the rest of Southeast Asia.)

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On the prospects for Indochina, Lee seems inclined to doubt that the Communists will launch another military offensive in the near future. The prospects, he thinks, are for the other side either to observe the settlement fairly closely, assuming that they can achieve victory through political means, or to resort to guerrilla warfare before long, assuming that political means will not be effective. Lee supports large-scale rehabilitation to both Vietnams, and intends that Singapore itself find ways to provide at least modest technical assistance to assist in this effort.

As regards the possibility of Singapore's establishing diplomatic relations with Peking, Prime Minister Lee intends to defer such a move until after his ASEAN partners have consummated diplomatic relations with the PRC. Lee would probably like to put this off as long as possible, fearing that Peking would use diplomatic ties to try to subvert Singapore's Chinese population, the older generations of which still have a strong attachment to mainland China.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 30, 1973

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Office Call April 10 by Singaporean
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew

Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore will call on you at 11:00 a.m. on April 10. You are giving a black tie dinner for him and Mrs. Lee the night of April 10.

Prime Minister Lee is making a private visit to the United States. He arrived March 25 and will be in the United States until April 11. Previous Lee trips to the U.S. include an official visit in 1967 and a 1970 private visit during which he called on you.

Lee finds intellectual stimulation in contacts with University life, and he likes to keep abreast of academic thinking. In 1970 he spent a month at Harvard and on this trip he has spent over a week lecturing and meeting with faculty and students at Eckerd College in St. Petersburg, Florida and Lehigh University in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.

Probably the primary purpose of the visit, however, is to meet with American leaders, particularly those in the administration, in order to assess American opinion and U.S. Government policies and plans. Among others, Prime Minister Lee will have called on the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury. The Vice President will give a luncheon for him April 4.

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GDS--DECLAS Dec. 31, 1979

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Lee comes to the U.S. at a high point in his career. He won a landslide victory at the polls last September, capturing all the seats in Parliament, and his tiny country is currently riding very high on the crest of a remarkable wave of economic prosperity (average growth rate 13-15% over the past five years, and per capita GNP of \$1,321 in 1972).

Despite these favorable developments at home, Singapore's leaders are pessimistic about the future of Singapore and Southeast Asia in general. At this point Lee is more than ever sharply aware of the vulnerability of Singapore to possible disruption of its vital trade relationships, to great power rivalries, and to Communist pressures and subversion.

Although he has consistently followed a policy of holding all the great powers at arm's length, there are some indications that Lee may now be in a mood to draw a bit closer to the U.S. The mood may be temporary -- Lee has lashed out at the U.S. in the past with little or no provocation -- but we want to encourage the trend insofar as it involves no commitments to Singapore's security and no significant increase in resources devoted to U.S. programs in Singapore.

Lee is apparently most concerned about the possibility of increased communist pressures in the aftermath of the Indochina war. Long a believer in the domino theory, he holds that a continued American presence in Thailand for the next several years is necessary to ensure the security of Southeast Asia, and he has repeatedly stated this in public. Lee is also deeply concerned about the vulnerability of Singapore's predominately Chinese population to the influence of Peking. For this reason he is worried about moves by other Southeast Asian countries to normalize relations with Peking, fearing that Singapore

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
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might be pressured to follow suit prematurely. He will be most anxious to have your views on the Indochina situation and Peking's intentions vis-a-vis Southeast Asia.

The Prime Minister will be accompanied in his office call on you by the Singapore Ambassador, Dr. Ernest Steven Monteiro.

An Issues and Talking Points paper is attached.



Acting Secretary

Attachments:

1. Issues and Talking Points
2. List of Official Party
3. Suggested themes for Toast
4. Notes for Mrs. Nixon

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BRIEFING PAPER

Issues and Talking Points

Prime Minister Lee's interests are global and he prefers to discuss great world issues. It is unlikely that he will dwell at length on any subject that strictly concerns Singapore or US-Singapore relations. He will be primarily interested in your views on the future of South-east Asia.

Courtesy Points

Prime Minister Lee is here on a private visit. You may:

- welcome him to Washington, referring to his 1970 private visit and his evident interest in U.S. universities.
- congratulate him on the landslide victory of his People's Action Party in the September 1972 general election. (They won all 65 seats, and 70% of the popular vote.)

Issues Lee is Expected to Raise

Future of Southeast Asia

Singapore's leaders are fearful that the peace agreement in Vietnam will ultimately lead to Communist domination, first of Indochina, then Thailand and finally all of Southeast Asia. Lee will be eager to know your thoughts on the security of the region. You may wish to:

- assure Lee that the U.S. intends to continue to play a vital balancing role in Asia and that we will continue to keep sufficient military forces in the region to back up our commitments.

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- tell Lee that while the ceasefire experience to date has been less than satisfactory, we continue to believe the basic elements of the peace agreement will be observed and that South Vietnam has an excellent chance of remaining non-Communist.
- express confidence that progress over the past decade towards economic growth and political stability in the non-Communist Southeast Asian countries, as exemplified by Singapore, augurs well for the future secure independence of the region.
- commend Lee for the constructive role of Singapore in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other regional activities, and note with favor the growth of regional cohesion in Southeast Asia.

Indochina

Lee is keenly interested in the Indochina situation and will want to know the latest developments there and our expectations and plans. You may:

- tell Lee that military activity continues in Vietnam, but most of the incidents are low-level in nature.
- state that in Vietnam neither side to date has indicated an intent to engage in the kind of fighting that would clearly threaten the basic structure of the agreements. At the same time we are concerned over the infiltration of men and material from North Vietnam since the ceasefire. We will be watching this situation closely.
- observe that the process of reconciliation between the two South Vietnamese parties is expected to be long and difficult. Negotiations have barely begun.

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- say that in Cambodia we continue to explore the possibilities of obtaining a cease-fire and a compromise settlement of the military conflict.
- explain that the prospects of a compromise solution is complicated by the lack of unity among the Khmer insurgents and by the number of countries that have conflicting interests to be resolved in any settlement.
- inform Lee that in Laos, the ceasefire seems to be holding and the level of fighting has declined. We expect the parties to the agreement to fulfill their obligations but it is too early to determine compliance.

Thailand

On his recent visit to Thailand, Lee made it clear that he regards Thailand as an essential buffer against Communist penetration into the rest of Southeast Asia. He is likely to ask about our plans to maintain a presence there and our assessment of the Thai political and military situation. You may:

- assure Lee that we shall continue to keep U.S. forces in Thailand until the situation in Indochina stabilizes, and we intend to keep our commitments under the SEATO pact.
- tell Lee that we regard the present Thai government as stable and possessed of the military capability to contain insurgent forces in the country, provided the level of outside support does not escalate substantially.
- ask Lee for his own assessment of the situation in Thailand on the basis of his recent visit there.

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Relations with the People's Republic of China

Singapore is fearful of Chinese political domination, to which it feels particularly vulnerable because of its large Chinese population. Privately Lee has expressed concern that the rapid pace of developing US-PRC relations may result in pressure on Singapore to recognize Peking sooner than Lee wants. Lee will probably want your assessment of PRC intentions vis-a-vis Southeast Asia and ask about our intentions in further developing bilateral relations with the PRC. You may:

- tell Lee we believe that normal relations between China and the United States will contribute to peace and stability in Asia.
- inform Lee that we believe the present arrangements we have with Taipei and Peking are best suited to present conditions and that we have no further steps in mind at the moment.
- indicate our belief that other Asian states should set their own pace in normalizing relations with Peking. We see no urgency in the matter.
- state our belief that Peking has no aggressive designs on Southeast Asia, being primarily concerned with the USSR, Japan, and its internal problems.

Neutralization of Southeast Asia

Although Singapore signed the 1971 ASEAN declaration on neutralization, GOS leaders regard the scheme as impractical for at least the near term future. They have downplayed the concept in ASEAN councils, made it clear they want a U.S. presence in the region, and indicated that they still value the Five Power Defense Arrangement (Singapore, Malaysia, U.K., Australia, and New Zealand). Lee may, nevertheless sound out your views on neutralization. You may:

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- observe that neutralization could be a desirable long term goal for Southeast Asia, provided the region becomes strong enough and sufficiently united to insure its own security.
- point out that any premature dismantling of present security arrangements in favor of neutralization could jeopardize peace and development in the region.

Issues You May Raise

Access to Singapore Naval Facilities



possibly
 has made it clear that present GOS policy is to welcome U.S. naval visits and to bar Soviet vessels from the sensitive naval base area of Sembawang and the Stores Basin. You may:

Lee

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- note our understanding that it is GOS policy to discourage and restrict Soviet use of Singapore's naval facilities.
- express our hope that this policy will continue, noting that facilitation of a Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean is not in the interest of Asian nations.
- express appreciation for the warm welcome the Seventh Fleet has been given in Singapore.
- indicate our intention, should the GOS be willing, to continue frequent Seventh Fleet ship visits to Singapore.

Law of the Sea: Straits of Malacca and Singapore

Singapore has taken the position that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore should be "freely accessible to all nations without discrimination", which contrasts

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with the position taken by Malaysia and Indonesia that these Straits are not international. Singapore also believes that the status of all international straits should be settled at the U.N. Law of the Sea Conference, not by unilateral action. This Singaporean stance closely parallels our own but Singapore is under pressure from Malaysia and Indonesia to change it. Accordingly, you may:

- indicate that free transit through and over international straits would best serve Singaporean, U.S., and world interests.
- state that we hope Singapore will support our free transit proposal at the Law of the Sea Conference.

Assistance to Vietnam

The Singapore Government seems to be prepared to participate in a modest way in the reconstruction of Vietnam. If Prime Minister Lee does not raise this subject himself, you may:

- mention the hope for a reconstruction program in Vietnam and suggest that Singapore may wish to play a role, particularly in providing technical expertise.

Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA)

Lee values the continued ANZUK military presence in Singapore primarily because it serves as a deterrent against any aggressive moves by Malaysia and Indonesia. The new Australian government has indicated that when their present tour is over, the Australian ground combat forces now stationed in Singapore under FPDA will not be replaced; however, the Australian logistical backup unit will remain along with British and New Zealand forces, and Australian air and naval units. You may:

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- note that we regard the FPDA as making a valuable contribution to regional stability and would like to see it maintained.
- suggest that the GOS continue to encourage maximum Australian participation in the FPDA.

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Department of State
March 1973

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