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COUNTRY PLAN

ALBANIA

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COUNTRY PLAN - ALBANIA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I PURPOSE OF PLAN

PART II COLD WAR PLAN

I. GENERAL

✓II. MISSION

✓III. OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL MATTERS

V. CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS

PART III TRANSITION PLAN

I. GENERAL

II. MISSION

III. OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES

PART IV GENERAL WAR PLAN

I. GENERAL

II. MISSION

III. TASKS, PHASING AND PRIORITIES

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL MATTERS

V. CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS

PART V ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL MATTERS

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ANNEX A COLD WAR PLAN - INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

ANNEX B OPERATIONAL PLAN

TAB A PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS

TAB B UNDERGROUND OPERATIONS

TAB C POLITICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS

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COUNTRY PLAN (ALBANIA)

PART I

Purpose of the Plan

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COUNTRY PLAN (ALBANIA)

PART I

Purpose of the PlanI. GENERAL

A. The purpose of this plan is to indicate the manner in which the principles, missions and objectives of CIA/OPC are to be achieved in Albania, in relation both to the Cold War and to General War.

B. Part II covers Cold War activities.

C. Part III (the initial version of which has already been submitted) covers the so-called transition period consisting of the first ninety days following the outbreak of General War. Part III will be revised every 90 days.

D. Part IV covers general wartime activities.

E. Part V is to consist of administrative and logistical matters.

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COUNTRY PLAN (ALBANIA)

PART II

Cold War Plan

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COUNTRY PLAN - ALBANIA

PART II

Cold War PlanI. GENERALA. Purpose of the Plan

This plan provides for the organization, development and execution of covert measures prior to wartime and as directed by competent authority, to include preparation for, and effectuation of, conversion of covert assets to wartime use.

B. Period Covered by the Plan

The plan covers the period from 1 July 1951 to 30 June 1953.

C. Definition of Terms as Employed in the Plan

1. "Peace" (peacetime) as used herein refers to all situations short of overt war.
2. "D-Day" refers to the day on which conventional combat operations start in a general war.
3. "Wartime"(general war) indicates that period immediately following D-day when the USSR with or without satellites engages in hostilities deemed by the NATO or UN to constitute a "state of war."
4. "Resistance" refers to any internal clandestine activity against the ruling Communist regime.

D. Area of Responsibility

Albania.

E. Policy Basis

1. National Security Council

a. NSC Directives 10/2; 58; and 58/2 have set forth CIA/OPC policy towards the Eastern European satellites of the USSR.

b. NSC 58 predicates US policy toward the Soviet Orbit on the fundamental principle that the "U.S. should maintain as its objective the development in Eastern Europe of independent non-totalitarian and non-Communist governments willing to accommodate themselves to, and participate in, the free world community.

"As the most feasible course of action available at this time, the United States should attempt, by methods short of war, to disrupt the Soviet Satellite relationship and bring about the gradual reduction and eventual elimination of preponderant Soviet power and influence from Eastern Europe."

2. Joint Chiefs of Staff

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have assigned to CIA/OPC a major responsibility for implementing JCS unconventional warfare measure in the "Guidance for the Development of the Unconventional Warfare Plan in support of the

Joint Outline Emergency War Plan (JCS 1969/1).

b. JCS 1969/1 points out that "the task basic to the successful completion of all other tasks is that of building up the covert operations organization, including forces of resistance, to the magnitude and effectiveness desired. This is an immediate peacetime task which continues into wartime; its fulfillment will be a prerequisite to maximum accomplishment of resistance objectives."

3. CIA/OPC

a. U.S. policy of world-wide application is set forth in the CIA/OPC Strategic Plan (TS 604541.) CIA/OPC's function as the covert arm of U.S. policy is coordinated on a continuing basis with the Department of State, the Department of Defense and the National Security Council.

b. The CIA/OPC Plan of Operation for Albania, approved 22 June 1949, has been concurred in by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The four major objectives of this plan are:

(1) To fortify the hope of liberation among the Albanian people and to foster their will to resist communization;

(2) To establish a clandestine underground

for the implementation of U.S. policy toward the Soviet orbit. This apparatus should be capable, on short notice, of hampering any Soviet and/or Satellite move against Yugoslavia or Greece, and of serving as a nucleus for effective resistance in the event of a general war:

(3) To undermine, by a combination of covert operations, including psychological warfare, the political, economic and military structure of Communist Albania:

(4) To develop a political center of representative democratic Albanian refugees to serve as cover for overt activities and a covert operational support arm for projected OPC operations.

F. Assumptions

1. General Assumptions (CIA/ONE):

a. Overt hostilities have not begun prior to 30 June 1953;

b. Overt hostilities could, however, occur at any time prior to that date, beginning 1 July 1951.

(It should be pointed out that the JCS have selected 30 June 1952 as the assumed D-Day for war-planning purposes.)

2. Special Assumptions (CIA/OPC):

- a. Tension between geographically isolated Albania and her Western bloc neighbors, Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia will increase. It will be stimulated by reciprocal propaganda, spy trials, and protests of border violations. The central government will continue to emphasize the threat to Albanian territorial integrity presented by these countries in an attempt to retain some measure of popular support.
- b. For their part, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Italy will continue to operate rival subversive nets inside Albania. Of these, the most enterprising and successful initially will be the Yugoslav-sponsored "League of Albanian Political Refugees" with its subsidiary welfare and paramilitary groups.
- c. Repression will increase as the regime implements its "anti-terrorist" decree, which has imposed a virtual state of martial law on the country.
- d. Passive opposition will increase proportionately although, because of the regime's effective network of spies and informers, organized resistance independent of outside aid will not be able to develop.
- e. The pro-Soviet faction of the Albanian Worker's Party will retain and exercise control of the state

apparatus with the support and direction given by Soviet managers and "political advisers."

f. Because of the limited capacities of the Albanian Army and Albania's isolation from the Soviet orbit, the Soviet Union will be unable to use Albania as a base for significant offensive operations in the Balkans. An attempt will be made to bring the divisions up to full strength and to equip them with standard Russian models as a defensive measure against Greece or Yugoslavia in the event of war.

II. MISSION

A. Strategic Concept

The program for Albania envisages the utilization of all available covert assets to exploit the resistance potential in Albania, undermine the Soviet power complex, develop a covert offensive in support of U.S. policy aims in the Balkans, and, in the event of war, to assist in the accomplishment of Allied war aims.

B. Cold War Mission

1. To plan, develop, and apply OPC capabilities and assets in support of U.S. policy toward Albania under present Cold War conditions;
2. To plan and initiate measures permitting an orderly transition from the present state of undeclared war to actual hostilities;

3. To plan and establish facilities for conducting in wartime unconventional warfare in Albania in conformity with higher military and political directives.

C. Transition Period Mission

1. To conduct such operations in support of the appropriate U.S. emergency war plans for Albania as available capabilities permit.

2. To effect as rapidly as possible the orderly transition from the Cold War organization and activities to the necessary wartime command structure and operations.

3. To initiate such additional measures as will ensure the development and effective utilization, under the direction of the U.S. Theater Commander, of unconventional warfare measures commensurate with OPC wartime responsibilities in regard to Albania.

D. General War Mission

To support U. S. and Allied military forces and overall policies to the maximum by all covert means.

III. OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES

A. OPC activities vis-a-vis Albania comprise the following major categories:

1. Covert psychological, political and economic undertakings designed to facilitate the achievement of CIA/OPC objectives in Albania and to so assist in undermining the Soviet-Satellite relationship;

2. Development of such covert assets inside Albania in the form of a supporting underground organization as will be able to carry out intensified cold war missions against the Hoxha regime;

3. Preparations for developing and expanding unconventional warfare operations under the conditions of a general war. Among these three categories, first priority is being accorded cold war psychological, political and economic undertakings, but appropriate attention will be devoted to the organization of correlated resistance nets and to preparation for general war action. The ultimate aim is the complete integration of all covert operations to the extent that available capabilities permit.

B. Priority tasks to be accomplished include efforts:

1. To utilize all means of psychological warfare to bolster the morale of the Albanian people and give them a sense of direct participation in a dynamic resistance movement supported by the West; to stimulate passive resistance and active sabotage in keeping with current resources and long-range plans; to promote tension and strife between the "nationalist" Albanian Communist elements and the Soviet sycophants in positions of authority.

(See Operations Annex (E), Tab "A")

2. To develop an underground inside Albania responsive to U.S. guidance and direction, in communication with CIA/OPC field agents, and capable of expanding and assuming more aggressive roles in keeping with the development of support facilities.

(See Operations Annex (B), Tab "B")

3. To develop a political center outside Albania composed of representatives of non-totalitarian elements sympathetic with U.S. policy objectives in the Balkans, to serve as a rallying point for anti-Communist elements inside Albania and in exile.

(See Operations Annex (B), Tab "C")

4. To develop and execute economic warfare measures designed to reduce the economic potential of Albania, disrupt planning, production and distribution and undermine the Soviet-Satellite politico-economic relationship by inciting further discontent on the part of the population and by dislocating efforts by local Communist leaders to meet commitments.

5. To acquire and organize such additional assets of a covert nature as will permit CIA/OPC to achieve its mission in Albania under intensified cold war conditions or in the event of war.

(Detailed logistical studies will be prepared later.)

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL MATTERS

Comment on these matters will be submitted after detailed guidance has been provided.

V. CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS

A. Command Relationships

1. Command relationships between CIA/OPC, Washington, and overseas installations will be as follows:

a. During the present Cold War phase, OPC Headquarters, Washington will exercise direct control and supervision of current operations directed against the Balkan satellites. It is planned to gradually transfer direction of these operations to a location nearer the area of operations, eventually to Tripoli as the tempo of the cold war increases. Washington Headquarters will continue to provide overall policy guidance and support.

b. In time of war, overall control of current operations will pass to CINCNELM or the Senior Theater Commander.

2. CIA/OPC orders to the Theater Command will be transmitted through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

B. Liaison Relationships

1. Divisional and appropriate Branch Officers respon-

sible for the implementation of the plan will maintain liaison with The Departments of State and Defense.

2. OPC will maintain liaison with the Theater Commander (CINCNEIM) either directly, or via the OPC Representative with the Theater Staff.

3. Relationships with clandestine services of other nations will be coordinated through Washington Headquarters.

4. Direct liaison between CIA/OPC and military, naval, and air units designated in direct support of covert operations is authorized.

C. Field Stations

1. OPC Field Stations supporting or capable of supporting operations against Albania are now located at [] Frankfurt, and [] (in process of being established.)

2. A Field Station at [] to support current operations, is now in the ^{existence.} ~~project planning stage.~~

3. In addition, a CIA/OPC Headquarters Station will be established in the Mediterranean Area (ultimately []) as indicated above.

4. Field Headquarters for the Albania operations are now located at []

D. Communications

1. CIA will provide the necessary signal plans, codes, and Signal Operating Instructions.


2. Individual radio frequencies will be assigned to each team or circuit in Albania.

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COUNTRY PLAN (ALBANIA)

PART III

Transition Plan



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COUNTRY PLAN (ALBANIA)

PART III

Transition Plan

(See WE/EE/NF Emergency Transition Plan, TS61789)

I. GENERAL

A. Purpose: The Transition Plan will provide for the immediate utilization of CIA personnel and materiel in the event of war to achieve maximum operational effectiveness and to effectuate at the earliest practicable moment the necessary regrouping and reorientation of the command structure.

B. Assumptions:

1. War has been forced on the U.S. by the USSR and/or its Satellites.

2. Complete integration of OPC and OSO will not have been effected. - This has been done - Summer 1962

II. MISSION

To dispose and activate all available US and indigenous Albanian operational personnel on or about D-Day to support the appropriate emergency war plans of the JCS and the Theater Commander.

III. OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES

A. To effect the necessary transition in operations and command structure, deploying as a matter of high priority key personnel and files from ^SWE headquarters, Washington, and from threatened advance bases to a CIA/OPC Mediterranean Headquarters, where Albanian

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unconventional warfare operations will be integrated into overall Balkan Strategy.

B. To activate all covert assets in support of approved Allied wartime objectives with due attention to long range requirements regarding the sound utilization of the resistance potential.

C. To organize and reinforce CIA/OPC control over indigenous resistance forces and to effect the delivery of large-scale materiel aid to the CIA/OPC underground in Albania for distribution to local resistance groups.

D. To initiate such additional action as may be required to ensure the development of necessary resupply channels, stockpiles, personnel pools, training facilities and specialized equipment for a sustained war effort.

FOR ALBANIAN TRANSITION PLAN

SEE

113.A

COUNTRY PLAN PART III-TRANSITION

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
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COUNTRY PLAN (ALBANIA)

PART IV

General War



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COUNTRY PLAN (ALBANIA)

PART IV

General WarI. GENERALA. Purpose

This plan provides for the development, prior to war, of the necessary covert plans, assets and capabilities to support Allied military war plans and for the execution of these plans in wartime under appropriate military command and as otherwise directed by competent authority.

B. The period covered by this plan is from 1 July 1951 to 30 June 1954.

C. Definitions

1. "Peace" or "peacetime" as used herein refers to all conditions short of overt general war.

2. For the purposes of this paper, "D-Day" refers to the day on which actual conventional combat operations start in a general war.

3. Wartime (General war): That period immediately following D-Day, vis., when the USSR with or without satellites engages in hostilities deemed by NATO or UN as constituting a "state of war".

D. Area of Responsibility: Albania

E. Assumptions

1. Basic Assumptions: This plan may be effective at any moment, but full implementation is predicated on the assumption that actual hostilities will not begin before 30 June 1953.

2. Special Assumption (JCS): M-Day may be identical with D-Day.

3. Added Special Assumptions:(CIA):

a. Although the Soviet Union may decide to call into play the Albanian-Bulgarian Mutual Assistance Pact to justify overt military operations in the Balkans, Albania will not be used itself to initiate or even to give significant support to such operations.

b. Unless the Bulgarian Army is able to overrun southern Yugoslavia, effecting a juncture with Albanian Forces, The Albanian Army will be primarily concerned with the maintenance of internal order and the protection of the country from invasion by Yugoslavia and/or Greece.

c. Given the above conditions, control of the hinterland will be relinquished to resistance elements operating in conjunction with Greek and Yugoslav forces. These may be nominally headed by Albanian refugees to assure the support of the local population.

d. In the event of military defeat for the Soviet-bloc

forces, the Albanian troops, exclusive of most officers and Security police, would probably desert across the borders in large numbers.

F. Intelligence Digest

1. Enemy Forces

a. General Vulnerabilities: Under wartime conditions, Albanian military forces are expected to be primarily concerned with the maintenance of Communist authority over a rebellious population, which is according to recent exfiltrates, hopefully awaiting the outbreak of hostilities before staging an open revolt. The offensive capabilities of the Armed Forces are negligible because of the small numbers involved and the low level of Albanian military efficiency, resulting from Albania's serious deficiencies in all supplies needed to equip and support a modern offensive army. Albania's geographical isolation from the Soviet bloc combined with inadequate harbor and airfield facilities makes the supply of military equipment by the Soviets in time of war virtually impossible unless an overland route through Greece or Yugoslavia is first assured. The USSR is currently attempting to reduce this handicap to the Armed Forces by sending grains for stockpiling and by

supplying limited amounts of military equipment. As most of these shipments are effected clandestinely, it is difficult to ascertain accurately the extent of modernization of the Albanian Armed Forces. It is believed, however, that much of the equipment is obsolete, requiring the importation of all replacement parts. The relatively small amount of such military aid, together with the intrinsic weakness of the Albanian Army, suggests that in open hostilities the USSR might be forced to abandon her western outpost in the Adriatic.

b. Soviet Military Forces in Albania:

(1) There are at present no tactical Soviet troops stationed in Albania.

(2) Soviet control of the Albanian Armed Forces is assured by the assignment of Soviet military and political "advisers" to Albanian Army units down to the ^{brigade} ~~battalion~~ level.

(3) The greatest concentration of Soviet military personnel is at the port of Vlone, site of the Soviet Technical Defense Command. Soviet control of this port, the Karaburun peninsula and the Island of Saseno is reportedly complete.

(4) Soviet military personnel in Albania is estimated at less than 600. Total Soviet personnel, including families, probably totals less than 3,000.

c. Indigenous Forces:

(1) The total number of men under arms is estimated at between 55,000 and 70,000. The top figure would include draftees not considered politically reliable and used in labor battalions.

(2) Ground Forces: The Albanian Field Army consists of four infantry divisions of approximately 10,000 men each. These are stationed at the capital, Tirana, and at strategic points along Albania's frontiers with Greece and Yugoslavia, i.e., in Shkoder, Gjinkaster, and Korce. Autonomous units include an independent tank regiment, equipped with some tanks of Italian and German make in poor condition and at least 16 Soviet T-34's.

(3) Navy: The Albanian Navy is subordinate to the Army General Staff. Total personnel is estimated at 800 officers and enlisted men. Albanian naval strength consists of some 30 small craft, the most formidable being 14 motor torpedo boats of Soviet origin, nine acquired in July 1950.

(4) Air Force: The Albanian Air Force, estimated at 600, is as yet in the embryonic stage. The primary function of the Directorate of the Air Force is the maintenance of anti-aircraft facilities and the supervision of repair and construction work undertaken on Albania's few airfields. Deficiencies in production and repair facilities combined with a lack of trained personnel to service and fly planes are expected to prevent the development of an Albanian Air Force of any significance.

Recent confirmed reports of the presence of Soviet YAK-9's in Tirana do not necessarily indicate a desire on the part of the USSR to utilize Albania as a forward air base. Although Yugoslav Intelligence estimates Albanian air strength at as many as 17 YAK-9's and 5 Sturmoviks, such Soviet planes as are now in Albania are probably only to prevent foreign overflights.

(5) Frontier Units: The guarding of the frontier and coast are the particular domain of the Border-Coastal Command, reportedly divided into a Yugoslav-Sector Command, a Greek Sector Command, and a Coastal Sector Command. It is believed that the Border Guard was formed from former DMP (special security police) units at the time of its dissolution in 1949. These are reported to number 15 autonomous units with a

strength of 600-700 men each. The strength of the Coastal Sector Command is put at 4,500; coastal regiments are reportedly based at Albania's two main harbors, Durres and Vlone.

(6) Security Forces:

(a) Gendarmerie (Policija): The Policija is the executive agency of the law having jurisdiction over crimes against the common penal code. It operates a country-wide network of small units (5-10 men). Its estimated strength is 7000 uniformed men carrying only light arms. This group is believed to be no more than 50% reliable.

(b) Sigurimi: The Sigurimi, a secret police organization, parallels the gendarmerie in reaching to the lowest branches of the Albanian political and social structure. A branch of the Ministry of the Interior, the Sigurimi is believed to comprise less than 10,000 agents in Albania, 90% of whom are believed to be firm Communists.

(c) Special Pursuit Brigades: These are reportedly 3 "Special Pursuit Brigades" consisting of reliable Communists only. They are responsible for the annihilation of resistance forces in the outlying areas. Each brigade is believed to be composed of 350-400 men.

b. Capabilities and Intentions

(1) Capabilities: The Albanian Armed Forces at present have no offensive capacities. In time of hostilities, they are expected to retain control of the coastal plain, abandoning the mountainous hinterland to guerrilla resistance forces. Even on the relatively controllable plain they will encounter difficulties in maintaining Communist authority. The unreliability of the Army itself constitutes a serious vulnerability, since large groups of disaffected enlisted personnel are expected to defect across the borders.

(2) Training: The recalcitrance and independence of the Albanian soldier are being currently combated by the Soviet Union's attempts to infuse Communist fanaticism by means of propaganda and indoctrination. Special courses under Soviet instructors, both in the Soviet Union and in Albania, are designed to supply the technical knowledge that so gravely handicaps the Albanian Army. Of the estimated 1,000 Albanians sent to the Soviet Union every year, probably 500 are military personnel from all branches of the Service.

(3) Equipment: Prior to 1947 most of the equipment

consisted of captured Italian and German arms. In 1948 there began the gradual and systematic replacement of captured weapons with Soviet makes. Although the supply of equipment has been recently accelerated with the arrival of Soviet planes, Czech vehicles, machinery, and gasoline fuel and lubricants, it is believed that these shipments are insufficient in quantity to make up for Albania's deficiencies in replacement parts, tires, machine tools, and processed petroleum products.

(4) Geographic location: Albania's strategic position as a Soviet base on the Adriatic is considered extremely vulnerable, presenting more of a liability than an asset to the USSR in time of war. Surrounded by anti-Cominform countries which are even now conducting anti-regime operations, Albania would be subject to invasion on all sides at the outbreak of war. The supply of military equipment to Albania under such conditions would be dependent upon securing an overland route through Yugoslavia or Greece, since present air or sea routes would be inadequate and subject to constant attack from bases in Italy.

c. The Albanian Communist Regime (See also Intelligence Summary)

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(1) The Albanian Workers Party:

At its first open congress in 1948, the Albanian Worker's Party announced its membership at 29,000 regular members and 16,000 members on probation, or 3.9% of the population. No official membership figures have been released since 1948; the extensive purge that followed this Congress plus the one now in progress indicates a rapid turnover of membership and presumably a reduced enrollment.

(2) Communist Front Groups in Albania:

(a) The Democratic Front: Claiming the adherence of all Albanians, this monolithic front was until 1948 the only official political grouping in Albania. It represents more the nebulous fiction of unanimity to be utilized by the Communist Party in effecting its policies than an organized cohesive political group.

(b) Trade Unions: The General Syndical Union was formed in 1945 to unify the few small craft organizations that had retained their existence during the war. At that time six all-inclusive syndicates were unified, comprising workers in

the fields of mines, industry, building and construction, civil service, transportation, and distribution and supply. Membership was estimated at 23,000 or half the prewar wage earners. In 1946 the Syndical Union claimed 32,000 members, and in 1947, 46,000. At present it is believed that membership includes some 65,000 workers.

Agit-prop units in each local section have been extremely active in orienting the Albanian Workers toward Communist ideology. As a group, the workers have probably benefited from the regime more than the peasants; lacking any anti-Communist trade union tradition such as existed in other European countries they were unable and unwilling to resist incorporation in a mass organization subject to Communist manipulation. The General Syndical Union is affiliated with the WFTU and has played an active part in Balkan trade-union activities.

(c) Working Youth Societies: The General Syndical Union has organized Working Youth Societies in all industrial centers with the purpose of screening and orienting young workers for future membership in the Communist Party.

(d) Union of Working Youth: This mass organization was formed in 1949, when the People's Youth and the Communist Youth of Albania organizations merged. All Albanians between the ages of 16 and 30 are members. In August 1951, Radio Tirana announced that 102,000 young men and women had participated in various building projects since the liberation. Most of these were recruited from the ranks of the Union of Working Youth. It is believed that their support for the regime has been diminished by the terrible working conditions and hardships endured on the various state projects at which they were employed.

(e) League of Albanian Women: This organization claims to have 246,000 members and hence must include almost every Albanian female over 16. Women played an important role in supporting the partisan forces during World War II. That they are increasing their importance in Albanian social life is testified by the fact that there are now over 12,000 women employed in industry, artisan and agricultural cooperatives, and national and local administration, as opposed to a few hundred employed

before the war.

(f) The Albanian-Soviet Society for Cultural Relations: During 1950 this organization doubled its membership from 53,000 to an alleged 114,000 members. Increased Russian interest in stimulating pro-Russian sentiment in a traditionally anti-Slav country may account for its transference into a mass society. Through meetings, speeches, literary gatherings, movies, and the publishing of text books, this organization performs a most important propaganda function.

(g) Society for Aid to the Army and Defense: Founded in 1949, this organization claimed a total membership of 41,000. Open for membership to all citizens at the age of 16, the society is actually paramilitary in concept. It offers courses in various skills for the support of military operations, such as communications and the operating of machines and vehicles. It is doubted that members are given military training as such because of the lack of equipment.

(h) Sports organizations: Presumably also of a paramilitary nature, these groups claimed 80,000

members in February 1951.

2. Friendly Forces:

a. U.S. and Allied:

There are no U.S. forces in the immediate area of Albania, apart from the VI Fleet in the Mediterranean, that would be available to support military operations in the country.

The adherence of Greece and Italy to NATO, however, strengthens the Allied front in the Balkan area, facilitates operations against the Albanian Communist regime and supplements the military potential available to the U.S. in the event of war.

The reorientation of Yugoslavia toward the West and the steady development of military ties between Yugoslavia and the NATO powers may be expected to act as a deterrent to unilateral Yugoslav operations against the Hoxha regime. In the event of war, it is assumed that Yugoslavia will be aligned with the West, will coordinate to some extent with the Western Powers on strategy and the tactical disposition of its forces, and ~~will~~^{may} provide advanced military and supply bases.

b. Friendly Native Elements

(1) American or NATO-sponsored troops operating in Albania may expect to receive the moral and material aid of at least 90% of the Albanian populace. Support

of this nature may be expected particularly in the outlying regions, where Communist control has been most firmly resisted.

(2) Political Parties (Suppressed) Albania's political parties were formed during World War II or in exile. Except for the Communist Party, they have never had the opportunity to exercise political power and consequently to develop their organizations in Albania.

(a) The Balli Kombetar, an anti-Communist resistance group, drew its main strength from the south central region. The exile of its leaders during and immediately after the "liberation" process has seriously handicapped its development as a clandestine organization inside Albania. The exiled leaders claim that significant support of the organization still exists, although the extent of this support cannot be determined. The present Balli Kombetar has a moderate agrarian-socialist orientation.

(b) The Legalitet (Monarchist) Party purports to represent ex-king Zog. It suffers from the same disadvantage as the BK, since Zog has not been in Albania since 1939 and Abas Kupi, the

resistance hero and Legalitet leader, fled in 1944. The Mati area, home of both of these "strong men" presumably contains much anti-Communist potential.

(c) The Eloku Kombetar Independent, unlike the first-named parties, does not receive the political support of the United States, although it was able to maintain contact with the northern Catholic tribes until early 1951. While these tribesmen are currently fleeing to Yugoslavia in increasing numbers, they are reportedly very pro-American and would cooperate extensively with U.S. operations in the northern mountains. ✓

(3) Religious Groups. The control of Albania's three religious groups, Moslem, Orthodox, and Catholic, has been assumed by the Communist Party. Religious conviction among Albanian Moslems, constituting 70% of the population, was never great and one could not expect aid from them on that basis. Pro-Communist figureheads of the Moslem community are being courted by the Soviet Union in return for their complete subservience. The Orthodox Church representing 20% of the population, concentrated

largely in Southern Albania, has in like manner been subverted to Communist ends. Its closest connections are now with the Patriarch in Moscow rather than with the Patriarch in Istanbul, as was the case formerly. The Catholic tribes constitute the only religious group which has been actively anti-Communist. Comprising only 10% of the population and located almost entirely in the northern Mirdite area, the Catholics have been subjected to severe persecution. Of 120 priests, 40 have been executed and 30 are now in prison. A recent government decree dissolving all bonds with Rome and making the Albanian Church directly dependent upon the state constitutes another step in the Communist program of eliminating all social groups opposed to their ends.

(4) Peasants: The peasants comprise approximately 85% of the population. Although they benefited at first from Communist land distribution policies, they have subsequently suffered greatly as a class from exorbitant taxation. Refugees report that the peasants constitute the social group most firmly opposed to the regime.

(5) Indigenous Albanian Assets available for ✓

employment: Present OPC plans for operations in Albania envisage the recruiting and training of an additional guard company, making a total of two (500 agents), and the infiltration of 50 agents by 30 June 1952. Given the widespread although at present uncoordinated opposition to the regime, it should be possible to recruit initially at least 2,000 guerrillas from opposition elements now awaiting outside assistance.

II. MISSION

A. Strategic Concept of Operations: By conducting unconventional warfare to reduce the Soviet war potential and capabilities in Albania and to support to the maximum the Allied counter-offensive in its military and political objectives by all covert means.

B. Mission Prior to War: To plan and develop assets for covert operations in support of the general war effort.

C. Wartime Mission: In the event of war, the OPC mission will be to achieve the following with respect to Albania:

1. To neutralize Albanian forces and/or Soviet forces engaged in Albania in counter-resistance activities by developing and conducting unconventional warfare operations.

2. To conduct sabotage against Albanian and Soviet military facilities and assets of all types which could be used to support an offensive in the West, such as dumps

containing fuel and lubricants, munitions and other supplies; power installations; communications; naval bases; air fields; and other military installations.

3. To establish an underground movement which will comprise an initial resistance force of 2,000.

4. To establish escape and evasion nets for the return of U.S. and Allied military personnel from enemy territory, the Albanian net, being linked to other systems in adjacent areas.

5. To establish exfiltration apparatuses for the removal of key Albanian and Soviet personnel, either by force or through induced defection.

6. To influence, by covert psychological warfare, the opinion, attitude and behaviour of enemy, neutral and friendly groups, with the purpose of assisting in the accomplishment of the above war objectives.

7. To continue planning for the support of future operations.

8. To plan and organize CIA/OPC clandestine operations of a political nature, both during and at the conclusion of hostilities, that will further the achievement of U.S. policy objectives with respect to Albania.

III. TASKS, PHASING AND PRIORITIES

A. Major undertakings in the event of a war involving Albania are:

1. The development of underground forces for such operations as may be required to accomplish CIA/OPC's wartime mission in Albania. This will necessitate the development of a training system for indigenous personnel on a scale considerably greater than that called for in Cold War operations. It will require training in sabotage, guerrilla warfare, and communications; and the development of a communications system for the underground apparatus. Auxiliary nets will be required for the following specialized tasks:

a. Conducting a planned program of sabotage against the communications system, port facilities, military installations and depots, and such industrial or mining assets as are of value to the Soviet war effort.

b. Contacting, organizing and directing resistance elements inside Albania responsive to Western objectives.

c. Contacting Allied personnel trapped inside Albanian territory, protecting them from hostile forces, and effecting their escape from enemy territory and return to duty.

2. The enlargement of the scope of psychological warfare measures against the Communist authority in Albania and the intensification of propaganda activity. This will call for

the expansion of facilities for the dissemination of propaganda both by radio and the printed word by such means as supplying radios to the potential audience and the infiltration of hand presses and duplicating machines inside Albania.

3. The overthrow of the Albanian Communist Government and the establishment of an interim Government compatible with U.S. objectives with respect to Albania.

D. Phasing:

1. Phase 1: D to D plus three months.

a. Establish a wartime headquarters, command and liaison organization and advance support base in the Theater of Operations.

b. Deploy all assets immediately available to reinforce the Albanian underground, particularly with sabotage and guerrilla activators.

c. Initiate the intensified training and infiltration of cadres of U.S. personnel to direct and assist the resistance organization.

d. Intensify PW activities designed to demoralize the Albanian armed forces, encouraging mass desertion and stimulating popular resistance.

2. Phase 2: D plus three to D plus 12 months.

a. Effect the regular delivery of arms, equipment and supplies, and organize supply channels to replenish stocks.

b. Continue and reinforce the PW operations directed at the enemy military forces and Albanian civil populations, exploiting to the maximum the popular resistance potential.

c. Conduct covert operations designed to harass the enemy forces, destroy hostile lines of communication, dislocate civil controls, and deny control of the Albanian hinterland to the enemy.

d. Increase the number of U.S. agents in Albania and undertake measures necessary to ensure the availability of requisite trained personnel and supplies to meet maximum wartime requirements.

3. Phase 3: D plus 12 to D plus 24 months.

Continue and intensify the activities outlined above with the aim of minimizing Albania's contribution to the Soviet war effort, developing the resistance force to its maximum optimum potential, and if possible eliminating Albania as a Soviet base of operations on the Adriatic.

4. Phase 4: D plus 24 months to end of the war.

Coordinate all covert activities in Albania and adjacent territory to assist in forcing the retreat of Albanian Communist and/or other pro-Soviet forces, harassing their withdrawal, and organizing pro-Western control in liberated area.

IV. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

To be prepared at a later date.

V. CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS

A. Command Relationships:

At the initiation of hostilities, the direction of OPC field operations will be transferred from control of CIA/OPC, Washington, to the appropriate theater commander in coordination with the OPC Theater Headquarters.

B. Liaison Relationships:

Under all conditions liaison with other Government agencies and with representatives of foreign intelligence services will be maintained by CIA/OPC Headquarters, Washington, being delegated to designated field representative when required.

C. Field Stations:

In case of war, the staff of the []nd []
[] will be subordinated to the OPC Headquarters
base at []

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D. Communications:

1. Wartime signal plans will be developed by the Communications Division, CIA/OPC, and coordinated with the Theater Commander.

2. CIA/OPC clandestine radios will operate on assigned frequencies.

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
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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

COLD WAR

ANNEX "A"



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ANNEX AINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY - COLD WAR

1. The Albanian Government

a. Relations with the United States and the West

(1) During World War II, the Great Powers encouraged and supported organized resistance to the Italian and German occupation forces in Albania through liaison teams that worked with the more important nationalist groups and Communist-led Partisan forces. The British mission to the Partisan Headquarters soon found themselves taking a back-seat to the Yugoslavs in every respect except where the provision of supplies was concerned. Even before the German troops departed, it had become evident to many observers that the Partisan "Army of National Liberation", working in close collaboration with the Yugoslav partisans, was devoting much of its efforts to the elimination of all other western-sponsored resistance groups. The honeymoon of collaboration between the Communist and non-Communist resistance in Albania ended in 1943, before it had even taken form. Anti-Communist resistance leaders who had worked with the West, such as Abas Kupa and Said Kryeziu fled Albania in 1944, realizing that the regime to be established would annihilate them. The seizure of power by the Communists, based upon the military successes of the Partisan Army of National Liberation against

both the occupying German forces and the non-Communist resistance groups, entailed thereafter the progressive repudiation of all ties with the West.

(2) Despite this trend of events concomitant with "liberation", the Great Powers gave provisional recognition to the government of the National Liberation Army leader, Enver Hoxha, in November 1945. Official British and American military missions had been in the country since liberation. UNRRA signed an agreement with the Albanian Government in August 1945 whereby an UNRRA mission transferred relief supplies to the Albanian Government at the port of entry for distribution to the people. Relations between the Western representatives and the Yugoslav supported central government, which had begun to deteriorate before liberation, were forced to the breaking point in 1946, when conspiracy trials were used to accuse the West of entertaining subversive intentions against Albania. The Corfu Channel incident in October 1946 in which 2 British warships were damaged by Albanian mines further hastened the rupture of diplomatic relations. The American diplomatic mission left in November of the same year following the Albanian government's refusal to honor the treaty obligations assumed by the government of former King Zog in its relations with the United States. In 1947, new tensions arose between the U.S. and Albania in

connection with another spy trial in which the accused maintained in court that the American and British missions had encouraged them to start an insurrection against the Hoxha regime. Since that time, Albania has increasingly shut itself off from all contact with the West, except through tenuous diplomatic ties with France and Italy. The Albanian Government tolerates the intermittent and circumscribed presence of French and Italian representatives in Tirana in return for the advantages of trade with Italy, and the opportunities for espionage and propaganda provided by Albanian Legations in Paris and Rome.

(3) Although the United States was relatively unimportant in Albanian politics by comparison with the influence wielded by Albania's neighbors and by the British, the United States was well known to the people through its humanitarian enterprises in Albania. The technical school in Tirana, an American foundation directed by Mr. Harry Fultz, was probably the best educational institution in Albania until its dissolution by the Communists. Although the UNRRA mission was exploited by the Albanian Communist Government for its own ends, American aid from this source provided food grains sufficient to feed one-third of the population, seed, farm machinery, and vehicles for the distribution of foods, some of which are still in use. The knowledge that the United States provided such aid in the past and that it has no territorial interests in Albania undoubtedly places the U.S. in a unique position in the eyes of the

Albanian people.

(4) The Soviet-directed government, in attempting to eradicate all pro-Western sentiment through its control of the media of mass communication, has for six years attributed to the United States and Great Britain an all-encompassing plan of aggression in the Balkans, to be instigated by their satellites, Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia. Appreciating the lack of direct appeal presented by its anti-American position, the government prefers to capitalize on Albania's traditional suspicion of its western-bloc neighbors, all of which have in the past maintained claims on Albanian territory. Its principal propaganda attacks are directed against these countries, which are regularly accused of disseminating anti-regime leaflets, of harboring subversive exile groups, and of violations of Albanian territorial integrity.

(5) One other aspect of Albanian-American relations, the connections of the Tirana regime with Americans of Albanian descent, should be mentioned. Hoxha has received the support of a significant portion of Albanian-Americans through the adherence of Bishop Fan Noli of Boston to the Communist line. The Bishop's influence on the Albanian Community here, both as political and religious leader, has been hitherto uncontested. This nucleus of opposition to U.S. policy objectives in Albania is, however, now being threatened by the current activities of pro-Western

Bishop Marco Lipa, who succeeded in wresting two Albanian Orthodox churches from Noli's control in the Boston area during the past year.

b. Position of the Albanian Government toward the USSR

(1) Following Hoxha's decision to adhere to the Soviet bloc at the time of the Yugoslav-Cominform breach in mid-1948, the Yugoslav technicians and advisers who had largely controlled the state apparatus were accused of colonial exploitation, and expelled. They were replaced by Russian and, to a lesser extent, other Satellite personnel. Estimates of the present size of the Soviet contingent in Albania vary greatly. While it is believed that there are no more than 3,000 Soviets including families in the country, their dominant positions in the Army, the Administration, and the economy ensure Soviet direction of three chief components of state control.

(2) Chief of the Soviet delegation to Albania is Minister Dimitri Chuvakhin who reportedly heads the Soviet espionage activities in Albania, controls the security police through Moscow-trained Mehmet Shehu, Minister of the Interior, and directs the Albanian cabinet ministers, each of whom has a Soviet "technical adviser" permanently attached to his office. The Soviet military mission, headed by General Ioakin Sokolov, is in virtual control of Albania's military forces through

the assignment of Soviet army officers to Albanian units down to the Brigade level. Soviet personnel also serve as instructors at military training establishments. It should be noted that there are no Soviet combat formations in Albania, nor are there any units in an advisory capacity capable of being developed into combat troops. In January 1951, the presence of Soviet Air Force personnel in Albania was reported for the first time; their arrival appears to have accompanied the influx of Soviet personnel in the Foreign Ministry and in the fields of culture and education. The Soviet Union has also undertaken to supply technicians for the development of Albania's primitive industries since Albania seriously lacks technically competent personnel.

(3) Any last minute defection of the Tirana regime to the National Communist camp would appear to be precluded by the tensions existing between Tirana and Belgrade, which are heightened by mutual recriminations and increasingly serious border incidents. This supposition is supported by the effectiveness of the control directly exercised by the Soviet advisers and by the dependence of Albania upon the Soviet-Satellite nations for economic aid.

c. Stability of the Government

(1) While Hoxha's decision to break with Yugoslavia isolated Albania from its closest ally, it strengthened Hoxha's hand in two respects: The annexation of the Albanian-inhabited Kosovo

area by Mussolini in 1941 had been very popular, and its restitution to Tito in 1944 had cost Hoxha prestige. This source of embarrassment was removed to some extent when Tito and Hoxha entered separate camps. At the same time, the break afforded an opportunity to eliminate those Communists who were most closely associated with the Yugoslavs, some of whom wielded considerable power in the party, and to replace them with men directly dependent upon Hoxha and Shehu. The Minister of the Interior, Koci Xoxe, and the head of the State Control Commission, Pandi Kristo, were accused of betraying the interests of party and country in favor of the Yugoslavs. Their trial and subsequent removal insured the control of the pro-Soviet faction of Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu. It is now believed that Xoxe had actually organized a conspiratorial group whose members held important posts within the Albanian Communist party, the administration, the Army, and the Security Forces. While many of these were removed during the purge on all levels that paralleled the trials of the top deviationists, there undoubtedly remain in positions of trust some remnants of a pro-Yugoslav, national Communist party which represent a constant threat to the Hoxha-Shehu government.

(2) The much-rumored rivalry between Moscow trained Mehmet

Shehu, Minister of the Interior, and the ex-school teacher, Premier Enver Hoxha, has not yet manifested itself to a significant degree. Both seem to have consolidated their position at the expense of what moderate elements remained in the Albanian Government following the recent deposition of former Minister of Justice, Manol Konomi, and vice-premier, Tuk Jakova. Although implications of the Cabinet shake-up that followed the February 1951 bomb explosion in the Soviet Legation have not yet been fully determined, the resultant increase of power in the hands of Shehu was assured by the "anti-terrorist" decree passed by the Presidium immediately following the explosion, which gave the Minister of the Interior the power of summary execution without trial.

(3) So long as the USSR continues to provide the support and direction of the dominant pro-Soviet faction of the Albanian Communist Party, the present Government of Albania appears securely established. Should the Soviet Union feel obliged in time of crisis to abandon her western outpost on the Adriatic, a successful challenge to the present regime could be expected.

d. Ability to support Soviet aggression

(1) Albania's armed forces, including four divisions of about 10,000 men each plus security and special border forces

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numbering an additional 15,000, are too poorly equipped and trained to constitute a threat to its neighbors at this time. (See Intelligence Digest Part IV for a more complete estimate of their strength). Although Albania was used successfully by the Yugoslavs as a forward base of operations in support of the Greek guerrillas, it is not believed that the Soviets are currently desirous or capable of utilizing Albania in the same way because of that Satellite's present isolated and vulnerable position. Few preparations have been undertaken to fortify Albanian harbors other than Saseno and the Karaburun peninsula now reportedly completely controlled by Soviet personnel. On both the mainland and island, extensive repairs and new fortifications have reportedly been undertaken presumably with a view to rendering Albania usable as a forward submarine base in the eastern Adriatic. Recent reports that Saseno is being currently used by Soviet submarines have not been confirmed. Other harbors, while closely guarded, have been barely restored to commercial use. The vulnerability of Albania's mainland harbors to air attack, as demonstrated during the last war, may account for the seeming unwillingness on the part of the Soviet Union to expand them for military operations in the Adriatic. Very much the same lack of development is remarked in Albania's few, rudimentary airfields,

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most of which have been restored to pre-war conditions without being expanded to handle new jet-type planes. The arrival of Soviet YAK-9's, the most modern planes yet reported in Albania, seems primarily designed to prevent foreign overflights and to impress the Albanian people with evidence of Soviet support. It is doubted that the Soviet Union intends to utilize Albanian facilities for offensive air operations.

(2) Albania's road and rail networks are primitive and difficult to maintain or develop because of the rugged terrain of all but the coastal plain of Albania. The sole railroad, which forms a quadrangle connecting the four cities, Elbasan, Tirana, Durres and Peqin, serves principally to transport goods from the coast to the capital. The equipment is so obsolete that the line is frequently out of commission and a large proportion of the imports have to be brought from the port to the capital by trucks. The main highways connecting the important cities of Shkoder, Tirana, Vlone and Gjinokaster have been repaired and are usable for military traffic along the coastal plain. East-west highways from Shkoder to Kukes and from Durres to Bilisht are harder to maintain where they pass through difficult mountainous terrain.

Although the extension of the communications network is one of the principal state undertakings with high priority in the Soviet-formulated plans for Albania's industrial development, both rail and road networks are still so primitive as to preclude their use for large troop movements or logistic support of significant offensive operations.

(3) While purported threats to Albanian "independence" by Yugoslavia or Greece might be used by the Soviets as justification for aggression in the Balkans by means of the Satellites, it is improbable that any such offensive move could be initiated from Albania or even supported to a significant degree from there in the light of Albania's primitive economy, the isolation from the sources of supply, and the internal opposition to the regime that constantly threatens the central government.

2. Friendly Forces

a. Parties represented on the NCFA

(1) Four of the exiled Albanian political parties are now cooperating with the United States in covert operations against the Hoxha regime. Of these, three are currently represented on the OPC-sponsored National Committee for Free Albania. In qualifying for membership in that body they purport to represent suppressed political groups still within

Albania. The Balli Kombetar (BK), now in a position of dominance in the NCFA, was formed during the German occupation and represented conservative, nationalist elements whose strength lay mainly in the southern and central cities. However, since the summer of 1950, the BK has split into two factions, the splinter group under Klissura retaining the conservative label and the majority ^{Ermenje Dosti} ~~Ermenje~~ faction representing agrarian-socialist tendencies. The BK was the first to be defeated by force of arms when in 1943 the Communists, seeing the Germans content to control just the large cities and the necessary lines of communication, attacked the BK forces in strength. By so doing, the Communists forced the BK into the compromising position of receiving German aid through the indigenous, German-sponsored Tirana Government in order to protect themselves against the Partisan attackers. The Communists later employed the same tactics against the remaining important resistance forces of Abas Kupa, who now represents the Legalitet (Monarchist) Party on the NCFA. Kupa and his forces, unlike the majority of Communists or the BK members were Gheg tribesmen from the Mati area, north of Tirana, where Zog originally drew his strength. Like the BK, however, the Legalitet Party leaders were forced to flee Albania in 1944 when the Communists finally conquered the Mati. Both parties undoubtedly left behind many supporters

who could have been termed "friendly forces". Their leaders have been subject to close surveillance, internment and progressive elimination; it is doubted that the PK and Legalitet sympathizers are now, after six years, in a position of offering coordinated opposition to the Hoxha regime because of their lack of leadership within Albania. The third party represented on the NCPA, the so-called National League of Peasants and Villagers, cannot be said to represent an indigenous political grouping, since it was formed in exile under British impetus by a few followers of the resistance leader, Said Kryeziu. The influence of the Kryeziu family in the Albanian and Yugoslav Kosovo was great during the war; some measure of allegiance to the present family chief undoubtedly remains in that area.

b. The Bloku Kombetar Independent

The fourth Albanian political party, the Bloku Kombetar Independent, (BKI) was also formed in exile by former "collaborationists" who fled the country at the time of the German withdrawal. Through the Markagjoni and Mirakaj families, leading members of which went to Italy while their sons, relatives and tribal followers remained in the northern mountains, this party, which is given considerable support by the Italians, has been able to maintain contact with its supporters in Albania to a much greater extent than Said Kryeziu. Since the BKI

represents almost all the effective resistance in northern Albania, it has been of great value in various U.S. intelligence-gathering operations, although it has been excluded from the NCFA on political grounds. While lacking American political support the BKI is reputedly very pro-American, and probably constituted the most coordinated "friendly force" inside Albania until recently. As explained elsewhere, the tribesmen owing allegiance to the Mirakaj and Markagjoni families are now escaping in increasing numbers to Yugoslavia, where they are offered refuge, aid and political support in conducting future operations against the Hoxha regime.

c. Other Resistance Groups in Albania

New resistance groups are reported in Albania from time to time. All of them are anxious to receive outside support, in particular that of the U.S. through the NCFA. Failing that, they turn to Yugoslavia, Italy, or Greece for aid. At one time resistance groups were reported in central and southern Albania; some allegedly had widespread organizations. None but the northern tribes were able to maintain their existence as an organized force for a significant period. Resistance groups have been tolerated by the regime until they were sufficiently infiltrated, then stamped out. OPC has, however, met with considerable success in recent months in obtaining from NCFA

members in Italy the names of many individuals in some of the larger cities who, while unorganized, are reportedly still alive and friendly to the NCFA cause. The persistence of these opposition elements despite the government's control mechanism testifies to the endurance of the traditional sentiment of independence for which the Albanians are noted.

3. Hostile forces

a. Non-Communist

Non-Communist or anti-Cominform elements within Albania who might actively oppose the policy objectives of the U.S. are limited to those Albanians now working for Yugoslav and possibly Greek interests. The Greeks have maintained an equivocal position on the question of Northern Epirus, and are attempting to remain in contact with the Greek minority in southern Albania in support of their own operations. Probably the most serious threat to U.S. policy in Albania is presented by the group of pro-Yugoslav Albanians who recently formed a rival exile organization in Prizren with its base of operations located in Yugoslavia's Kosovo district (600,000 Albanians). This committee's proximity to Albania, its connections with active resistance elements within that country, and Yugoslavia's own remaining contacts in the Albanian Communist party undoubtedly place it in a favorable position to supplant the influence of the NCFA and hence that of the United States. Its present effectiveness

is undoubtedly greatest among dissatisfied Albanian Communists who have been conducting operations over the border for the Yugoslavs since 1948. The Yugoslavs and their refugee committee appear to be achieving some success among the northern tribesmen and their BKI leaders who, lacking representation on the NCFA, are now receiving assurances of Yugoslav support. Although the Yugoslav Committee itself is headed by a southern Tosk, it is doubted that the southern Albanians regard it with other than suspicion, since Yugoslavia represents a former Communist and Slav master, now supporting their traditional rivals, the Gheg chieftains.

b. The Albanian Worker's (Communist) Party

(1) The Democratic Front: The Albanian Communist Party, officially founded at a secret meeting in Tirana in November 1941, remained until 1948 a semi-legal secret organization. The Party operated openly through the Democratic Front, an outgrowth of the National Liberation Movement (LCN), which was formed in 1942 for the ostensible purpose of uniting all nationalist resistance groups. The Communists were able from the outset to obtain control of the LNC, and to organize local National Liberation Councils throughout the country. Formed clandestinely in every town and usually headed by a Communist or fellow-traveler, these councils controlled nearly

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all resistance movements in the locality, and functioned as a governmental body when the locality was liberated. From the Communist-controlled LNC emerged the National Liberation Front or FNC which eventually possessed all the attributes of a provisional government throughout the liberated area, comprising the southern three-fourths of the country in 1944. This organization became in 1945 the Democratic Front (DF) which remained until 1948 the only officially recognized political grouping in Albania. As the single, all-embracing political organization, the Democratic Front alone was allowed to sponsor candidates in the general elections of December 1945. Of a total population of 1,120,531 (census of September 1945), 603,566 persons registered, of whom 89.86% actually voted at the polls. The Democratic Front received 93.16% of the total votes cast in elections which were by all accounts universal, secret, and free; no coercion, intimidation or fraud was reported. The success may be attributed to the good organization and tireless efforts of the Democratic Front local councils, combined with its ostensibly non-Communist character. The Communist control did not become evident to the rank and file of the Albanian people until after the elections when the new government instituted a Communist reign of terror. All Albanians over 16 were expected to belong to the Democratic Front; only

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the Communist Party maintained its separate, semi-covert identity. The Communist Party has continued to work through this pseudo-coalition in subsequent elections. The elections to the People's Assembly in May 1950 resulted in a complete success for the Democratic Front, when, according to Albanian official figures, 99.43% of the eligible population voted, giving 98.18% of the votes to candidates of the Democratic Front.

(2) The Worker's Party

Immediately after the publication of the resolution against the Yugoslav Communist Party on June 23, 1948, the Albanian Communist Party discarded its former policy of keeping itself in the background and came out as the vanguard of the "democratic authority." A thorough purge of pro-Tito Albanian Communists was instituted immediately thereafter. The Party's first Congress was held in November 1948. At this time the official strength of the Albanian Worker's Party (as the Communist Party was renamed) was announced to be 29,000 regular members and 16,000 members on probation, comprising 3.9% of the population. There have been no official membership figures since 1948, but it is believed that the party has now some 30,000 members, plus about 15,000 probationary followers, new members having been recruited from the party-controlled youth, women's and labor groups to fill the places left by dissatisfied former partisans and Titoist elements. Of these, it is estimated

that no more than 10,000 can be relied upon to support the regime under adverse conditions.

b. Recently there have been some evidences that the Albanian Worker's Party is again purging its ranks of unreliable elements. Reports have been received indicating that the Worker's Party membership cards are being recalled for reissuance only to proven party regulars. This move appears to be concurrent with the demotion and dismissal of top Communists Tuk Jakova, Manol Konomi, and Sali Ormeni following the February bomb explosion in the Soviet Legation.

3. Policies of the Albanian Worker's Party

a. Through control of front organizations, the media of mass communication and the educational system, the Worker's Party has succeeded in regulating and dominating all aspects of Albanian political, economic and social life. This has occurred in a country where the movement was almost non-existent either in theory or in practice before World War II and where Communist dialectics are understood by no more than a handful of people.

b. In accordance with Soviet doctrine, the Worker's Party succeeded in nationalizing all industry and business by the end of 1945. Volunteer labor brigades recruited particularly from the youth groups were employed to construct and maintain Albania's railroads and highways. All working

Albanians, reportedly including farmers as well as industrial workers, are now required to work approximately half of each month on state enterprises. While the production figures quoted by Albanian officials are vague and intentionally misleading, Albania's first Five Year Plan, as recently enunciated by Premier Enver Hoxha, envisages the development of Albania's mining and oil enterprises, necessary for export of chrome, ore, copper, and oil to the USSR and the satellites. Other long-standing projects, such as the building of a hydro-electric plant near Tirana and the draining of Lake Maliq, are to be pursued by means of the voluntary efforts of the Albanian people and the "very satisfactory credits" extended by the USSR and the other Popular Democracies. While such projects undoubtedly received considerable popular support during the reconstruction period immediately following "liberation", a large portion of the work is now done by compulsory labor battalions made up of prisoners and unreliable elements which it would be unwise to draft into the Armed Forces.

c. The Communist Party's policy of land distribution, put into effect immediately after the liberation, accounted for much of its early popular successes, particularly in the south where tenant farming on the estates of the landed beys had been

prevalent. The Communists' extreme measures of tax collection and expropriation of livestock from the private farmers have alienated much of this support, according to refugees who state that they could not retain enough food to subsist. Collectivization of the redistributed land has not been pursued with the relentlessness encountered elsewhere in Eastern Europe. By July 1949 there were only 86 farm "cooperatives" embracing only 6.3% of the total productive land and 4.7% of all grain land. In the spring of 1951 it was planned to till with tractors only 7.3% of all grain land, both private and collectivised. At the same time it was decided not to increase the number of cooperatives but rather to consolidate existing cooperatives into larger units.

4. Critical Problems affecting the Stability of Albania

a. Economic Problems

The Hoxha regime, having rejected the support of its brother-in-arms the Yugoslav Communist Party, has proved unexpectedly stable in spite of Albania's geographical isolation from the Soviet orbit and its primitive internal conditions in the past generally non-conducive to the extension of central controls. The most crucial internal problems affecting Albania's stability - chronic economic insufficiency and widespread though passive opposition to the regime - do not constitute

a serious threat to Hoxha's continued hegemony so long as he receives the support of the Soviet Union. Although the Albanian standard of living has not returned even to pre-war levels, which were probably the lowest in Europe, the stability of the Government does not seem greatly affected thereby. The privations suffered by the people are probably more effective as a lever to obtain conformity with government directives than they are as incentive to revolt, since the resources for maintaining and supporting a large-scale resistance movement are correspondingly reduced. At the same time, increased shipments of grains and industrial equipment paid for by credits extended by the Soviet bloc indicate Moscow's willingness to provide the necessary economic props for the regime.

b. Nationalist opposition

Internal opposition to the Communist regime has been facilitated by the territorial factors that have always aided the Albanian mountaineers in maintaining their independence of the government of Tirana. Except for the coastal plain, extending inland only twenty to thirty miles, Albania is made up of high mountain ranges, offering excellent concealment for isolated guerrilla forces. These ranges dominate the frontiers with Yugoslavia and Greece, providing routes of escape at many points along the border. Despite this terrain

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favorable to guerilla warfare, the internal political stability of Albania has been maintained by the central government's successful efforts to exterminate nationalist opposition through its widespread network of informers and its security police. Resistance to the Communist regime, which at first represented as much the invasion of the northern tribal areas by the south as it did the imposition of a foreign social order, began at the time of the Albanian civil war before the German troops had departed. The tribal chieftains, many of whom had actively cooperated with the occupying Germans, mustered their individual forces and for a time cooperated in a last attempt to oppose the invading Communists through organized force. Lacking outside aid and confronted with the strength of the well-organized Communist "Liberation Army", the chieftains were forced to disperse to the mountains, where they have been subjected to the progressive decimation of their forces. For a while, the outlying regions were able to maintain a degree of autonomy from the central authority. Each time, however, the northern areas seemed capable of producing effective opposition, the regime intensified its campaign to wipe out resistance in the mountains through the dispatch of special brigades to control the rebellious mountaineers. Their position

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has consequently been reduced to that of bands of marauding outlaws, disorganized and without adequate supplies. Their unalterable bitterness against the regime, which has no place in their tribal system of allegiances, makes them potentially the greatest internal threat to the hegemony of the Hoxha government.

c. External Forces affecting Albania's stability

One factor tending to maintain the regime in power despite inarticulate popular opposition and occasional outbreaks of violence is the real or alleged threat to Albanian territorial integrity maintained by its western-bloc neighbors, Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia. The Albanian people fear equally the reimposition of Italian control, the annexation of Northern Epirus by Greece and the incorporation of Albania into the Yugoslav federal structure. The Tirana regime deliberately encourages these fears, which have some justification in history in order thereby to strengthen its own position. After six years of Soviet domination, however, the people may consider any change in the government an improvement. The ruling power in Albania since the establishment of independence in 1912 has been directly dependent upon one or another foreign power, a fact that the Albanians themselves recognize and accept. Ruling factions have received the support of Greece, Italy and Yugoslavia within the memory of the Albanians now dependent upon the Soviet Union. Certain Albanians are undoubtedly still willing to cooperate with a foreign power if their

position in a "liberated" Albania were assured in consequence. For them the threat of invasion by hereditary enemies has probably lost some of its power in neutralizing their opposition to the regime.

(2) The various conflicting attempts made to obtain western support by Albanian political groups in exile, still maneuvering in terms of traditional Albanian politics but within the context of the present world ideological struggle, have frequently served to negate the overall purpose of removing the Communist regime from Albania. Each group demands constant assurance that the overthrow of the present regime will not result in its replacement by an opposing group, supported by another foreign power. Using Hoxha's own tactics, they exaggerate the threats to Albanian sovereignty and territorial integrity presented by the Greeks, Italians, and Yugoslavs, and hence of the exile groups supported by these countries. The much publicized possibility that all anti-regime operations within Albania sponsored by foreign powers might be used by the Kremlin as a casus belli in the Balkans, calling into play Albania's Treaty of Mutual Assistance with Bulgaria, has further reinforced the position of the central government.

(3) Of these foreign operations, Tito's stepped up activities seem to constitute the most serious present threat to the

central government. Starting with the natural advantages of a long contiguous frontier, the traditional ties between Yugoslav Kosovo and the northern Albanians, a knowledge of partisan activities in Albania second to none, and their great political flexibility and realism, the Yugoslavs seem to have made considerable success in gaining the support of the most active resistance elements in northern Albania. They have done so despite Albania's traditional anti-Slav prejudice, since they have offered the two things which the clansmen most desired, an easily accessible haven from Communist persecution and a chance to attempt the liberation and reintegration of their country under the aegis of their traditional leaders, now excluded from the NCPA.

(4) The activities of the NCPA present a more long-range threat to the central government, although the Committee is handicapped by geographical separation, a certain amount of internal dissention, and the absence of certain influential leaders affiliated with the BKT. While not constituting in any way a government-in-exile, the NCPA is able to present itself to the Albanian people as a fairly representative body, uncontaminated by either Fascist or Communist connections. Its intensified propaganda campaign against the Tirana regime is expected not only to encourage resistance but to

channel the support of the Albanian people to the NCFA.


(5) From the conflicting interests in Albania as outlined above, it is evident that any change in the Balkan status quo, such as a decisive success for either the Yugoslav or NCFA operations, will upset the equilibrium currently maintaining Soviet power in Albania, and thus set in motion all the forces, both internal and external, that threaten Russian control of the country.

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OPERATIONS PLAN

ANNEX "B"



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ANNEX B
COUNTRY PLAN (ALBANIA)
Operations Annex

I. GENERAL

See Section I, PARTS II, III and IV of the Albanian Country Plan.

II. MISSION

To apply existing covert assets and capabilities in the execution of the CIA Cold War mission, and further to develop and apply these capabilities in a manner which will permit CIA at a given moment to wrest the initiative from the USSR in Albania and to launch a covert offensive for the purpose of achieving U.S. policy aims in Albania, under conditions of intensified Cold War or a General War.

III. OPERATIONS:

A. CIA/OPC will continue, in conformity with existing authorization to develop and apply its covert assets in the form of organization, field installations, trained U.S. and indigenous personnel, black propaganda media, underground agents, supporting stockpiles and such other facilities, mechanisms and devices as are required in the accomplishment of the CIA/OPC mission in Albania.

B. Operations will be developed along the following four concurrent lines of action which will be progressively integrated as capabilities permit:

1. All phases of psychological warfare directed at the anti-Communist population and against the Communist rulers of Albania.

2. Establishment of CIA/OPC special purpose underground nets inside Albania capable of being expanded on order into an aggressive resistance organization;

3. Development of an effective, representative, and democratic political center of Albanian exiles to function as a cover and covert support group for OPC operations.

4. Preparation for, and implementation of, economic warfare measures to be undertaken as capabilities permit.

(See Tabs A-C for a detailed discussion of subsidiary tasks (1) through (3). Tabs A-C envisage operations primarily under present and intensified Cold War conditions. In wartime, all operations will be developed, expanded and conducted in conformity with Theater Command Plans.)

C. CIA/OPC will continue to provide the necessary covert support for the establishment of a CIA/OPC underground in Albania commensurate with the CIA/OPC mission. CIA/OPC will organize and maintain a pool of Albanian Nationals which can be expanded to meet the requirements of intensified Cold War or General War. A total of approximately 500 indigenous Albanian agents will be recruited, trained, and infiltrated on proper authorization with the mission of activating a wartime CIA/OPC-controlled resistance force including guerrilla units, intelligence and sabotage nets, escape and evasion route

operators, etc. A total of 1,000 guerrillas and underground agents is considered to be the optimum basic resistance force for wartime operations. Under intensified Cold War or General War conditions, U.S. personnel will be introduced into Albania to assist and direct the underground organization.

D. CIA/OPC will procure, transport, install and hold at forward bases and advance distribution points the necessary equipment, supplies, arms and ammunition to support Cold War operations. CIA/OPC will further stockpile at advance points sufficient arms to equip an Albanian resistance force of approximately 2,000 men in the event of an emergency situation justifying the immediate employment of unconventional warfare measures.

E. U.S. Naval units will support and assist covert operations in Albania in the delivery of supplies and personnel to forward bases.

F. CINCSAF will assist and support covert operations as required. Subsequent to its activation at Wheelus Air Base, Tripoli, North Africa, the special Air Support Wing designated by the U.S. Air Force will provide direct support over Albania and contiguous areas.

G. CINCLUR will support and assist covert operations as required.

H. When such assistance is deemed advisable or necessary by the proper authorities, the Department of Defense will procure, transport and hold at forward stockpiles military stocks and equipment as required in the execution of U.S. policy in Albania through covert means.

I. Direct liaison is authorized between CIA/OPC, the appropriate military staffs and units in direct support of covert operations in Albania.

IV. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

See Part V of the Albanian Country Plan. (To be added later)

A. CIA/OPC will procure, pack, transport to, and hold or install at forward bases the supplies and equipment necessary to maintain the present scale of operations and to increase these in conformity with the phasing and priorities outlined in the CIA/OPC Strategic Plan.

B. At such time as conditions warrant and as determined by U.S. policy at the time, the Department of Defense will at its expense procure, pack, transport, and hold at forward stockpile such additional military equipment and supplies as may be available and required for covert operations in Albania, furnishing such supplies to CIA/OPC as needed on memorandum receipt and on a non-reimbursable basis.

C. CIA/OPC is responsible, in the accomplishment of its Cold War mission, for the recruiting, training and maintenance of all personnel, until such time as the requirements laid on CIA may exceed its capabilities, whereupon such additional U.S. personnel (or indigenous Albanian personnel serving in U.S. controlled military units as provided for in the Lodge Act) as are necessary

will be provided on assignment to CIA by the Department of Defense.

V. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS

A. Command Relationships:

1. Implementation of this plan under current conditions and until D-Day is under the supervision and control of CIA Headquarters, Washington, in coordination with the Department of Defense, Department of State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. Coincident with D-Day, operational control passes to the Senior U.S. Theater Commander. The chain of command will be from CINCNELM (Acting Theater Commander) to the CIA/OPC Mediterranean Headquarters, Tripoli, North Africa and thence via channels established by CIA in the field.

B. Communications:

1. Communication plans, codes and Signal Operating Instructions will be prepared and issued by CIA/OPC.

2. CIA-operated clandestine radios will operate on assigned frequencies.

3. CIA/OPC Base Signal station at Tripoli, North Africa, will function as the CIA/OPC main communication center for Balkan operations.

TAB "A"

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONSI. Purpose:

To utilize all means of psychological warfare to bolster the morale of the Albanian people and give them a sense of direct participation in a dynamic resistance movement supported by the West through the National Committee for Free Albania; to stimulate passive resistance and active sabotage in keeping with current resources and long-range plans; to promote tension and strife between rank and file Communists and the Soviet agents in positions of authority; to obtain the maximum impact of available media of psychological warfare through the close coordination of all propaganda activities and the development of new techniques.

II. Operations:A. Objectives:

1. To initiate covert and overt propaganda attacks designed to exacerbate Albania's already difficult political and economic situation and consequently to weaken the present regime's hold on the people.

2. The Albanian population, however, should not be incited to premature revolt. Each propaganda product should include a positive statement of action for the consumer. (The term "action" in this context does not mean hasty, ill-considered violence,

but rather a non-violent subversive program instilling in the population a feeling of participation in an organized plan.)

B. Background Data Determining Specific Propaganda Themes:

1. 45% of the 3,000,000 plus Albanians are reported illiterate. The present regime has made considerable efforts to reduce this number, and it is assumed that these efforts have met with some success.

2. There are three major ethnic groups: The Ghegs in the mountainous central and northern regions; the Plainsmen of the coastal area; the Tosks of the south. There are also three religious groups: Moslems - 70% of the population, Greek Orthodox - 20%; Catholic - 10%. Most of the Catholics are in the north; the Christians in the south are Orthodox.

3. Albanian society is largely tribal. Any regime can "govern" beyond the plains and towns only to the extent that it avoids antagonizing the tribesmen of the hills. The present regime has instead followed a policy of subduing the mountaineers by means of force and is particularly hated by these groups.

4. Albania as an independent, national state is more an artificial creation of power than an expression of national will. Appeals to national sentiment must not be overemphasized since tribal loyalty far outweighs national loyalty.

5. Aversion to the Hoxha regime pervades approximately 80% of the population because of the mountaineers' traditional resistance to coercion, the regime's persecution of all religious faiths, the serious economic situation, and the populations' traditional dislike of pan-Slavism.

6. Communications are primitive, yet an effective grapevine facilitates the rapid spread of news, rumors, and propaganda.

C. Targets:

1. "The enemy" -- i.e. the present regime, members of the Communist Party and Soviet-appointed stooges in the army and civilian administration.

2. The general population, including the army, whose resentment against the present regime should be exploited.

D. PV Guidance of Principal Political Issues (as agreed upon with the British in Joint Policy Guidance for BGFIEND)

1. Propaganda should stress the National Committee for Free Albania's role in a close collaboration with the Western Powers as the protector of Albania's territorial integrity. In expressing this line, propaganda output should invariably use the term "maintenance of Albania's territorial integrity."

2. Propaganda should call for close and friendly relations between Greece and Albania. Involvement in the complicated

and controversial question of the Northern Epirus will be avoided.

3. Propaganda should call for mutual respect for sovereignty as a fundamental basis for friendly Italian-Albanian relations, particularly in the economic field.

4. No hints or implied commitments of any kind should be permitted at this time with respect to possible direct American or British aid to a free Albanian Government. However, the usual contrast should be drawn between the aid being afforded Western nations from the U.S. and the pitiful and degrading conditions of Soviet satellites seeking aid from the Soviet Union.

5. The basic consideration concerning Yugoslav-Albanian relations is the question of the Kossovo. Propaganda must avoid implications that the Committee favors the return of the Kossovo to Albania; it should also avoid the impression that the Committee is anti-Tito or anti-Yugoslav, on the one hand, or in league in any way with the Yugoslavs on the other.

a. Propaganda should not adopt a neutral attitude in discussing Cominform PW attacks against Yugoslavia or Soviet machinations to create a war psychosis in the Balkans. On the contrary, the basic causes for the Kremlin's desire to destroy Yugoslavia's new independence

should be stressed, as well as the lessons to be gained from Yugoslav exposés of Stalinism. Reference to the current Yugoslav efforts to influence the situation inside Albania, particularly through the League of Albanian Political Exiles recently formed at Prizen, should be reserved and sceptical, avoiding polemics. The aim should be to maintain the prestige and integrity of the National Committee as the repository of Albanian hopes for freedom, democracy and independence, without giving vent to explosive denunciations of Yugoslav intentions under present conditions, but replying in kind to any intensified Yugoslav attacks on the motivation of the NCEA. (This comprises a proposed revision of the PW Guidance for ~~5~~GFRIEND in the light of current Yugoslav activities among Albanian refugees.)

b. Propaganda should not actively seek to encourage Titoism among the Albanian Communists, although such encouragement may result as a by-product of the emphasis on nationalism and sovereignty. Note: The object is not to restore Albania to its former status as a Yugoslav satellite.

6. There is no objection to referring to the Turkish occupation of Albania as a historical parallel to the current situation in order to illustrate to the Albanians that foreign

domination is not an eternal thing; propaganda should avoid any offense to the Turks.

7. Propaganda should link the Committee with the Western Powers in their struggle for a free Europe. The role of the United States, and where appropriate, of Great Britain, should be stressed in regard to the establishment of Albanian independence and the strengthening of her territorial integrity following World War I.

8. Propaganda should avoid the problem of King Zog. The propaganda course to be followed in response to initiatives taken by Zog should be determined as they occur.

E. Propaganda Themes

1. The propaganda campaign should be conducted in the name of the National Committee for Free Albania, and in special cases in the name of an underground organization obviously closely associated with the Committee. All through the campaign, the impression should be created and maintained that this Committee is a well-organized, efficiently functioning body whose efforts are thoroughly planned and amply supported.

2. The propaganda themes -- listed below in detail -- should be represented by selected news stories and commentaries which should report items to encourage thinking along the lines indicated.

a. Anti-Soviet: Cite facts which exemplify how the Communist regime is responsible for:

- (1) Debasing the Albanian economy (such as the drain on food supplies by the army).
- (2) Disrupting relations with neighbors.
- (3) Making Albania the pawn of USSR power interests.
- (4) Instituting terror against simple Albanians.
- (5) Setting father against son.
- (6) The ruin of the peasants through doctrinaire Communist policies.

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(7) Converting Albania into a base of military operations against the nations traditionally friendly to Albania, and thus insuring Albania's destruction in the event of war.

b. Anti-Collaborator. Characterize Soviet-Albanian collaborators as:

- (1) Weak little men.
- (2) Selling out their country's welfare.
- (3) Plotting against the freedom of action of true patriots.
- (4) Weakening the courage of the populace.
- (5) Enriching themselves.

c. Confidence in the National Committee for Free Albania

Emphasize the variety of elements and breadth of interests represented in the Committee by exploiting the huge and responsive international audience for the Committee's voice. Predictions of the Committee should be timed so that the entire population will have its confidence bolstered by observing their fulfillment.

d. Awareness of Problem

Descriptive material should develop the essential elements of the political and economic problems, all of which derive from Moscow's domination.

- (1) Informers and Security Police.
- (2) Former German prisoner - Gestapo terror.
- (3) Communist collaborators.
- (4) Threats of neighbors.
- (5) Control of currency in USSR hands.
- (6) Expropriation of merchants.
- (7) Labor and concentration camps.

e. Freedom is Attainable. Exploit the support of all elements by:

- (1) Citing the numbers of people ready to help in Albania.
- (2) Citing the strength of powers already combined against the USSR.

(3) Detailing the history of Albanian self-determination.

f. Determination. Assume constantly that courage and firmness can overcome long odds -- "better an eye plucked out than a head lost"; conversely, emphasize the weakness of the appeasers, especially Hoxha.

g. Feeling of Participation. Word of mouth dissemination of information should increase the sense of participation. Passive resistance should be encouraged.

h. Sense of Unity.

(1) Numbers of local resistance cells should be exaggerated.

(2) Exploits of agents should be reported in detail.

(3) Channels of communication should be shown to be protected.

i. Hatred of Enemy. Vilification of the USSR and of Communist collaborators should be based upon active incidents.

(1) Assassination or imprisonment of revolutionaries should be idealized.

(2) Murdered hostages should be martyred.

F. Subsidiary tasks and operations:

1. Black Radio

a. To utilize the present combined radio installation of two 500 watt transmitters in Greece which are now

transmitting for "Radio Free Albania", increase these to four, and exploit against Albania such additional transmitting equipment as may be established for combined Balkan targets.

b. To develop such additional radio assets as may be required to overcome jamming.

c. To ensure the availability of trained personnel for the operation of equipment in use and being procured.

d. To improve and expand the research and editorial facilities already established in the Balkan Propaganda Center at Athens, in coordination with overt and gray propaganda agencies such as VOA and Radio Free Europe, exploiting all available sources of propaganda intelligence and developing other sources as needed.

e. To increase the potential audience for all forms of radio propaganda by procuring and distributing throw-away radios. Present plans call for the distribution of 5,000 such radios in Albania by 30 June 1953.

f. To foster the development and utilization of specialized devices which would permit ghost transmissions over Albanian beams or amplify and extend the range of present transmitting facilities.

2. Radio Free Europe

To maintain close coordination with RFE, supplying guidance on programs beamed to Albania and assisting RFE to obtain propaganda intelligence.

3. Printed Materials

a. To exploit to the maximum facilities already established and operating in the Rome Propaganda Center for the production of leaflets, posters, stickers, etc., and to provide support to the Propaganda Center in furnishing necessary personnel and equipment, notably printing facilities.

b. To continue and perfect the present system of airdropping leaflets by OPC clandestine aircraft based in Greece, basing future requirements for aircraft on the type and degree of opposition encountered in current operations.

c. To continue publication of the NCFR newspaper Shqipëria, including an edition suitable for airdropping.

4. Underground psychological warfare activity.

a. To utilize agents infiltrated into Albania for the distribution of graphic materials, word-of-mouth proselyting of friendly elements, initiating rumors intended

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to spread fear among Communist elements, and for the printing and distribution of indigenous propaganda.

b. To support the indigenous propaganda effort by supplying hand presses, duplicating machines and necessary material.

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TAB "B"

UNDERGROUND OPERATIONS1. Purpose:

To continue to provide the necessary covert support for the establishment, in accordance with present phasing schedules, of a CIA/OPC underground in Albania commensurate with the CIA/OPC mission. Originally, operations in Albania had as their maximum objective the overthrow of the Hoxha regime. On 6 September 1949, it was agreed that the maximum objective should be temporarily abandoned. The purpose of operations in Albania at present is to maintain popular resistance at a high level through covert media and to develop OPC underground nets in Albania with the capability of exploiting effectively any large-scale resistance movement against the Hoxha regime. Due to the complexity of international factors bearing on Albania, the maximum cold war objective is under continuous review.

2. Subordinate tasks and undertakings:

a. To organize and maintain a pool of Albanian nationals which can be expanded to meet the operational requirements for agents under intensified Cold War or General War conditions. According to the present time table, by 31 December 1951 there will be a force of 50 covertly trained agents, either actively engaged in operations or ready to be committed by 30 June 1952. In addition, two Albanian Guard Companies of an approximate strength of 250 each, will be

trained extensively in basic paramilitary and guerilla warfare. The goal of a pool of wartime activators is to be met by processing potential agents through the present Guard Company and/or the covert training facilities in Germany. The recruitment of these agents will require an intensive program of screening and processing, carried out, when possible with the aid of the National Committee for Free Albania and the cooperation of the clandestine services of France, Greece, Turkey and Italy.

b. To infiltrate agent teams inside Albania with the following missions:

- (1) To establish routes of penetration and egress by direct observation of security systems and through contact with friendly elements;
- (2) To procure detailed operational information on the transportation and other essential targets, and
- (3) To evaluate, tangibly support, and exploit the existing resistance potential within the country.

c. To establish systematic contact between agent teams inside Albania and advance headquarters in peripheral areas.

d. To encourage, through systematic psychological warfare operations, the anti-Communist majority and institute a campaign of terror against Communist Party officials and members.

e. To undertake isolated acts of sabotage, violence and other

one-time operations that would not unduly jeopardize the underground organization.

f. To establish escape and evasion nets and make other preparations for special purpose networks in case of war.

g. To introduce counterfeit ration certificates and currency in order to further dislocate the Albanian economy.

h. In view of the basic, multiple-purpose nature of the underground and the importance of the specific mission to be assigned to each of the various nets, detailed plans will be prepared for individual operational phases involved in the accomplishment of OPC's overall objectives in Albania. Such plans, to be attached to the Albanian Country Plan operational annex as separate appendices, will be developed for:

- (1) Escape and evasion routes.
- (2) Underground-operated PW activity.
- (3) Internal subversion and defection programs.
- (4) Military and industrial sabotage.
- (5) Paramilitary and unconventional warfare operations.

i. Because of the mountainous Albanian terrain and the tribal nature of the hill society, it is planned that underground activity will be undertaken initially by local groups operating independently, in touch with headquarters but not with each other. Past experience has shown that the potential for Western-sponsored resistance

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activity will probably be greatest in the north; consequently it is planned to concentrate OPC-sponsored forces in the north, in the Mirdita area. These will eventually push southward and link up with resistance elements throughout the country.

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TAB "C"

POLITICAL WARFARE

1. Purpose:

To develop a political center outside Albania composed of non-totalitarian elements sympathetic with U.S. policy objectives in the Balkans which will serve as (1) a rallying point for anti-Communists inside Albania and in exile; (2) a cover for OPC operations, and (3) as a covert support arm for OPC. In the event of war, to organize the overthrow of the Albanian pro-Soviet Government and assist in establishing a Government compatible with U.S. objectives.

2. Subsidiary tasks and operations.

a. To develop the National Committee for a Free Albania (NCFA) as an effective, representative, harmonious, and democratic body, by:

(1) Following the principle that new elements should be introduced into the NCFA only if they are capable of making a positive contribution to the overall effort (at present, the principle has special reference to the problem of introducing representatives of the Markajoni family, closely associated with the compromised BKT, and the Klissura faction of the BK).

(2) Emphasizing the ideal of the National Committee as a body above party politics, at the same time avoiding giving Committee members grounds for the belief that the U.S. Government regards the Committee as the nucleus

of a Government in exile.

(3) Increasing the prestige of the NCFA by ensuring that it received the maximum of favorable publicity in OPC sponsored media as well as the commercial press and radio.

b. To improve coordination with representatives of the National Committee for a Free Europe, so that attainment of specific objectives in regard to Albanian affairs can be facilitated via the parent organization of the NCFA, the National Committee for a Free Europe.

c. To coordinate closely with the Department of State to ensure that the programs and activities of the NCFA fall within the framework of U.S. policy lines and to facilitate the accomplishment of OPC objectives in utilizing the services of the NCFA.

d. To utilize all available means, including diplomatic channels, to reduce the threat to U.S. objectives in Albania contained in Yugoslav sponsored activity with respect to that country, ultimately, through external pressures and political activity on the scene in Albania, to neutralize Tito's political agitation in Albania.

e. To coordinate a system of political underground work with the paramilitary underground operations, whereby in the event of hostilities representatives of the NCFA would be infiltrated inside Albania to rally the people in support of the Western-sponsored resistance movement.