

ANNEX E

PLAN FOR POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTION TO PROMOTE
LIBERATION OF ALBANIA FROM SOVIET ORBIT
BY ACTION OF BALKAN (PACT) COUNTRIES

A. MISSION

To engage Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia in multilateral action to promote an internal uprising against the pro-Soviet regime in Albania; to cause, through this internal revolt, a separation from the Soviet bloc and the establishment of an independent Albania within its present boundaries; to include Albania in a Balkan anti-Soviet bloc, organized presently for mutual defense and eventually for a regional economic and international entity based on the historic and traditional affinities of the nations concerned.

B. ASSUMPTIONS

1. The current negotiations for a mutual defense agreement between Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece may lead to a series of other agreements. As the present discussions between the three countries indicate, the purely military understandings intended for specific situations, may lead to more comprehensive armament agreements and to political and economic treaties. Furthermore, it may be assumed that such understandings may lead to a revival of the Balkan Pact which was a pre-war regional grouping including Yugoslavia, Turkey, Greece, Rumania and Albania.
2. The currently negotiating countries would need little prodding to institute a drive for a Balkan pact. They may, however, be induced to issue declarations that for the security of the Balkans they advocate an international organization comprising all six independent Balkan countries.
3. A proclamation by Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia, anticipating a future Balkan Union, or at least a Monroe Doctrine for the Balkans, could have a far-reaching, anti-Soviet appeal in Albania, Bulgaria, and Rumania.
4. Such a campaign for a Balkan grouping of independent states could give a maximum conceivable guarantee of boundaries of recognized Balkan nations and would thus appeal to a small state such as Albania, for the guarantees for its existence and integrity would derive from a pact concluded by the neighbors and by a country (Turkey) to which the majority of Albanians still look for traditional (historic) and religious affinities.
5. In general a Balkan Pact, concluded by Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece, would appeal in various degrees to all Balkan peoples, and could serve as a strong anti-Soviet rallying point. It could from its inception carry the seeds for internal revolt in Communist countries of the Balkans.

C. DISCUSSION

The Balkan Pact, or movement for a united Balkans, free of power politics of the world, was started by Kemal Pasha of Turkey, King Alexander of Yugoslavia, and Venizelos of Greece. It was a promising movement until 1936 when Hitler's advance disrupted its efforts. The movement had appeal for all Balkan nations because of its basic guarantees of the inviolability of boundaries, a ban on all aggression within the Balkan group and because of its inherent appeal and slogan for keeping the great powers of the world out of the Balkans.

After World War II, the idea of a united Balkans became again a matter of speculation when Tito in December, 1946, began negotiations with George Dimitrov of Bulgaria for a possible union. Both leaders apparently favored the idea of union, but Dimitrov recanted soon after, and Tito was thrown out of the Cominform — partly because of his Balkan aspirations, according to some observers. A Balkan union of any form, as demonstrated by this incident, would not be acceptable to the Soviets. Any international alliance of Balkan nations, even if sponsored by a Communist government in the Balkans, would be opposed by the Soviets whose present (or for that matter, past Russian historic) goal seems to be in attaining and holding undisputed hegemony over the Balkan peninsula.

If such a Balkan Pact were announced with subsequent declarations for the liberation of the Balkans from outside domination, the nations at present under Communist rule would become vulnerable to any campaign for liberation from Soviet domination and for inclusion as equal and free partners in the new Balkan grouping.

Albania, because of size and geographic isolation from the Soviet orbit, could become the first target for inclusion into the Balkan Pact. A concerted guarantee from the Balkan group (Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia) would present a most idealistic and realistic appeal to Albanians. Turkey still has an historic hold on Albania, greatly enhanced by the fact that about 70% of Albanians are Moslems. The Yugoslav guarantee would be territorial as well as political, for Turkey and Greece as co-guarantors would outbalance any Yugoslav efforts for exporting into a liberated Albania a Titoist brand of Communism by way of such instruments as the Prison League of Albanian Refugees. Greece, likewise, would not be suspected of intending to claim the counties of northern Epirus if she, in concert with Turkey and Yugoslavia, guaranteed as a signatory of a Balkan Pact the inviolability of Albania's borders.

D. CONCLUSIONS

The territorial claims, economic aspirations and political speculations of the neighbors of Albania are so intricate that any unilateral "liberation" of Albania from the Soviet orbit (say by Yugoslavia), or any multilateral liberation by Western powers with the use of Albania's neighbors, would lead to a series of new problems. "Liberation" may mean partition to

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Athens, economic privileges to Rome, establishment of a pro-Tito Communist or popular front regime to Belgrade. None of these neighbors is, in fact, concerned primarily in the liberation of the Albanian people, and none really cares about exploiting this "liberation" propagandewise in an effort to break down the Soviet orbit. In other words, a successful "liberation" of Albania can mean an end of her independence. To Soviet satellites the example of such Albanian "liberation" would have little or no appeal no matter what propaganda technique we employed.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

American political action should, at first in an exploratory fashion, aim at determining a campaign for a Balkan Pact initiated by Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. Covert efforts should be made to examine the attitudes in the three capitals and to prepare the ground for a meeting of the Yugoslav, Greek and Turkish foreign ministers to propose and discuss a Balkan Pact. This action should be followed by an immediate appeal to current mutual defense negotiations of the three parties.

While the movement for a Balkan Pact and subsequent declarations regarding the Balkans and their liberation should be a matter of completely local origin and instigation, U.S. political activists working on this regional anti-Soviet pact should concentrate on each of the respective foreign offices. The latter should be cognizant of the American favor and sympathy for such movement. Such favor should not, however, in any way compromise the impression that the Balkan Pact countries are again stepping forward spontaneously with the demand for independence from foreign (this time Soviet) encroachment; that they stand united for a free and friendly Balkans; and that they would support in its efforts towards liberation each Balkan nation at present suffering under the Soviet occupation.

The proclamation of the Balkan Pact countries should be made the subject of extensive propaganda. It could be particularly useful because it would obviously emanate as a combined action of groups which the Communists have continuously been tagging as incapable of organizing except when under their own (Communist) guidance.

Apart from the overt of public pronouncements of the Balkan Pact countries, the movement should entail covert agreements and activities. The Albanians, for instance, alerted about the new movement for a free Balkans, should be the target for clandestine propaganda with appeals and guarantees from each of the three friendly Balkan nations.

If a Balkan Pact, as a regional anti-Soviet grouping, can be agreed upon and proclaimed as a result of an undertaking of Greece, Turkey, and

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Yugoslavia, CIA should undertake the necessary action to coordinate the clandestine work for the three governments into Albania and similarly also into Bulgaria. While CIA should be in the position of mapping out this work and coordinating it, the activity should, for all practical purposes, appear to be a local, Balkan effort towards liberation and evolution of the Soviets.

The risk to CIA in instigating a Balkan pact would be negligible, and the gains could be great.

* The Balkan Pact of the 1930's had a great deal of British inspiration and approval, as observed in the activities of such agents as Clarence Atherton in Belgrade and his equals in Ankara and Athens. Similarly, the French political activism as demonstrated in the creation of the Little Entente of the 1920's and 1930's was a regional grouping or a cordons sanitaires as the Soviets denounced it.

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