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ANNEX B

PLAN FOR POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTION TO BE TAKEN
IN EVENT OF AN ATTEMPTED UNILATERAL COUP INSTIGATED BY
YUGOSLAVIA AGAINST ALBANIA

I. DISCUSSION

The United States would be placed in a difficult position if Yugoslavia were to move unilaterally against Albania. Yugoslavia's probable intentions would be the eventual consolidation of Albania under Yugoslav control. While an alleged "Popular Front" and "democratic" government would probably be installed, Tito would be the real ruler. The question of whether the United States, if consulted in advance, should approve a Yugoslav instigated coup is not within the scope of this plan. The plan covers covert political and propaganda action in the event of a Yugoslav coup -- whether we are consulted in advance or taken by surprise, whether we overtly approve or disapprove the Yugoslav action.

II. MISSIONS

To reduce Soviet and Soviet Bloc strength by the overthrow of the Communist regime in Albania without incurring serious danger of international war or retardation of NATO defense objectives in the eastern Mediterranean.

To encourage the Albanian population to aid the overthrow of the Hoxha regime.

To establish ultimately an independent Albanian government not controlled by any outside power but friendly to anti-Soviet nations, especially the US, UK, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Italy.

III. ASSUMPTIONS

1. United States and U.K. policy re Albania will continue to be coordinated.

2. United States and U.K. will emphatically disassociate themselves from a Yugoslav-inspired coup attempt in Albania until it is apparent that the coup will succeed and will not result in immediate military retaliation from the Soviet Bloc.

3. The United States and U.K. will take all appropriate overt measures to prevent liberated Albania from becoming a Yugoslav satellite.

4. United States covert political and propaganda activity undertaken under this plan will support the Yugoslav coup against the Soviet controlled regime as a spontaneous Albanian uprising, not as a Yugoslav invasion.

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5. If Yugoslavia, after a successful coup against Albania, gives indications of an attempt to transform Albania into a Yugoslav satellite, a new plan will be drawn in which United States effort will be directed to opposing Yugoslav intentions in Albania.

6. Greece and Italy will be vitally concerned with and probably opposed to a unilateral coup by Yugoslavia against Albania.

7. In the event of a successful Yugoslav coup, only small northern areas of Albania will be favorably inclined towards Tito.

8. In the event of a Yugoslav coup against Albania, this plan for political and psychological action directed to Albania will be supplemented by plans for action directed to other parts of the world.

IV. OBJECTIVES

1. To assure that NCFA (with or without the Prisren League) is given a position within the future Albanian government from which it can influence the course of events in Albania.

2. To assure for the United States the greatest possible degree of control over whatever provisional government is established to replace the Hoxha regime.

3. To establish a UN trusteeship to replace the provisional government and to educate the population of Albania in the concept of self-government with a view toward an eventual constituent assembly and democratic parliamentary processes.

V. TARGETS

1. Albanian tribal (rural and mountain) leaders
2. Albanian urban population
3. Moslem groups
4. Catholic and Greek Orthodox groups
5. Press and radio officials
6. Accessible members of the armed forces and security forces
7. Adherents to pre-war political groups
8. Professional and labor groups (Profsoyuz)

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VI. CAPABILITIES

CIA's assets for political and psychological activity inside Albania are limited to the following:

1. A small number of agent teams recruited independently or with the help of King Zog. These could be used for limited distribution of rumors, radios, leaflets, and posters, and for contacts with members of the armed forces.
2. Clandestine broadcasting facilities, capable of daily broadcasts but subject to jamming.
3. Airplane drops for leaflets, posters, radio receiver sets, etc.
4. NCFA -- capabilities include agents in Albania and the ability to produce propaganda material and newspapers and to provide leaders for resistance forces and the provisional government.

VII. COURSES OF ACTION

1. Order NCFA to support the Yugoslav coup as an Albanian uprising against the Hoxha regime.

NCFA to announce full cooperation with Pristina League as "Albanian brothers in Yugoslavia who are part of the united effort to free the homeland." Convey the impression that the leading role in masterminding and supporting the liberation is being played by NCFA.

2. Order immediate production of leaflets and posters by NCFA and other available propaganda resources.

Material must be inexpensive in appearance to decrease suspicion of United States backing.

3. Deliver radio receivers into Albania by air drop and agent teams with special efforts to distribute them to the three major ethnic populations: Ghegs, Tosks and Plainsmen.

4. Broadcast liberation themes (outlined in propaganda guidance) by NCFA and other radio facilities.

5. Coordinate with foreign intelligence services in planning to:

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- a. Utilize Greek agents to promote an independent Albania and deny Greek interest in the northern Epirus.
 - b. Attempt enlistment of Italian agents, such as, for example, those from the EMI, in rallying support to NCFA. (It is estimated that EMI controls about 1,000 men in Northern Albania.)
 - c. Coordinate with British teams in Albania.
 - d. Monitor Yugoslav covert activities in Albania to detect signs of any Yugoslav intentions to make Albania a Yugoslav satellite.
6. Attempt to prevent implementation of the Bulgaria-Albania mutual assistance pact by broadcasting over the Bulgarian transmitter the theme that the Yugoslav coup is an uprising of the Albanian people.
 7. Mobilize agent teams for rumor-spreading with special emphasis on tribal and Moslem populations.
 8. Utilize agent teams in contact with the Albanian army to disrupt resistance by issue of false and forged orders. Solicit their support of NCFA as the leaders of the new Albania.
 9. Instruct NCFA to attempt to gain control of the Tirane broadcasting station.
 10. Utilize NCFA's small number of agents infiltrated in Albanian security forces to disrupt resistance to overthrowing Hoxha.
 11. Elicit statements from world Catholic leaders urging support of Albanian Catholics for overthrow of Hoxha.
 12. Utilize Albanian emigrants -- such as Albanians in Germany, Italy, and the United States -- for propaganda, and if feasible, infiltration.
 13. Organize food drops (attributed to NCFA) for distress areas. Fishing communities, to cite one example, will probably have their livelihood threatened by bans against fishing.
 14. Develop such additional radio assets as may be required to overcome jamming.
 15. Use specialized devices to effect ghost transmissions over Albanian radio transmitting beams if NCFA is not able to gain control of the facilities.

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16. Maintain close coordination with RFE, supplying guidance on programs beamed to Albania and assisting RFE to obtain propaganda intelligence.

17. When conditions within Albania warrant, support indigenous propaganda effort there by supplying hand presses, duplicating machines and necessary material.

VIII. PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

1. Identify the "coup" as an internal uprising of Albanian people driven to desperate action by the tyranny and inhuman exploitation of the regime of Hoxha, the Kremlin stooge.

2. Call for strict maintenance of Albania's territorial boundaries with specific injunctions against encroachment by Yugoslavia and Greece.

3. Stress Albania's right to internal independence free of domination by USSR, Yugoslavia or any outside power.

4. Identify NCFA as the chief exponent of freedom and territorial integrity for Albania and the medium through which Albania can gain Western support for attaining these objectives.

5. Refer to the Prizren League as a welcome ally in attaining Albanian independence, but maintain the position that the NCFA has the leading role.

6. Call for close and friendly relations between Greece and Albania and avoid involvement in the controversial question of the northern Epirus.

7. Call for mutual respect for sovereignty as a fundamental basis for friendly Italian-Albanian relations, particularly in the economic field.

8. No hints or implied commitments should be made of possible United States or U.K. economic aid to a free Albania, but frequent references should be made to the deterioration in Albania's economic welfare under Soviet domination.

9. Avoid mention of Yugoslavia, Tito, or the return of Kosovo to Albania, whenever possible. Assume neutral position between pro or anti-Yugoslavia or Tito.

10. a. Propaganda need, not, however, be neutral in counter-attacking inevitable Soviet accusations of Yugoslav intentions in Albania. The aim should be to present NCFA as the staunch protector of Albanian hopes for democracy and independence, without either accepting or rejecting Yugoslavia as an ally.

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b. Propaganda should not actively seek to encourage Titoism among the Albanian Communists, since the object is not to restore Albania to its former status as a Yugoslav satellite.

c. Follow the line that whatever final form of government -- whether a republic or constitutional monarchy -- is chosen by the Albanians, it will be democratic and progressive.

10. There is no objection to referring to the Turkish occupation of Albania as an historical parallel to the current situation to illustrate to the Albanians that foreign domination can be overthrown. This propaganda should avoid any offense to the Turks.

11. Avoid the problem of King Zog. The courses to be followed in response to his activities should be determined as they occur.

12. Utilize the Albanian culture hero, Skenderbeg, as a symbol for NCFA. His picture with a simple legend such as, "Unite with NCFA," are recommended for poster and flyer distribution in rural and other illiterate areas.

13. Appeal to Albanian love of independence and resentment of central authority by frequent references to Soviet system of security forces which lead tribal members to spy on their own brothers.

14. Appeal continuously to the Albanian Army and Security Forces to join the people in their fight for freedom and national independence.

15. Cite facts which exemplify how the Communist regime is responsible for:

- a. Debasing the Albanian economy
- b. Making Albania the pawn of USSR power interests
- c. Instituting terror against Albanians
- d. Sending 20,000 Albanians to prison camps
- e. Ruining the peasants through doctrinaire Communist policies
- f. Converting Albania to a base for military operations against her neighbors, thus alienating her former allies.

16. Characterize Soviet-Albanian collaborators as:

- a. Weak little men
- b. Selling out their country's welfare
- c. Enriching themselves

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17. Gain support for anti-Hoxha forces by:
- a. Citing the number of anti-Communists in Albania (one estimate holds 85% as the figure).
 - b. Citing the strength of powers already combined against the USSR.
 - c. Detailing the history of Albanian independence and of Skenderbeg's exploits.
 - d. Stressing that courage can overcome long odds and that "better an eye plucked out than a head lost."
 - e. Exaggerating the numbers of local resistance cells.
 - f. Reporting the exploits of agents in detail.
 - g. Exhorting all political factions in Albania to unite in ousting the Soviet stooges.

18. Aggravate hatred of enemy by:
- a. Itemizing atrocities ordered by Soviet-dominated Hoxha regime.
 - b. Making martyrs of Albanians murdered by Hoxha forces.
 - c. Emphasizing the decline in the standard of living under Hoxha; the shortages in food and clothing; the valueless paper money; the fact that the Communists have taken from the Albanian people all their gold and silver.

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