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SECURITY INFORMATION

1824-CAGWU

2 August 1952

Subject: Security Clearance - BGFIEND

To : Chief, DYClavier
Washington, D.C.

Attn: []

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

Reference: []

1. The request for permission to use personnel following carriage tests and receipt of local clearances submitted in reference is a matter of particular concern to BGFIEND. It is felt a satisfactory method of expediting clearances must be forthcoming or the BGFIEND agent infiltration program will continue to be seriously handicapped for the following reasons:

a. Our present inability to take advantage of opportunities that present themselves and must be acted upon promptly if at all.

b. Lack of necessary elasticity which prevents us from readily altering team composition when circumstances warrant which is frequently the case.

2. A review of the dispatches covering the recruiting, training, and infiltration of all the BGFIEND teams since the start of the project immediately shows that the composition of virtually all teams changed from the time each operation was planned and finally mounted. A variety of reasons beyond our control explains these constant personnel shifts and include such factors as illness, political and personal differences, loss of heart, inability to absorb training, and a variety of other reasons. This situation which unfortunately can not be anticipated in each case could be partially remedied if a pool of cleared, trained agent personnel were on hand. However, scarcity of suitable agent material and the present lack of a holding area and staff to operate same eliminates this solution.

3. As a result of our inability to shuffle team composition promptly we are presently forced to start from scratch each time a mission goes sour. This entails recruitment, submission of biographic data for clearance, and a wait of some 10 to 16 weeks before clearances are obtained and training can begin. In many instances this long time lag is such a serious handicap the operation must be cancelled because of the end of the operational season or for some other reason.

4. We are convinced the proposal to permit BGFIEND to use agents who are locally cleared and who have been polygraphed does not shortcut security in any way. [] files, a local carriage test and the thorough LCflake service security check would give us a sound basis on which to make a decision.

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5. In addition to the reasons for accepting local clearances stated in paragraph 1 we would also like to point out that at present the character of many of our operations and the calibre of many of our agents is such that the loss of these men or security violations does not present a serious threat to the basic security of the project. In these instances we are dealing with peasant types who are recruited to perform limited as is contact with our personnel. Furthermore they are not trained in w/t and are sent into KMWaahoo with a minimum of knowledge of our organization and general operating procedure. Because these agents have so little operational knowledge which the opposition does not presently know and which they can exploit, we feel our request for permission to use agents following receipt of local clearances is strengthened and hope it can be acted upon promptly and favorably in Washington. In the event it is impossible to give blanket authorization to clear prospective BGFriend agent personnel in the field we hope it will be possible to do so in instances where the prospects are to be used on so called "low level" operations. Your careful consideration of this basic, pressing problem will be appreciated.

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