

KAPOK # 1228
[] []

AIR POUCH

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Chief, SE
Attn: [] []
Air Maritime Section
Senior Representative, [] []

23 December 1952

ACTION-SE/1

BGFIEND/Operational
Sea Infiltrations, 1953 - BGFIEND

REFERENCE: [] [] [] [] [] []

1. In para 2 of second reference [] [] stated that BGFIEND was planning no sea infiltrations in its 1953 operational schedule. However, as a result of [] []'s Athens visit Dec. 17/18, we have been informed that RNCASTING will supply us with teams for the Scutari and Valona areas. For these operations we strongly recommend the use of sea infiltration, due to the hazards involved in attempting an overland route to Scutari and the presence of strong security forces between the frontier and the Valona area. We have discontinued the use of blind air drops as a result of our 1950 and 1951 experiences.

2. BGFIEND has thoroughly reviewed the matter of sea infiltrations with Trohan. We feel that it is not necessary to employ a second vessel aboard which the teams would be transferred at sea after embarking from our island training base for the following reasons:

a. A successful sea operation must involve as few persons and vessels as possible to maintain security, minimize the chances of error and mechanical failure and to expose the fewest number of indigenous crew members to our work.

b. Increased security hazards are involved by a sea rendezvous. If other vessels are in the area, they are practically certain to make a report to the harbor and customs authorities, thus marking both vessels as contraband suspects.

c. Extreme difficulty in recruiting and properly training an indigenous crew for a second vessel in time for 1953 operations along with accompanying cover set-up.

2. We propose the

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2. We propose the use of the vessel proposed in [] for our sea infiltration operations.

a. A speed in excess of 10 knots is not considered an essential requirement. []'s conversation with the British took up this point specifically (Attachment to []) and their skipper stated that at no time in his opinion was high speed a necessary factor. High speed engines in a vessel will be most difficult to conceal and the purpose of the boat can not long remain unknown.

b. The boat proposed in [] is designed so that it can be maintained and operated from our island base as a service boat as well as leaving from there under the cover of darkness with teams for infiltration. The crew will consist of three Greeks, one of whom is employed aboard KMHYMNAL and is already cleared. He has had 30 years experience on caiques among the islands and during the war ran contraband into Greece from Alexandria. This crew would undergo extensive training under [] and [] which would terminate in a series of night landing exercises for the team members themselves.

3. It is requested that approval be given to proceed with the construction of this dual purpose vessel as described in []. [] has located a new 225 h.p., 2 cycle, Gray marine diesel engine for approximately \$4500. which would be an ideal power plant for our needs. We are extremely anxious to include sea infiltration in our 1953 operations as well as have a suitable vessel to service our island base. In order to start plans for the vessel's construction and take immediate advantage of a unique opportunity for the purchase of this engine, we would appreciate a quick reply to [].

WPH/RPE/lgk

Distribution:

Wash: 3
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