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
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ARGENTINA: Guerrilla army decides to concentrate on urban rather than rural operations. (Page 17)



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ARGENTINA

The People's Revolutionary Army has [] decided to deemphasize its rural guerrilla operations and concentrate on the urban warfare, which has been its most effective weapon. The decision made in early 1974 to launch an intensive rural effort in the small but sugar-rich northwestern province of Tucuman has drawn off terrorist resources from the principal population centers.

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Insurgent leader Mario Santucho had hoped that a successful rural guerrilla campaign would, in Castro style, contribute to ultimate political success in the cities. In an effort to accomplish this objective, the People's Revolutionary Army has been forced to commit six of its 12 companies to operations in Tucuman. The remaining are assigned to Buenos Aires, Cordoba, and other cities. Santucho has now admitted that spreading his meager forces has contributed directly to recent reverses at the hands of the Federal Police, especially in Buenos Aires.

The relationship between Santucho's group and the larger, neo-Peronist Montoneros movement has worsened. While there have always been ideological differences between the Marxist People's Revolutionary Army and the more nationalistic Montoneros, the split has become more pronounced lately because of differing perceptions of revolutionary tactics. Santucho and his colleagues believe the Montoneros are playing into the government's hands by employing widespread, somewhat indiscriminate violence, which the Argentine masses find repugnant. They also believe that Montonero support of the radical parties in the recent Misiones election was counter-productive to the revolutionary cause, so poor was the performance of these parties.

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