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**SECRET**

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POUCH 793

5 February 1946

TO: SAINT, Washington

FROM: SAINT, London

SUBJECT: Gustav MEISSNER

1. Attached is one copy of the report on MEISSNER from CIC, British Military Mission, Denmark, dated 26 October 1945, and a statement by Dr. Hans WESCHE concerning him, dated 20 November 1945. We received copies of this report from the War Room, and are forwarding it to you and Germany only, on the assumption that SAINT, Copenhagen, will get it directly from CIC, Denmark.

1 attachment

ccs: Germany  
Copenhagen (cover sheet only)

*Wes*  
*Wash - Reg - Det - 175*  
*XX - 10721*  
*Box - 4*

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Date: 2001

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)  
(2)(A) Privacy   
(2)(B) Methods/Sources   
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

FROM THE  
WAR ROOM  
DISTRIBUTED

X X - 10 721  
2/5/46

O.I.C. 699  
S.M.C.  
PLN/LS

DATE: 5 JAN 1946

CIVILIAN INTERROGATION CENTRE  
BRITISH MILITARY MISSION (DENMARK)  
Alsgade School, Copenhagen.  
October 26th, 1945.

SECRET

Name: GUSTAV MEISSNER. *Indexed*

Born: August 26th, 1910, at Kiel.

Nationality: German citizen.

Occupation: Counsellor of the German Legation in Copenhagen.

Political Attitude: Became a member of NSDAP in 1937. Was a member until the capitulation. For a short time member of S.A.

Religion: Lutheran.

Latest permanent address: 17. Bengtavej, Hellerup, Copenhagen.

Reason for detention: Arrested on May 13th, 1945, while he and his family stayed at the refugee camp "Nordwerk" in Copenhagen. Charged of being a member of RSD.

RELATIVES: Married on April 24th, 1940, to Ilse nee Schneider, (nee) born on July 30th, 1916, in Berlin, daughter of Poul Schneider, Director, and wife Elisabeth, nee Wohltz, Charlottenburg, Berlin.   
SEX - F - WIFE OF GUSTAV MEISSNER  
MEISSNER [ ]

Son: Rolf-Dieter, born August 20th, 1944 in Copenhagen.

Father: Georg Meissner, marine engineer, deceased. German officer. Killed in the Skager Rack battle on June 30th, 1916.

Mother: Motha Meissner, widow, nee Poulsen, residence: 28. Stubenrauchstrasse, Eichwalde, Berlin.

Brother: Georg Meissner, merchant, born February 22nd, 1908, residence: Kiel. SS-Oberscharführer, served in Denmark from 1943 up to the capitulation. Served at Ersatz-kommando "Dänemark" while he was in Denmark. The DET. knows nothing about his present residence. He was at the refugee camp "Nordwerk" together with the DET., but he was fetched by the resistance movement, with whom he had contact before the capitulation.

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GUSTAV MEISSNER

C. I. C. 699-

A P P E N D A G E

Item A: Name list.

Item B: Various reports and statements.

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ANTECEDENCE:  
Education

§ 1. The DET. states that after his father's death his mother mostly stayed at her father's. His father died in 1916. His maternal grandfather was the hotel owner Asmus Poulson, "Elisalund" hotel near Anbonraa. In 1925 the DET.'s maternal grandmother died, and from this time onwards the mother took permanent residence in South Jutland at her father's to manage his housekeeping for him.

Prior to the mother's definitive moving to Denmark, she had lived partly at Kiel and partly at Wilhelmshafen. She last lived at Wilhelmshafen prior to moving to Denmark.

The DET. started his schooling at Wilhelmshafen, and when his mother moved to Anbonraa, the DET. boarded at his aunt's - she was the hotel owner Kristine Hansen, Kollund Strandhotel - because Kollund was near enough for him to frequent the Realschule (secondary school) at Flensburg.

The DET. attended this school up to 1929, when he was transferred to Kiel to take his matric. there, and in 1930 he took his matric. at the Oberrealschule am Königsweg at Kiel.

Immediately after taking his matric. the DET. obtained employment at the daily "Flensburger Nachrichten" of Flensburg. He worked as a journalistic pupil up to 1931.

In 1931 the DET. left for Hamburg and then to Berlin. At these places he worked as a free lance journalist. He worked mostly for Berlin Lokalanzeiger and Deutsche Illustrierte, and in some cases he sold to the "Film-courier" and "Weldrevy".

The DET. worked as a free-lance journalist during something of a year, and in the Spring of 1932 he went back to Kollund and lived with his mother, who was now residing there. Here he also worked as a free-lance journalist and wrote articles to Holstein papers and Berlin papers. Simultaneously he was working on a major historical novel.

In the fall of 1932 the DET. was again taken on the staff of the "Flensburger Nachrichten" as editor of local news and the serial novels. He kept this job up to 1934, when he gave it up because he intended to write a book about Northern Schleswig. He did actually write the book, and it was in fact published in the fall of 1934.

§ 2. From the fall of 1934 up to the summer of 1936 the DET. worked as a free-lance reporter in the German minority work "V.D.A." (Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Auslande). In this job his function was to write articles and reports for the periodicals "Schleswig-Holsteiner" and other daily's in Schleswig-Holstein. Every month he made a revue of happenings in Northern Schleswig and made mention of the more important cultural news in other border districts.

In 1934 the DET. enrolled in Hitlerjugend at Flensburg. He was still a member of this organisation at the time of capitulation. In the Hitlerjugend organisation the DET. worked with journalistic jobs for the Juvenile Press

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in Germany. In reality this amounted to a sort of educational work.

In the summer of 1936 the DET. came to Berlin to take charge of Pressedienst "Ostrau", which supplied German papers abroad with material. Pressedienst worked along a social political and welfare interest line. The articles were for the most sent to German minority papers in the Balkans and in Poland. Simultaneously with being the editor of the Pressedienst the DET. personally wrote articles to the various papers. While doing this he was also a member of the Hitlerjugend, and his job here was to co-operate with the Danish youth movements. The DET. also wrote articles to various German papers such as "Volk and Reich", "Das junge Deutschland" and many others.

§ 3. A job was offered the DET. in February 1937 as a "Referent" at Ambassador Ribbentrop's H.Q. Ribbentrop was at this time German Ambassador in London. The DET. was offered this job by the minister, MARTIN LUTHER. LUTHER later became Vice-Secretary of State.

The DET.'s principal function was to work with and represent Germany in various German-Scandinavian associations which all worked under the central leadership of "Vereinigung zwischenstaatliche Verbände". Of these the following can be mentioned: "Danish-German Association", "Swedish-German Association", "Finnish-German Association" and "Norwegian-German Association".

The object of these associations was to establish a closer co-operation between Germany and the Scandinavian countries.

As a referent the DET.'s function was also to keep himself informed as to what was written in the Scandinavian papers and periodicals, and the DET. gave a summary of this to MARTIN LUTHER. In cases of major importance this collated material was forwarded to the Press Dept. of the foreign ministry.

In the course of his work, the DET. constantly came into closer contact with the Press Office of the foreign ministry, and ultimately he got a job here. It was when RIBBENTROP's Berlin H.Q. was amalgamated with the foreign ministry after RIBBENTROP's appointment as foreign minister.

§ 4. The DET. carried on with this representative work in the realm of German-Scandinavian associations up to the time he was sent to Copenhagen towards the termination of August 1939. He was sent to Copenhagen as a press attaché to the German minister in Denmark von RENTHE-FINK. The DET. got this job because he spoke Danish.

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Europe the ministry of propaganda in Berlin sent out various people, who were to be in charge of the various press functions at the German Legations in foreign countries. In the case of Denmark these press functions were thus handled by Pressebeirath FRIELITZ, who was the envoy of the ministry of propaganda. At the outbreak of war the foreign ministry wanted to have its own press attachés, and as a consequence the DET. was sent to Denmark, where he worked in juxtaposition with FRIELITZ up to April 9th, 1940 (occupation of Denmark), whereupon he was given

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sole charge of the job of being press attaché.

§ 5- On the 9th of April, 1940, the DET. was appointed head of the press department of the German Legation in Copenhagen, and it was his function to work in collaboration with the Danish foreign ministry and the Danish press.

The DET. was head of the press department up to February 1943, at which time he was called up in Germany.

From the fall of 1942 and up to the time of his "call up" in 1943, he was also the head of the cultural department of the Legation.

When the DET. was called up in 1943 in February, he was first of all sent to Munich and from there to Prague, and in Prague he was given 2 months' military training, whereupon he was sent to the East front, where he served as a SS-Sturmann as a calculator at the 6th artillery regiment 3. SS-P.F.C.

Towards the close of September 1943 the DET. was wounded and sent to military hospital in Sachsen, the "Reserve-lazaret Klein Welka, where he was an in-patient for 4 weeks. After this he was discharged from the hospital and sent back to Prague - to an Ersatz Kbtlg. From Prague the DET. was sent to Seltchau in Böhmen, and here he worked as a military clerk. While he stayed at Prague he got a relapse and was sent to Denmark, where he was a patient at the "Lazaret" on Nyelandevej in Frederiksberg near Copenhagen. He was taken in to this hospital on January 30th, 1944.

The DET. stayed at this "Lazaret" through 5 months whereupon he was discharged and sent back to Seltchau to resume his duties as a clerk.

In November 1944 the DET. was transferred to SS-Standarte "Kurt Eggers" (Kriegsberichterabteilung) in Berlin. His job here was to give the press a daily bird's eye view of the ruling conditions, and he had this work up to March 1945, at which time he was ordered to serve in Norway. It was intended that the DET. should work with German front reports, which he was to offer the Norwegian press. The DET. was sent to Norway to examine the market, whereupon he was to return to Berlin and make a statement on the subject.

Towards the end of April 1945 the DET. left Norway, it being his intention to go to Berlin to hand in the reports about the work in Norway, but he was detained in Copenhagen and has stayed here up to the capitulation.

In Copenhagen the DET. stayed at his brother's. This brother SS-Oberscharführer GEORG WEISSNER had a club flat at 62. Vestersøhus, and here the DET.'s wife also lived, because the DET.'s flat at 17. Bengtstavej had been let in the fall of 1944.

The DET. stayed in his brother's flat at Vestersøhus up to the 10th of May, 1945, when he was arrested by members of the resistance movement, and he was now transferred to the refugee camp in the General Motors' premises at Nordhavnen (he doubtlessly means General Motors of Aldersrogade, translator's note).

MEISSNER'S RELATION TO S.A.:

§ 7. The DET. explains that in the month of March 1933 has joined S.A. in Flensburg, and he was a member up to 1934, at which time he was transferred to Hitlerjugend, and he thus automatically had to leave the S.A.

The DET. was a private member of the S.A. and as such he was entitled to wear a uniform but not arms. He participated in one or two marches, but he soon got an exemption from this, because his work as a journalist took all his time.

MEISSNER'S RELATION TO HITLER-JUGEND

§ 8. On account of his interest in juvenile welfare the DET. joined the Hitlerjugend as a private member in the summer 1934 in Flensburg, and he continued to be a member of this organisation up to the time of capitulation in May 1945. After the DET. had moved to Berlin in 1936, he was promoted Gefolgschaftsführer, and he kept this rank up to 1942, when he was appointed Stammführer in the Hitlerjugend organisation.

From 1936 and up to the Det. getting a job in RIBBENTROP'S Berlin H.Q. in 1937 his function had been to seek co-operation with Scandinavian youth movements such as "The Finnish Boy Scouts", "Swedish Youth", "The voluntary Norwegian Labour Service" and "The voluntary Danish boys' brigade".

Apart from this the DET. also wrote a number of articles for the Hitlerjugend papers inside the German Reichsgebiet, but he did not write articles to foreign juvenile publications. The DET. made a lot of round tours to Scandinavia to keep up the contact with the Norwegian youth organisations, and on one of these tours he visited Copenhagen in 1936, and here he contacted "the voluntary Danish boys' brigade" at the office in Copenhagen. This organisation was in point of fact very ready to let members of "the voluntary Danish boys' brigade" visit Germany, and in return an equal number of Hitlerjugend should visit Denmark, but this plan, however, never materialized. It is thought this was due to the fact that "the voluntary Danish boys' brigade" was very busily engaged with making youth camps (holiday centres in Denmark).

During this visit the DET. also visited Mr. ARNE SØRENSEN (editor of the Copenhagen daily MORGENBLADET, translator's note), whom the DET. had met in Copenhagen on former visits. ARNE SØRENSEN was also very partial to the idea of sending 6 - 7 members of the youth movement to a meeting in Norway and later to a meeting in Germany.

MEISSNER'S ATTITUDE TO NSDAP

§ 9. In the summer of 1937 the DET. joined the nationalistic Deutsche Arbeiter Partei. This enlistment took place in Berlin at Ortsgruppe Wittenberg Platz, and his membership number was 5.826256. He joined as a private member and never attained any rank in the Party.

He attended a number of Party meetings, but he never spoke at these meetings.

MEISSNER'S EMPLOYMENT AT PRESSDIENST "Ostraum"

§ 10. The DET. was appointed leader of Press-Dienst "Ostraum", which had its head office in Berlin - in the summer of 1936. Press Dienst "Ostraum" consisted by

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virtue of its economic support from Hitlerjugend and a minor support from a department of the home ministry. The support or grant from the home ministry (Ministry of Home Affairs) was given because this body was interested in juvenile education problems, and the publications of the press service were used as readers' and correspondents' school materials in the juvenile education work.

From merely journalistic point of view the mission of this instruction was to supply the various German minority papers in the Baltic States, Poland, the Balkans and Elsass-Lorraine with material. The largest purchaser was the "Bukarester Tageblatt". Among the other German papers the DET. mentions "Rigasche Rundschau", "Revalsche Zeitung", "Bromberger Zeitung" and the Sudetic-German papers "Die Zeit" and "Rumburger Zeitung".

§ 11. The work in the Press-Dienst "Ostraum" was handled in the following way:

- 1) Reporters amongst the various minority groups sent in material appertaining to their special local conditions,
  - 2) The DET. vetted this material,
  - 3) DET. set the material in journalistic shape,
  - 4) DET. sent the material to the minority papers through Press-Dienst.
- Thus the minorities were kept informed about conditions in other groups.

On the basis of these incoming reports the DET. also made articles for the Press-Dienst itself and sometimes for the periodicals "Volk und Reich" and "Das junge Deutschland".

MEISSNER'S  
APPOINTMENT IN  
THE RIBBENTROP  
H.Q.:

§ 12. In February 1937 the minister, MARTIN LUTHER offered the DET. the job at RIBBENTROP's Berlin office (also called "Dienststelle Ribbentrop"). The DET. accepted this offer.

The bureau was set up by RIBBENTROP in 1935, and it was supposed to handle his interests in Berlin, while he was at the Embassy in London. The object of this office was to - along lines of cultural work - keep up friendly relations and/or contacts with the various countries in Europe.

Head of this office was the aforesaid LUTHER and the minister von RAUMER. LUTHER who was the DET.'s chief had a sort of supervising function with regard to the various German political organisations' work abroad. The object was that all this work should be carried out along the lines laid by the central body controlling German foreign policy. Thus a certain check was kept on the relations between "Frauenshaft" "Hitlerjugend" and "Studentenschaft" and their foreign contacts, because it some times happened that those organisations arranged meetings or visits with their foreign connections without informing the foreign ministry or the minister or ambassador in question.

§ 13. The DET.'s work consisted in supervising what the various cultural associations who were working in the Northern countries were doing.

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The associations supervised by the DET. were:  
"Danish-German association", "Finnish-German association",  
"Swedish-German association", "Norwegian-German association",  
"Riksföreningen Sweden-Germany" and "Nordische G sellschaft".

Things of special interest inside these organizations were reported to MARTIN LUTHER, who passed on the intelligence to the foreign ministry if the matter was of major import.

As a "Referent" in the "Dienststelle RIBBENTROP" the DET.'s job was also to keep himself informed with up to date news as to what the various Scandinavian papers were writing and to give MARTIN LUTHER a summary of this. In cases of major import this intelligence was passed on to the foreign minister.

Of the articles published in Danish by Danish journalists the DET. remembers that NICOLAJ BLADEL's articles in Berlingske Tidende aroused a certain amount of indignation in German circles.

MEISSER APPOINT-  
ED IN THE GERMAN  
FOREIGN MINI-  
STRY

§ 14. When RIBBENTROP was appointed foreign minister Dienststelle RIBBENTROP was amalgamated with the foreign ministry, and in the course of time it was actually dissolved, in as much as the staff were gradually absorbed by other bodies. By virtue of his knowledge of Scandinavian languages and Scandinavian conditions the DET. was given an appointment in the Press section of the foreign ministry, and he was supposed to continue working on matters relating to Scandinavia in this job.

The appointment in the foreign ministry's press section was given in the beginning of 1939, and the DET. kept this job up to the end of August that year.

The daily routine work in this job was to read the Scandinavian newspapers and simultaneously peruse the press reading reports which were sent in from the German Legations in Scandinavian countries.

MEISSNER TRANS-  
FERRIED TO THE  
GERMAN LEGATI-  
ON IN DENMARK

§ 15. When the German circles realized that war was inevitable, it was decided to increase the staff at the various Legations abroad, and towards the end of August 1939 the DET. received an order according to which he was to report for duty at the press section in the German Legation, Copenhagen.

The DET. reported for service to the then German minister in Denmark von RENTHE-FINK at the Legation in Copenhagen on September 1st. 1939.

He was assigned some work as assistant press attache in the press department of the Legation.

The DET. was sent to Denmark by the German foreign ministry. There was already one press attache sent out by the ministry of propaganda in Berlin, namely press-Beirat FRIEDLICH, but FRIEDLICH was nevertheless to receive orders from the Legation. Prior to the war the ministry of propaganda in Berlin was supreme master of everything appertaining to the press, but at the outbreak of hostilities the German foreign minister wished to send its own press attache to the various Legations abroad, because the foreign department wanted firsthand information and not

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information which had to go to the ministry of propaganda.

The DET.'s function was to peruse the Danish papers every morning and to give the foreign ministry "a bird's eye view" of the contents by telephone to Berlin.

It was also part of the DET.'s duty to endeavour to contact people in the Danish press world in view of promoting German interests through persuading the Danish press to bring German picture material and if possible to get the papers to write friendly articles on various German conditions. This last mission gave the DET. quite a lot of worry particularly before April 9th, 1940.

After his arrival the DET. first and foremost paid an official visit to the press bureau of the Danish foreign ministry, but he did not call on the various editors before after April 9th, 1940, in as much as he thought it useless in view of the fact that FRIEDLITZ had already established these personal contacts, and the DET. did not want to give the Danish press men the impression that two distinct factors were working.

§ 16. Re the German occupation of Denmark on April 9th, 1940, the DET. makes the following statement: He did not know that the occupation was to take place, but a few days before the occupation a civilian man by the name of HILMER came to the Legation, and it later proved that he was a major general. HILMER dallied about the Legation, but as far as the DET. could see, he did nothing at all, but the Legation circles were aware of the fact that some political move was at the threshold. However, it was impossible for the DET. to find out what this move was to be.

At 3 o'clock in the morning on April 9th, 1940, the DET. was called to the Legation by telephone. When the DET. arrived in the Legation it was rumoured that a German occupation of Denmark was pending, but it was not before the aeroplanes over Copenhagen were seen and heard that the minister von RENTHE-FINE called the staff together and told them about the occupation as a fait accompli.

§ 17. The minister told the DET. that he according to the wish of the foreign ministry was to handle the press work of the Legation alone, and that Press-Beirat FRIEDLITZ was to be used for other work. The minister asked the DET. to hand in a plan on the coming co-operation with the Danish press.

On the same afternoon the DET. handed in his suggestion, the idea of which was to contact the Danish press executives as soon as possible and to let them know, how the Germans wanted the Danish press to function.

On the 9th of April 1940 the DET. had a talk with General KAUPISCH's press officer, Hauptmann ZIMMERMANN, and the DET. asked the latter which demands the Wehrmacht would put to the Danish press. Hauptmann ZIMMERMANN issued a ban against information on military incidence and troop mustering in Denmark and for that matter any reports which could give material for military deductions. Further the DET. was to inform the press that the Wehrmacht did not want weather forecasts to be published.

That very day the DET. called at the Press bureau of the Danish foreign ministry and discussed the case with the

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chief of this bureau, ESKELUND. The DET. and ESKELUND agreed upon a plan of co-operation with the press. The idea was that the Danish press should set up a press committee to control that no anti-German interests were published or any material detrimental to Wehrmacht interests in Denmark, viz. in view of ZIMMERMANN's demands.

The press committee was to consist of 5 representatives of the Copenhagen Press and 5 representatives of the provincial press. The press committee was to send out a promemoria to every editor in Denmark, and this note was to explain the German demands with regard to the future attitude of the press. Every chief editor was to sign a statement to the press committee to the effect that the committee had a right to fine the papers and to sentence them to a forfeiting of papers, telegrams etc.

The DET.'s idea was that press committee should be the sentencing instance, because the German authorities could not interfere in purely punitive measures, in respect of the fact that Denmark in accordance with the promise given was to keep their superiority.

§ 18. On the 10th of April the DET. invited the representatives of the press to a lunch at the Palace Hotel. In the course of this lunch the DET. made a speech in which he gave a picture of the situation and at the same time stressed that it was desired that the press should maintain its natural face and not be uniformed.

In the subsequent discussion between the representatives of the press and the foreign ministry's press bureau it was agreed upon that the DET.'s idea was to be followed. The further discussion was to take place between the press bureau and the papers.

§ 19. After a meeting at the Palace Hotel the editor of Berlingske Tidende, SVEN AAGE LUND, asked whether the Germans were contemplating any action against the editor NIKOLAJ BLADEL, because the DET. had told ESKELUND in the foreign ministry's press bureau that there were some difficulties with regard to BLADEL and another editor called FRANZ von JESSEN. To this the DET. replied that it was sufficient if BLADEL stopped writing, and it would not be demanded that he should be removed from the paper, if the paper could give him another job than writing, and the same point held good in the case of JESSEN from "Nationaltidende".

§ 20. In the course of the years some Danish chief editors had to resign, but it was not due to actions on the part of the Legation press department.

The DET. realized that his arrangement with the press on April 10th could only have the desired effect as long as the Germans were favoured by the fortune of war, and he realized that difficulties would arise if the military situation should turn, and this also proved to be a correct surmise.

One of the chief editors was set out of function owing to the DET.'s demands. This editor was SCHOCH from "Nationaltidende". This the DET. had brought about because SCHOCH had written extremely anti-German articles in connection with Denmark's signing of the Anti-Komintern pact.

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It was, however, more the captions than the contents of the articles which had aroused the anger of the Legation in Copenhagen and the foreign ministry in Berlin.

§ 21. As to the co-operation with the Danish foreign ministry the DET. states that this propaganda went quite smoothly, while the DET. was the press attaché, while the foreign ministry's press bureau handled all the daily routine questions and thus avoided any too great German influence on the Danish press. This included influence direct as well as indirect. There was no advance censorship. This was not introduced until August 29th, 1943.

The foreign ministry in Denmark had a certain control with news material coming in and particularly in the case of political telegrams including reports from Germany. When there were any reasons for doubt as to how a certain thing was to be handled, the press bureau consulted the DET. by phone, and thus an immediate decision was reached without delaying the work of the Danish press.

Apart this the DET's work as a press attaché was that he perused the Copenhagen newspapers every morning and made notes on points of interest.

A conference was held at the "Dagmarhus" every morning, and in the course of this the DET. gave a political summary on the basis of the material, he had gleaned from the newspapers. Besides this he also used the teleprint signals which had come in from Berlin, and which were transcript of the most important American and British telegrams.

The representatives of the ministry and the various Legation departments and the Wehrmacht were as a rule present at these morning conferences.

MEISSNER-s  
CONTACT WITH  
THE PRESS  
BUREAUS

§ 22. When the DET. came to Copenhagen the press bureau (news agency) S.T.B. (Scandinavian Telegram Bureau) was already functioning. Its leader was the editor GILBERG. S.T.B. was a branch of the agency "Europe Press", and GILBERT got the major part of his telegraphic material from "Europe Press". Besides this he also had a telegraphic connection in Stockholm.

The DET. knew that GILBERG had led a somewhat unsteady life, but he did not have any detailed knowledge about him. They only contacted each other on matters appertaining to press work. It was not until after GILBERG's death that the DET. learned that GILBERG had worked for German intelligence, but the DET.'s impression is that it was not quite known whether GILBERG was killed by the Danes or by the Germans.

§ 23. "Dansk-Tysk Pressesekretariat" was established in the fall of 1940. This was done in conjunction with the Danish Press and was agreed upon at a meeting arranged by Professor Vinding Kruse (Professor of jurisprudence at the Copenhagen university, Translator's note) in the assembly hall of Nordisk Forsikringselskab (a major insurance firm). The object of this D.T.P. was to give the Danish press "raw material", that is to say the actual facts and then let the press work on it as they pleased.

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The D-T.P. came into being because German circles had asked why the Danish press never wrote about things of German, such as German film, German theatre, national economics and with this "the winter help" and so on. To this it was replied, that the Danish press had no material to work on and that one did not want to ask the Germans for any such materials. Thus the idea was that the D-T.P. should function as a sort of intermediary. The D-T.P. was not to ask the Danish press what it wanted, and the DET. would thereupon get the material from Berlin.

Upon H.P.SØRENSEN's (editor of the Socialdemokraten) suggestion the journalist HENNING DALSGAARD became leader of D-T.P. His salary was paid by the German Legation.

The DET. had suggested that the author LOUIS von KOHL should be the head of the Sekretariat, but this the Danish press circles did not want. The D-T.P. worked in collaboration with not only the provincial but also the Copenhagen press.

§ 24. "Billedbureauet" in Copenhagen was established on the initiative of the DET. in 1941, and the journalist HENNING JENSEN was appointed head.

Every week HENNING JENSEN got picture series which he was to set up as picture stories supplied with text and send to the Danish press in the shape of clichés.

The DET. supplied the pictures free of charge, and he also paid for the clichés and thus HENNING JENSEN had a chance of making a suitable profit. HENNING JENSEN who worked alone received no definite salary.

§ 25. Apart from this there was a certain form of co-operation between the press department of the Legation and the press bureau in Copenhagen. This bureau had a circle of clients comprising about 40 daily's in the provincial towns. The bureau was managed by the journalist I.A.JENSEN. He did not, however, receive any salary from the press department of the Legation. All in all the press bureau (Pressens Bureau) received the same material which was sent to Pressesekretariatet.

The journalist I.A.JENSEN was decidedly "rural left" in his politics, he being a provincial journalist.

§ 26. In the beginning the co-operation with the Danish press developed to the satisfaction of the German authorities in Denmark, but as the military difficulties increased for the Wehrmacht the position of the press was somewhat changed.

After the introduction of the advance-censorship on August 29th, 1943, the good relations between the Danish press and the German authorities were brought to a complete standstill.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESS DEPARTMENT AND THE DAILY "FEDRELANDET" § 27. When the DET. arrived in Copenhagen at the time of the outbreak of war, the daily "Fædrelandet" (Nazi) had its premises in Kolding, and it was only issued three

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times a week. It had a circulation of 3 - 4000,

The DET. thought it unfortunate that the "Fædrelandet" should have its H.Q. at Kolding, because it was his impression that it was imperative that the paper had its H.Q. in Copenhagen, and that it was issued as a regular daily, it being the only Danish paper with a 100 % pro German attitude.

In November 1939 the DET. contacted the lawyer H.C. BRYLD and discussed the question of "Fædrelandet" with him. In this connection the DET. states that he had not been in contact with the executives of "Fædrelandet" prior to this. Neither had he contacted the executives of DNSAP.

The DET. and BRYLD had a talk in Copenhagen. It was the DET. who had invited BRYLD. The DET. asked BRYLD how the Party work was going, how strong the Party was and how many members it had and so on.

In the course of this the DET. said that he thought it would be most advantageous if "Fædrelandet" was moved to Copenhagen and was issued as a regular daily, but BRYLD said that in spite of the fact that he personally agreed to this point, the Party "Führer" FRITZ CLAUSEN insisted on the paper staying in Kolding, because FRITZ CLAUSEN was a native of the South Jutland and also because the major part of the members of the Party was in South Jutland. In view of this BRYLD therefore thought it would be difficult to talk CLAUSEN into moving "Fædrelandet" to Copenhagen.

At a meeting between H.C. BRYLD and the DET. some 14 days later BRYLD said that he had spoken to CLAUSEN about the question and that CLAUSEN had agreed to moving the paper to Copenhagen. This did not necessarily imply that the paper could become a daily in as much as they were afraid of incurring extensive expenses.

§ 28. The paper "Fædrelandet" was moved to Copenhagen around new year 1940, and it became a daily in spite of the fact that its print and set up was poor. The then editor was STEEN RASMUSSEN. His co-editor was POUL JENSEN.

As a sort of support to the "Fædrelandet" from a purely editorial point of view and also to promote German press interests the DET. sent a number of telegrams to the paper daily. These telegrams came to the DET. by teleprint from Berlin. The DET. also tried to make the paper write pro-German non-news articles.

The "Fædrelandet" did not receive any pecuniary support from the Legation in the period from the outbreak of war and up to the occupation on April 9th, 1940.

§ 29. As mentioned heretofore the net circulation of the "Fædrelandet" only comprised 3 - 4000 copies, but subsequent to the move to Copenhagen in 1939/40 the circulation increased somewhat, and after the 9th of April, 1940, this increase suddenly went on in leaps and bounds. The Det. thinks that the net circulation of this paper was about 20 - 25000 in the fall of 1940, subsequent to which a decrease set in again.

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In the course of 1940 the "Fædrelandet" only received very sparse aid from the press department of the Legation at various times. The whole thing was a matter of a few Thousand Kroner. It was the editor STEEN RASMUSSEN who contacted the DET. in an endeavour to procure financial support, the paper not always being able to pay the staff wages.

The DET. did not have any press-front, and he was thus obliged to talk RENTHE-FINCK into granting the money which was taken from special account handled by the Legation. (Dispositionsfond).

§ 30. In the beginning of 1941 the economic status of "Fædrelandet" became so bad that a really effective aid was imperative to keep the paper going. The DET. thought it would be a painful loss of face, if this only Nazi paper in Denmark were to shut up shop. As a consequence he debated the matter with the press department of the foreign ministry in Berlin, who arranged it so that the representative of the "Mundus Aktiengesellschaft" left for Denmark to investigate conditions in connection with the "Fædrelandet"

"Mundus A.G." had its H.Q. at Pressburg (Bratislava) and was a German enterprise which handled the financing of dailies particularly in the occupied territories. This enterprise was also organised on a financial basis, the idea being that it, in the course of time, should consist in the returns from, in particular, the Western territories, that is to say, returns from the financing of dailies in these territories.

"Mundus A.G." was set up in 1940 on request of the German State, and it was controlled by the German foreign ministry and ministry of propaganda.

§ 31. "Mundus A.G." sent its agent SCHONWITZ to Denmark, and here he negotiated with the following: H.C. BRYLD, lawyer, C.B. NIELSEN, manager, STEEN RASMUSSEN, editor, and probably also the editor HELGE BANGSTED. SCHONWITZ investigated the status of the paper, economically and otherwise, most thoroughly and sent in a report to Berlin. The DET. received a transcript of this report. The essence of the report was that "Fædrelandet" should be supported out of sheer political considerations in spite of the fact that it was a dead loss. SCHONWITZ calculated the monthly expenses to round 15.000 Kr.

Out of consideration to this political issue "Mundus A.G." granted the necessary amounts. The money was paid over the clearing account in Berlin through the press department of the Legation.

Up to February 1943 the monthly grant was Kr. 50.000.--, but the DET. believes that this amount was increased after he had left the Legation.

The T/T was sent to the Legation in Copenhagen and thereupon paid the amount in cash to the commercial manager of the paper, C.B. NIELSEN, when he called at the Legation.

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After "Fædrelandet" had received the first monthly grant, it opened a news stand in the building, and certain editorial and technical improvements were introduced.

The original plan was that the "Fædrelandet" should not only be supported with the aforesaid financial grants but also with increased advertising space to German firms. This project, however, never materialized owing to the small circulation of the paper.

The DET. wanted to have a sort of check on what the "Fædrelandet" was doing, and he also wanted a check on whether the paper was advancing with regard to circulation and editing, and in respect of this the DET. contacted the chief editor or the head of the admin. and conferred with them either at his office or at the offices of the paper.

§ 32. After "Mundus A.G." had taken the "Fædrelandet" over, H.C. SCHIMMELMANN was chosen as a president of the Board of Directors by "Mundus A.G.". He was to function as MUNDUS's representative, particularly because he was financially independent. Besides SCHIMMELMANN H.C. BRYLD, C.O. FISCHER and STEEN RASMUSSEN were members of the Board. Later at some time in 1942, the grocer DAM JOHANSEN of Flensburg was chosen for a seat in the Board.

DAM JOHANSEN who was a German national was taken on as a member of the Board without the DET. having been informed. DAM JOHANSEN was chosen in accordance with FRITZ CLAUSEN's wish, but the DET. did not favour this member of the Board it being his idea that it was tactically wrong to set a German national in the admin. of a Danish paper, even though the "Fædrelandet" was actually owned by "Mundus A.G.".

"SKANDINAVISK  
REPORTAGE"

§ 33. "Skandinavisk Reportage" was set up in 1940 and was originally headed by a German called SCHULTZE-RICHARD. SCHULTZE-RICHARD was, however, later removed because he was in opposition to "Europäische Korrespondenzen" of which "Skandinavisk Reportage" was a part.

"Europäische Korrespondenzen" was headed by Freiherr von STUTNITZ, who handled the "name material", i.e. articles written by celebrated writers or political and scientific leaders under their own name. These articles were sent to "Skandinavisk Reportage" and other branches in European countries. Further "Skandinavisk Reportage" were given ordinary material for articles and pictures.

"Skandinavisk Reportage" was to turn articles into Danish and offer them to the various papers.

Von KOHL was taken on the staff in 1941 and was paid by "Europäische Korrespondenzen". Further he was given money for rent and salaries to his staff. All in all he was given about 6000 Kr. a month.

The DET. was most interested in this enterprise, as he was supposed to give the Danish press material to work on, and he had some negotiations with von KOHL re press questions. Von KOHL worked very effectively and energetically, and he disposed over a good run of customers in the Danish press. Furthermore he was known as the author of a series of books dealing with Danish and German projects.

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It was the DET. who got von KOHL the job at "Skandinavisk Reportage". Von KOHL was at the time unemployed and had no other income than the money which he received by selling his books.

"KRITISK UGE-  
REVUE"

§ 34. "Kritisk Ugeevue" was established prior to the war and was edited by KURT KOCH. The DET. got contact with KURT KOCH in 1940, but he had both before and after the occupation sent articles in to the paper. "Kritisk Ugeevue" was economically independent, the paper having a large income, but in spite of this it was KOCH's wish to get more advertisements.

KURT KOCH had previously been in connection with Press-Beirat FRIEDLITZ, and it was through him that the DET. contacted KURT KOCH.

"Kritisk Ugeevue" was decidedly pro-German, and KOCH complained to the DET. about the unfairness of the Danish newspapers, which were not pro-German, getting larger advertisements from German papers than the pro-German papers did. The question was about some major serial ads. which had been issued by Berlin. The DET. wrote to the foreign office press department at Berlin and asked them to pull some strings for "Kritisk Ugeevue" at the "Werberat der deutschen Wirtschaft". This was a large advertising agency for the major German industrial and commercial enterprises, and it was responsible for the placing of ads. The letter from the DET. got "Kritisk Ugeevue" more German ads.

The DET. states that KURT KOCH was decidedly pro-German in his sympathies, and that he was very partial to DNSAP. The DET. further thinks it possible that KURT KOCH might have been a member of the Danish Nazi Party.

RE PRESS FINES

§ 35. When a Danish daily or periodical wrote an article or brought reports which were not in keeping with the German instructions as set out by the press committee (Pressenævnet) the DET. contacted the Danish foreign ministry and demanded that the press committee should take action, and the press committee thereupon sentenced the offender to fines of varying amounts.

These fines were to be paid to the press committee and as soon as the first amounts had come in the foreign ministry contacted the DET. and asked him what was to be done with the money. The DET. answered that to his mind the most practical way of disposing of these amounts would be to give them to the old age fund of the Danish journalists' association. The DET. never demanded to see receipts in proof of the money actually having been paid. The DET. later learned that these fines were actually a sort of goodwill ads. for the papers in question, because the subscribers were urged to take more advertising space, when they heard that the paper had been sentenced to a fine.

THE POLITICAL  
SITUATION IN  
DENMARK AND RE-  
LATIONS TO THE  
DNSAP AFTER  
THE OCCUPATION

§ 36. The DET. contacted DNSAP of his own initiative. He got this contact through H.C. BRYLD through whom he came into contact with FRITZ CLAUSEN towards the end of 1939. The DET. met FRITZ CLAUSEN for the first time at a private party in BØRGE BRYLD's home. The DET. had himself

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asked to have this meeting arranged. On this evening FRITZ CLAUSEN and the subject discussed the war in general and the Nazi Party in particular. He did not, however, touch on the subject of later meetings.

In the time up to April 9th, 1940, and some time subsequent to this, only press matters were discussed between the DET. and FRITZ CLAUSEN. The DET. did not visit the offices of the "Fædrelandet", and it was only when FRITZ CLAUSEN was in Copenhagen on some mission or other that they met each other in the Copenhagen restaurants.

§ 37. After April 9th, 1940, the Party became very active. This activity was partly due to the development in Norway where National Samling had taken over the power and partly due to the considerable increase in the numbers of members after the occupation. In the summer of 1940 the Party had 30,000 members on its files. These figures were given the DET. by FRITZ CLAUSEN. In the summer of 1940 the German foreign ministry started to interest themselves in the DNSAP. This interest the DET. thinks was due to the fact that the German Nazi Party was interested in bringing about a political development in Denmark parallel to that in Norway. As far as is known to the DET. all this was instigated by the Aussonpolitisches Amt der NSDAP, who were handling the political new order (Nyordning) in Norway.

§ 38.

NSDAP had, so it is believed, contacted the German foreign ministry and tried to bring about greater German support to the Nazi groups in Denmark.

When the DET. was on a service tour to Berlin in September 1940, MARTIN LUTHER called him to the foreign ministry. LUTHER asked the DET. about the strength of the DNSAP and the qualities of its leaders. The DET. told him that DNSAP had had a very favourable advance, and this was in the time from the outbreak of hostilities and up to the occupation, this being due to the pecuniary difficulties with which the rural population found themselves faced.

As illustrative of this advance the DET. said that on one and the same day in March 1940, 3 very large meetings were to take place at Copenhagen, Aarhus and Odense simultaneously, and about 22,000 people had attended. At the same time the DET. stressed to MARTIN LUTHER that in spite of the fact that the Party had had favourable working conditions up to April 9th, 1940, it was very likely that this would change one day now that Germany was no longer a neighbour, but an "occupying" power. With regard to FRITZ CLAUSEN the DET. said to MARTIN LUTHER that he was from South Jutland, Danish in mind but very pro German and a convinced National Socialist since 1932, but he also thought it would be better, if the minister himself were to meet FRITZ CLAUSEN some time and get a personal impression of him. Of this talk with MARTIN LUTHER the DET. of course did not say anything to FRITZ CLAUSEN.

§ 39. Later in September 1940 when the minister LUTHER (MARTIN LUTHER) and the minister von GRUNDTHER, who was the head of the foreign ministry's Nord-Abtlg., came to Copenhagen on a short visit, a lunch was arranged at "Skovriderkroen". Present at the lunch: the two German ministers and the German minister to Copenhagen von RENTHE-FINK, probably also KANNSTEIN, who at the time was head of "Innere Verwaltung". Besides these H.C. BRYLD and FRITZ CLAUSEN.

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FRITZ CLAUSEN and LUTHER got into a friendly personal contact and LUTHER thought very well of FRITZ CLAUSEN. The

The question of a possible "Machtübernahme" on the part of the Danish Nazis were not touched upon, but MARTIN LUTHER asked about the strength of the Party, its organisation as compared to the NSDAP, and as to whether it was progressing.

This invitation to the lunch at "Skovriderkroen" FRITZ CLAUSEN considered as a friendly gesture on the part of the Germans.

The German representatives did not call on the Danish foreign office, and this the Danish Nazi Party considered to be of particular significance.

After the lunch LUTHER made a direct statement about FRITZ CLAUSEN personally. His idea was that the ministry in Copenhagen should appoint a liason officer to keep up the contact with the Party, and he suggested that this liason officer be the DET.

§ 4o. As early as in the Spring of 194o certain political incidents developed between the various Danish Nazi groups. This activity could but awaken the interests of the Legation and Berlin. These groups were all anti-parliamentary and on account of the conditions prevailing then, they were pro German in their sympathies.

These political groups were:

- 1) A military group which attacked STAUNING very severely on account of the incidents around April 9th, 194o. According to rumours which the DET. heard in the Legation, it was the intention of this group to take over power (political) in Denmark in some way or other. As far as the DET. knows this group was also negotiating with FRITZ CLAUSEN. As far as the DET. knows it was Kommandørkaptajn AUGSEURG and another high rank Danish officer, whose name was NØRREGAARD (?), who negotiated with FRITZ CLAUSEN. Generallejtant WITH also played a part in this group and in the association known as "Det frie Nord". This association later turned anti-German.
- 2) HØJGAARD-group. Besides the military group some well known persons from the public life displayed much activity, and they are also supposed to have approached the King with the object of having the STAUNING-Government dissolved. To this group belonged besides HØJGAARD, engineer, KAMPMANN, engineer, Dr. WILHELM COUR, A.P. Møller, ship owner, and Prince Axel, who was mentioned as a possible object for the post of the Prime Minister. The heads of "Nationaltidende" and "Berlingske Tidende" were apparently at the time interested in the group's politics, and the DET. remembers

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that a series of articles appeared in the "Nationaltidende" demanding a new spirit in Danish politics with regard to Germany and the new conditions created by the war. The group was strongly anti-parliamentary.

- 3) DNSAP, L.S. and "Bondepartiet" (farmers' Party) In the summer of 1940 DNSAP arranged a co-operation with L.S. and "Bondepartiet". This co-operation was prompted by the Germans through MORTENSEN, engineer, who is a Danish citizen, and who co-operated with von LOW and was probably paid by him. The major association represented by Hofjægermester SEBESTED was also a part in these negotiations. The DET. states that the L. THOMSEN brothers and HARTEL, member of the lower house, and also KNUD BACH had contact with MORTENSEN.

MORTENSEN's interference in these matters without the Legation knowing anything about it, was the first political initiative in Denmark of the Sicherheits Dienst.

The amalgamation with L.S. gave DNSAP additional power, because DNSAP's parliamentary group was increased by "Bondepartiet"'s mandates. In the summer of 1940 KNUD BACH and SEBESTED made a journey to Germany to negotiate about the agricultural prices. This journey was made on the initiative of MORTENSEN, and the Legation was not told about the arrangement. In Germany they negotiated with BACH, the State Secretary, and they also called on HEYDRICH. They returned from Germany with the promise of a higher price for butter. To this the DET. states that the Legation and the Danish agricultural council had simultaneously discussed the question of the price for butter, and they had attained the same result as KNUD BACH and SEBESTED during their negotiations in Germany. The only difference was that the results of the German considerations with regard to the agricultural prices were known by L.S. some time earlier owing to the journey to Germany.

This trip to Germany and also the negotiations between LS and DNSAP were as a matter of fact undesirable on the part of the Legation, because the negotiations as stated above were prompted by SD, and SD had thus, without approaching the Legation on the subject, negotiated directly with political instances in Denmark. While the Legation exhibited a watching attitude, the SD was in favour of an active interference in Danish political matters, which was a neglect of the Legation's work.

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- 4) Study groups. Apart from the political groups the so-called study groups having preferably economic interest were established. These study groups also went in for German interests.

It was the circle round HEMPPEL, engineer, the circle round the director of the real estate company BOLDSEN and a new trade group established by SANDER, director at "Carlsberg". Furthermore there was a circle round judge advocate general FURSCHER. This group, however, was not as important as the others.

§ 41. When the new Government was formed in July 1940, the Foreign minister SOAVENIUS made a declaration to the effect that a close co-operation with Germany corresponding to the development at that time was to take effect.

As far as the DET. remembers the question of a customs union was raised, when the minister MOHR handed over this statement in Berlin. The question was also discussed later during a visit which the German Ambassador RITTER made in Copenhagen.

Subsequent to RITTER's visit in Denmark AUGUST HOLM, director, invited the minister and some officials from the Legation to a party at his home in Klampenborg. Besides the above mentioned, various leading people of the economy, trade and industry were present. Of those the DET. remembers L.P. CHRISTENSEN director at the Elsinore dock-yard, HARTZ, director, and consul general SVANHOLM.

From the conversations carried on during the evening the DET. got the impression that they in point of fact were positive. One would, however, wait to see the final results of the war and actually say YES only, when Germany's victory was certain.

§ 42. There was, however, an increasing opposition in the Danish circles that were interested in these questions, and it was particularly CHRISTIAN MØLLER who advocated this opposition.

§ 43. In September and October 1940 DNSAP started the campaign against the STAUNING Government on the basis of the happenings around April 9th, 1940. In this propaganda PREBEN WENCK and BLANKENSTEINER were used for writing propaganda, and it was particularly BLANKENSTEINER who had contact with the military group.

The Legation watched these events attentively, but remained inactive though favourably disposed towards the National Socialists.

On November 10th, 1940, the German minister RENTHÉ FINK received a telegram from von RIBBENTROP to the effect that the propaganda which was started by DNSAP about April 9th, was to be stopped at once, it being detrimental to German interests. The Foreign minister von RIBBENTROP was of the opinion that the DNSAP's propaganda was a disguised nationalist propaganda against Germany. Von RIBBENTROP

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presumably got this idea through the Scandinavian and particularly the Swedish papers.

Von RENTHE FINK, who as a matter of fact was aware that the German interpretation of DNSAP's intentions was wrong, yet took steps, and on that same afternoon he invited FRITZ CLAUSEN to call at the Legation. At this meeting he told FRITZ CLAUSEN that the propaganda in the "Fædrelandet" ought to be stopped at once. This also happened. It was a very painful thing for DNSAP, because they had already advertised the unveiling of sensations about April 9th, which sensations so to speak would "spell ruin" to the STAUNING Government. The DET. is unable, however, to say anything further re these sensational unveilings, because it was BLANKENSTEINER and WENCK, who worked with these things.

The Legation was aware that negotiations were carried on in the DNSAP as to which persons would be fit for the post as ministers, and the following subjects were mentioned: Dr. POPP MADSEN (minister of justice), KNUD BACH (minister of agriculture), HARTTEL, (minister of education) HINDBORG, chief physician, (minister of health) and Professor WANSCHER.

As far as the DET. knows from FRITZ CLAUSEN's own statements, he (FRITZ CLAUSEN) did not wish to undertake the post as Prime Minister, because he considered himself better adapted to be leader of the Party than of the State. His tendency was rather to get influence over the forming of a new Government, which should then in turn favour the Party so that it could grow strong.

The meeting at "Forum" which was meant to be a sensation was as a matter of fact visited by 11,000 people, but the sensation failed to appear, because FRITZ CLAUSEN had been told by RENTHE FINK to keep to the material which did not touch on the happenings of the fatal 9th of April.

The DET. witnessed the march to "Den lille Hornblæser" (the little horn-blower) from Dagmarhus, and he got the impression that only the bold course of action of the Danish Police prevented tumults, which would have been very detrimental to the country at the then prevailing conditions, because it might be feared that the German Wehrmacht would have to take strong measures if the Danish Police did not succeed in maintaining quiet and order. Such interference was not desirable by the Germans nor by the Legation, because one did not wish measures to be taken by the Wehrmacht which would be detrimental to the functions of the Legation.

§ 44. After the "Forum" meeting on November 17th, 1940, it came to strong opposition between DNSAP and the all Party's Government, which was particularly put to voice in the dailies. Also this controversy was inconvenient to the Legation, because the discussion of the term "Nazist" (Nazi) was interpreted as anti-German and was in reality not directed against the Danish but against the German National Socialism. The Legation therefore on several occasions took measures against the foreign ministry and the Danish Press.

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§ 45. Towards the end of 1940 the pamphlet "Rene Folk med rene Hænder" (Clean people with clean hands) was issued. It was edited by an opposition Nazi group, the head of which was WILFRED PETERSEN. WILFRED PETERSEN was in friendly relation to Regiorungsrat CHANTRE, whose confidant he was, and this friendship caused that particularly President KANNSTEIN, who was head of "Innere Verwaltung" became critically disposed towards H.C. BRYLD, BØRGE BRYLD, AXEL JUUL, LANGGAARD NIELSEN and P.M. ASMUSSEN, who were the executives of the new-established trade groups, which were to be some sort of trade union under Nazi influence.

The object of the group was outwardly to get men in the executive staff of DNSAP, who were morally unassailable, but in reality it was the object to create disagreements and disintegration in the DNSAP and to give the German authorities the impression that a collaboration with FRITZ CLAUSEN was quite hopeless. They also succeeded in this.

The DET. knows only some of the persons who stood behind the group and supplied it with money. These were Prince Axel, PERCY IPSEN, wholesaler, and GUNNAR LARSEN. Behind the group were furthermore Superintendent ODMAR and Police Assistant WEISS. These names had been given the DET. by a man called SARNUM, who belonged to WILFRED PETERSEN's inner circle, but who had apparently come in opposition to him.

SARNUM had been introduced to the DET. by cand. polit. AAGE PETERSEN, who edited a pamphlet "Den danske Tilskuor" (the Danish spectator), for which pamphlet he got a support by the press department of the Legation or rather by the DET. It happened in this way: the DET. subscribed to a large number of the papers, which he paid at double the price. AAGE PETERSEN was particularly well acquainted with political conversations in Parliament and in the various Parties, particularly "Venstro" (the rural Party), and he often mentioned names like HIMMELSTRUP and VAGN BRO with whom he has presumably had direct contact. The co-operation with AAGE PETERSEN started in the fall of 1940 and continued to January 1943, at which time the DET. was sent to the front. At that time AAGE PETERSEN was not a member of DNSAP, but the DET. gave him a job as an editor of the periodical "Europa Kabel", which was started in Copenhagen in 1943 on the initiative of OSCAR VON RAI, who was editor of EUROPA KABEL in Amsterdam.

It was SARNUM who wrote "Rene Folk med rene Hænder". This the DET. was later told by AAGE PETERSEN. The DET. also learned that SARNUM was a man who had changed his name, his original name being SAMUELSEN.

ATTEMPT OF  
BURGLARY IN THE  
GERMAN LEGATION

§ 46. For a short time SARNUM came to the press department office on several occasions pretending that he was interested in material of articles. The DET. however, was very reticent towards him, because he considered him a mysterious person.

Some day after lunch time in December 1940 or January 1941 the DET. discovered that there had been an attempt of breaking in at his office in the Legation. The burglar had tried to break up an iron safe, in which the DET. amongst other things kept some money belonging to the press department, a total of Kr. 2,000.-. The DET. reported

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the burglary to the minister and saw that an investigation was made.

The DET. became suspicious of SARNUM, and he told the orderly not to let SARNUM get in any more.

The DET. told AAGE PETERSEN about his suspicion against SARNUM, and he reproached him with recommending a man like SARNUM. AAGE PETERSEN went to SARNUM, who, however, <sup>denied?</sup> refused to have had anything to do with the burglary, and AAGE PETERSEN passed this intelligence on to the DET.

Some days after the last conversation with AAGE PETERSEN re SARNUM, the DET. received by mail at his residence, 19. Osterbrogade, an extensive letter giving a detailed statement of VILFRED PETERSEN's political and economic connections, which as stated above were PRINCE AXEL, PERCY IPSEN, GUNNAR LARSEN, ODMAR and WEISS. Furthermore there were a number of names which the DET. does not remember. In the statement it was distinctly made clear that the whole VILFRED PETERSEN action was a mere attempt to cause friction inside the DNSAP. The statement was typed, and there were some corrections made by hand in green ink. The DET. recognised SARNUM's handwriting in these corrections. He knew SARNUM's handwriting from the MS sent in for the periodical "Den danske Tilskuer", which the DET. perused before they were printed. These MS.s were nearly always written in green ink.

§ 47. The DET. here stresses that VILFRED PETERSEN simultaneously with his attempt to cause friction inside the DNSAP had contact with Regierungsrat CHANTRE from KANNSTEIN's department "Innere Verwaltung", through whom he tried to obtain political acknowledgement from the German Legation.

Immediately after the receipt of SARNUM's statement the DET. contacted the minister von RENTHE FINK and informed him of the contents of the statement.

The DET. asked the minister to arrange that the Abtlg. "Innere Verwaltung" discontinued the connection with VILFRED PETERSEN.

Von RENTHE FINK spoke with CHANTRE of the question, but CHANTRE said that VILFRED PETERSEN was used for greater objects, and that one could not do without him.

§ 48. Some time after this episode AAGE PETERSEN was seized by the Germans and arrested by the German military authorities. After three weeks AAGE PETERSEN was again released. Later he told the DET. under the promise of secrecy, that the Germans during his imprisonment had every day promised to set him at liberty at once, if he admitted that the DET. had ordered him to investigate the "Innere Verwaltung"'s and "Abwehrstelle"'s relation to VILFRED PETERSEN. However, the DET. had never given AAGE PETERSEN such an order, and the DET. considered AAGE PETERSEN's imprisonment a personal persecution of himself by a German circle, which the DET. knew nothing about.

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THE ESTABLISH-  
MENT OF THE  
DANISH FRONT

§ 49- The object of editing "Rene Folk med rone Hænder" was gained through the friction inside the NSDAP, which came about immediately after the publication.

The opposition inside the Party was headed by HINNE, chief engineer, and KAJ RINCK, engineer, who contacted FRITZ CLAUSEN and demanded the immediate removal of the persons inside the Party, who were attacked in the paper. This FRITZ CLAUSEN had, however, refused to do so.

RINCK and HINNE thereupon went to the DET, asking him to make FRITZ CLAUSEN exclude the persons concerned from DNSAP. This the DET refused, arguing that he as a German citizen and a member of the German Legation could not interfere with a Danish Party's personal affairs. After the DET had declined to interfere, RINCK and HINNE declared that their position in the Party was precarious and that they would go into opposition and form their own National Socialist group.

The meeting at the DET's office took place in January or February 1941, and shortly afterwards the National Socialist Party "Den danske Front" was established under the charge of RINCK and HINNE.

The DET stresses that he had no contact whatsoever with this Party, but he continually kept up contact with FRITZ CLAUSEN.

GOVERNMENTAL  
CRISIS IN DEN-  
MARK IN JANUARY  
1941

§ 50. In the winter 1940/41 the all Parties' Government got into opposition to the German interests owing to the discussion at public and secret meetings and in the Danish press re the customs union, and Germany was actually accused of intending to make Denmark a Protectorate.

At these meetings especially CHRISTMAS MOLLER and HEDTOFT acted as speakers. Other speakers were HARTVIG FRISCH and ALSING ANDERSEN and Professor HAL KOCH.

Also the public opinion and the heavy attacks on DNSAP had influence on the crisis. On the part of Germany the attacks on DNSAP were considered as directed against Germany. As far as the DET knows there were furthermore a number of practical political questions between the all Parties' Government (Samlingsregeringen) and the German Legation, and these questions had not been satisfactorily solved. The last consequence of the crisis went against Prime Minister STAUNING's person.

The minister von RENTHE FINK had already for some time been aware, what was going to happen, and he therefore took up residence in Berlin in December 1940. This gesture was to be taken as a last warning to the Danish Government. The reports of the above mentioned secret meetings had come to the minister's knowledge through "Innere Verwaltung".

Prior to the minister's journey to Berlin he had concluded the German wishes in 5 particular points to the effect that a thorough alteration be made in the relation to Germany and that the prominent political members such as HEDTOFT, CHRISTMAS MOLLER and HARTVIG FRISCH be removed from their influential political positions.

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The minister returned towards the close of December 1940, but the crisis had not yet found its solution.

The crisis became acute in January 1941, when it was demanded from Berlin that STAUNING should resign from his post as Prime Minister.

§ 51. The DET. further states that he was aware that if STAUNING was removed as Prime Minister, it would create uneasiness, and the relations between Denmark and Germany would become worse. Without telling the minister RENTHE FINK anything about it in advance, the DET. contacted STAUNING in order to find a solution to the difficulties. He had previously met the PRIME MINISTER STAUNING at a party at "Nimb" in July 1940.

The DET.'s wish to speak with the Prime Minister STAUNING was made possible through the author LOUIS von KOHL, who was an old acquaintance of the Prime Minister, and in the beginning of January 1941 he confidentially told the DET. that STAUNING wanted to have a conversation with him.

Prior to the conversation with the Prime Minister STAUNING, von KOHL arranged a meeting with the former minister of justice, K.K. STEINCKE, and the meeting took place in the DET.'s flat at Østerbrogade.

STEINCKE confirmed what was also the Det.'s opinion that the whole situation was fatal. The DET. told STEINCKE that STAUNING's retirement as the Prime Minister was a German demand. STEINCKE found this very unfortunate and pointed out the consequences, particularly inside the Social Labour Party and the Trades-Movements.

During the debate re a solution of the crisis the DET. suggested that he might try to make the Germans decide on their attitude to be adopted towards STAUNING personally. The DET. gave STEINCKE a detailed account of his idea, and he asked STEINCKE, whether he thought that STAUNING would possibly be willing to take over the post as a foreign minister in a ministry, which was in charge of a pro-German person as for example director general KNUTZEN or the Chief Lord Mayor VIGGO CHRISTENSEN. The DET. asked this question because he knew that the German wishes at that time were in favour of these two persons.

STEINCKE said, however, that he did not think it advisable that he himself spoke to STAUNING about these questions, but he urged the DET. to call on STAUNING and discuss the matter with him.

The object of STEINCKE's conversation with the DET. was to convince him that the situation would be precarious, if STAUNING were actually removed. The DET. was already aware of this, and he and STEINCKE therefore very soon agreed to their points of view.

§ 52. Immediately after the conversation in question with the former minister of justice, STEINCKE, the DET. arranged the meeting with the Prime Minister, STAUNING in his home at Valeursvej. As previously stated the meeting was brought about by LOUIS VON KOHL.

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The Prime Minister STAUNING and the DET. discussed the situation. The DET. pointed out the difficulties that had arisen, and he said that a crisis in connection with STAUNING personally should be avoided, because STAUNING was the most respected person in the country with the largest Party and labour movement to support him. The DET. further pointed out to STAUNING that the labour movement had formerly been kindly disposed towards Germany, and the DET. could not understand why things could not continue in this way. The DET. further informed STAUNING about the intelligence re the anti-propaganda against Germany which had come to the knowledge of the Legation. This anti-propaganda was mostly carried on by HEDTOFT, H.C.HANSEN, Hartvig FRISCH and ALSING ANDERSEN of the Social Labour Party.

To this STAUNING replied that he knew nothing about this anti-propaganda, and he did not believe in it.

Thereupon they discussed the crisis itself, and the DET. stated that the crisis could possibly be solved, if STAUNING would be willing to take over the post as a foreign minister in a new Government. To this STAUNING asked what should happen with SCAVENIUS, who was very popular with the Germans. The DET. said that his fundamental idea was first and foremost to have it made clear, whether the Germans would consider STAUNING a future active politician or not, and if the Germans could get STAUNING acknowledged as a foreign minister in the Danish Government, it would mean that the Germans did not object to him personally as a politician, and his position as the Prime Minister could possibly be maintained in this way.

After these negotiations STAUNING, on the basis of the idea set forth by the DET., agreed to accept the post as the foreign minister.

The DET. states that he did not tell STAUNING about his conversation with the former minister of justice, STEINCKE.

LOUIS VON KOHL was present at this opportunity, and both he and the former minister of justice STEINCKE will be able to confirm the statement given by the DET.

§ 53. After the meeting with the Prime Minister STAUNING the minister von RENTHE FINK was told about this conversation as well as that with the former minister of justice STEINCKE, and the DET. emphasized the seriousness of the situation. The minister was in favour of keeping STAUNING as an active Danish politician although he did not approve of STAUNING getting the post as foreign minister. The DET., however, made von RENTHE FINK realize that the suggestion was the best way of attaining a German intimation re STAUNING's future relation to Germany. The Det. further made it clear to the minister that it would be advantageous if the Prime Minister STAUNING were actually to take over the post as a foreign minister, because STAUNING had both the Socialist Democrats and the labourers to support him as against SCAVENIUS who had only few partisans.

Thereupon the DET. suggested that the minister should

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phone the Gorman foreign ministry. This he also did, and he spoke with LUTHER, sub-secretary of the State, who at the time stayed at Salzburg together with RIBBENTROP. LUTHER, who was very kindly disposed towards the DET, suggested to the minister, von RENTHE FINK that the DET. should go to Salzburg to give a verbal statement. This suggestion was also prompted by the wish to let von RENTHE FINK stay in Denmark, because it was obvious that it would make a sensation if he again went to Germany.

The DET. phoned STAUNING from his home saying that he had been requested to go to Salzburg, and that he expected that everything would turn out satisfactorily. During the conversation STAUNING mentioned that something unfortunate had happened, the "Demokraten" at Aarhus having published an article about the crisis. The article had had a strong tendency against Germany. As a solution they agreed that both chief editors should be suspended temporarily. STAUNING should see to this, and it also happened.

§ 54. At Salzburg the DET. told MARTIN LUTHER, the sub-secretary of the STATE, about the prevailing situation in Denmark, and LUTHER was in favour of the idea set forth by the DET. He would, however, not contact the foreign minister RIBBENTROP, until he had received a telegram from von RENTHE FINK giving a view of the situation in Denmark. He intended to submit the telegram to RIBBENTROP and at the same time point out that the DET. had come to Salzburg, because RIBBENTROP would no doubt find it strange that such an important question was handled by a secretary of a Legation.

LUTHER got the telegram from RENTHE FINK two days after the DET.'s arrival in Salzburg, and he showed it to RIBBENTROP, at the same time drawing attention to the DET's presence in Salzburg. LUTHER told RIBBENTROP that he called the DET. to Berlin in some other affair, but that the DET. was well acquainted with the situation in Denmark. On that same evening the DET. was called to RIBBENTROP's castle at Fuschl.

§ 55. Here he was introduced to RIBBENTROP, and present was also MARTIN LUTHER.

The DET. states that he particularly pointed out to von RIBBENTROP the necessity of keeping STAUNING in Danish politics, and he was in reality not unkindly disposed to Germany. Apart from that he had the greatest influence on the development in Denmark, being head of the largest Party in Denmark and with the trades unions to support him.

To this information RIBBENTROP declared that in case of a new Government being formed in Denmark, the Germans would not object to STAUNING being elected the foreign minister.

At the same opportunity von RIBBENTROP asked the DET. how strong the Danish National Socialists were. The DET. stated that the number of the Party members were about 30,000, and he pointed out that this Party with its comparatively small power represented an important factor

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and it was of significance in respect of propaganda, the Party being very anxious to arrange meetings, which were generally well visited.

There was not discussed anything else during the conversation which lasted 10 minutes only.

§ 56. The sub-secretary of the State MARTIN LUTHER thereupon sent a telegram to von RENTHE FINK, in which he accounted for RIBBENTROP's point of view as far as STAUNING was concerned.

On the next morning the DET. returned to Copenhagen, and on arriving at his home he learned that STAUNING had phoned him privately the day before, because he wanted to know whether the DET. had returned.

The DET. immediately called up the Prime Minister, and during the telephone conversation he intimated that his visit at Salzburg had been favourable, and that RIBBENTROP had answered positively to the questions formerly discussed by STAUNING and the DET. STAUNING was very satisfied with this information.

§ 57. On the basis of the telegram from MARTIN LUTHER von RENTHE FINK three days later contacted STAUNING at the ministry.

During this conversation, which was later reported to the DET. by RENTHE FINK, STAUNING stressed that he could not understand why he could not continue as the Prime Minister seeing that the Germans acknowledged him as a foreign minister, and his work in the Ministry of State seemed much more natural to him.

Von RENTHE FINK reported this to the foreign ministry in Berlin, adding that he had also come to a satisfactory agreement re the 5 points relating to a better co-operation between Denmark and Germany, set forth by him in December 1940.

At this point the crisis had actually come to an end.

§ 58. Some few days later the DET. again called on STAUNING at his home at Valeursvej. This time they particularly spoke about HEDTOFT, and STAUNING said that he (Hedtoft) was the man inside the Social Labour Party and the trades union movement whom he liked best, and it would be a great loss to do without him. The DET. here states that STAUNING literally said: "I cannot throw the man out in the dark, if I do not even know why".

STAUNING suggested that the DET. should talk with HEDTOFT, because he was certain that during such a conversation he would get a good result and another opinion of HEDTOFT from a political point of view.

This the DET. refused, and he pointed out that it was not a question of his opinion of HEDTOFT personally, but of HEDTOFT's statements about Germany. Those statements had offended Germany, and the DET. feared that the situation would be misunderstood, if it were discovered that he had contact with HEDTOFT. The HEDTOFT question would have to be settled with von RENTHE FINK. The DET. pointed out

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to STAUNING that it was a German demand that HEDTOFT resigned from Danish politics, but in order to secure HEDTOFT's existence it might be advisable to grant him a seat for example in the Board of Directors of the brewery "Stjernen" or something like that, because in that case he would be more or less forgotten for a time. In this way he avoided at any rate to be the object of the German attention. STAUNING made a note of the DET's statements.

STAUNING thereupon trenched upon the question of altering the Government in such a way, that the Ministry of Commerce was divided into Ministry of Commerce and a Ministry of maritime affairs, and that the director general of the State Railways, KNUTZEN would be offered the post as Minister of maritime affairs. The DET. again stressed towards STAUNING that this was a matter which had to be discussed with von RENTHE FINK, but that he (the DET.) believed that it would be dangerous to plan a change in the Government if this was the only enlargement contemplated.

The DET. then told STAUNING that it was of far greater import that the 5 points were maintained and generally acknowledged by STAUNING, to which STAUNING replied that he was willing to acknowledge these 5 points. Thereupon the DET. asked STAUNING whether he would let this information be forwarded to RENTHE FINK. STAUNING replied in the affirmative.

The DET. now started talking about setting up some form of co-operation between the Danish Trade Union movements and the German social bodies (Soziale Organisationen). In doing this the DET. stressed that it was of major import to relations between Denmark and Germany, to which STAUNING replied that he had in fact already toyed with the idea and was not against a co-operation on a basis of social welfare interests.

After this interview the DET. gave von RENTHE FINK details on the talk with STAUNING, and RENTHE FINK then took the initiative in trying to reach an agreement with the Prime Minister.

§ 59. The DET. now adds that he started working on the Government crisis, because the member of the Danish Parliament LAURIDS HANSEN (United Labour Unions - Samvirkende Fagforbund) had in December 1940 (?) contacted the DET. and made clear to him that it would be precarious if it would prove true that the Germans were trying to remove STAUNING, the Prime Minister.

CO-OPERATION  
BETWEEN "SAM-  
VIRKENDE FAGFOR-  
BUND" AND GERMA-  
NY

§ 60. The Det. contacted LAURIDS HANSEN, who as mentioned was head of "De samvirkende Fagforbund" through the head of the Danish-German Press Committee (Danish-German Presssekretariat) and polyt. HENNING DALSGAARD (B.Econ.)

This DALSGAARD had published a book through the BINAR MUNKSGAARD publishing house. This book was called "Tysk Planøkonomi" (German rational economy). At the time this book aroused some interest in Danish political circles. In discussing the idea of the book with DALSGAARD, who was a member of the Social Democratic Party, DALSGAARD often touched upon the fact that it would be

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desirable if some form of co-operation could be organised between the Danish and German workers. The DET. was very interested in this, realising that the sympathy of "De samvirkende Fagforbund" with its 500,000 members would be a decisive factor in German-Danish relations.

§ 61. While on a vacation at "Sandkroen" near Asserbo in the fall of 1940, HENNING DALSGAARD phoned the DET. and asked him whether he was willing to receive DALSGAARD and LAURITZ HANSEN, the head of the "Samvirkende Fagforbund". The DET. immediately answered in the affirmative, and on that same afternoon he met LAURITZ HANSEN for the first time. They - at this their first meeting - spoke of German social objects. In the course of the talk the DET. ventilated the thought that the representatives of "De samvirkende Fagforbund" should visit Germany on a tour of study, and LAURITZ HANSEN did not turn the subject down.

The DET. believes that LAURITZ HANSEN wanted this meeting to be arranged to get some idea as to the inside working of the German authorities in Denmark. It was at this time necessary for the Trade Union chiefs to have this contact, if they wanted to maintain their influence on Danish labourers, who at that time were working in Germany in large numbers.

After his return to Copenhagen the DET. told RENTHE FINK about the meeting, and the DET. suggested that RENTHE FINK should try to make the German foreign ministry obtain invitations from "Deutsche Arbeitsfront" to prominent members of the Trade Union movements in Denmark. While talking to RENTHE FINK the DET. struck on the idea of inviting prominent members of the Danish "Employers' Association" (Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening) because some co-operation existed between the "Employers' Association" and the Trade Unions.

§ 62. The invitation was sent out, and the DET. agreed to forwarding the invitations to the people who were supposed to participate in this tour. The individual invitations were to be sent in a personal note. The persons in question were:

LAURITZ HANSEN, president of "De samvirkende Fagforbund"

AKSEL OLSEN, president of the Navvys' Union,

PETER ANDERSEN, president of the Mechanics' Union,

NIELS MADSEN, president of the Joiners' Union,

FANNY JENSEN, president of the female Trade Unions,

IB KOLBJØRN, member of the County Council,

FLØTKJÆR, president of the Municipal Council,

T.K. THOMSEN, engineer, president of the Employers' Association.

HANS L. LARSEN, vice-president of the Employers' Association.

ERNST BERG, secretary in the "Samvirkende Fagforbund",

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JENSEN, director of "K.K.K.K." (Copenhagen Coal & Cokes Company)

HANSEN-LARSEN, Professor at the Agricultural School,  
and another Professor at the Agricultural School.

All the persons invited answered in the affirmative, and the tour was carried through in the autumn 1940. The DET. participated in the tour as the representative of the Legation. The tour went over Berlin, where various institutions and enterprises were visited. A camp with Danish labourers outside of Berlin was also visited to give the participants in the tour a chance to see how these labourers were getting on.

The stay at Berlin wound up with a reception at Marrenbach's. Marrenbach was Dr. LEY's deputy. (Stellvertreter).

From Berlin the Party went to Mecklenburg so that they could study the rural reconstruction. Here they visited Reichsstaatsholder HILDEBRANDT, who gave a dinner at Schwerin, and thus the tour to Germany came to an end.

It is the DET.'s impression that the tour impressed the participants most favourably. In proof of this he states that after the return to Copenhagen the participants in the tour invited him to a dinner in "Studentforeningen", on which occasion they gave him a large porcelain statue as a gift from those participants belonging to the "Samvirkende Fagforbund". In the course of a speech of thanks LAURITZ HANSEN handed the present over to the DET. in the name of all the participants.

§ 63. The next "study groups" left shortly afterwards for Germany, but the DET. does not remember who conducted the tour, although he remembers that BOLLERUP MADSEN, HARALD BERGSTEDT and AKSEL BERG, secretary of the Joiners' Union participated in this tour. It was after this tour that HARALD BERGSTEDT wrote his article to the paper "Socialdemokraten", which led to a breach between him and the chief editor of this paper H.P. SØRENSEN.

Re H.P. SØRENSEN's retiring the DET. says that this was caused in the following way: BOLLERUP MADSEN had written an article published in "Aalborg Socialdemokrat". This article treated the Germany tour just like the County Council member IB KOLBJØRN had made a speech in the radio on the same subject, but the "Socialdemokrat" in Copenhagen had not published any such article, although they had sent HARALD BERGSTEDT on the tour, because it was his job to write such an article about his impressions, when he came back. When the DET. found that the "Socialdemokraten" did not bring any article on this tour, the DET. phoned H.P. SØRENSEN, why no article by BERGSTEDT had not been published, to which H.P. SØRENSEN answered that BERGSTEDT's article was pure Nazi propaganda, and he refused to have it in his paper.

The DET. explains that he later received a copy of the articles HARALD BERGSTEDT had written, because BERGSTEDT thought that the DET. was to censor the articles.

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When the DET. was at a lunch at "Pressesekretariatet", he asked BERGSTEDT why he had not written anything at all about the tour.

After having perused the article the DET. phoned H.P.Sørensen and said that the case would be treated at a meeting of the parties concerned, and this committee was to decide whether the articles were to be printed or not. H.P.SØRENSEN replied that he intended to resign if the committee gave a decision to the effect that he should publish the articles. At the meeting it was decided that H.P.SØRENSEN should publish the articles, whereupon H.P.SØRENSEN retired as editor in chief of the Socialdemocratic paper "Socialdemokraten".

§ 54. As a sequence of the study trips the DET. reached an agreement with the chiefs of "De samvirkende Fagforbund", according to which all Danish Trade Union papers, which actually covered a circulation of half a million persons, were to publish articles on German social conditions and trade news. The DET. ordered these articles at "Arbeitswissenschaftliches Institut" in Berlin, and they did not contain any political propaganda; they were purely trade items.

These articles were put in shape by the "Pressesekretariat" and then sent to the various editors.

§ 65. As a further sequence of the tours is also the "Globus-group", but the Prime Minister's (Stauning's) speech in the "Studentforeningen" was also one of the factors leading to the birth of the "Globus-group". The periodical "Globus" was founded by the editor AAGE JØRGENSEN. The paper called its periodical for "Rational economics and Socialism". The first number of this pamphlet had a fore-word by the Prime Minister, STAUNING.

The friends and staff of this periodical came for the greater part from "De samvirkende Fagforbund" and the Social Democratic Party. Amongst others NIELS LINDBERG from "De samvirkende Fagforbund", and ERNST BERG, AKSEL berg, VIKKELØSE JENSEN, SCHANDORF, engineer, HARALD HENRIKSEN, BØRGE JACOBSEN and HARALD BERGSTEDT also belonged to the "Globus-group". All in all this circle, so the DET. believes, comprises some fifty people.

The club was set up in the Spring of 1940, and at certain intervals it arranged discussions meetings. At these meetings social and economic conditions in Germany were discussed - very often discussed.

Later the DET. learned that the Socialdemocratic chiefs were very strong in their counter acting of this group. They called it a Nazi-infected organisation. This entailed that many of the members of the group were excluded from the Social Democratic Society (Association).

The DET. maintains that he has never been present at the group meetings, either as a speaker or as part of the audience.

Later a part of the men excluded by the Social Democrats

"DANSK ARBEJDS-  
FELLESSKAB"

joined the "Danish Arbejdsfællesskab" (the Danish Labour Fraternity Union) which was set up in the Spring of 1945.

§ 66. "Dansk Arbejdsfællesskab" was a social organization which closely collaborated with DNSAP and which had been started in 1941, when the trade-groups under DNSAP headed by P.M.ASMUSSEN had been broken, because ASMUSSEN had been strongly attacked in the pamphlet "Rene Folk med rene Hænder". After having been excluded from DNSAP he joined the VILFRED PETERSEN Party.

The task of "Arbejdsfællesskabet" was to give intelligence to the Danish labourers who worked for the Germans in Denmark. This task had hitherto been handled by "Deutsche Arbeitsfront" and "Organisation Kraft durch Freude". At the same time it was also the idea that "Dansk Arbejdsfællesskab" through negotiations with the German building enterprises in Denmark (Bauleitung) should build barrack camps for Danish workers. These barracks were to be established as near the places of work as possible so as to avoid the daily transport of the workers from their homes, which were often situated far away from the places of work.

The driving to and from the places of work was, apart from the loss of working hours, an expensive thing for the German building enterprises, because they had to pay the normal wages plus the so-called "distance money" to the labourers. The amount gained by "Bauleitung" by having the workers near the place of work was to be spent on financing the managing of the barrack camps, and in this way "Dansk Arbejdsfællesskab" would be able to afford the labourers cheap board and lodgings.

Another object was to establish contact with the Danish labourers in Germany and to arrange a regular propaganda amongst them, which was to compensate the German work of propaganda.

§ 67. The Danish Trade Unions were not satisfied with the establishment of "Dansk Arbejdsfællesskab", because they considered it a competitive enterprise under the influence of Nazi ideas. This was several times pointed out to the DET., and he was asked to use his influence to hinder such a development.

When the Trade Unions started being reluctant to send out the articles mentioned to the Danish trade papers, the DET. tried to make a closer and better contact with the German "Bauleitung" in Denmark. The "Bauleitung" were, however, subordinated to the Wehrmacht, and an influence from the Legation was therefore almost hopeless, and furthermore there were too many different Danish interests in these building enterprises.

On the other hand the DET. made all pressure to bear to make the "Fædrelandet" discontinue their attacks on the Social Democrats and "De samvirkende Fagforbund" and make them write friendly articles about the Trade Unions instead.

Simultaneously the DET. contacted FRITZ CLAUSEN to make him arrange it so that "Danske Arbejdsfællesskab" saw to it that all workers who joined "Dansk Arbejdsfællesskab"

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should be forced to remain members of "De samvirkende Fagforbund". Thus the DET. tried to avoid "Dansk Arbejdsfællesskab" becoming a real serious competitor to the Trade Unions' set-ups already in existence.

§ 68. The DET. did all this to keep up the friendly relations to "De samvirkende Fagforbund". To further promote the friendly relations to the executives of the "Samvirkende Fagforbund" the DET. helped them to obtain travel permits to congresses in Sweden and Finland.

With respect to his relations to "De samvirkende Fagforbund" he states that this was maintained up to the time the DET. left Denmark in February 1943.

In Berlin the DET. has often had political talk with various people about Denmark and the importance of maintaining a friendly relation to the Trade Union movements. This was particularly the case in his talk with MARTIN LUTHER, and this was no doubt one of the reasons for RIBBENTROP's statement to SCAVENIUS during the latter's visit to Berlin in the autumn of 1942. RIBBENTROP told SCAVENIUS that it would promote Danish-German co-operation if one or two prominent members of the labour movement in Denmark were to be given seats in the Government.

The DET. knows that SCAVENIUS later urged LAURITZ HANSEN to join the Government.

§ 69. The contact with "De samvirkende Fagforbund" was kept up through repeated invitations from the DET. These rendezvous were held in the "Pressesekretariat" who had their quarter at "Vestersøhus".

At these meetings - the participants were mostly members of the German tour - the DET. saw to it that the guests had an opportunity to lunch.

Before leaving Denmark in January 1943 the DET. invited the executives of "De samvirkende Fagforbund" to a supper in his home. Present was also the German minister extraordinary Dr. BEST.

In the course of this dinner not only the social but also the political relations between Germany and Denmark were debated.

The object of this supper was to say au revoir to the executives of "De samvirkende Fagforbund" and also to introduce Dr. BEST to these men, so that a contact with the Danish labour movement would be maintained subsequent to the DET.'s departure from the Legation.

RELATIONS TO  
DNSAP

§ 70. The incidents around November 17th, the publishing of the scurrilous pamphlet "Kene Folk med rene Hænder" = clean people with clean hands, the feud in the DNSAP on account of VILFRED PETERSEN's action in conjunction with the action of the various Danish Papers against the DNSAP resulted in DNSAP being extremely weak in the beginning of 1941. As early as in the fall of 1940 DNSAP had expressed a wish that money coming from membership fees paid by Danish labourers in Germany might be transferred to Denmark. The Party (DNSAP) had branches at Berlin, Hamburg and other large German towns. The members

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of these branch sections were Danes resident in Germany, and the memberships had increased in the course of 1940, when the Danish labourers started to come to Germany.

It was an extremely difficult proposition to arrange for the transfer of the money, but in the fall of 1940 it was twice carried through successfully, and each time an amount of Danish Kr.150,000.- was sent over. This amount was forwarded over the Clearing Account at Berlin, but the DET. cannot make any further statement about this transfer, as he was not informed on pecuniary details. The money was transferred in compliance with a request from FRITZ CLAUSEN, because the Party in Denmark lacked cash, and FRITZ CLAUSEN asked various people, amongst these the DET., to assist. The DET. approached RENTHE FINK and counsellor of the Legation RADERMACHER, and thus the transfer of the funds was arranged.

§ 71. From January 1941 the problem of transferring funds from Germany was arranged in such a way that DNSAP received a monthly instalment of Kr.70,000.-. This money was DNSAP's outstandings in Germany and were in point of fact the membership fees to the DNSAP from its various town groups in Germany and its "Arbejdsfront-groups" and from the sale of "Fædrelandet"'s publications in Germany. This money was used for various organising purposes in the DNSAP. The amount Kr.70,000.- were paid out by the cashier of the German Legation.

Between the "Reicharbeitsdienst" og "Den frivillige danske Arbejdstjeneste", which was a sub-section of the DNSAP, there was an agreement to the effect that "Den frivillige danske Arbejdstjeneste" should receive support to keep its "working camps" particularly in Jutland. This financial support also came into effect in January 1941 and amounted to Danish Kr.50,000.-.

A third amount paid out by the Legation was the money which "Mundus A.G." sent to the Legation to be paid out to the DNSAP to the credit of "Fædrelandet". This amount was about 80,000 Kr.

These three amounts in all amounted to approx. Kr.198,000.-, which were paid out by the Legation to the DNSAP. The DNSAP portioned the money out. As a rule the money was collected at the Legation by the naval Captain WODSCHOW.

The money paid out to "Fædrelandet" and "Arbejdstjeneste" were controlled as to their proper use. This control was effected by the representative for "A.G.MUNDUS", who, while the DET. was in Denmark, was SCHONWITZ, who came to Denmark at intervals to go through the books of the "Fædrelandet".

Reicharbeitsdienst had also its representative in Denmark to supervise the "Danske frivillige Arbejdstjeneste" organisation, for example the structure of the work in camps and also to check on the use of the money granted. This representative was Arbeitsführer SCHIEFFARTH, who stayed in Denmark for some years. He was, however, called back to Germany in 1942. His job was not only to collaborate with "Den frivillige Arbejdstjeneste", which was a sub-section of DNSAP, but also to endeavour to contact working

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camp projects, which were set up by Socialdemocratic circles.

The third amount which appertained from the membership fees in Germany was not checked on as this amount was considered to be of Danish origin and belonging to the DNSAP.

§ 72. The money was mostly used in propaganda, because the DNSAP were extremely active with meetings all over the country. There were, however, also established a number of institutions in DNSAP, which had to be supported pecuniarily. These organisations were: "Det juridiske Raad" (the legal council), "Den erhvervsøkonomiske Afdeling" (the vocational - economic section), "Dansk Arbejds-fællesskab" (Danish labour fellowship), DNSAP "Bondekontor" (DNSAP section for rustics), "Kvindegrupperne" (female groups) and "Nationalsocialistisk Ungdom" NSU (National Socialist urgence).

§ 73. During MARTIN LUTHER's visit to Denmark in September 1940 (compare § 39) he had expressed the wish that the DET. be appointed liason officer between the Legation and the DNSAP and thus check up on what the DNSAP was doing, and particularly to check up on that no other German organisations such as DS or Aussenpolitisches Amt were trying to contact the DNSAP or other Nazi organisations in Denmark without going through the Legation, as they might try to get these contacts in their endeavours to gain some influence on the Danish/German co-operation, compare SD's initiative in arranging a Berlin trip for KNUD BACH and others through von LOW and Ingeniør MORTENSEN (compare § 40, section 3).

§ 74. Even though the DET. worked in good faith in connection with the DNSAP he never let an opportunity go by to examine whether other German circles were gaining influence, because he in point of fact realized that there was already some form of co-operation between SD and DNSAP via Flensburg, because DAM JOHANSEN was an old school friend of FRITZ CLAUSEN and also a sort of V-man for von LOW. The DET. knew that DAM JOHANSEN often called at FRITZ CLAUSEN at Bovrup, and it was natural to think that LOW was kept informed about the Party affairs through DAM JOHANSEN.

The collaboration between DAM JOHANSEN/FRITZ CLAUSEN/LOW had no doubt, so the DET. thinks, existed in a good number of years prior to the war.

LONNEKER LANDS  
JOB AT LEGATION

§ 75. The DET. knows that HEINRICH LONNEKER, who was an old school chum of his, was in Flensburg without any real work at the time. He had formerly been a Hitler-jugendführer, but had gradually been absorbed by a co-operation with SD at Kiel. At any rate the DET. knows that the co-operation with SD at Kiel existed up to the outbreak of the second world war, but when this co-operation started the DET. does not know.

§ 76. The DET. had not time enough to check accurately on the DNSAP work, and as he did not wish to be too much mixed up in the daily politics of the Danish National Socialists, he suggested to the minister to appoint a man in his department, who would be capable of keeping up contact with the Party. As a reason for this it was

stated that the DET. should simultaneously work with the governmental Press and keep up the preparatory friendly contact with "De samvirkende Fagforbund", and therefore if he engaged himself too strongly with the opposition, the other Parties might get the impression that the whole thing was a political double dealing.

The minister did not object to appointing another man, but was even in favour of the suggestion. The choice was for LONNEKER, not only because he was a former good friend, whom the DET. thought he could rely on, but because the DET. in point of fact assumed that LONNEKER would be the man who could make the Flensburg contact superfluous and direct the work which via Flensburg went to Germany to Copenhagen. It was apparently SD's intention to make LONNEKER come to Berlin at the time, and the DET. who for some other object was at a visit in Berlin, took the opportunity of speaking to Freiherr von LOW on the question: LONNEKER.

Freiherr von LOW suggested that LONNEKER, if he were to work in Copenhagen, might as well be paid by Reichsicherheitshauptamt. The DET., however, did not agree to this, because he objected to LONNEKER having any contact with SD at all, if he worked in the Legation in Copenhagen. It was as a matter of fact also prohibited the co-operators in the foreign service to have contact with organisations or to take on jobs which were not subordinated to the Foreign Ministry. The DET. succeeded in making von LOW give up the idea of having LONNEKER come to Berlin. It was also decided that LONNEKER should not be paid by SD and be placed at the disposal of the Legation in Copenhagen. LONNEKER's work would be to attend the DNSAP meetings and to report on what happened at these meetings. He should furthermore contact all sections and groups inside the DNSAP in order to get knowledge of the public opinion inside the Party. This work involved that he travelled all over the country with FRITZ CLAUSEN, when he (Fritz Clausen) was to speak at Party meetings.

He started his employment as Angestellter at the Foreign Ministry's Press Section in Copenhagen in February 1941, and he worked here until the summer of 1942, at which time he was suddenly called up for active service in the Waffen SS and immediately transferred to Croatia, where he should fight the partisans. All this happened without the Legation being informed in advance.

The reason for this sudden measure taken against LONNEKER was, as he later told the DET., that he "followed the Meissner line". The DET. maintains that the idea was to prevent that factors such as SD, Germanische Leitstelle and the like SS-organisations should gain access to DNSAP / in the Legation, because according to his knowledge the Legation was only authorized to keep political inspection with the development in Denmark.

§ 77. The DET. strongly complained towards MARTIN LUTHER re LONNEKER's removal from the Legation in Copenhagen.

The DET. pointed out that if there was any objection to him personally, he might be made responsible, but one could not lay hand on a person, who only knew about the DET.'s work indirectly.

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The DET. further stated to MARTIN LUTHER that SD had no doubt taken offence, because LONNEKER did not hand over reports to Reichsicherheitshauptamt in Berlin. The DET. had, however, refused him to do so prior to his starting work as attaché at the Legation in Copenhagen, because it was also prohibited the officials in the German Foreign Office to collaborate with other political instances.

MARTIN LUTHER agreed with the DET. and promised to complain officially, which, however, had no result.

§ 78. At the same opportunity the DET. spoke with Freiherr von LOW, and he also complained to him. Von LOW asserted that he had had nothing to do with the removal of LONNEKER, but that it was a measure taken by the Waffen SS, because LONNEKER belonged to that class, who was now to be called up for service. He also promised to keep an eye on what further happened to LONNEKER and to assist him, should an opportunity arise.

LONNEKER did not return to Denmark, however, as long as the DET. stayed there. It was only later, after the DET. had left Denmark, that LONNEKER was made head of SD at Aarhus.

THE DEVELOPMENT  
OF DNSAP WORK  
UNTIL JUNE 22nd,  
1941

§ 79. The development inside the DNSAP up to the outbreak of hostilities with the Soviet bore a strong impression of the internal disagreements caused by the attacks of the Danish Press and the VILFRED PETERSEN pamphlet "Rene Folk med rene Hænder". The opposition was mainly aimed at the brothers HANS CARL and BØRGE BRYLD and LANGGAARD NIELSEN.

The DET. is not able to account further for the motives of these attacks against the two brothers BRYLD and LANGGAARD NIELSEN. The DET. thinks that it was partly mutual jealousy inside the executive staff and partly that one tried to find a "scapegoat" for the decline of the Party.

In the Spring of 1941 VILFRED PETERSEN published a weakly: "Stormen" (the storm). In this paper he continued the attacks on DNSAP, and he attacked simultaneously the Danish Government, particularly the officials in the Foreign Ministry.

After a couple of months the publication of "Stormen" was prohibited temporarily on account of a military picture, which had been commented upon by the German Wehrmacht.

§ 80. It was particularly VILFRED PETERSEN, "Den danske Front" and the Danish Trade Groups which caused irritation to the DNSAP work, because all these groups were in clear opposition to FRITZ CLAUSEN.

About 10 other National Socialist groups - smaller groups - joined these larger groups. Each of them counteracted the DNSAP and at the same time each other.

These groups tried to get on speaking terms with members of the German Legation in order to be able to claim that they were officially acknowledged by the Germans.

Of the various groups the DET. remembers a group called "Arbejdsfællesskab" (labour fellowship), which, however, had no contact with the formerly mentioned organisation

"Dansk Arbejdsfællesskab" (Danish labour fellowship). Furthermore there was a group called "Arbejder- og Bondepartiet" (the Party of labourers and rustics).

In order to prevent that the Legation got mixed up in this game of politics, the DET. made the German minister, von RENTHE FINK impose upon the officials of the Legation, that they did not enter into conversations with representatives of the groups. This also referred to LONNEKER. Another reason for this prohibition was also that the DET. could hereby prevent that the DNSAP got an occasion to complain of an aggressive attitude on the part of the Legation.

In spite of this prohibition the contact between the "innere Verwaltung" and the small groups were kept up, particularly on the initiative of Regierungsrat CHANTRE, because in this way he would be able to follow the dispute.

When it became clear to the small groups that the Legation was not particularly friendly disposed towards them, they satisfied themselves with the support they had from representatives of the SS, because CHANTRE was SS-Sturm-bannführer.

§ 51. As far as the DET. knows the Danish Police at this time started a suspicion on a number of DNSAP members or executives. It was done in this way: the Police passed penal certificates on various Party members on to Regierungsrat CHANTRE at the "Innere Verwaltung", as a sequence of which "Innere Verwaltung" repeatedly criticised the DNSAP, who according to their opinion apparently only existed of criminals.

The minister von RENTHE FINK told several times the DET. to see FRITZ CLAUSEN and make him realize that it was necessary to effect a purge inside the Party.

The DET. was aware that FRITZ CLAUSEN would object to a German interference in the Party's personal affairs, but in view of RENTHE FINK's order he contacted FRITZ CLAUSEN. FRITZ CLAUSEN stressed that he had been head of the Party for about 10 years, and he had never been told that the persons, whom the Germans wanted to have removed, had made themselves guilty of criminal misdeeds. Furthermore he objected to this interference on the part of the Germans, which interference he denoted as "noseying".

Afterwards FRITZ CLAUSEN, however, investigated the matter and found that the German assertions were incorrect. On requisition he got penal certificates for some of the persons, who had been mentioned to him, and it proved that the certificates were negative. FRITZ CLAUSEN became then very annoyed at the interference of "Innere Verwaltung" in the Party's affairs, and it gave rise to a personal disagreement between FRITZ CLAUSEN and "Innere Verwaltung" 's executive: President KANNSTEIN.

In the time to follow, the opposition became stronger and stronger and was in reality a breach between the Party and "Innere Verwaltung", which was considered to represent the SS-interests at the time.

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## THE ACTION AGAINST THE BRYLD- BROTHERS

§ 82. At the same time - in the Spring of 1941 - the action effected by "Innere Verwaltung" and aimed at BØRGE and HANS CARL BRYLD was carried through. BØRGE BRYLD was accused of bringing about an Anti-German opinion amongst the executive staff, and according to information given by "Innere Verwaltung" HANS CARL BRYLD was supposed to have said at a meeting, the the minister von RENTHE FINK should not be called RENTHE FINK but "RANKE-FINK" (Ranke = intrigue), and this statement had been reported to the minister.

FRITZ CLAUSEN persistently refused to comply with the German wish, which he denoted an encroachment.

After some time the brothers BRYLD all the same retired from the Party's work, where they had been in charge of "Det juridiske Raad" (the legal council), the "Propaganda & Kulturafdeling" (propaganda and culture section) respectively. The retiring of the brothers happened according to their own wish, but was prompted by the German actions.

FRITZ CLAUSEN became annoyed with the DET. when the two brothers BRYLD retired, because he thought that it was the DET. who had arranged the action against them, and he was also supposed to have procured the false penal certificates.

On account of this misunderstanding the DET. had no contact with FRITZ CLAUSEN until the fall 1941, when the DET. accompanied FRITZ CLAUSEN, COUNT SCHIMMELMANN and WODSCHOW on the journey to Germany. The object of the journey was to visit the Free Corps.

The contact between DNSAP and the DET. was, however, kept up through LONNEKER, so that the DET. was kept informed as to what happened in the Party.

§ 83. The DET. learned through RADEMACHER, counsellor at the foreign ministry, that during a visit in Berlin in May 1941 the DET. had been criticised, because the SS-circles had pointed out that the German co-operation with DNSAP had suffered a serious breach on account of too much interference on the part of the DET.

During this visit in Berlin the DET. was introduced to MARTIN LUTHER, who did not consider the criticism very serious, and he pointed out that it was in point of fact the DET.'s task to prevent other German factors interfering with Danish political affairs without the Legation knowing about it.

To these other factors belonged amongst others the SS-organisation and the Reichsicherheitshauptamt.

With reference to the DET.'s wish to be exempted from his job as a liason officer to DNSAP, MARTIN LUTHER answered in the negative and he pointed out that the same difficulties existed in all the other occupied countries, where all kinds of German sections displayed an activity, which it was difficult to control. MARTIN LUTHER requested the DET. to continue his work as heretofore and to try to re-establish the former relations of confidence to FRITZ CLAUSEN.

When the DET returned from his trip to Germany, LONNEKER told him that "Innere Verwaltung" and particularly Haupt-

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sturmführer PAHL had attempted to throw suspicion on the DET. inside the DNSAP with the view of getting more popular himself with the Party.

At the time there was no opportunity to have the problems elucidated in a conversation with FRITZ CLAUSEN, who most of the time stayed at Bovrup, and the DET.'s contact with FRITZ CLAUSEN was, as mentioned heretofore, only re-established during the trip to Germany.

If during the time the DET. had no direct contact with FRITZ CLAUSEN some question or other aroused, which could not be handled by LÖNNERKER, the DET. contacted WODSCHOW, captain in the Navy, who was chief of the staff in the Party.

Such questions was for example the establishment of the Free Corps and the DET.'s attempt to bring the disputes inside the DNSAP to a close and his urging an amalgamation of the various mutually opposing National Socialist groups.

§ 84. The opposition inside the Party had not become less, after the two brothers BRYLD had retired. On the contrary, it continued. Likewise the hope of an amalgamation of the opposing National Socialist groups and DNSAP after the retiring of the two brothers failed. On the contrary "Innere Verwaltung" still pointed out names of persons, who they thought should be removed from the Party for some reason or other.

The DET. thinks that this action which "Innere Verwaltung" directed against DNSAP is due, not only to the contact with the National Socialist groups outside the DNSAP but also to influence on the part of the Danish Police, and as an example the DET. mentions the affair with the penal certificates and the arrest of a number of prominent members in the DNSAP in Copenhagen. These arrests had been made on the initiative of the German "Geheime Feldpolizei" in the fall of 1942.

With regard to these arrests the DET. states that various sabotage actions which had taken place at the time had been proved by the Danish Police to have been committed by members of the DNSAP in order to create trouble in the country. As a sequence of this various persons, the names of whom the Police had informed "Innere Verwaltung" were arrested under the charge of keeping H.E. in their homes. Amongst the persons arrested was THOMSEN, director, (called "Tykke Tom"), who the day before had received some cases with H.E. At the search at THOMSENS' it proved, however, that it was only a question of a supply from a greengrocer.

Early in the morning THOMSEN's wife phoned the DET. and told him that apart from her husband a number of prominent members inside the DNSAP had been arrested by the German Feldpolizei. (military Police).

The DET. immediately called on the minister von RENTHE FINK asking him if he had any knowledge of what had happened. Von RENTHE FINK answered in the affirmative, and he stressed that it had been necessary to arrest these people, because the charge against them had been so serious. Nor could it be expected on the part of the Party that special consideration be taken to the Party's pro-German disposition in the case in question, because it would then be

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hopeless to keep up a co-operation with the Danish Police, who would no doubt not accede to the Germans treating Danish persons differently.

The DET. described the accusations as an impossibility, because it was improbable that people whose sons and brothers were fighting on the East front together with the German Wehrmacht should make themselves guilty of sabotage against the same German Wehrmacht in Denmark. However, von RENTHE PINK would only give his opinion in the case pending the result of the investigation.

The German Wehrmacht interrogated the persons arrested, but the interrogation gave no result, and the minister had later to apologize to FRITZ CLAUSEN for what had happened.

In spite of the apology both FRITZ CLAUSEN and DNSAP did not know what to believe about President KANNSTEIN's and "Innere Verwaltung"'s opinion of the Party.

Soon after this President KANNSTEIN went to Berlin, presumably to prevent that a criticism be aroused against him on account of his reports of these happenings.

DNSAP's DIFFI-  
CULTIES IN THEIR  
CO-OPERATION WITH  
THE GERMANS

§ 85. Prior to June 22nd, 1941, there was hardly any positive political work for the DNSAP. The Party was to keep up a friendly co-operation with Germany, because it was a National Socialist Party. After the occupation on April 9th, 1940, the original ideologic friendship between DNSAP and Germany was somewhat altered, because Germany was now an occupying power in Denmark.

As a military factor in the occupation of Denmark the German Wehrmacht was exclusively interested in preserving peace and order in the country. As far as civil matters were concerned the same thing referred to President KANNSTEIN's Abtlg. "Innere Verwaltung", the task of which was to keep up the public peace and order.

The great military events in Europe in the course of 1940 brought a comparatively large increase of new members to the DNSAP, who expected that the sequence would be a political revolution in Denmark.

If DNSAP wished to keep these members, they would have to display an activity of propoganda, which demanded new political conditions in Denmark, and thus they would have to turn against the all Parties' Government (Samlingsregeringen).

§ 86. The German Wehrmacht was not interested in an oppositionist National Socialist propoganda, because Denmark was considered an occupied country, where peace and order had to prevail, and if, on account of the political oppositions, there would be trouble in Denmark, this would mean that the German troops could not feel secure any longer. Apart from this Denmark was also a transit country for the German troops, who had to go to and fro between Norway and Germany. This last thing was a further reason why the Wehrmacht wished, from a military point of view, to maintain absolute peace in Denmark and to turn against all factors, which might have a disturbing effect.

In KANNSTEIN's civil Abtlg. the same wish prevailed, because

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there was a close co-operation between "Innere Verwaltung" and the German Wehrmacht.

In Wehrmacht circles in Denmark the opinion was prevailing, that the political question could always be met with, when the final battle had first been won, and it was thought that if Germany, militarily seen, was the victorious power in Europe, a new line would no doubt be adopted in the Danish politics towards Germany.

As an example of the German wish to keep peace in Denmark the DET. states that both RENE THE FINK and the German Wehrmacht entered a protest against FRITZ CLAUSEN, when it had come to demonstrations in Copenhagen, Roskilde and Haderslev in the summer and the fall of 1940.

The German authorities left it at the time entirely in the hands of the Danish Police to punish the persons who had made themselves guilty of the offence. At the time demonstrations of any kind were prohibited.

Also the restriction on Meetings in Denmark coincided well with the interests of the Wehrmacht and the Embassy to maintain peace and order, even if it were absolutely against the interests of DNSAP as an opposition Party.

The Germans surely appreciated DNSAP as an ideologically related factor in Denmark, and yet they regretted that this factor was not stronger, while on the other hand they would not agree, for the purpose of maintaining peace and order, to modifications with regard to controlling the persons who participated in meetings, for the sake of DNSAP only, although this was the only way for the Danish National Socialists to get larger influence.

All these factors affected at the time DNSAP's relations to Germany, and the Danish National Socialists could not but suspect the real German intentions with regard to the future of DNSAP.

§ 87. In the German Foreign Ministry they were well aware of the political question which had arisen through the occupation. In all the other occupied countries -- especially in Norway -- National Socialist Governments had been set up immediately after the occupation, while Denmark had kept a Coalition Government based on a democratic basis.

The examples from other countries had proved that it did not lead to advantageous political results to form a National Socialist Minority Government based on the German bayonets. In all these countries political difficulties had arisen. Considering the Danish conditions Denmark's large agricultural production further affected the German political interests, in consequence of which it was considered more important for Germany's war supplies not to interfere with the production but to further it instead of attempting political experiments.

In spite of this chain of reasoning one yet had to consider the factors that arose in Berlin through the dualism between the National Socialist Party and the State Institutions.

The NSDAP-organisations, particularly SS, had at once been

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given tasks in the other occupied countries, and they had at once started to establish organisations similar to those in Germany, as for example SS, Arbeitsdienst, Hitlerjugend, female groups etc.

It was quite natural for the German Foreign Ministry to fear that the German Party organisations would finally attempt to get the same influence in Denmark, now that Denmark was also occupied, and it also proved to be the case later.

The DET. knows that Hitler was personally interested in the National Socialist work in the occupied countries. At any rate they often spoke of this interest in the German Foreign Ministry.

§ 88. The DET. states that even though DNSAP compared with the other political Parties in Denmark came to but a small percentage, the Party was still a very important political factor, which had to be considered on the part of the Germans. The German Foreign Ministry was therefore willing to support DNSAP both morally and economically. The effect of the support should be that the German Foreign Ministry did not lose control with the National Socialist endeavours in Denmark, but on the contrary managed the control themselves.

Thus FRITZ CLAUSEN was actually a revolutionary, who was bound both by Danish and German interests. While the Danish interests (the coalition front) who were against the DNSAP were of a political nature, the German interests (maintenance of peace and order) who were in opposition to DNSAP were of a merely practical nature.

§ 89. The DET. explains that FRITZ CLAUSEN once said to him, that he felt himself like a "bogey", whom the German minister von RENTHE FINK used, whenever it suited him, to frighten the Danish Coalition Government.

This statement was as a matter of fact correct, because one could not but notice that the existence of DNSAP might be considered advantageous from a political point of view for the purpose of making the Coalition Government take up a positive opinion of the wishes put forth by Germany. In this way it might be avoided that the Germans materialized the idea of having the Coalition Government changed into a National Socialist Government, which they had done in so many other countries in Europe.

All these reasons affected DNSAP's position before June 22nd. 1941, and after the outbreak of hostilities with Russia the result was quite a new political attitude of the DNSAP.

THE SITUATION IN  
DENMARK AROUND  
JUNE 22nd, 1941

§ 90. The DET. states that the Danish political circles knew some weeks prior to June 22nd, 1941, that it would come to war between Germany and Russia. They got this intelligence from the Swedish Press.

The editors of the Danish Press confirmed this to the DET. during a conversation. In May 1941 he discussed the subject with the chief editors of Copenhagen at a lunch at "Skydebanen". It was particularly the editor GUNNAR HELWEG LARSEN from "Kristeligt Dagblad", who put the question to the DET. as to when he thought the war between

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Germany and Russia would break out.

The DET. attempted to evade answering, and then HELWEG LARSEN and "Berlingske Tidende"'s chief editor SVEND AAGE LUND told him that the papers had prepared detailed chronicles the tendency of which was aimed at Russia. The articles treated Scheinius' book "Den røde Flod stiger" (the red tide flows) and dealt with the violent Russian encroachments in the Baltics.

The DET. said that he dissuaded the publication of these articles, because it would only lead to complaints by the Russian Legation in Copenhagen to the Danish Foreign Ministry.

On the part of the Press, however, it was thought that it was of greater importance what the Germans had to say, and it was pointed out that the opinion of Russia had not changed much since the first Finnish-Russian war.

Some days later there was a Press reception at the German minister's, von RENTHE FINK, at Kastelsvej. Also at this opportunity the possibility of a war between Germany and Russia was discussed. The DET. remembers that amongst the expressions made by the chief editors re this subject, special attention was paid to a statement by SCHOCH, chief editor at "Nationaltidende". The statement was given to BAUMGARTEN, the correspondent from "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung". SCHOCH said that he was quite certain that 95 % of the Danish-German points in debate would be put aside at the time Germany started war against Russia.

The editors stated at the time to the DET. that according to their opinion a German-Russian war would not last longer than about 6 weeks considering the experience gained during the Finnish war.

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§ 91. The Det. presumed that these statements on the part of the press covered the general opinion of the population and Danish political spheres.

The discussion about the escape of Rudolf Hess to England influenced the question, as at that time many people in Denmark thought that Hess had not fled the country, and that he had flown to England with the blessing of Hitler in order to obtain an English-German peace, before the war with the Soviet broke out.

Through the conversations with the press people the Det. was impressed, that such a high-political turn might lead to a complete change of the political relations between Germany and Scandinavia.

THE WAR BEAKS OUT  
BETWEEN GERMANY  
AND SOVIET:

§ 92. The Det. states that though the German Legation had realised the significance of the marching up of the German army in Poland and the Russian army at the new Polish East frontier, they did not, however, exactly know if or when the war would break out.

After the fashion of April 9th 1940, the Legation only received official information on the night of June the 6th 1941 of what was to take place on the following morning.

secret/

The ambassador published this to a narrow circle of collaborators, owing to a detailed telegram that he had received from Berlin.

This telegram is supposed to have contained instructions as to the measures to be taken against the members of the Danish Communist Party, together with a wish for a responsum from the Danish Government.

These questions were, however, treated by the ambassador himself and Präsident Kannstein from the "Innere Verwaltung", and the Det. can give no further information as to the treatment of these questions.

With regard to questions in connection with the press the Det. received no direct orders, and he considered it superfluous to take any measures on account of the new war, in view of the fact that his conversations with the press people had impressed him to the effect that the press was going to take up the the desired attitude.

At the meeting of the press in May 1941, Helweg Larsen, Editor, "Kristeligt Dagblad", gave his opinion of the attitude of Denmark towards Soviet, and he characterised the attitude of the press, stating that "the matter with the articles against Soviet would be preserved". Consequently these articles appeared in the press after the 22nd of June 1941.

From the out-break of the war between Germany and Soviet till the battle of Stalingrad in January 1943, the Danish press - without being particularly influenced by the Germans - nearly daily wrote military chronicles and leading about the course of the war at the East front. These articles were written in favour of the Germans, and it was particularly the articles of "Nationaltidende" and "Berlingske Tidende" that were quoted in the German papers.

Yet an exception from this course was made with regard to the Danish adhesion to the Anti-Komintern-Pacht, that was given a cold shoulder in the Danish papers, particularly because of the fact that the Anti-Komintern-Pacht was feared to be a German attempt to draw Denmark into the war, and furthermore it was feared that the German propaganda against the so-called "Jewish-Bolsjevik danger" would sooner or later cause Denmark to take measures against the Jews in Denmark.

It was on this occasion that the Det. had a dispute with Redaktør Schoch (Editor), "Nationaltidende", the result of which was that Schoch withdrew from his position as an editor. (compare § 20).

THE ESTABLISH-  
MENT OF "FRIKORPS  
DANMARK":

§ 93. Already on the night of June the 22nd 1941, Orlogskaptajn Wodschow, who was Fritz Clausens staff commander, reported to the Det. at the legation and informed him of the fact that the party wanted to discuss a very important question with the Det.

The question was about the establishment of a voluntary corps for the East front.

They went together to the staff office in Rosenwængets Alle, where Fritz Clausen and some collaborators from the DNSAP press service were present. The Det. cannot remember the names of these collaborators. The question about the establishment of the voluntary corps was discussed with Fritz Clausen and Wodschow only.

Fritz Clausen told the Det. that party circles had promoted the idea of establishing a voluntary corps to fight at the Eastern front.

before/

The Det. claims that he had never formerly participated in negotiations about this question, nor is he aware that a question of this kind had previously been discussed.

Fritz Clausen asked the Det. what he thought about the idea and if he had any notion of the ambassador's attitude to the question.

The Det. answered that of course the Germans would be very much pleased at this proof of faithfulness given by DNSAP under the present circumstances, but the Det. was of opinion that the ambassador could not decide upon this question alone, it being a matter of the greatest interest to the German military authorities. Simultaneously the Det. asked if it was thought advisable that DNSAP formed the corps, or if it was not better to find a superior Danish officer to head a voluntary corps, so that it might at once become a military fact.

Both Fritz Clausen and Wodschow approved of this, and Wodschow added that as quickly as possible he would go to Holbæk in order to speak to Kryssing, Lieutenant Colonel, whom he considered best fit for taking the initiative.

On the same evening the Det. informed Gesandt von Renthe-Fink of his conversation with Fritz Clausen. Renthe-Fink approved of the thought, also with regard to the Det.'s proposal to the effect that a superior Danish officer should take the initiative.

§ 94. On the following evening Orlogskaptajn Wodschow informed the Det. that he had been to Holbæk to have a talk with Oberstløjtnat Kryssing, and that the latter had declared himself willing to head a Danish voluntary corps, that was to fight at the Eastern front.

Immediately afterwards Kryssing arrived in Copenhagen, and according to the wish of Fritz Clausen and Wodschow he was received by Gesandt von Renthe-Fink. Present at this intro reception was also the later second in command of the voluntary corps, Kaptajn Thor Jørgensen together with Fritz Clausen and Wodschow.

During the conversation with Renthe-Fink, the Danish wishes were further discussed.

The voluntary corps was to be called "Frikorps Danmark", and it was originally desired that the members of the corps should preferably wear a Danish uniform, but to this the ambassador remarked that this would certainly cause difficulties. It was agreed that the voluntary corps should be a purely Danish corps with Danish officers and commanders, and that it was to fight under the Danish flag. In case the question of uniforms should prove to cause practical difficulties, it was, at all events, agreed that the members of the voluntary corps were to wear Danish colours and a Danish flag on the sleeve.

§ 95. The ambassador had informed the German Foreign Ministry of the intended establishment of "Frikorps Danmark", and he received an answer to the effect that his plan was approved of. Through this wire from Berlin he was told that "Frikorps Danmark" was to be under the command of Waffen SS.

The enlistment for "Frikorps Danmark" was undertaken by Nebenstelle "Nordsee", who mainly applied to the Danish SS, in view of the fact that first volunteers had come over from this organisation.

§ 96. The legation had only heard about enlistment for the Waffen SS, before the 22nd of June 1941, by rumours, it being officially prohibited by the Germans to undertake such enlistments.

§ 97. The Det. established a meeting of the press in order to introduce Kryssing, lieutenant colonel, to the Danish press. The meeting took place at Hotel d'Angleterre in the close of June 1941.

Present at the meeting were Oberstløjtnant Kryssing, Captain Thor Jørgensen, SS-Obersturmführer Lorenz, who was the leader of Nebenstelle "Nordsee", and the Det.

There were representatives of all the metropolitan papers and of the province bureaus, furthermore the press bureau of the foreign ministry was represented through Eskelund, chief of office, and Bodenhoff, confidential clerk.

The press put some questions to Kryssing, among others as to why he had decided to head the voluntary corps. To this he gave the following answer: "Because of the fact that I hate democracy". Besides this he said nearly nothing, as he did not feel inclined to make a speech to the press.

In order to give the press the desired explanation re the "Frikorps Danmark" the Det. had to step in with a long account.

After the meeting the press brought a favourable and rather specified report of the voluntary corps.

§ 98. During the ensuing time DNSAP was completely engaged on "Frikorps Danmark" matters. Already at the beginning about 100 persons joined the Frikorps, and since nearly all of them were members of the party or of the S.A.

Furthermore nearly all the meetings held by DNSAP after this were a kind of enlistment meetings for the "Frikorps Danmark".

From the reports, that the Det. received from Lönneker, it appeared, that there was a great rush at these meetings.

§ 99. In June-July Renthe-Fink told the Det. that also outside the DNSAP there was a pronounced interest for the Frikorps idea, but that here people hesitated to join the corps on account of the fact that the corps, through the effect of the DNSAP propaganda, was a very one-sided national socialistic corps.

In this connection the ambassador mentioned the name of Gunnar Larsen, the Minister, and they were supposed to be discussing the possibilities of establishing a special Danish corps besides the "Frikorps Danmark". This corps was meant to go to Finland, but the plan was never realised.

In the same connection the name of Dahl, whole sale merchant, was mentioned. Dahl was known as the manager of the military efforts in Finland during the first Finnish-Russian war.

Gesandt von Renthe-Fink had learned this through the Finnish Ambassador Pajula, who had interrogated Renthe-Fink as to his attitude to the question.

From DNSAP the Det. learned that at that time Gunnar Larsen was interested in the question of the Danish volunteers, and that furthermore he was of opinion that Denmark should take over the pay of the volunteers. The Det. remembers that to have heard that Gunnar Larsen should have met Fritz Clausen at Christiansborg, and on this occasion he told him that he would prefer the "Frikorps Denmark" to be Danish also in a financial way, and therefore he during a meeting of the ministers had proposed that Kr. 5,000,000 should be granted as a preliminary contingent. This proposal was, however, not accepted.

§ 100. The Det. can give no particulars as to the departure of of "Frikorps Danmark", its being installed in the barracks in Hamburg, or its transfer to Posen, all these questions being discussed with Nebenstelle "Nordsee".

A question that demanded the initiative of the legation was the taking of the oaths of the Danish volunteers in Germany. The Det. states that Fritz Clausen, on account of the reports he had received from the Danish volunteers, took the initiative of a conversation with Gesandt von Renthe-Fink with the object of finding a suitable oath-formula.

In Hamburg it seemed to have been the plan to use the ordinary German oath-formula, that alleged faithfulness towards Hitler as Führer of the German people and first commander of the German Wehrmacht.

In Denmark this formula of an oath was then not approved of and another formula was looked after.

It was agreed that the Danish volunteers should take the oath to the commander-in-chief of the German Wehrmacht. This proposal was sent to the management of Waffen SS via the German Foreign Ministry, and accepted.

COMMOTION IN  
THE FRIKORPS;

§ 101. After "Frikorps Danmark" had been transferred to Posen in the autumn of 1941, still more reports were received of disputes, a.o. as to whether or not German officers should be admitted in the Frikorps, and in Denmark this was not exactly approved of. Also Kryssing himself was subject to a series of attacks, as he was not thought fit for his position as a leader of the corps, being trained as an artillery officer.

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Furthermore an opposition arose against the party. This was a result of the "Pan Germanic Idea" being included in the training. This idea was misunderstood by many, because of the fact that they thought it actually covered a veiled aggression against Scandinavia.

As characteristic of the public opinion within "Frikorps Danmark" the Det. gives a quotation, which he received from Fritz Clausen who had it from a Danish volunteer. The man had expressed himself as follows: "We are all expected to become Germans, but for the present we are called Germanios".

BRIEF TO GER-  
MANY IN ORDER  
TO VISIT THE  
FRIKORPS DAN-  
MARK:

§ 102. Fritz Clausen was very alarmed at this development, and on many occasions he voiced a wish of having an opportunity of visiting the corps in order to acquaint himself with the state of affairs.

The German Foreign Ministry did not feel inclined to allow Fritz Clausen to undertake a journey to Germany, as such a journey was sure to make a political sensation in Denmark and was bound to be misunderstood by the Danish government.

Now the leader of Germanische Leitstelle in Berlin, SS-Sturmbannführer Riedweg proposed to the German Foreign Ministry to allow him to invite Fritz Clausen to visit the Germanische Leitstelle.

The plan was that Fritz Clausen should go to Posen and visit the corps. This journey took place in November 1941.

Fritz Clausen was accompanied by Orlogskaptajn Wodschow and Lensgreve H.C. Schimmelmann. The latter participated in the journey merely to show off, as he had had nothing to do with the establishment of the corps, nor had he any notion of what it was all about.

The ambassador was informed by Understaatssekretär Luther, that he was to attend the company to Berlin.

In Berlin Understaatssekretär Luther told the Det. to watch that no information of Fritz Clausen's visit to Germany appeared, neither in the German nor the Danish press.

During the stay in Berlin it appeared that visit to the corps could not be carried through, as it was feared that the disputes within the corps, especially with regard to Kryssing, would increase by the visit of Fritz Clausen.

Instead of this an invitation from Reichsführer Himmler was arranged for, and now Fritz Clausen, Schimmelmann and Wodschow were to go to East Prussia, by car, where Himmler was staying in the neighbourhood of the town of Lötzen. The Det. awaited the return of the company to Berlin, as he was to accompany them home.

Through a notice, given to the German Foreign Ministry, the Det. learned that the object of the visit to Himmler was but a public lunch and a talk about the affairs of the corps, during which Himmler moved (to Fritz Clausen) that all Danish volunteers, that were outside the "Frikorps Danmark" and members of the various SS-divisions, should be united into one regiment under the name of "Thule", as the dispute had partly been due to the fact that a number of Danish volunteers, that had originally joined the "Frikorps Danmark, was not enrolled in the corps, but in German and mixed SS-divisions, that they did not know beforehand.

During the visits with Himmler political subjects were not broached, and furthermore this was made a condition by the German Foreign Ministry as long as the the visit to Himmler had not been sanctioned.

Previous to the trip to East Prussia nothing had taken place but a public lunch with SS-Sturmabführer Dr. Riedweg in Berlin.

"Nordische Verbindungsstelle" that used to make receptions, when famous Scandinavian personalities visited Berlin, initiated the plan of arranging a reception for Fritz Clausen and his company; the plan had probably already been discussed with the Danish minister in Berlin, Gesandt Mohr.

The realisation of this plan was, however, prevented by the Det., it being his task to see to it that any kind of publicity in connection with Fritz Clausen's visit to Germany was avoided.

Immediately after the company had returned to Berlin, it set off for Denmark.

The Det. recollects that Fritz Clausen was somewhat disappointed at the result of the journey, especially because of the fact that his wish of visiting the "Frikorps Danmark" had not been respected by the German. It had been intimated to Fritz Clausen that, owing to the disputes within the corps, he could not call there, as it was desired that his person should be kept away from these disputes.

On being questioned the Det. maintains that no political negotiations of any kind were took place in Berlin.

THE DISPUTES WITH  
SS AND DNSAP:

§ 103. With regard to the disputes with DNSAP and SS the Det. explains that they arose mainly owing to the activities of "Germanische Leitstelle" in Berlin, which was at that time the main organ of training on the basis of the "Pan Germanic Idea".

This idea tended to bring about a future union of all Germanic people, and the SS was to be the medium. The Schools at Sennheim and Töls cultivated this idea in particular.

In fact it was Himmler that was recommended as a leader of a future "Germanic union".

The reaction of the volunteers varied to a great extent; a considerable number of them were opposed to the thought, because they feared an obliteration of Danish national traits.

A smaller part of them approved of the idea and now turned against the DNSAP, which had come to regarded an obsolete political factor.

This opposition manifested itself in numerous disputes in connection with the co-operation between DNSAP and SS.

The idea of the establishment of the "Frikorps Danmark" had been to send volunteers to the Eastern front, where they were to contribute to the removal of the communist danger from Europe, and thereby form a strong basis for a future co-operation between Denmark and Germany; but, on the contrary, the DNSAP realised that the volunteers were exposed to a political propaganda which - at any rate in the opinion of Fritz Clausen - was by no means in favour of the intended development. in Denmark.

Präsident Kannstein, in his capacity of SS-Brigadeführer, was the chief commander of the SS in Denmark, and was in charge of supervising the enlistment work of Nebenstelle "Nordsee". In course of time Nebenstelle "Nordsee" had become very independent in its activities, so that it held its own enlistment meetings without, as usual, to maintain the contact with the party.

RECORDED  
INDEXED  
SERIALIZED  
FILED

Now the Det. states that there was a number of Danish volunteers that did not want to join the party, and instead they joined the Nebenstelle "Nordsee" or as it was later on called, Ersatzkommando "Dänemark".

The Det. explains that the strained relations that had always existed between the DNSAP and Kannsteins section, were further emphasized by the frictions between the Waffen SS and the party.

§ 104. As a consequence of the strained relations between DNSAP and the SS, which had been emphasized by Fritz Clausen's visit to Himmler, the Det. almost daily had to occupy himself with small problems that were to be solved via the legation. These questions always were about the same subject, namely the fear of the party being displaced by a "Pan Germanic SS-Organisation".

The Det. generally discussed these questions with Präsident Kannstein and before the latter he, as a rule, took up the attitude of the DNSAP, and thereby the Det. came in opposition to Kannstein.

In the beginning of 1942 when "Germanische Leitstelle" tried to found a branch in Denmark under the head of SS-Sturmbannführer Boysen, the Det. feared a complete break with the DNSAP, and that was why he went to Berlin to Understaatssekretär Luther in order to draw his attention to the state of affairs. It appeared that SS had founded the "Germanische Leitstelle" in Copenhagen without having previously informed the German Foreign Ministry of its intention.

It having been explicitly prohibited to the SS (on account, a.o. things, of an agreement between Ribbentrop and Himmler) to carry out political activities in Denmark, the German Foreign Ministry immediately put in a protest against the SS. This caused the "Germanische Leitstelle" to be dissolved, but it was so only outwardly, as Boysen stayed in Copenhagen in spite of the dissolution of the corps. The Waffen SS explained this course, saying that Boysen was merely to concern himself with the Danish volunteers that already were in the Waffen SS.

In spite of that Sturmbannführer Boysen carried out political work, especially with regard to a "germanic SS", that was to be a Danish SS-unit under the command of Himmler.

This unit was not intended to be a war unit, but a purely political formation on the basis of the Germanic idea. The plans were energetically counteracted by DNSAP, so they did not come to much while the Det. was in Denmark.

Later on the Schalburgkorpset were inculcated with some of the plans.

§ 105. In the course of 1942 many disputes arose between Denmark and Germany. In particular it was the Danish press that gave vent to many remonstrances from Germany, especially from Berlin. Owing to these remonstrances from Berlin the Det. had on many occasions had to protest against the press.

In August 1942 SS-Obergruppenführer, Staatssekretär in the German Home Ministry Stuckart and SS-Brigadeführer Ohlendorf from Reichsicherheitshauptamt went on a journey to Denmark, and one evening they visited Gesandt von Renthe-Fink,

THE CRISES IN  
CONNECTION WITH  
THE ROYAL SOVER-  
EIGNTY AND DR.  
BEST'S ARRIVAL IN  
DENAMRK;

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It was on this occasion that Ohlendorf voiced a sharp criticism of von Renthe-Fink's work in Denmark; this statement was made in the presence of the superior officials of the legation. The criticism was aimed at the Danish press, and the German press policy in Denmark, as well as against the political work done by the ambassador, which was described as being rather aimless.

As far as the Det. is concerned, SS-Brigadeführer Ohlendorf gave in a report to Himmler re the political development in Denmark. The visit of Ohlendorf had, however, no immediate consequences.

§ 106. SS-Brigadeführer Ohlendorf<sup>advised</sup> was on rather friendly official terms with President and SS-Brigadeführer Kannstein. The information of the Danish affairs Ohlendorf, no doubt received through Kannstein, and already for some time the co-operators of the legation had perceived that - although the diplomatic personnel of the legation were constantly reduced - the number of the co-operators of the "Innere Verwaltung" were considerably increased.

Innere Verwaltung was the department of the legation with the largest staff. The diplomatic personnel of the legation considered this illustrative of the fact that the SS was systematically endeavouring to bring about a displacement of the German Foreign Ministry in Denmark.

This view was justified by an order from Hitler to the effect that Himmler, politically, should be minister-in-chief of all Germanic countries.

§ 107. The Det. explains that Hitler's well known telegram, that initiated the "Royal Crisis" in September 1942, quite surprised Renthe-Fink, who knew nothing of the answer telegram that the King had sent to Hitler.

Nor had the Danish Foreign Ministry any knowledge of the telegram, it being dispatched by the King himself, independent of the Foreign Ministry.

It was, however, the German commander-in-chief in Denmark, General Lüdtke, who received the first order from Berlin to leave Denmark immediately, as it had been wrongly supposed at the Führerhauptquartier that Lüdtke also had the political responsibility in Denmark. Through this mistake Lüdtke came to leave first, whereas Renthe-Fink only left the next morning, according to orders from the Führerhauptquartier.

In accordance with Renthe-Fink's wishes the Det. accompanied him to Berlin in order to avail himself of his friendship with Understaatssekretär Luther to assist Renthe-Fink.

At his departure Renthe-Fink, owing to the the drastic contents of the telegram, realised that this time he would have to overcome the greatest difficulties in Berlin in order to secure a calm development in Denmark, and simultaneously he was aware of the fact that his own position as a German ambassador in Denmark was at stake.

§ 108. In Berlin it was proved that the situation was hopeless for Renthe-Fink, and Hitler had already decided that Renthe-Fink should not go back to Denmark.

It was decided to send an old party member to Denmark instead of Renthe-Fink, and later on Dr. Best was selected.

It was the impression of the Det. that the outward reason for the removal of Renthe-Fink from Denmark was the King's telegram, but, in fact,

the reports from the Reichsicherheitshauptamt about the state of affairs in Denmark were the real reason for a stricter course against Denmark.

Shortly afterwards the Det. returned to Denmark together with Minister Mohr.

The decision for the appointment of Dr. Best for Reichbevollmächtigte des Deutschen Reiches in Denmark was postponed on account of the fact that the Führerhauptquartier had not finally decided whether or not the German Foreign Ministry was to remain in Denmark.

In October 1942 the new chief of the German Wehrmacht in Denmark, General von Hanneken, arrived in Denmark. During his first visit with Gesandt Barandon von Hanneken claimed to have great authorities conferred to him by Hitler, also with regard to political questions.

Among other things von Hanneken told Barandon that der Führer had ordered him to inform the Danish Foreign Ministry of his arrival in Denmark by writing a note on a piece of paper torn from a note-book. This note should be given to an officer, which was done accordingly. This act was to symbolise the stricter course that was to be introduced to Denmark.

Furthermore this was emphasized by the fact that von Hanneken prohibited all German officers to associate with Danish friends.

THE RUMOURS OF  
THE ESTABLISH-  
MENT OF A PROTEC-  
TORATE:

§ 109. On the arrival of von Hanneken in Copenhagen in October 1942 rumours arose about the establishment of a protectorate. These rumours were not exactly justified, but at that time not even the legation had any idea of the course of the development in Denmark.

Now the Det. was called on by Fritz Clausen, who was very nervous and took the rumours of the formation of a protectorate very seriously. Fritz Clausen was desirous of preparing a memorandum, and he asked the Det. to help him to give it the proper German formulation, which the Det. did accordingly.

Now Fritz Clausen called on Gesandt Barandon and handed him the memorandum, that was to the effect that in case the Germans had really plans of a protectorate Denmark, this would spoil any Danish-German co-operation in the future, and that in this case it would be impossible to Fritz Clausen and the DNSAP to continue their pro-German activities in Denmark. Furthermore Fritz Clausen emphasized the fact that a speedy decision in connection with the government crisis was necessary, and the, personally, he was of opinion that any new Danish government, even formed by political opponents, was to be considered more favourable to the Danish-German co-operation than a protectorate.

This memorandum impressed Barandon very deeply and he sent it directly to Berlin.

THE PLANS OF THE  
FORMATION OF A NEW  
GOVERNMENT IN DEN-  
MARK:

§ 110. Furthermore the Det. states that on November the 2nd 1942 Dr. Best arrived in Denmark in order to take over his position as Bevollmächtigte des Deutschen Reiches in Denmark.

During his visit in Berlin together with Renthe-Fink, the Det. had talked to Understaatssekretär Luther, who had asked the Det. what he thought about the formation of a new government in Denmark.

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To this the Det. answered that in case the Germans would bring forward wishes in this direction, he moved that regard was paid to "De samvirkende Fagforbund" and DNSAP, and furthermore he proposed that Germany recommended C.O. Jørgensen, landed proprietor, as Agricultural Minister, and Lauritz Hansen, Axel Olsen and perhaps a third representative for the Labour Movement as ministers of Labour and Public Welfare.

During Svavenius's visit to von Ribbentrop these matters were discussed - as far as the Det. knows - but there was no mention of names.

The Det. maintains that it was without previous agreement with C.O. Jørgensen, Axel Olsen and Lauritz Hansen, that he recommended them for the said offices in the intended Ministry.

When Dr. Best initiated the negotiation about the formation of a government in Copenhagen, he did not pay any attention to the said wishes, and he left it entirely to Svavenius to form a new government, in which, however, Lauritz Hansen became the Minister of Public Welfare.

AMENDMENTS IN THE  
ADMINISTRATION AF-  
TER THE ARRIVAL OF  
DR. BEST.

§ 111. The difference between Dr. Best and Renthe-Fink was/Dr. Best primarily felt as the personal/that/ representative of the Führer in Denmark, whereas von Renthe-Fink had always regarded himself as an ambassador under the German Foreign Ministry, even though he called himself Reichsbevollmächtigter in Denmark.

On his appointment as Reichsbevollmächtigter in Denmark, Dr. Best was by Himmler furthermore appointed SS-Gruppenführer, and this promotion caused Himmler to expect that Dr. Best took care of his interests in Denmark.

Dr. Best took it upon him to look after the interests of the SS in Denmark, placing "Germanische Leitstelle", Ersatzkommando "Dänemark" and the work of the SD under his authority, and simultaneously he issued a ban to the effect that no reports must be sent to Berlin without his consent.

MEISSNER'S DEPARTURE FOR THE FRONT:

§ 112. The Det. maintains that while Renthe-Fink had acted in accordance with the Det.'s endeavours to check the growing influence of the SS in Denmark, Dr. Best had acted to the contrary.

The Det. maintains that he had been appointed a leader of the cultural section within the legation in order to exercise a greater influence in accordance with the wishes of the German Foreign Ministry, or rather General Luther.

Dr. Best did not approve of the the great influence exercised by the Det., the latter being simultaneously in charge of the press- radio and intelligence- department (besides the cultural department). This was due to the fact that both Reichssicherheits- hauptamt and SS-Hauptamt - after the appointment of Dr. Best as Reichsbevollmächtigter in Denmark - had told him to have the Det. removed as quickly as possible.

This, however, Dr. Best did not do, but on purpose he kept the Det. outside all political questions, and he favoured the Det. collaborators without paying any regard to the Det. himself.

On a few occasions the Det. wrote to Understaatssekretär Luther and complained of this, especially of the increasing influence of the SS, but Luther asked to Det. to put up with it.

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At the beginning of February 1943 Luther was sent to a concentration camp owing to some statements he had made on the foreign policy carried on by Ribbentrop.

The dismissal of Luther from the German Foreign Ministry caused the Det. to apply to Dr. Best with a new wish of getting to the front. Dr. Best allowed him to go, and in the close of February the Det. left.

One of the reasons for the disputes between the Det. and Dr. Best was the establishment of the Schalburgcorps intended by "Germanische Leitstelle", to the effect that the Schalburgcorps was practically placed under the command of the German SS, whereupon Fritz Clausen and DNSAP were to be played out. The Det. had applied to Fritz Clausen several times and warned him against this development.

Simultaneously the Det. had warned Dr. Best against transferring a German police bataillon to Denmark, but Dr. Best took this warning in a bad part and maintained that the police bataillon was not to have any executive task, it merely was to be at hand, which however, the Det. did not believe.

On this occasion Dr. Best intimated to the Det., that the Det. was always trying to work on one line, namely a purely Danish national socialist party, whereas SS wished to spread on two lines, viz: the Danish National Socialists and SS organisations in Denmark.

"INNERE VERWALTUNG":

§ 113. On the occupation on the 9th of April 1940 "Innere Verwaltung" was established under the management of Präsident Kannstein, whose collaborators were Regierungsdirektor Stalman and Regierungsrat Chantra. These two collaborators were to look after purely administrative interests. Later on, however, there came representatives for the German Staatspolizei, of whom the Det. recollects Kriminalrat Hermansen and later probably Kriminalrat Bunke. Furthermore there was a staff of other collaborators, and this staff was constantly increased.

Within the "innere Verwaltung" SS-Hauptsturmführer Pahl and later Dr. Wesche were employed as reporters but in reality they were representatives of Reichssicherheitshauptamt.

There was no real co-operation between the Det. and "innere Verwaltung" besides that the press conferences were attended by a man from "innere Verwaltung", and that the Det. discussed questions in connection with Danish volunteers and the DNSAP with Kannstein, who was at that time the chief leader of the SS.

Also the disputes between DNSAP and "innere Verwaltung" mentioned heretofore - as well as the false police records and the like (see § 81) were discussed by Kannstein and the Det.

§ 114. Dr. Wesche only applied to the Det. on one occasion, and that was immediately after the arrival of Dr. Wesche in 1941 in Copenhagen, when he voiced a plan of starting a periodical in order to strike Danish opponents of Germany with "strange weapons". The nature of these weapons he did not specify. As a leader of the press department he was to place money at the disposal of this plan, which, however, he refused to do. At this Dr. Wesche was very much offended, and since then he had no direct contact with the Det., but the Det. is aware that later on Dr. Wesche took great action against the Det.'s person.

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From the staff of Reichsicherheitsamt Dr. Wesche was the most active official, and he established an intelligence service that covered all Denmark with its branches, but the Det. is not in a position to give any further information hereof, as he knows none of the collaborators.

§ 115. SS-Hauptsturmführer Hans Pahl arrived in Denmark in 1940 it being his task to represent the department of Freiherr von Löwe, and he was only interested in sending reports to Berlin of the political development in Denmark.

Besides he was not very active, and that was supposed to be why Dr. Wesche was sent to Copenhagen to assist him.

The Det. denies that Pahl should have applied to him for co-operation, but being interested in news, Pahl contacted all possible political personalities in Copenhagen in order to gain such information.

Among others he contacted DNSAP and LS so as to obtain the information he desired as to the state of affairs within the party.

The Det. takes it for granted that Pahl also contacted the leaders of DNSAP in view of the fact that Freiherr vom Löw was personally interested in the development within the party.

The Det. cannot say if the contact between DNSAP and LS on the one side and Pahl on the other was established before the occupation.

The connection between Pahl and DNSAP had no positive aim - as far as the Det. is concerned - Pahl being only desirous of news, whereas the Det.'s co-operation with DNSAP was more useful to the party, as the Det. was merely interested in the work in connection with party, and furthermore the Det. had helped to procure financial support for the party.

Pahl was very irritated at the Det.'s influence with DNSAP, as the Det. represented the German Foreign Ministry, that was regarded with criticism by the SS.

Pahl quickly realised that the tendency of the Det.'s work was to prevent other German organisations from occupying themselves with the SS DNSAP, which caused the relations between the Det. and Pahl to be very strained.

The Det. is aware that it has always been the object of Pahl, through the influence of the SD, to have the Det. removed from Denmark.

The Det. has not contacted Pahl, either before or after his stay in Denmark.

§ 116. Freiherr von Löw met the Det. at the time when he - in 1935 - worked as a journalist at Flensburg. Von Löw was then employed in the SS at KIEL. The Det. became acquainted with von Löw through Wilhelm Lönneker, who was a Bannführer for Hitlerjugend at Flensburg and a brother of the later SS-Obersturmführer Heinrich Lönneker.

At this first meeting the Det. and von Löw discussed the disputes within the German Volksgruppe in Southern Jutland. These disputes were very vexing, there being 5 or 6 disputing parties in Southern Jutland, among others Dyrläge Möller (veterinary surgeon) and Jep Nissen.

CONNECTION WITH  
FREIHERR VON LÖW:

*index*

In 1936 the Det. arrived in Berlin. After the Det.'s arrival his brother, who was at that time living at Flensburg, was sent to a concentration camp, and in order to have his brother released, the Det. went to Kiel to request for the assistance of von Löw.

Freiherr von Löw promised to do, whatever he could, but as the case against the Det.'s brother was to be treated in Berlin, he could do nothing.

During the time from the first meeting at Flensburg till the time when the Det. went to Kiel to ask for the assistance of von Löw, the Det. had had no contact whatsoever with von Löw.

After this the Det. had no contact with von Löw or other persons within the SD, till von Löw came to Berlin in 1938. In Berlin he only superficially contacted von Löw, and there was no question of co-operation.

The Det. maintains that, as far as he remembers, he only on a single occasion had a conversation with von Löw. This was at a lunch.

In 1940 von Löw in Berlin, within the Reichsicherheits-Hauptamt, came to be concerned with Scandinavian affairs, and hereby he acquired his first real position as a chief of Section III B.

§ 117. After the occupation of Denmark von Löw often visited Denmark for the purpose of studying. During these visits he had some talks with various political personalities, as for instance Fritz Clausen, Hartel, Sehested and probably H. C. Bryld. Furthermore the Det. is aware that von Löw had some discussions about economical questions with Direktør Juncker, Aarhus.

During these visits to Denmark von Löw always attended the German legation that was interested in learning about von Löw's activities in Denmark and about his impression of the political development. During these conversations von Löw proved to be a very moderate man, and Renne-Fink appreciated his opinion very highly.

During these visits to the legation von Löw and the Det. often discussed the result of von Löw's travels to Denmark.

First and foremost the Det. hinted at the Germanic policy of "Germanische Leitstelle" in order to be supported by von Löw, at any rate, as he thought von Löw capable of making remonstrances with the SS-organisation. Also at these talks it was the impression of the Det. that von Löw preferred the line of the German Foreign Ministry to the ultra line of the SS.

Besides these questions the Det. hinted at his relations with Pahl and Dr. Wesche, saying that it was his impression that these two persons were plotting against the Det.'s person, but von Löw ignored this question, saying that it was certainly not so bad as that.

§ 118. During the Det.'s various visits to Berlin he occasionally talked with von Löw, and in such cases they discussed affairs of the SS, as the Det. considered von Löw capable of assisting him in these questions. He is aware that at one time they discussed the Free Corps Denmark, the DNSAP in Denmark and other similar questions.

After the Det.'s departure from Denmark in February 1943, he has only called on von Löw two times in order to get information as to what happened in Denmark. These two visits were caused by the Det.'s personal interest in Danish affairs.

Von Löw always went to Denmark alone.

MEISSNER'S CON-  
NECTION WITH  
MERCHANT DAMM  
JOHANSEN AT  
FLENSBORG:

§ 119. The Det. states that he only made the acquaintance of Damm Johansen, merchant, after the latter returned a member of the board of directors of the "Fädrelandet" in 1941.

Damm Johansen and Fritz Clausen had been at school together and had kept up their connection through the years, which was one of the reasons why Damm Johansen was elected for the board of the "Fädrelandet".

The Det. is aware that at that time Damm Johansen contacted von Löw in RSHA Abt. 111 B in Berlin. The Det. cannot say, however, when this contact was established, but he takes it that it was at the beginning of the war.

The Det. regarded Damm Johansen rather as a "Vertrauungsmann" of von Löw, it being his sole task to keep up contact with Fritz Clausen. The Det. is of opinion that the "rank" of Damm Johansen did not amount to that of a "Hauptvertrauungsmann".

Damm Johansen was not a member of DNSAP or of any other SS-organisation.

As stated heretofore in the report the Det. had protested against the election of Damm Johansen for the board of directors of the "Fädrelandet" on account of the fact that Damm Johansen was a German subject.

On two occasions Damm Johansen called at the legation in order to see Lönneker, who was attached to the Det. Damm Johansen had wanted to see Lönneker, the latter being an old friend of his.

The Det. denies having contacted Damm Johansen, politically or otherwise.

The Det. did not approve of Damm Johansen's frequent visits to Copenhagen, as he was of opinion that a German subject ought not to be on the board of the "Fädrelandet", and therefore he persuaded Lönneker to tell Damm Johansen's housekeeper, that when in Copenhagen the Det. spent much of his time/

wenching, and con-  
sequently his vi-  
sits to Copenh. be-  
came less frequent/

The Det. maintains that he can give no further information as to Damm Johansen's activities within the SD.

As far as the Det. is concerned, the contact between Damm Johansen and von Löw was maintained up to the capitulation.

§ 120. Besides the aforesaid Freiherr von Löw, Dr. Wesche, SS-Hauptsturmführer Pahl, and Damm Johansen, the Det. is ignorant as to who were employed in the Sicherheitsdienst.

The Det. denies having ever sent in written reports to the Sicherheitsdienst, either before or after the outbreak of the war.

§ 121. On being questioned the Det. denies having ever in any way or at any time contacted the Abwehr.

The only person known to the Det. within the Abwehr was Kommandörkaptajn Howoldt, who was a leader of the Abwehr in Copenhagen, and whom the Det. met now and then at "Dagmarhus" at press conferences or at companies with Gesandt von Renthe-Fink.

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§ 122. The states that he met Axel Juel, estate-owner, in Copenhagen at the office of the "Fädrelandet" in the beginning of 1940.

In Easter 1941 the Det. and his wife were invited to "Villemstrup". In the company were also Landsrestsagfører Börge Bryld (lawyer) and Landsretssagfører Holger Bryld. The visit to "Villemstrup" lasted for 3 days.

The Det. was on friendly terms with Axel Juel, and the Det. saw him on a few occasions when he visited Copenhagen for some reason or other. Juel has not, however, visited the Det. privately.

SS-Sturmbannführer Boysen reproached the Det. for associating privately with semi-Jews. He was hinting at Mrs. Juel, nee Schmigelow.

Axel Juel resigned his job as an S.A. leader in 1942 on account of the fact that he could not manage the dispute about the "Höveltegaard" school.

The Det. is of opinion that before the war Axel Juel has supported the "Fädrelandet" and the party financially.

Having withdrawn as an S.A. leader, Axel Juel had nothing to do with party work.

MEISSNERs CONNECTION WITH H.C. BRYLD:

§ 123. The Det. entered into connection with H.C. Bryld in the autumn of 1939 after the Det.'s arrival in Copenhagen, and at that time they very frequently discussed the "Fädrelandet", and it was through Bryld that he contacted Fritz Clausen and other persons within the party.

The Det. states that he has associated privately to some extent with H.C. Bryld. During Whitsuntide 1942 the Det. together with his wife and his brother-in-law, Assessor Schilf, who was killed in action in Italy later on, visited H.C. Bryld at "Rask Mølle".

The work of H.C. Bryld for the "Fädrelandet" and later on his activities as a propaganda leader for the DNSAP, had the effect that the Det. - in the time from 1940-41 and till he resigned - had a lot of talks with Bryld, as well about press- as about propaganda matters.

With regard to the economical support to the "Fädrelandet", the Det. explains that H.C. Bryld was the person who - previous to the support from "Mundus A.G." - in his capacity of an accountant for the "Fädrelandet" furnished the Det. with information as to the economical situation of the paper.

Re C.O. JÖRGENSEN:

§ 124. With regard to C.O. Jörgensen, land-owner, (Proprietär), the Det. states that from the German side he was very highly appreciated on account of his capacity as an expert on farming. He was a leader of the "Bondekontoret" (farming office), and simultaneously he had a close contact with Knud Bach.

In case of visits by Reichsdeutsche experts in the field of farming, it was a general rule that Gesandt von Renthe-Fink invited C.O. Jörgensen, in order that German farmers might have an opportunity of discussing practical questions with him.

In case the legation received information from the "Landbrugsraadet", C.O. Jörgensen was generally questioned simultaneously.

Personally the German Provision Minister Bache rated C.O. Jörgensen very highly, as he regarded him a qualified Danish expert on farming, fit for greater tasks, and that was why, in the autumn of 1942, the Germans hit on the idea of regarding him as an object of the office of Agricultural Minister.

The Det.'s knowledge of C.O. Jörgensen is confined to the meetings at the legation in Copenhagen.

MEISSNERS  
DEPUTY:

§ 125. Through meetings with the editors of the Metropolitan press the Det. was informed of all questions within Danish political circles, as both the Det. and the press discussed these questions quite openly.

Independent of each other the Editors, Harald Martinsen and Aage Schmidt issued so-called "Confidential letters" about the political situation. These "letters" were issued every fortnight to a certain circle of persons from trade and industry and from public life.

Before the press bureau of the Foreign Ministry the Det. had asked for a copy of every new edition of Martinsen's and Aage Schmidt's "Confidential letters", if he did not get this, he would issue a ban against the "letters".

Martinsen/

Harald Martinsen, who was at that time an editor at the "Nationaltidende", in this way/involuntarily furnished the Det. with a good deal of information. The "letters" were about all kinds of important political and economical subjects, that were discussed in Denmark.

EDITOR AAGE  
SCHMIDT:

§ 126. Editor Aage Schmidt from the IS-press did not - like Harald Martinsen - confine himself to sending a copy of "Confidential letters" to the Det., and he called on the Det. regularly every fortnight, previous to the issue of the letters, in order to discuss with the Det. questions that contacted German interests.

Schmidt, in his capacity of a reporter of the Rigsdagen, being an courier of all Danish political questions, the Det. interrogated him as to the intelligence received from the Rigsdag and the parties, and Schmidt readily answered all the questions put to him.

The Det. adds that at the same time as he received information from Aage Schmidt, he also furnished the latter with information that might be of interest to him.

The Det.'s connection with Aage Schmidt lasted from the summer of 1940 till the Det. left Denmark in February 1943.

CAND. POLIT. AAGE  
PETERSEN:

§ 127. Cand. polit. Aage Petersen was also one of the reporters with whom the Det. regularly associated, and with whom he discussed the political events in Denmark.

They had not any exact agreement as to the frequency of their meetings, but as a rule they had a talk once a week.

As mentioned heretofore Aage Petersen had connection with Vagn Bro and Himmelstrup, members of the Folketing, but the Det. is of opinion that these members of the Folketing did not realise that the information they gave Aage Petersen about political questions discussed in the Rigsdagen, were passed on to the Det.

The Det. states that Aage Petersen was always well informed of the political events in Denmark.

After the Det. had gone to the front, Aage Petersen entered the Schulburgcorps.

Re the activities of Aage Petersen, see §§ 45, 46, and 48.

EDITOR HENNING  
DALSGAARD:

§ 128. Henning Dalsgaard, Editor, who was a leader of Danish-German press secretariat, regularly informed the Det. of his talks with the editors and correspondents of the Danish papers.

Through the work of Dalsgaard the Det. obtained the necessary personal contact with the Danish press, and thus he was au courant of the political and practical questions that were discussed by the press people.

§ 129. The Det. maintains that he has not received information of political or other questions through others than the aforesaid persons, and none of these persons received any salary for the information they gave.

INTERROGATION OF  
MAJOR CARL ANDER-  
SEN :

§ 130. Re Gustav Meissner Major Carl Andersen (Germany December 1st 1894) explains that Meissner has never contacted the Abwehr, and he maintains having prohibited his collaborators to communicate in any way with Meissner, as he regarded him as having a bad character and as being a Nazi-profiteer, and in Wehrmacht circles there was an opposition against a young man like Meissner meddling with high policy, it being obvious that Meissner associated with Danish politicians.

Furthermore the chief of the Abwehr, Kommandörkapitajn Howoldt had prohibited the staff of Abwehr to communicate with Meissner.

Carl Andersen, the detainee, maintains that he was not able to give information re Meissner's activities in Denmark or elsewhere, but he is of opinion that Kriminalrat Hermansen, who has been employed under "innere Verwaltung" at the legation in Copenhagen, will be in a position to give information about Meissner.

CONCLUSION:

From the interrogation it appears that at a very early time of his career Gustav Meissner has been Nazi-minded, having been a member of S.A., Hitlerjugend and DNSAP.

After his engagement as a press-attache in Copenhagen he displayed very eager political activities and contacted both Nazi and social democratic circles in Denmark.

Meissner had realised that DNSAP was too small a party to have any vital influence on Danish policy, and therefore he tried to obtain contact with the Danish Labour Movement in order to propagandise for an anti-German conception of things.

To some extent his political activities in Denmark were influenced by his disputes with the SS-organisations.

As the protégé of Understaatssekretär Luther, Meissner was very difficult to remove, and it was only after the arrival of Dr. Best in Denmark, and after Understaatssekretär Luther had been sent to a concentration camp, that Meissner realised that he could not keep his position any longer, and that was the reason why he joined up at the front.

Major Carl Andersen verifies Meissner's explanation to the effect that he has never had any connection with Abwehr, which explanation is corroborated by the unverified news of the arrest of Aage Petersen. In this way a light was thrown on Meissner's conduct with regard to espionage in connection with Abwehr and "innere Verwaltung".

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

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Apparently Meissner was regarded with jealousy by the SD-representatives of "Innere Verwaltung", partly owing to Meissner's close connection with DNSAP and partly owing to the direct contact that the Det. had with the leader of RSHA Abt. III B, von Löw, a contact, however, that was not strong enough to prevent the removal of Meissner.

I recommend that the following persons be interrogated on the matter in order to elucidate the relations between the Det. and the SD:

Freiherr von Löw,  
Dr. Wesche, and  
Kriminalrat Hermansen.

Furthermore SS-Hauptsturmführer Haps Pahl should be interrogated on the case - when he has been arrested.

RECOMMENDATION:

Upon interrogation of the aforesaid persons I recommend that Gustav Meissner be transferred to the authorities concerned for further handling.

Signed Sv. Malmbak,  
Lt.

