

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT : Comments Re OBDURATE

NOTE: These comments are supplementary to ~~already~~ OPS comments.

1. OBDURATE's Project Outline objectives should be amended to include two of its actual targets which are not presently covered in the PO, i.e. the Albanian Legation in Rome and Albanian emigre activities in Italy. The present PO does not accurately reflect actual objectives.
2. More information regarding [] and [] cover and contacts is necessary and should be obtained from the field.
3. Regarding mail communication:
 - a. What is the Yugoslav censorship pattern on mail to Italy?
 - b. What has been evidence of censorship activity, and checks made to ascertain such activity, covering the mail from Yugoslavia involved in this operation? In this respect a check of []'s letters reported no evidence of censorship, while one of []'s correspondents in August 1954 expressed suspicion that []'s mail was subject to Yugoslav censorship.
4. Who specifically are the members of CHARITY and related missions still in Yugoslavia? In this respect the Project Outline is again misleading in that the bulk of the actual correspondence ~~sent~~ to [], as reflected in the file, is from miscellaneous individuals other than CHARITY members.
5. An examination of the correspondence involved in the operation indicates that the correspondence ~~is~~ is not channeled with any particular individuals but appears to be generally scattered with respect to correspondents. However, it would still appear to be desirable to maintain a set of correspondents' logs in connection with this, or any operation involving postal communications of this nature. Each correspondent should be given a separate page and a brief summary of each successive communication from that correspondent should appear on that page. This enables a quick and ~~a~~ better analysis to be made of such factors as which correspondents are most productive, and whether any correspondent appears to be Yugoslav-I.S. controlled by the nature of his correspondence. The field's opinion with respect to this last might be asked.
6. Why not put the 201 files of former Charity agents involved in the correspondence together with the OBDURATE files?
7. [] Kapok, 8 July 1954, contains a long list of pertinent names and does not appear to have been indexed.
8. Why is a report like [] 16 July 1954, with [] as ~~an~~ source included in OBDURATE? Other similar examples are reports with [] and [] as the respective sources. These sources belong to other ~~xxx~~ projects; including reports from them in OBDURATE serves only to give a false picture of the project's actual productiveness when it is evaluated with respect whether or not it should be continued by the FI Senior Staff. With respect to the actual product in the OBDURATE correspondence, the operation appears to have produced no positive intelligence and only some CE information (from the letters that is).

9. [] appears to be pro-BKI in his dispatches at times rather than completely objective. Should any comment on this be made to the field? No

10. One of [] correspondents appears worthy of further investigation. Hasan Kaleshi, an assistant professor on the faculty of the Oriental Philology Department at University of Belgrade, is a member of the CPY who was sent to Istanbul during the fall and winter of 1954 to engage in research for the Yugoslav government. On 23 September, [], who had been in previous correspondence with Kaleshi, had a two-hour meeting with Kaleshi in Istanbul where [] had gone to attend a congress of the Association of European Refugees. In view of the possibility that Kaleshi engaged in intelligence activity for UDBa while in Turkey, he should be green listed and full Headquarters traces run on him, if such has not already been done. In addition, Headquarters should request the [] to obtain from [] plus any other sources which it may have available, any information available regarding Kaleshi (biographical data) and Kaleshi's activities and contacts while in Turkey. Even though Kaleshi is probably back in Yugoslavia by now, such a request should be made for its defensive CE value.

11. Regarding [], the PA of OEDURATE, the following comments and questions appear applicable:

a. No PRQ I and II forms have been submitted; it is not ~~clear~~ clear whether or not he has been Green Listed (my notes do not cover this and my memory may be at fault here); he has no Staff C operational clearance. It is understood that the Italian Branch has taken the position with respect to obtaining PRQs and clearances on some of our key individuals that we are primarily engaged in subsidy operations [], ~~that~~ that the latter have the operational responsibility and that no SIC clearance is necessary. With respect to OEDURATE at any rate, this is not a defensible position and Headquarters should instruct the field to forward the necessary forms, making this a knock-down drag-out issue with WE/4 if necessary.

b. [] has engaged in dealings with members of so many intelligence services that ~~it~~ it is questionable whether CIA has control over him.

(1) He reportedly has Italian I.S. connections and "excellent" Vatican contacts. He failed to inform us re BKI recommendations for Italian subsidization of the Italian political ~~emigration~~ (2) Roi Guni wrote on 19 May 1954 that a Yugoslav colonel had spoken favorably of []

(3) His secretive contacts with Karl Haas of the German I.S., as reflected by the information in the file, indicate that he may have furnished more information to Haas, whose acquaintanceship with him dates from 1943, than he claimed to have given.

(4) He has been characterized in a report [], 6 July 1954) as venal.

(5) He has been assessed as giving a BKI slant to his reports and also as providing inaccurate information regarding the NCFa.

(6) He had contact in Istanbul on 23 September with a possible UDBa agent, Hasan Kaleshi, and he objected strongly to checks by the Italian I.S. as to whether he had contacted Qazim Gojani, an UDBa agent in Istanbul, indicating thereby that the Italian I.S. regarded his bona fides as somewhat suspect.

c. Who is Cedo Mijovic who was helped by []

d. Why have two folders on [], particularly when one has nothing in it

Top UDB authority on Albania!

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20 December 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Kraja-Shuti-Mersini D/A Operation

Note: These comments are in addition to [] comments and so do not represent a complete round-up of all comments of CE pertinence.

1. Iljas Kraja:

a. No PRQ I and II has been received from the field, although one was promised some time ago, and no operational clearance apparently exists. A cable should be sent to the field requesting full PRQs to permit an OC to be obtained. An LCFLUTTER should be planned also.

b. The file reflects little available biographical data on Kraja and no evidence of Headquarters traces and Green Listing having been accomplished on Kraja, both of which should be done if ^{in the files} not already done.

c. Not only is there no evidence of any technical surveillance having been accomplished of Kraja's meetings (although it does not seem that any such surveillance would be possible with meetings held in public places; here it would seem necessary to get Kraja to establish a different meeting place pattern which would permit technical surveillance to be established), but no spot checking on Kraja's activities appears to have been undertaken. If the station has such capabilities, it should be undertaken.

d. Kraja has three brothers in Albania, i.e. Hajis who is in prison, Maliqi and Qazim. Possession of these brothers in the country gives the Sigurimi a possible control lever which may already have been used with some effect. However, when Shuti offered on 4 February to take Kraja's greetings to two of this brothers, Kraja allegedly refused. Nevertheless, how do we know he actually refused?

e. The Sigurimi has made several attempts to obtain some sort of financial control.

(1) Although Kraja allegedly refused an offer of 100,000 lire on 4 January, how do we know that he actually did so, particularly in view of the fact that a few weeks earlier he had been in financial straits and had thus come to the attention of the Legation as a likely recruitment prospect.

(2) Kraja accepted a "loan" of 20,000 lire on 10 May. Why should he have taken any money at this time, particularly after all his previous alleged rebuffs? He might be asked this question.

2. Knowledgeability of Operation:

a. [] the KUBARK case officer, did not come into direct contact with Kraja during the ~~109~~ contacts of Kraja with Shuti. ~~int~~ [] source of information ^{on} all of these contacts except the eighth, on 10 May 1954, was []. His information on the eighth meeting was obtained from [] Kraja as a BKI member came under some control of the BKI leadership and also received financial aid from the BKI. The field should be asked why the reporting on the eighth meeting was handled differently.

b. The BKI leadership complex is obviously insecure and the SHUTI contacts were known not only by [] and [], but also by at least four others, i.e. [] and DECADAL. With respect to the latter four who became cognizant of the operation apparently after the first four, the following questions arise. Why did [] contact [] and DECADAL during May, while endeavoring to bring Kraja's activities under better control, thereby apparently widening the circle of knowledgeability? In what way did [] and [] become cognizant of, and to what extent are they knowledgeable of, the operation?

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c. Although [] after he came into direct contact with Kraja, obtained the latter's agreement on 2 September to talk to no one but [], Kraja still depends on the BKI for subsistence funds and thus may very well ~~then~~ continue to report to [], [] and their complex, in addition to any other contacts he may have with the Italian I.S. With respect to funds, the \$100.00 per month escrow fund we set up does not do Kraja any immediate good thereby giving the BKI a continuing ~~lever~~ financial control lever. (The field should be queried to confirm whether or not the escrow fund was actually set up; the implication in the field reporting is that it was.) With respect to his possible reporting to the Italian I.S., it is difficult to believe that the Italians, ~~x~~ either through their surveillance of key personalities in the Albanian Legation or through their close relations with the BKI are not aware of the details of the Kraja operation.

3. Operational Development:

a. In retrospect it would appear that ~~arrangement~~ before [] took over direct control of the operation, Kraja gave much more information to his Albanian case officer than the latter gave Kraja, pointing up the rather obvious conclusion that in any operation as sensitive as a D/A operation, effective control should be asserted as early in the development of the operation as possible. Why did [] wait so long before attempting to assert any effective control over the operation?

b. In view of the fact that Mersini is willing to talk much more freely than Shuti it would appear desirable to endeavor primarily to prime him with questions designed to yield as much positive political intelligence as possible, since this seems to be what he is best equipped to furnish, on the basis of the reports on the first three contacts with him so far. Although his possible defection at some time should be kept continually in mind as a possible long term goal, there is no indication on the basis of the information presently available in the file that he is ideologically or otherwise susceptible to defection. He also appears to be sufficiently self-confident of himself as to make it/doubtful whether he could be sufficiently compromised as to cause him to agree to a defection.

c. With respect to the actual handling of the case, the following questions arise:

(1) Why was Kraja instructed to emphasize the gravity of his financial plight during his 4 March meeting with Shuti, if he had previously refused to accept ~~the~~ money from Shuti and allegedly refused again during this meeting? If the objective was to build up the Kraja-Shuti relationship by having the former take money from the latter, then an offer should have been accepted. Otherwise the action/appear~~s~~ ridiculous, if not even somewhat suspect in the eyes of the Albanian case officer.

(2) In terms of an aggressive exploitation of the operation, what advantage was to be gained in instructing Kraja, through [], not to meet SHUTI on 28 March as previously arranged, in order "not to appear too eager"?

(3) It would appear questionable whether Kraja's bona fides in the eyes of the Albanian I.S. were strengthened by his request of Shuti on ^{4 March and} 16 April for permission to inform [] of the contacts with Shuti.

(4) Although [] excluded/^{Possible} Albanian I.S. knowledge of his 25 June meeting with Kraja as having possibly been responsible for Shuti's failure to meet Kraja on 28 June as scheduled, citing instead Kraja's theory that it was more probably due to a cutback in Albanian I.S. activities following the Bequiri case, the former theory should not be discarded outright.

(5) It does not appear to be a desirable practise for Kraja to be allowed to copy briefing notes while preparing for a contact in view of the possibility of passage of these notes to other parties.

(6) It should be noted that the initiative ~~for~~ the idea of telephoning the Legation in an effort to revive the operation came from Kraja, which is surprising when contrasted with his previous alleged reluctance to continue the operation. However

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it could be due to [] pep talks.

(7) Mersini's blank reaction to Kraja's statement during their 22 October meeting that he (Kraja) was trying to emigrate to the U.S. may indicate a low evaluation by Mersini of the operation.

(8) Mersini has continued Shuti's technique of attempting to appeal to Kraja's patriotism and has also sought, by referring to the APPLE operation, to boost the professional status of the Albanian I.S., presumably with the hope of giving Kraja greater confidence in it. close surveillance.

(9) The mechanics of the 6 and 21 September meetings showed Kraja had been under

4. Possible Disclosure of Other Albanian I.S. Assets:

(a.) One or more informants in the Munich camp report by mail to the Sigurimi Albanian Legation in Rome. (The SE/1 branch has ~~x~~ asked the ^{appropriate} field station whether it could take some measures to uncover such informants.)

(2) The Legation appears to have coverage of the NCFAs either through Gaqo Gogo (4 January meeting report: "I shall learn them in the future from Gaqo Gogo") or through other informants within the NCFAs complex. A full review of NCFAs appears in order therefore.

(3) The activities and bona fides of Ibrahim Kodra, Kadri Mufti and Rrapo Bineri, mention in the report of the 16 April meeting, need to be examined.

(4) Is there anything suspicious in Shuti's having been willing for Kraja to inform [] of their contacts (providing [] informed no one else.).

(5) The type of questions directed by Mersini towards Kraja in their 22 October meeting may indicate of a planned attempt by the Albanian I.S. to contact one of the BKI leaders, [], Has any check been made by the field regarding this?

5. Comments on Albanian I.S. EEI:

(1) Of special interest, if not of disseminable value, is the nature of the EEI as revealed in the operation.

(a) In the first three meetings, on 18 and 21 November and 4 December, major attention was paid to the relationship of the various emigre groups to the Yugoslav Prizren Committee and to British relations with the latter. In only one other meeting in the series did relations with Yugoslavia again come up as an EEI; this was during the seventh meeting on 16 April. Albanian concern during this November-December period in particular may still be of disseminable value.

(b) The NCFAs, agent training in the Munich camp, Gaqo Gogo and the BKI were the other principal EEI in terms of the large numbers of times these EEI were given during the course of the total of 12 contacts reported on thus far.

(2) It would appear desirable with respect to all D/A operations for a separate EEI log to be maintained, listing in summary fashion under the date of each successive meeting the particular EEI given the agent in that meeting. The maintenance of such a log will permit ~~the~~ a fast and better EEI analysis to be made.

Does

6. ~~is~~ paragraph 33 and/or paragraph 64 of [], 12 October 1954, contain disseminable information?

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