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21 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation between [ ] and King Zog

1. I called on King Zog at the Hotel Mediterranee in Alexandria on 21 March 1952 and spent 2½ hours discussing various matters of mutual interest. The appointment was made by telephone with Queen Geraldine.

2. Zog stated that he was living at the Mediterranee temporarily, having taken over the whole hotel for several months in order to house his family and his retinue following the sale of his villa. I asked him how long he proposed to remain in Alexandria, and he said that he would stay there approximately two more months and would then go on to France and subsequently to the United States.

3. I mentioned the fact that while in Istanbul I had had a long talk with his man there, Gazi Khan, who informed me that he had just made arrangements with Lutfi Tozan for the latter to visit Zog in Alexandria within the next couple of weeks in order to discuss an approach to the Yugoslavs on Zog's behalf. King Zog said that he had been anxious to talk to me about this matter and would like to know my reaction to his plan. He felt that it would be worth making another demarche to Tito in order to determine whether there had been any change in the Yugoslav attitude toward Zog, and to explore further Yugoslavia's attitude and plans toward Albania. He felt that it might be useful to send an emissary to Tito who could pose the same questions that Zog had asked the Yugoslav Ambassador in Cairo some time ago; namely, (1) in the event of revolution in Albania would Yugoslavia be willing to cooperate to a certain degree in assisting the overthrow of the present government and, (2) in the event Yugoslavia were indisposed to assist in the overthrow of the Hoxha regime in Albania would it maintain at least an attitude of benevolent neutrality? Zog went on to say that the selection of a suitable person for this approach presented many difficulties. He was anxious that the man should not be an Albanian and at the same time he had to select someone who had access to Tito and with whom Tito would probably be willing to discuss such a matter. Tozan seemed to be the only person available at this time, and although it was unfortunate that he had associations with the British Intelligence Service, he seemed to have the other necessary qualifications. In fact, Tozan had already received a Yugoslav visa and seemed genuinely interested in the proposition which the King planned to put to him.

4. My expressed reaction to Zog's scheme was that such an approach would probably do no harm and could conceivably produce some interesting information. Consequently, I said that there would seem to be no objection, provided it were made absolutely clear to Tozan and in turn to Tito that the approach is being made purely on King Zog's initiative and on behalf

of King Zog.

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of King Zog. I then asked what motives Tozan could have in taking on such a mission, and whether it was purely a matter of money. Zog replied that he did not know yet what compensation Tozan expected, and suggested that perhaps he would ask for special privileges or concessions relating to mineral deposits, possibly petroleum, after Albania's liberation. He then added that Tozan may also be able to determine whether the Yugoslav sponsored Albanian Committee would be in a position to cooperate with the National Committee for Free Albania in Rome.

5. I then reminded the King that some time ago he had talked of the possibility of approaching King Paul of Greece through King Peter of Yugoslavia with a view to urging the Greeks to make some official statement confirming the lack of aggressive intentions on their part in regard to Albania. He replied that he had looked into the matter further and discovered that King Peter's presence in Greece was not welcomed probably because of Greek efforts to develop better relations with Yugoslavia. While on the subject of Greece, Zog remarked that the deplorable political situation in that country was largely the fault of King Paul and the Queen, the latter being a pushing and interfering woman who harbored bad feelings toward Marshal Papagos. The difficulties, he said, resulted to a considerable extent from a certain German stubbornness and stupidity on the part of the Greek royal family.

6. I informed the King of the fact that I was aware of Irfan Bey Ohrida's trip to Turkey and Greece, and that we had actually facilitated his entry into Greece. Zog said that the object of the trip was primarily to determine the interest among Albanians abroad in some eventual action to free their homeland, and also to determine the approximate strength of the Albanian population there. Furthermore, he wanted Ohrida to feel out the sentiments of certain Albanians in Greece. The information secured by Ohrida in Turkey indicated, Zog said, that there were some 10,000 to 12,000 Albanians in that country who would be interested in participating actively in a war of liberation. He added that these men, largely Kossovars, represented a very much sounder element than the inhabitants of the refugee camps as they had not become victims of the demoralizing influences affecting all refugee camp inhabitants. I asked Zog whether these men in Turkey had not established themselves so well that they had lost complete interest in Albania and should consequently be regarded more as loyal Turks. He replied that this was definitely not so and that they represented a very patriotic element.

7. In regard to the Yugoslav sponsored Albanian Committee, Zog said that he was definitely under the impression that the Yugoslav group was very much less active against the National Committee for Free Albania than formerly. He didn't know just what was behind this, and said that he was still receiving occasional letters from his followers in Yugoslavia

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indicating that at this time they were being subjected to no special political pressure. He said that although the active campaign of vilification of the NCFA by the Yugoslav sponsored group had abated, there was still a definite tone of hostility toward the Rome Committee. He added that he had recently received a letter from Nick Sokoli, thus disproving reports that the latter had been killed.

8. In regard to the NCFA, Zog said that he had no comments to make at this time other than he regretted the constant bickering among the Committee members, and that he had instructed Abas KUPI to maintain the best possible relations with all factions. He also said that he had tried to convey the same instructions to the other member groups and felt that he had accomplished something constructive toward keeping the Committee together. He further stated that he felt that it would be desirable to broaden the Committee to provide representation for all anti-Communist groups, but that such action should be taken with extreme caution in order not to risk the collapse of the existing Committee. He added that actually the political parties are primarily an emigre affair and have little support as parties within the country. Such support as they may receive inside is based primarily on personalities and local loyalties to the various individual leaders.

9. In discussing Zog's plans for the future, I asked when he actually expected to reach the United States. He replied that he hoped to do so in the autumn. I then said that I would like to bring to his attention a matter of which he may not be yet aware, namely, the problem of visas for his retinue. I said that the immigration laws in the United States are very strict, and it is extremely difficult to arrange for any deviations from the established laws. I added that there are strict rules against bringing indentured servants into the country. Therefore, I hoped he realized it would probably be very difficult to bring to the United States any large group of persons in addition to his immediate family. He replied that he was aware of these things and that he did not propose to ask for visas for anyone other than members of his immediate family and seven loyal retainers.

10. While discussing his estate in Long Island, he said that he had a special question to put to me. He owned property in France and the French Government had relieved him of the necessity of paying taxes. Furthermore, he said that he had been informed by the British that if he wished to do so he could live in England on a place that would cost him virtually nothing. Would I therefore, he asked, be good enough to explore the possibilities of a waiver of the taxes on his Long Island estate? He added that this was naturally a small matter but, under current circumstances, it meant quite a bit to him. (I ascertained from the King's aid that the taxes on the Long Island property are something in the order of \$7,000 a year.) In

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replying to this query, I explained that the Government of the United States was rather different from some of the European governments in this respect, and that such taxes are under the jurisdiction of the individual states and communities. We as an organization were generally unable to arrange for deviations from the law, particularly as tax matters of this type were handled exclusively by the local State, municipality, or township authorities, and that intervention by agencies of the Federal Government would be most unlikely to succeed.

11. In parting, King Zog said that he regarded me as a very close friend, but there was one thing he did not like: namely, the fact that I never accepted his invitations to stay with him or accept his hospitality - he wanted me to remember just not to be too like the British in this respect.

[ ]  
Deputy for Policy Coordination

SE/PC-GMY--awn

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