

VIA: AIR POUCH
(Specify air or sea pouch)

Dispatch No. OIRA - 577

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KAPOK ITALY # 2439

To : Chief, W E

Date 30 April 1953

FROM : []

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operational, Plan OBSTACLE
SPECIFIC- Re Funds Dropped to [] Mission on 23 May 1951.

Source : [] through []

Date of Info : 20 April 1953

Date Acquired : 29 April 1953

Reference : Kapok 1548 [] 8123)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

1. In a letter dated 20 April 1953, [] writing from Shabac Jugoslavia reports that mission funds dropped to [] on 25 May 1951 have been recovered. The pertinent portion of his letter, in translation, reads as follows:

- a) "A few days ago we received word that the package dropped over the Puka mountains on the night of 23 May 1951 has been recovered. Last summer [] was advised by a friend of his from Puka that the package had been found by a Midha peasant whose name we do not know. As our very close and trusted friend Rjeter KIMZA was about to proceed to the Mirdita on mission at that time, [] informed him of the finding of the package. KIMZA thus went to Midha, and forced the peasant to turn over to him the eight hundred gold pieces still in his possession. The other two hundred pieces apparently had already been spent by the peasant.
- b) "Acting on [] instructions, KIMZA cached the gold pieces in a safe place before returning to Jugoslavia.
- c) "[] orders in this connection are that when there will be a possibility of bringing the funds safely into Jugoslavia, they will be equitably distributed among mission members, local support personnel who are now in Jugoslavia, and among friends and collaborators of BKI here. These payments will be made as coming directly from BKI for welfare purposes.

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- d) [] has not mentioned this matter to any of the other members of our group. I shall keep you informed of any future developments."
2. In submitting the [] information set forth above, [] added his own comment as follows:
- a) [] information constitutes clear evidence of the influence exerted by BKI in northern Albania. This fact is in contrast to the claims of BKI's political enemies that that Party's political leaders enjoy no consideration in their homeland.
- b) Pjeter KIMZA discovered the man who had taken possession of the gold pieces dropped in 1951 and forcibly took possession of them while on a Yugoslav sponsored mission into the country. Nevertheless he did not mention the matter to Yugoslav authorities on his return, but revealed the matter only to [] and [] It should be noted that KIMZA was not a regular member of the mission, but only a local supporter. In this case he could have kept the gold pieces for himself, but following the discipline which is typical of the Mirdites, he informed his mission chiefs and asked for their instructions. It is believed that the majority of northern Albanian refugees in Yugoslavia similarly recognize BKI leadership and authority and, if necessary, will give like evidence of their fidelity.

3. Field Comment .

The above report answers the questions raised in paragraph 59 of Reference by clarifying the fate of the gold pieces dispatched on the last air drop of the operational phase of Plan CHARITY. It is logical to assume that the cypher instructions dropped at the same time did not fall into enemy hands as Reference held possible, but were either hidden or destroyed by the peasant who found the package.

4. It will be interesting to see if [] report will be confirmed by subsequent correspondence from [] and [] It is possible however that the latter, feeling their mail is subject to a stricter surveillance, may have instructed [] to report the matter for them, and will not make further mention of it themselves.
5. Although, as [] avers, the influence of BKI leaders in Yugoslavia over their followers may to a certain extent be demonstrated by the present incident, Albanian appreciation of security is not presented in a similarly favorable light. It is most likely that the existence of a gold cache in Albania will come to the knowledge of Yugoslav authorities interested in Albanian affairs, and that we shall hear more of the matter in the future.

4-Wash
2-Files
1-Source file
1-Plan file

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