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DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EGFA-35559
TO Chief, SR	INFO Chief, EE; COS/Germany		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. []
FROM Chief, of Base, Frankfurt	DATE DEC 21 1961		RE "43-3" - CHECK "3" 228
SUBJECT CALL BEPACKAGE REDSKIN AEABYSS REDWOOD Debriefing of AEABYSS-1	SEARCHED FOR INDEXING X		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED For your information	INDEXING CAN BE DONE BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY		

- A. EGFA-35559, 31 October 1961
- B. FROB-7819

1. On 11 December the writer, using the alias of [] and [] cover, met with AEABYSS-1 for a lengthy debriefing session. Contact with AEABYSS-1 was effected through [] who notified us of the return of AEABYSS-1 on 8 December. The debriefing took place in the home and in the presence of AEABYSS-4 in Salzgitter-Lebenstedt.

2. AEABYSS-1 was fully cooperative and expressed every willingness to continue to cooperate with us. If we are to take AEABYSS-1's own declaration at face value, his motivation for cooperating with us is based upon a deep-seated hate and distrust which he professes for the Soviets and the Soviet system. He makes no secret of the fact that he did all he could during WW II to strengthen the German war effort to bring about the defeat of Communism. He still feels the U.S. should have sided with Germany at that time to finish off the Soviets. Now, he maintains, the West must do everything in its power to keep the Soviets in check and to employ every available means to obtain information on the USSR designed to learn about her future plans and intentions. (Note: We have no doubt that AEABYSS-1 harbors violent anti-Soviet sentiments, but this attitude did not preclude his accepting the construction assignment in Salavat.)

3. During the debriefing it became increasingly clear that AEABYSS-1 was unable to supply any information of operational interest and that his chief contribution in terms of PI was a description of the chemical complex with which he was connected in Salavat. In this context AEABYSS-1 has provided a report of the physical layout of the kombinat 18 at Salavat, estimated production figures, information on the chemical byproducts retrieved from the waste gases of the kombinat, power plants, transportation facilities, and now construction. This material has been forwarded to FOB Reports for processing.

4. Observations in Salavat: No military units of any type are stationed in Salavat. The only time AEABYSS-1 saw a military contingent in Salavat - 100 men strong - was during the May Day celebration. AEABYSS-1 believes the unit to have been brought in from Ufa specifically for this occasion. AEABYSS-1 estimates the uniformed police force to number not more than perhaps 20 men. Most police seen in Salavat are members of the militia, identifiable by red armbands but otherwise wearing civilian garb. AEABYSS-1 observed no civil defense activity in Salavat or in the KOMBINAT 18. He saw no air raid alarm systems, drills, AB shelters, nor did he hear of any plans to set up a civil defense system in the future. AEABYSS-1 described Salavat as an overgrown and drear village, but expanding rapidly. About 15,000 people of a total population of 60,000 are said to be engaged in construction work alone in Salavat and at the KOMBINAT 18. Two-thirds of this work force allegedly are women. 10,000 to 12,000 workers are employed at the KOMBINAT. AEABYSS-1 was asked to obtain town plan of Salavat and whatever maps and pictures of the region he could obtain.

5. Living Quarters for the Germans in Salavat: AEABYSS-1 and several his assistants live at the GOSTNIZA URAL, the only hotel in Salavat. The Germans, mechanics and monteurs, live in assigned billets at Karl Marx Street 18. All Germans are checked when leaving or entering their living quarters. All are supposed to be in their quarters not later than midnight.

5. Security Measures: The Germans are permitted free movement in the town of Salavat and in a limited area surrounding Salavat. Photography is permitted in Salavat and of the polyethylene plant under construction in the

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FORM 35b 10-57 1-58	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 24-26, 27-29 AND 34-39 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	INDEXING Mehner 201
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KOMBINAT. All other photography is strictly forbidden. Travel to areas outside the limits cited above is prohibited and granted to the Germans only for business reasons.

6. Travel: AEABYSS-1 made two flying trips to Moscow in 1961 for discussions with TECHMASCHIMPORT. He was accompanied on each trip by a Soviet interpreter. On two occasions AEABYSS-1 also traveled to Novokuybishev for discussions of company business with Salzgitter personnel at the Novokuybishev low-pressure polyethylene construction site. These trips were made by train, again in company of a Soviet interpreter. On route AEABYSS-1 stopped briefly in Ufa and drove with the Soviet interpreter through the city. He had nothing of interest to report. According to AEABYSS-1 there is one train each day from Salavat to Ufa. The train leaves Salavat at 0020 and arrives in Ufa at 0630. One train each day also runs from Ufa to Salavat; this train leaves Ufa at 0020 arriving in Salavat at 0615. Two daily busses are also said to communicate between Salavat and Ufa. AEABYSS-1 has not used this type of transportation and is not familiar with the bus schedule. On his flight from Moscow to East Berlin in December of this year AEABYSS-1 noted that the Soviets at the Moscow airport checked his travel documents only but showed no concern for his luggage.

7. Soviets in KOMBINAT 18: In his capacity as construction chief AEABYSS-1 comes in contact with the following Soviets:

- * HERESOVSKIY, fnu
Chief of KOMBINAT 18
- * GUYKOV, fnu
Commercial Director of KOMBINAT 18
- * FILARETOV, fnu
Director for Construction at KOMBINAT 18
- * NIERENEERG, fnu
Director for Production Distribution at KOMBINAT 18
- * SISIN, fnu
Chief of High-Pressure Polyethylene Plant in KOM. 18

(Names were spelled by AEABYSS-1 as given; none listed in SMOS.) AEABYSS-1 stated his relationship with these Soviets is on a strictly business-like basis and conversations with them take place in the presence of a Soviet interpreter. AEABYSS-1 speaks little or no Russian. His relationship with lesser Soviets he described as similarly formal, stating that he could not afford to involve any of the Soviets in conversation designed to probe for possible existing ^{ulnerability} data. He declared that any suspicion on their part that he might be engaged in conspiratorial activity would render his position in Salavat untenable. He added that the difficulties and chicaneries placed in his way by some Soviets at the construction site could be overcome only by his having ready access to the KOMBINAT management whose trust and confidence he must retain in order to be able to complete his construction assignment.

8. Operational lead: AEABYSS-1 had no information concerning the Soviets selected from Novokuybishev for training at Schloven-Chemie in Gelsenkirchen, West Germany. He said no Soviets from Salavat would require training in West Germany for the operation of the high-pressure polyethylene plant when completed. He said that all necessary instructions for the operation of the plant would be given to the Soviets in Salavat when the plant begins to operate. When asked whether he could recommend a person in the Salzgitter firm who would be knowledgeable on Soviets visiting in West Germany, he named Identity-1 (cited in Para. 5 of Ref. A) as the best qualified candidate. AEABYSS-1 said Identity-1 (Para. 5, Ref. A) would be in charge of all Soviet visitors coming to West Germany on Salzgitter business and that Identity-1 in this capacity could be a valuable contact for us. We intend to follow this lead. POA traces on Identity-1 are being requested separately.

CONTINUATION OF
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EGPA-36128

9. AEABYSS-1 returns to Salavat on 4 January 1962. He expects to return to Germany in July or August 1962 when the construction assignment in Salavat will be completed. He has declared himself willing to cooperate within the limitations imposed upon him as discussed in Para. 7. One more meeting with AEABYSS-1 will take place prior to his return to the USSR. During this meeting, we will impress upon AEABYSS-1 once more the types of personality information on Soviets which is desired.

WAT

Approved: ATL

Attachment:

Identity Sheet, USC

*forwarded
h/w*

5 Jan 62

Distribution:

- 2 - SR, w/att.
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CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

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DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
Separate Cover Attachment to
EWFA-36026

Identity Sheet

Identity-1: * DRABENT, Anton ^C
DPOB: Unknown CTW.GERMANY
△ Braunschweig-Germany, 10 GERMANY
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Att 1 to EGFA-36028

FORM 1007 (MCI)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 1007, 11-260 AND 51-20 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	<input type="checkbox"/> CONFIDENTIAL	PAGE NO.
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Separate cover attached as sheet #

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