

PROGRAM Open End - David Susskind STATION WPIX-TV *File 24013*
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FULL TEXT

(MUSIC UP, OUT)

DAVID SUSSKIND: "Good evening, and welcome to Open End. My name is David Susskind. Tonight, The Deadly Game of Spying, a conversation with some real live spies. And I'd like to present them to you now.

"Our first guest is Mr. Peter Tompkins, who wrote about his personal espionage activities in German-occupied Italy in a book called, 'A Spy in Rome.' Next, Mr. Ladislas Frago, active in intelligence work in the United States and Europe. Among his many books on espionage is: 'War of Wits, The Anatomy of Espionage and Intelligence.' Next, Mr. Christopher Felix, which is a pseudonym. He is a former U.S. Government agent with extensive experience in American intelligence operations; and he is author of the book, 'A Short Course in the Secret War.' And finally, Miss Flora Lewis, New York correspondent for the Washington Post, whose book, 'Red Pawn' is a case history of a presumed American master spy Noel Field. In just a moment we'll join our guests, after this brief message."

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SUSSKIND: "I want to thank you all for being here tonight. I'd like to begin by asking you, why does anyone want to be a spy. Mr. Tompkins, what was your motive?"

PETER TOMPKINS: "Well, if you look at the professions, the oldest profession I've by-passed, and chose the second-oldest."

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SUSSKIND: "Well aside from antiquity, doesn't the danger put you off, Mr. Tompkins?"

TOMPKINS: "Well, frankly during World War II, they gave me so much trouble, the brass on our side, that I thought it would be safer on the other. And it was."

(LAUGHTER)

SUSSKIND: "Alright. Mr. Felix, why are you a spy -- why were you a spy?"

FELIX: "It was partly, I suppose -- it started in the war -- and it was an exciting aspect of the war. And once you're in it, there are pleasures and compensations, and they hold you in. And I went on for many years after the war."

SUSSKIND: "What are the pleasures and compensations of spying?"

FELIX: "Well, they're not very noble. There's the sense that you know what other people don't know. And there's also a sense that you are accomplishing things, which can't be accomplished any other way."

SUSSKIND: "Do you encounter the incredibly beautiful women that James Bond always seems to get involved with?"

FELIX: "That has nothing to do with espionage. That happens in any form of life."

SUSSKIND: "We now have got a surfeit of spy books, spy movies, spy television shows. What do you think accounts for the fantastic interest in spying today?"

LEWIS: "Well, it's always been interesting. It's not a new subject. Eric Ambler wrote a great deal, and others. And with so much going on in the world, it's difficult to understand and hard to figure out how. For people interested in politics, most of the spy stories are political thrillers."

SUSSKIND: "Well, what's it like to be a spy? Is it a constant struggle to stay alive, as we've been led to believe by all the spy literature?"

FARAGO: "I don't think so. I don't think that you think of the dangers while you are at it. As a matter of fact, the drama and the glamour - I found some glamour connected with it -- but I was never in a situation even remotely comparable, except for a very short escapade, comparable to Mr.

Tompkins' experiences. He was behind enemy lines, sitting tight, shifting for himself, and in constant danger. There is to say, any second of his existence behind enemy lines could have been the end for him. Nevertheless I don't think from my own personal experience or on the basis of what I was told that the danger element ever interferes with your interest in the activity, with your devotion to the activity, especially when you are a dedicated agent, devoted to a cause and trying to serve it to the best of your ability."

SUSSKIND: "What kind of a spy were you, Mr. Farago?"

FARAGO: "I don't think I qualified as a spy. I was, maybe, perhaps -- I was -- an intelligence analyst, an intelligence specialist, trying to evaluate, and exploit the information provided by agents in the field for intelligence operations. And at one point in my chequered career I was directly in charge of a small group of agents going in and out, across the Iron Curtain, mainly into Hungary, to gather information and to a certain extent to get people who were in immediate danger of being arrested by the Communists.

"And then, at the same time, I was to conduct an intelligence operation which was supposed to prevent the consolidation of communist regimes in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the other Iron Curtain countries by spreading sufficient amount of dissent without actual danger to the group, and a sufficient amount of doubt, to create inside the people a silent opposition to the regime. That was a major operation which had a certain amount of adventurousness about it. And it was, I think, quite successful until higher-ups, as usual, stopped it."

SUSSKIND: "Mr. Felix, what kind of spying did you do?"

FELIX: "The major operation in which I was involved in the field began as an intelligence operation. I think it's fair to say that the word spy is not a word that one uses in one's own head. It's a word that politicians and public prosecutors and super patriots use. You don't think of yourself that way. The technical term is an agent. And even you don't think of that. You think that you have a job to do, and this is what you're trying to accomplish. And the labels don't count very much."

SUSSKIND: "What's the difference between intelligence and spying? Is there a difference?"

FELIX: "Well, intelligence is the product of espionage operations."

SUSSKIND: "Well, what kind of espionage were you engaged in? Were you getting people in and out of countries? Did you steal state secrets?"

FELIX: "Well it began -- this is an operation in Hungary right after the war -- and it began as what we call a straight intelligence operation. That is to say, I was to gather information which was not obtainable openly, on developments within the Hungarian government, within the Hungarian Communist Party, within the Russian occupation forces. And, in fact, anything concerning the country was of interest to the American government.

"However you then run across one of the major obstacles of this kind of work, which is the people you are working with have political objectives. Obviously the people who were working with me wanted to see Hungary free of Russian domination. And as the situation progressed, as the Communists increased their power and the Russians helped them at each step, this became a political operation. That is to say, trying to assist people to block this Russian take-over. And then when that was unsuccessful it became an escape chain. That is to say, I removed people from Hungary who were in great danger, in danger of their lives."

SUSSKIND: "If you had been caught in Hungary -- were you working for the American government?"

FELIX: "Yes."

SUSSKIND: "If you had been caught what would have been the penalty?"

FELIX: "Well, that's very hard to say. But most likely I simply would have disappeared and they would have found my body somewhere."

LEWIS: "Like the man who was thrown off the train."

FELIX: "Yes. Well, it happened to two of our naval attaches in Eastern Europe at that same period. One of them, ostensibly, is reported to have driven off a bridge in the night, a bridge which was broken and not marked, an automobile accident. And another naval attache fell off a train just outside of Salzburg. So they say."

SUSSKIND: "When we read in the paper that our military or naval attaches have been arrested by foreign governments and are accused of espionage activity and our government has been asked to take them out of the country, is it generally true that they have been spying. Mr. Tompkins, what would you say?"

TOMPKINS: "It's more his field than mine."

SUSSKIND: "Alright, Mr. Felix."

FELIX: "No, it's that the attache is engaged in what is legitimate espionage. That is to say, you let my people do it, I'll let yours do it."

FARAGO: "I think I knew one of the attaches. You spoke of Major Wylie in Poland?"

FELIX: "Uh-hum."

FARAGO: "I had my office next door to his during the war, and he was an absolutely delightful man. His was a wonderful family. And he was the chief of the Soviet desk during the war in naval intelligence, and he was the only officer in that branch. There was a single yeoman given him as an assistant. He was completely ostracised, because although we were fighting on the same side as the Russians, nobody in naval intelligence really liked him. And he somehow developed this liking for the Russians, and his was a very dramatic and romantic feeling.

"My office was next to his. The office was inside naval intelligence on the second deck, as it was called, of the Navy Department building; and it was plastered with Russian recruiting and propaganda posters. And the phonograph machine was going all the time playing Russian marching songs -- Red Army marching songs -- so the Navy disliked him to such an extent, because he always insisted that the Russians are going to win in the end, that they excluded him from the daily briefings because he was too optimistic from the point of view of the brass. They imported a colonel from G-2 who was not as optimistic as to the chances of the Russians."

SUSSKIND: "What happened to that man?"

FARAGO: "Wylie? He came into his own. Of course, when the Russians won he was very highly regarded and was sent as Naval attache, because he was in the Marine Corps, to Poland. He was doing very well, and he was on a trip to Western Poland when, in the night, he vanished. At least that's what the Poles said, he vanished. And I think his driver survived. And they used his driver as a witness to say that they went through a bridge that wasn't there, which sometimes happens with bridges. But the funny thing about it was how the driver managed to survive and the major did not."

FELIX: "That'll show you, Mr. Susskind, how these things work. Mr. Farago was sitting in the office next to Major Wylie during the war and I was working for Major Wylie. And I only met Mr. Farago a few weeks ago."

SUSSKIND: "Miss Lewis, you've written a book about spies. You've reported on espionage. What are characteristics, attributes, common to successful spying?"

LEWIS: "Oh, there are all different kinds of people. I don't think there's really a type, except, to the extent that it's useful, not to be too conspicuous. Although sometimes it's the other way around. It's the most conspicuous person who appears to be the dashing playboy or something. Would you say, Mr. Felix, that there is a common type?"

FELIX: "Well we had a case like that after the war in Germany. We needed -- during the occupation -- we needed a very self-effacing, quiet man who had a great deal of authority, but we didn't want that known. And we found him a minor office in Germany, and we hoped that agents would be able to come to him without arousing attention and so forth. And he got there, and a few months later we realized our mistake, because he was driving up and down the Rhine in a bright red convertible, he was head of the American ski club, his wife was President of the American women's auxiliary. There were Halloween parties in the office. It was a disaster. We needed a very quiet man. We got a community leader."

LEWIS: "Most of the people I've met complain not about danger or trouble, but waiting and boredom. So much of the time you have to sit around."

FARAGO: "And you know, if I may answer that question too, this being conspicuous or not being conspicuous, two of the outstanding spies were just at the opposite end of this. One was the most conspicuous and the other was the least conspicuous. And both blew up. Both fell down. It makes no reason. In the end it makes no difference. Sosnosky, who was the great Polish spy during the Nazi regime in Germany, was a playboy with a string of mistresses in the German war office. And Abel, perhaps the outstanding Soviet spy who emerged since the war, was totally inconspicuous. Nevertheless, in the end, both fell down. And there is reason why these people fall down."

SUSSKIND: "When you become an intelligence operative, a spy, are there tests? Do you take vocational tests, did you, Mr. Tompkins?"

TOMPKINS: "No, when I started there weren't any such things. I just had to go and practice by myself. And I used both forms of disguise. At times I tried to look as inconspicuous as possible. I had glasses that weren't really for reading, but they covered by face, and I wore the worst-looking clothes I could find. At other times I passed as a playboy with Caracene clothes. I did that, actually, with the chief of the opposition, the spy catcher, the German spy-catcher in Rome, the

head of the Ziguhoistdionst (?), who knew my name and knew that I was in Rome running an intelligence service; but we spent the night venching and drinking and playboying, and he never knew for a second who I was."

SUSSKIND: "Don't they search your rooms or bug your rooms with wire tapping?"

TOMPKINS: "No, they never knew. They never had a clue as to where I was."

SUSSKIND: "Well, in the more recent history of spying, would our government today -- the CIA -- would they give tests, would they make an effort to find out if a man was in character and temperament equipped?"

FARAGO: "Already, during the war, there was a tremendous assessment center."

TOMPKINS: "It was very funny, you know, because the general, General Donovan, somebody said to him, why don't you make up a school to test who's good and who isn't for spies. And he said, alright, let there be such a place. And after the war I ran across a book in Columbia University library -- it fell off the shelf -- and I opened it up, and it was a book by the psychiatrist who had started the school. And the opening paragraph is, I had no idea how to go about this. And as a matter of fact, when I came back from five years of war almost and five months behind the lines, I couldn't leave the country again to go on another assignment without having been put through one of these tests. And I flunked it completely. I needed a word from the General to say he can go, he's alright, but I flunked all of their silly test."

SUSSKIND: "Did you ever take any tests, Mr. Felix?"

FELIX: "No, I didn't. I also got in before that became required."

SUSSKIND: "Now, Mr. Felix, why do you use a fake name today -- is somebody after you?"

FELIX: "No, there's no danger to me, but it would be very embarrassing to certain things which continue to go on if I used my own name."

SUSSKIND: "Today's CIA, in recruiting people to work in the department, what kind of screening or aptitude tests do they give?"

FELIX: "Well, I haven't seen them, but they're very extensive."

PARAGO: "Yes, its a continuation of the wartime. It's the assessment of man, it is called. It's very elaborate. It begins with selection. This is the picking of the person. Then it continues with a security assessment. Then it continues with a preliminary indoctrination, that is to say, to tell him that he is getting into something where he is not supposed to flamboyant. And finally, he has to undergo a very severe test which lasts for several days. And all the time inbetween he is subjected to lie-detector tests, which the CIA has a tremendous respect for. And I understand even the director of Central Intelligence has to undergo periodic lie detector tests to find out whether he's really the director."

TOMPKINS: "Well, it's quite safe, because they don't know how to ask the questions anyhow."

(LAUGHTER)

SUSSKIND: "We have to pause for our own tests here. We'll be right back."

* * *

SUSSKIND: "Can we establish whether or not spying is a perilous, dangerous, profession, death a looming possibility, always?"

TOMPKINS: "Yes indeed, it was in my case all the time. But mine became a spying operation which started off really as an intelligence operation. Just before the Anzio landings General Donovan, who used to appear on the scene whenever anything exciting was going to happen, said he wanted an intelligence officer in Rome to coordinate Partisan activities and gather intelligence. But, as you know, when we landed at Anzio, General Lucas, who was in command, instead of taking advantage of the surprise with which we caught the Germans, and taking Rome, refused to move. And then they wanted to know exactly what the Germans were doing.

"Kesselring changed his mind when he saw we weren't advancing and started to move his troops to wipe out the beachhead. Then my operation turned into a classic espionage operation. Because they wanted to know every single thing they could about the Germans. So I made contact with the people in Rome who could do that, which were the various parties of the Committee of National Liberation. And we set up an organization to watch all the roads, so that all German traffic to the beachhead was watched. And then, as things developed, we found a contact right

inside German headquarters. So I was able to radio by secret radio to the allies on the beachhead each time the Germans were preparing for attack, where they were going to attack, where they were going to feint and in what strength they were going to attack. And this was going immediately to the beachhead, an hour, two hours, three or four times a day, sometimes 24 hours before an attack, 48 hours before an attack. And we had the intelligence straight from Hitler. Hitler was planning the three major attacks on the beachhead. Finally, the one on the 16th he was personally in command, down to practically platoon level, of how that attack was going to be launched and carried out. But all the time we were radioing this directly to the beachhead, to the allies on the other side."

SUSSKIND: "Was your contact within the German headquarters a German?"

TOMPKINS: "Actually, to be more precise, he was an Austrian."

FARAGO: "Was his name Skokholz?"

TOMPKINS: "I have no idea what his name was, because I worked through a young man who was half Austrian and half Italian, and whose father was Austrian before; and he had many contacts among the Austrians who were in the German Army. And to the Germans they were secure, but of course, they weren't, because they remembered."

LEWIS: "Would that have any connection with the Rotocapalla and Lucie (?) Operation, or was it strictly from Rome?"

TOMPKINS: "No, it was strictly from Rome."

SUSSKIND: "When you compare the espionage effectiveness and expertise of the Germans during the war with the Russians, have you any basis for such a comparison? Are the Russians excellent at espionage?"

TOMPKINS: "They're first rate."

FELIX: "Absolutely first rate. The Germans had tremendous successes during the war; they also had some magnificent failures."

FARAGO: "You must consider in this that the German espionage organization was secure from their own point of view. The German espionage was honeycombed with anti-Nazis, who could find a refuge inside the intelligence organization. If they had remained outside the intelligence organization they would have been caught. But they had the protection of the intelligence organization against the Nazis. Now the second in command of the Abwehr (?), for example, which was the Wehrmacht Intelligence Organization,

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like the Central Intelligence Organization, was a Colonel or Brigadier General named Oskar. He was one of the great fighters against Nazis. And Hitler was dependent on an intelligence boss who hated him, hated him from A to Z. And of course it was very difficult for the German intelligence organization to betray directly the High Command, but what they did was that they gave them intelligence information, very frequently, the accurate information, because they were in possession of it. As a matter of fact, it was so good that their top-ranking agent ⁷¹ in England, who went under the cover name of Josephine, remains unidentified to this very day.

"They diluted the information by inventing alternatives and leaving it to Hitler's intuition to pick the right landing spot or pick the correct event that was going to happen. And although the German intelligence organization was excellent, as Mr. Felix has just said, it was undermined by the fact that it was sabotaged from within. And this is one of the outstanding intangibles mitigating against intelligence."

TOMPKINS: "Well they were operating, from the very beginning, for a negotiated peace, to dispose of Hitler and make peace with the Allies. That all comes out later on. The whole North African venture was based on German feelers to obtain a negotiated peace with Britain if they could. And General Oskar and Canaris (?) and all of these people from '38 on appear to have been trying to stop Hitler and stop the war. In fact they gave away the date of the invasion of Holland and the invasion of Norway, of the invasion of Denmark."

FARAGO: "Oskar called the Dutch military attache at home."

TOMPKINS: "At night. And said the operation is taking place in the morning, the operation on my wife is taking place in the morning. And of course, that's the attache talking back to the Hague. But the thing that often happens is, you see, that a spy gets hold of absolutely marvelous intelligence and shrieks it and screams it and radios it through, and nothing happens, nobody pays any attention."

SUSSKING: "How would you characterize Russian espionage today? Have you been dealing with it yourself, Mr. Felix?"

FELIX: "No, I haven't been dealing with it directly in the sense of countering it. But if you are working in these things you're aware of such things going on around you. And in the type of work that I was doing for some years, until I left the profession, were political operations of the type that Mr. Farago was speaking about, you're constantly surrounded by them. So you have some hint of what they're doing and how they operate. And they're an extraordinary mixture of the

highest professional skill and the lowest sort of brutality. Because they will constantly attempt to enlist agents by the cheapest form of blackmail. And a blackmailed agent is not a good agent. He's not a person you can depend on."

SUSSKIND: "When Americans read in the press about the capture of a spy, whether it be in Copenhagen or Washington, D.C., they're appalled at this kind of goings-on. Is it truthful to say that we, as a country, have an enormous spy apparatus in being at the moment all over the world, and that America is one of the leading countries involved in espionage?"

LEWIS: "I'm sure. I hope so."

SUSSKIND: "Well, how do you account for our indignation? We act so moral and upright."

TOMPKINS: "To a certain extent it shouldn't be. But on the other hand I firmly believe that there is good and bad spying. And if there is any purpose to this plan at all there is a moral purpose. And there is in spying too. And you can go just so far and play the game and succeed. If you go one step too far you vitiate your game, dispel your whole premise and that's what I call bad spying."

"That's what the SD of the Germans did and that's what Canaris, as head of the Abwehr, tried as best as he could not to do. Now you can say there are bad Germans. But there are differences between the Germans. And the difference between Canaris and Himmler and Heydrich and the SD's was quite a noticeable difference."

SUSSKIND: "Does bad spying work?"

TOMPKINS: "Now you may have quick successes with it, but I think you're doomed to disaster in the end."

LEWIS: "I agree with the distinction about spying, but in my mind it's a different one. If it's correct information, that's good, because people will behave more reasonably and more rationally when they know what they're dealing with. If the information from Cuba had been accurate, there probably wouldn't have been a Bay of Pigs invasion, and that would have been just as well. Bad spying, to my mind, is when you use the spy to achieve a purpose; I think he should be a reporter not an activist."

FARAGO: "The Russian organization of today and of the past 30 years -- after the period of '37 -- is a good example for the distinction, for the difference between good spying and spying. The Soviet Union has two major spy organizations."

One is a strictly professional military intelligence organization, which is good spying, and which has gained and is gaining, I presume, its greatest successes. Then there is -- there is the NKVD, Cacha-type of espionage organization which is superimposed on the military intelligence organization and which to a large extent is spying on the military intelligence organization, and in which their attitude is that the ends completely justify all the means. However, another distinction must be made between the purpose of spying and the purpose of spying.

"Now a spy may be sent out for a specific purpose, like, for example, in developing anti-tank guns we simply must know the thickness of the Soviet armor. Now he is sent out to get a sample of the steel of which Soviet tanks are made. This is a specific intelligence operation. It either succeeds or fails, but it is good spying if it succeeds. This is legitimate spying. It's necessary spying.

"On the other hand, if you send in people just to do mischief -- unfortunately I have to confess I was doing a lot of mischief in my own experience -- that is needless spying, that only aggravates the situation and adds to the tension and really pushes the people to the brink of war. This is irresponsible, unnecessary. So good spying is for a basic purpose which is a legitimate purpose. Bad spying is when it is connected with some sort of mischief-making."

SUSSKIND: "Mr. Felix, when we get bad information as we did in Cuba on the occasion of the Bay of Pigs invasion, was that because our spies found erroneous information? Were they hoodwinked? What accounts for that debacle in espionage?"

FELIX: "Well you know you have the problem of the collection and you have the problem of evaluation; and you have prejudice at both points in the process. So that you had Cubans reporting, let us say, what they wanted themselves to believe, that if an invasion of a thousand men came ashore the country would rise. You had men in America who were receiving that information who wanted to believe it also. So that there's a weakness at both ends of the process."

SUSSKIND: "Is spying a well-paid profession?"

TOMPkins: "Not in my case. I took a very large out to do it."

(LAUGHTER)

SUSSKIND: "Mr. Felix, could you give us the range of salaries involved for people that are spying?"

FELIX: "Well there's been, I gather, some inflation and so forth, but the operation which I conducted in Hungary for 20 months, which served 75 people -- and I didn't stint with the money -- cost \$20,000.00."

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SUSSKIND: "Is there a high mortality rate among spies -- injuries, deaths?"

TOMPKINS: "Well, of those men that I had on the roads, for instance, of the 60 odd that took eight hour shifts, 22 were caught and shot."

SUSSKIND: "What about in post-war spying?"

FELIX: "No, then it's not as high. In the peacetime situation, first of all, the numbers are not the same numbers are involved. And I recall that once the Russians did break up a British ring in Hungary, and they arrested a hundred people. But of those hundred I have no idea how many were killed. In Wartime they would have been shot instantly. But in peacetime even the Russians would ship them off to prison."

FARAGO: "We had a small group working for us consisting of 27 people, and seven of them disappeared. Now I presume some of them went over to the secret police and denounced themselves. But we did find one hanging from the barbed wire. Actually they left him there as an unpleasant example. And I'm absolutely sure that two or three have been killed on the way, in transit. Now Peter Churchill, who was very active in the special operations during the war once calculated and came to the conclusion that in wartime 85 per cent of the agents fell down, that is to say were arrested. Now those who were arrested were subject to torture and died. Many of them died under torture. But very few of them were actually executed. Some of them came out of the prison camps. Like, for example, the White Rabbit. The Rabbit was caught on his second mission. And he was Churchill's personal representative to the Marquis. And everybody assumed that they would kill him. But he showed up after the war, and he wasn't too much worse for the wear."

SUSSKIND: "Is espionage equipment as complicated and fascinating as we've been led to believe through movies and literature -- invisible ink and tapping and bugging and hidden radios and so forth -- is it all a technical wonderland?"

TOMPKINS: "Well in my experience, I longed to have some useful technical equipment, but it was all kept in Washington

top secret, not to be used in the field. For instance, we had to build fires at night to receive parachute drops in Rome's cemetery when, sitting in Washington, was a beautiful infra-red light, silent 22's, all kinds of fascinating little gadgets, little matchbox cameras; and when I went back I found a whole bunch of colonels sitting there inventing the most marvelous stuff. But it never got into the field. So, by the time -- I think at the end of the war they must have declassified a bit of it -- because now it's much better."

SUSSKIND: "Mr. Felix, what are some of the tools you worked with?"

FELIX: "I didn't have the benefit of any of this -- all this equipment -- because the kind of operation I was in I appeared in a very normal setting, and there wasn't a great deal of skulking around. So I never benefited from all this."

LEWIS: "What led to Abel's capture was the hollowed-out nickel, wasn't it?"

SUSSKIND: "What is that you've got?"

FARAGO: "If I'd had this in it, would have removed him from the chair."

SUSSKIND: "What is it, a bullet?"

FARAGO: "This is a tear gas bullet."

SUSSKIND: "May we see that on camera; can you hold it for that camera over there?"

TOMPKINS: "Careful, it might be loaded."

(LAUGHTER)

FARAGO: "You wear it here, and the moment you expect danger, you don't take any chance. This, you just pull it out and shoot it. I'm not very proficient with it, but people are who are trained for it. And sometimes an agent is trained, just to have his trigger finger..."

SUSSKIND: "It's made to look like a fountain pen."

FARAGO: "It's supposed to look like a pen. Some of them are actually a hundred per cent like fountain pens, but they can shoot in an emergency. General Donovan was a tremendous gadgeteer. And there was quite an assembly of tools, including fountain pens."

that had to be assembled and reassembled. And when it was reassembled it was supposed to shoot. But then agents found out, unfortunately, that after reassembly that it did not shoot, that there was a bug. But this is not a bug. This is a weapon which is very good from the point of view that it only disables your opponent. That is, he stays around for interrogation and all kinds of things.

"Now the most important thing to consider is that all the techniques in espionage which are used today -- or most of the techniques -- came in after the war. As a matter of fact, the appearance aerial surveillance -- things like the U-2 -- took a lot of work out of espionage. For example you needed road watchers, coast watchers, train watchers to report on mobilization, movement. All that is being done now by photographing it from the air. Now that came in -- the bugging equipment.

"And I have here for example a catalogue, an actual catalogue -- of bugging equipment. And they are very elaborate and there are many of them, and they are very effective, and they are so miniaturized -- thanks to space research largely which carried miniaturization to the extreme -- that a lump of sugar on your table, during a conversation, can be a radio transmitter. Olives in a martini can be a transmitter."

SUSSKIND: "What about a man standing a couple of blocks away -- can he hear a conversation in a room?"

PARAGO: "Yes he can. He no longer needs the parabolic microphones which they used to use in order to concentrate on the conversation. Now it can be done. It is, however, still safer to have a mike of some form or another. And it can be in any form today. The microphones no longer look like microphones. It is better to have something to pick up the conversation. But you no longer need any wiring. That is to say, that pick-up can also have its own transmitter. And that transmitter is a very short range transmitter, which transmits for about a block or a car downstairs or a room downstairs, and picks up the conversation and records it. So that he has a complete conversation. And for example, the mirror in the room can be a two-way mirror so somebody in the next room can watch the whole conversation taking place.

"Minute cameras are available now which can take pictures automatically. And it is a highly mechanized and automated situation. But these are chiefly used for counter-intelligence purposes, because a spy who is worth his salt does not use this equipment. I have here with me, for example a coding machine, a secret form of coding machine, which if it would be found on a man...."

SUSSKING: "Would you hold it into that camera so we can get a look at it."

FARAGO: "This is a coding machine. It's a very simple coding machine. It sells for about a couple of hundred dollars; and it is a very good coding machine. It has this battery which is easily keyed and so on. But this is good for somebody who is a courier for example, who is out of the range of danger and can, then, send his messages by diplomatic pouch or something like that or commercial code. But if a gadget like this, although a small gadget, would be found on a man suspected of espionage, that would be the end of the man because it is conclusive evidence against him. The spy uses very few gadgets. Most of the gadgets of which we hear are used in counter-intelligence, counter-espionage, because we have the preferred gadgets today like the U-2 which does the work of hundreds of spies."

SUSSKIND: "When a spy is caught is it generally because of his carelessness or because of betrayal by someone?"

FELIX: "It could be either. But in most cases it's a simple wearing down of the laws of chance, which are operating inexorably against him. There's quite a literature on the subject of how long an operation can be kept going without being caught. And Sergei, the Russian spy in Japan -- Manchuria and Japan -- ran for nine years. This is, I think, a record."

Farago: "That was a very interesting operation too."

THOMPSON: "Nobody yet knows who he was really spying for in the end, nor what happened to him, do they? They don't know whether he's alive today."

SUSSKING: "You know, we've read that our embassy in Russia has been tapped and bugged. We read, recently -- I think it was Warsaw, but perhaps it was the British Embassy that had been bugged."

FELIX: "Ours."

SUSSKIND: "Are we doing the same kind of thing? Are embassies all over the world bugged so that the other governments can overhear conversations?"

FARAGO: "And with whatever little knowledge I have of these empty houses, I assume that somebody was in the house behind the closed shutters. We ourselves have an empty house for other purposes in Washington."

SUSSKIND: "Mr. Felix, Mr. Thompson, are spies motivated by adventure, are they soldiers of fortune, are they souped-up patriots? What is it that motivates spies?"

TOMPKINS: "A bit of both."

SUSSKIND: "A bit of both."

FELIX: "A bit of both. I once set forth a schedule, a diagram of the various motives, and the degree of reliability that flows from those motives. And at the top of the list is what I called independent political persuasion. That is to say, a man who has arrived at conclusions of his own about political objectives, by his own thinking, and he wishes to see those achieved. He is the best man you can get. After him, comes the man who has a sense of duty to his country, and who's a very fine, very reliable man. But he may fall down in not being sufficiently aware of the situation around him. He's not sufficiently perceptive. But he's fairly dependable."

SUSSKIND: "The United States being a relatively open society, a free society, is it a particularly easy assignment for foreign spying, do you think?"


FARAGO: "Only that we give out a plethora of information, and the spies don't know what to take. And also every columnist has an inside story. And therefore you sort of dilute the real information."

LEWIS: "And every magazine publishes blueprints."

FARAGO: "And also we are making life rather easy for agents in this country. Just the other day I happened to be in the Government Printing Office in Washington, which is the bazaar place for spies, for Russian spies and foreign spies, and I picked up a wonderful little manual for spies; 'How to Evade Pursuit while Driving.' Here is a little manual which is selling for 50 cents at the Government Printing Office, called Pursuit Driving, which describes exactly how to pursue a fleeing suspect. And the fleeing suspect, all he has to do is read this manual to know how to evade the pursuer."

SUSSKIND: "A last quick question: is that U.S. spying a good system -- is the CIA functional, effective, good as a spy organization -- in your view, Mr. Felix?"

FELIX: "I think yes. It's vastly improved over what it was at the beginning. We're not a people who have taken easily to this form of work. But I think great steps have been made. And I realize that there is a moral feeling in this country about it. In that I disagree that there is a moral feeling in this country about it. In that I disagree with Miss Lewis. Because it is not just a question of getting information. Of the total amount of information which comes to the American government, of use, concerning the world situation, concerning foreign affairs, a maximum of 20 per cent is obtained by secret means."



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SUSSKIND: "We have to pause again."

* * *

SUSSKIND: "We've been discussing Spies and Spying. And it is indeed a deadly business. We want to thank our guests, who have included: Mr. Christopher Felix, which is a pseudonym, a former United States government agent with extensive intelligence experience; Mr. Peter Tompkins who wrote about his espionage activities in wartime German-occupied Italy in a book called 'Spy in Rome;' Miss Flora Lewis, New York Correspondent for the Washington Post, whose book, 'Red Pawn,' is a case history of an American master spy; and finally, Mr. Ladislav Farago, active in intelligence work in the United States and Eastern Europe. Thank you for being with us. Join us again next week."

(MUSIC UP, OUT)