

**TOP SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

OSO PLAN FOR ALBANIA

PART I. Present Situation and Target Opportunities:

1. Albania [is now] the only Satellite state with an outlet to the Mediterranean; it is separated from the heel of Italy by some fifty miles of water. It is under tight Communist control and yet paradoxically, because of the warlike and independent nature of its people, it has had, in the past at least, an anti-Communist potential far out of proportion to its size. For [all] these reasons, the country has received more attention from the world's leading powers in the past five years than in all the centuries of its previous history, and would, to judge from the extent of this attention, appear to be an intelligence target of prime importance.
2. Such however is not the case, and the remarks which follow will show that this area, from the OSO standpoint, is relatively unimportant and one to which we are not justified in devoting more than the minimum amount of effort necessary to keep us informed of an unlikely increase in its strategic importance.
3. The original reasons for the interest of the intelligence services of the United States, Great Britain, and Italy in Albania were rooted in the country's geographical isolation. Shut off as it was from communication with western Europe, it became the object of general speculation as well as a convenient subject for the professional fabricator, whose reports of a large Soviet submarine base at Saseno and guided missile launching platforms near Vlone were extremely difficult to controvert. Equally important were reports of large scale organized resistance in the mountains of the north, based on conditions in 1945 and 1946 rather than on the situation existing in 1947-48 when the reports reached their peak. Finally, following the break with the Cominform and the Yugoslav withdrawal from Albania, it was not certain to what extent the Soviets were taking over direct control; reports were contradictory, with some indicating the build-up of a major Soviet military bastion, while others indicated control by the anti-Communists of significant portions of the country.

DO NOT GRAB PER  
CLASSIFICATION E NEW DIVISION  
MAR 1999

86057

#1

**TOP SECRET**

4. As a result, agent teams were sent into Albania in considerable numbers, under the auspices of the U. S., British, Greek, Italian and (at a slightly later date) Yugoslav services. The information gathered from these teams, coupled with that gradually obtained from refugees and repatriates, and from air and sea photographic missions, brought the situation into perspective. A certain resistance potential was shown to exist, but the anti-Communists were unorganized, without resources of money, food, or munitions, and subject to constant persecution. As for the alleged Soviet submarine bases and other important military installations, they proved non-existent, although a large Soviet military mission exercised strong and increasing control of both the military and civil aspects of the socialized state.
5. The prime motive of the powers which sent agent missions into Albania was not intelligence, however. The Greeks were furthering territorial claims; the Italians were having a tremulous stab at reestablishing a sphere of influence; and the Yugoslavs were probing for signs of Titoist strength among the Albanian Communists in the hope of establishing a friendly government in Tirana. The major effort, curiously enough, was launched by the British and Americans, operating from behind the facade of the National Committee for a Free Albania. Using propaganda and a large number of agent teams, this effort sought to organize a strong, country-wide resistance movement which would serve as an edifying example to other Communist-dominated nations.
6. The net result of the uncoordinated programs of the several powers has been, if anything, to weaken Albania's anti-Communist potential and strengthen Soviet control. A very large number of anti-Communists, exposed by the aid they rendered to agents from abroad, have been executed or imprisoned, or have been forced to flee the country. Others, anti-Communist or potentially so, have been disillusioned by the failure of the various powers, and the emigre groups representing them, to make good on promises of imminent liberation. Further, the number of foreign agents apprehended and tried by the Albanian Communists can scarcely have reassured the population.

7. Responsibility for this unsatisfactory result cannot be laid at the door of any one foreign power or group. In addition to the contradictions between their several policies, the nature of the country itself has militated against successful operations. Albania is small and its population, supported by a primarily agricultural and pastoral economy, has for centuries been virtually immobile. In consequence, it is difficult for even a well-documented agent to move freely in the country, because even prior to the present regime there were few reasons for a man to leave his own community. Since in general all the members of a community are known to each other and identifiable by their own peculiarities of speech and dress, it is even more difficult for a stranger among them to go undetected. Thus the presence of an agent, except in rare instances, soon became known to a large number of persons, and his survival depended to a greater degree than in any other European country on the unanimity of the population's anti-Communist sentiments. Such unanimity was inevitably weakened by the spectacle of discord among the emigre leaders and conflicting purposes among their foreign sponsors.
8. The only foreign power which has gained rather than lost ground as a result of this confusion has been Yugoslavia. Not only do the Yugoslavs possess a long land frontier across which the most war-like of Albania's population, the northern mountaineers, can flee, but they have had the ideological flexibility to recognize that their original concentration on building a nationalist (or "Titoist") Communist group within Albania was insufficient to accomplish their aim of removing the enemy at their rear. They have thus reoriented their effort in the direction of supporting an ostensibly non-political movement aimed at a "free, independent, truly democratic Albania," and have made overtures even to rightist emigre leaders whom they not long ago were stigmatizing as "war criminals," "traitors," and "collaborationists." How seriously these slogans are taken by anti-Communist Albanians is uncertain, but the fact remains that Yugoslavia is sheltering and treating excellently a steadily growing group of 5000 or more north Albanians who are for the most part eager to take action against the Hoxha government.

**TOP SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

9. The situation above described has seriously limited OSO's ability to mount intelligence operations into Albania. Although on its face the will of a population to conduct resistance is more a matter of concern for OPC than for OSO, in an area where truly clandestine operations are exceedingly difficult popular morale is of vital concern to intelligence operations as well, since on it depends the support of or opposition to OSO teams. An added complication is provided by exclusion of the group which OSO has used most profitably for operations, the National Independent Bloc (or BKI), from the National Committee for a Free Albania. This has placed us in the difficult position of demanding sacrifices for CIA by a group which another CIA-sponsored organization has simultaneously branded as unfit to represent its country.
10. The above difficulties could be overcome were it worth the considerable expense of effort, manpower, and money necessary to do so. In our opinion, however, there is no present justification for such a major effort, nor any indication that adequate justification will exist in the future. There are no major intelligence targets within the country, since its geographical isolation by Yugoslavia and Greece, which leaves it without any overland means of communication with other Satellites, has resulted in an apparent Soviet decision not to use Albania as a base against the West. As previously indicated, OSO's peacetime task is a negative one: to maintain only such coverage as is necessary to ensure our being informed of a change of Soviet intentions which would result in an increase in the country's strategic importance. It is believed that the present plan provides for coverage sufficient to meet this demand, while reducing to a minimum the expenditures of money and manpower so urgently needed for operations against more important areas.

**PART II. Present Facilities and Coverage:**

1. There is no official cover station in Albania nor is there any expectation of there being one within the time limits set for this plan.
2. There are no facilities under unofficial cover since travel into Albania from non-Communist areas is practically impossible.
3. The analysis of agent operational and source assets can most logically be made under three headings:

**TOP SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

- a. Liaison: Of the Liaison services the most productive so far have been the Greek and Italian. Greek Service reports have been obtained primarily from debriefings of refugees crossing the border into Greece and secondarily from Greek operations into Albania itself. The Italian service on the other hand has contributed a considerable volume of reports based on actual Italian operations, most of them using the resources of Italian Naval Intelligence, e.g., its ability to place agents on Italian vessels stopping in Albanian ports and to check on traffic of other nations visiting Albania by observing such traffic from fishing vessels cruising the Adriatic and the Straits of Otranto.

Potentially more valuable than our relations with either the Greek or Italian Services is our newly established liaison with UDB. This service runs extensive operations into Albania both from the Montenegrin and Kosovar regions in the north and from the Macedonian region further to the south. These operations make use primarily of the large number of refugees presently seeking asylum in Yugoslavia, and although we know little of the results obtained it is safe to assume that good coverage results in view of Yugoslavian expertness in Albanian matters. (In this connection, it is worth noting that heading the Yugoslav effort is Dusan Mugosa, who served as Tito's emissary to the Albanian communists in 1943 and who is generally credited as having been the architect of the Albanian Communist Party.) In an effort to stimulate exchange of information between ourselves and the UDB, we recently passed to the Yugoslav service an extensive study of the Albanian IS and its leading personalities, derived primarily from a debriefing of a high-ranking Albanian defector in late 1949. No Albanian information has been forthcoming in return as yet, but UDB has promised an evaluation of the study in question. We hope that in due time we shall be in a position to request the product of the Yugoslav cross-border operations already referred to. It is not contemplated, however, that we will make any effort to engage in joint operations with UDB into Albania, since the Yugoslav government regards Albania as an area in which it has paramount interest.

- b. Joint Operations: Another category of assets is the use of liaison services for the mounting of operations under our supervision and with such control as is afforded by

**TOP SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

our financing, and, in the past, the attachment of a case officer to the service in question to supervise a particular operation. In such cases we are of course making use of the facilities offered by the liaison service's official position, its ability to obtain police protection and facilitation of our operation, its ability to contact individuals in its area who have operational potentialities, and, in theory at least, its ability to act for us and thus to cover our American participation.

- c. Independent Operations: Finally, there are operations which have been developed and executed by OSO in which liaison services have either not figured at all or only to a negligible extent. An example of such an operation is the current use of an OSO interrogator in north Greece to interrogate refugees coming from Albania. This operation was conceived in the effort to allow us to guide the interrogation of refugees along lines of particular interest to OSO and its customers, rather than being at the mercy of Greek interrogators who are of necessity primarily guided by the interests of their Greek superiors and generally less thorough than is desirable.

4. Summary of current operations and production.

- a. Plan CHARITY.

This plan (carried budget-wise as a subdivision of the overall plan for liaison with the Italian services) originally involved the use of agent personnel recruited from the ranks of the BKI (Blokus Kombetar Independent-National Independent Bloc), an Albanian emigre group enjoying strong loyalty in the northern regions. The operation at its height had three W/T circuits active, but became relatively inactive in August 1951, when the last agents fled to Yugoslavia. Although we have since radically reduced our expenditures in connection with this operation, we have continued to maintain a relatively large continuing investment, primarily because we regard the BKI as a valuable long-term asset, whose hold on the loyalties of the most war-like and anti-Communist region of Albania is not equalled by any other group. We had also hoped that one additional

**TOP SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

agent team could be dispatched into Albania this spring, in cooperation with OPC, to establish contact with a northern resistance group. This hope has proved unrealizable, however, since OPC has been unable to work out a satisfactory working relationship between BKI and emigre groups represented in the NCFA (National Committee for Free Albania). In the absence of such a working relationship, the BKI cannot profitably be used, since its intelligence-gathering potentialities are dependent on its contacts with the resistance, and the resistance aspect can obviously not be exploited except by OPC. It is our intention, therefore, to reduce still further our expenses in connection with this operation, continuing only such investment as is necessary to receive the continuing flow of CE and positive information which we obtain from the group, particularly regarding Yugoslav operations into Albania.

b. Project THROTTLER.

This operation uses a three-man team based in Greece for a border crossing operation into the southwestern coastal region of Albania. The team was first sent into Albania in August 1951 and remained there for four months during which time it was able to develop four operationally useful long-term contacts. The information production during its initial stay was small; the purpose of the operation, however, is the development of long-term penetrations in the Albanian army and security services. Its leader demonstrated an unusual comprehension of his intelligence mission and is now in Greece training with one of his subordinates to return to Albania shortly with the mission of establishing W/T communication from inside the country.

c. Project OBSERVANT.

This operation, referred to in Part II, paragraph 3d, uses an OSO-hired Albanian interrogator to debrief refugees crossing the border into Greece.

d. Project THREESOME.

This cryptonym denotes an Albanian D/A operation which has never been formalized, since the relatively small present

**TOP SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

expenses are charged to Project LABEFLECTION, covering activities of the Italian liaison services. The D/A in question, GACCESS, arrived in Greece in August 1950. Control had been established over him by the Albanian IS through his brother, whose death sentence had been suspended on condition of GACCESS's cooperation. Soon after his arrival in Greece with the mission of going to Italy, GACCESS was doubled by us and efforts were initiated through the Italian IS to obtain his admission to Italy. After much delay by the Italians, this was done in January 1952. To date, GACCESS has not been contacted by the Albanian IS as he was to have been; however, since his arrival in Italy was long delayed, no immediate developments are necessarily to be expected. If he is not contacted soon, he will take the initiative and attempt to get in touch with Skender KONICA, the Albanian IS chief in Italy who originally served as GACCESS's case officer in Albania.

*Wish to  
keep*

e. Project OBLATION.

This project consists of some 25 agents who have been used for border crossing operations by the Greek service. We hope to bring these men under direct U.S. control and to attempt thereby to obtain more productive employment of them for intelligence purposes than can be hoped for operating indirectly through the Greek service, in view of its limited technical qualifications and its primary emphasis on the organization of resistance rather than the procurement of information.

*has become  
4/6/52*

f. Plan HOPE.

This operation, run in conjunction with the Italian Air Force Intelligence Service involves the use of a P-38 pursuit plane for photographic reconnaissance over Albania. Since 1949, 18 missions have been flown and complete photographic coverage has been obtained of air fields, harbor installations, and the Saseno-Vlone area, where the construction of submarine pens had been reported. The most recent mission was run in April 1952.

*act*

g. Project THORNAPPLE.

An F-51 pursuit plane has recently been provided to the Greek Air Force, primarily for the purpose of photographic reconnaissance missions over Bulgaria and Rumania. However,

**TOP SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

[ ] reports that, at least initially, the Greek Air Force plans to confine the activities of this aircraft to missions over Albania as a test of the possibility of safely overflying Satellite territory.

h. Project LAVOW:

This project will not be activated due to our policy of not doing anything at this time which might be prejudicial to our relations with the UDB. The project was intended as a penetration of Yugoslav operations into Albania, mounted in the furtherance of the as yet unclarified Yugoslav policy towards Albania.

5. As a result of the operational situation sketched in Part I, operations into Albania have relied primarily on the use of operational facilities of other countries. By and large such operational facilities have been examined carefully and used to the maximum. The principal facilities involved in the past, and of possible use in the future, are listed below:
  - a. Emigre groups. Anti-Communist emigre parties centering in Italy and Greece have provided the agent personnel for OSO and liaison service operations into Albania in the past. The possibilities of exploiting these emigre parties have greatly decreased with the passage of time because of many factors, including emigration of a great number of the refugees, heavy recruitment by other services and by OPC, and the death of a number of competent leaders who were the first to be sent into Albania.
  - b. CIA still has a large pool of potential agent personnel, represented by a 250man guard company in Germany. It is hoped that in case of war this could serve as a joint pool from which both OPC and OSO could draw agents. In peacetime it is unlikely that we shall have occasion to draw from this pool.
  - c. In Greece, OSO has a considerable establishment designed to train agents in communications, parachute jumping, and other aspects of operations. For further details, see the Greek Country Plan.
  - d. In Italy, we enjoy such facilities as the Italian service is able to offer, but because of Italy's geographic

**TOP SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

situation, these are less important than those of Greece. Operations from Italy into Albania thus far used only air drops, whereas missions from Greece into central and southern Albania have been infiltrated overland and on occasion by sea.

6. From the description of the situation within Albania, it is evident that no facilities exist there which can be used in fulfilling the OSO mission into other countries.

**PART III. Requirements:**

1. In the past, for lack of higher level directives, OSO has to a large degree determined its own objectives and targets. Recently several IPC targets have been received. In brief, the major objective is that of obtaining sufficient information on Albania to forewarn us of any change in its strategic importance and of its development as a Soviet base. OSO is watching for any indications of such change, such as the development of an Albanian air force and air force installations; significant developments in commerce and shipping between Albania, the Satellites, and Soviet Russia; and the extent to which Soviet and Satellite personnel are used to maintain Communist control of the country. Information on the extent of anti-Communist resistance within the country also continues to be of interest, partly in itself but largely for its effect on OPC planning.
2. The coverage at present afforded us by the debriefings of refugees and by our access to the product of operations mounted by Italian intelligence to check on commerce and shipping between Albania, the Satellites, and the USSR, is believed to be adequate for our limited intelligence needs. It will be supplemented during the coming year by Projects THROBBER and OBLATION.

**PART IV. Plans and Programs to Implement Section A of the OSO Mission.**

1. Personnel.
  - a. 1 January 1952 to 31 December 1952: At the present time OSO has available one Albanian-speaking junior staff officer who works full-time on Albanian operations. A Senior Staff Officer in Rome also devotes part of his time to Albanian operations.

At Headquarters, the Albanian branch at present has only one full-time employee, a GS-7 reports officer. A new T/O has been requested for the Albanian Branch to include two reports officers in addition to the branch chief and clerical assistance.

**TOP SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

- b. 1 January 1953 - 31 December 1953 and 1 January 1954 - 31 December 1956: Within the above periods, it is hoped that, as personnel becomes available, we can recruit a total of two to four staff officers who can work on Albanian operations and/or reports long enough to acquire an adequate area knowledge which will fit them to handle Albanian operations, even though they may later be transferred to duties involving other areas.

2. Agent Personnel and Facilities:

- a. 1 January 1952 - 31 December 1952: During this period, efforts will be continued to develop legal resident nets within Albania through Projects THROTTLER and OBLATION. Expectations in regard to these operations should not be exaggerated, however, since on this occasion as in the past the teams may be able to do little more than survive while providing some current coverage from periodic contacts with miscellaneous informants. An effort will also be made during this period to locate and recruit an Albanian agent in Trieste, an area where we are at present without coverage due to the emigration of an agent formerly used there.
- b. 1 January 1953 - 31 December 1953 and 1 January 1954 - 31 December 1956: During this period, it is hoped that, in addition to activities continued from the previous period, we shall also obtain information on Albania through our liaison with the UDB. It is not anticipated that any joint operations into Albania would be attempted with the UDB, even should the Yugoslavs be willing to permit our participation, since such operations would almost certainly be mounted first against Rumania or Bulgaria, both of which also have common borders with Yugoslavia.

3. Cover and Facilities.

No extension of current facilities is contemplated.

4. Intelligence Support.

- a. Our intelligence support needs now and in the foreseeable future are very limited. We have devoted in the past, and shall continue to devote in the future, considerable effort to the procurement of Albanian documentation. However, this effort is made in support of OPC rather than of our own operations, since it is OSO's position that in general it is futile to attempt to document illegal agents for travel in a country

**TOP SECRET**

**SECURITY INFORMATION**

where the population is largely static and where even the best documented stranger attracts attention.

- b. More important from the OSO standpoint is obtaining Albanian currency for our border crossing missions. Because the Albanian lek is not used for trade with non-Communist countries, the obtaining of such currency has been a continuing problem in the past. It is believed, however, that a solution will be forthcoming soon, since the UDB has promised to supply us with a limited amount, obtained presumably by its own operations and from refugees.

5. Liaison and Penetration.

Not applicable.

6. Security.

Not applicable.

PART V. Plans and Programs to Implement Section B of OSO Mission:

1. Operations Against Priority Targets.

As previously stated, there are few important targets within Albania to which we would be justified in devoting attention. The role played by Albania within the Soviet sphere is necessarily an insignificant one because of the country's geographical isolation. Information as to Soviet intentions presumably could, however, be obtained if we had access to cipher traffic between Tirana and Moscow or the satellite capitals, but, as will be explained below, our efforts to defect two important Albanian diplomats, with a view to obtaining the Albanian cipher, have been unsuccessful. We are therefore forced to limit our objective as regards Albania to maintaining sufficient coverage to warn us of a change in the country's strategic importance; in the unlikely event of such a change, priority targets might come into existence and it would then be necessary for us to mount operations designed to cover them.

2. CE Operations.

CE operations against Albanian targets are not contemplated. Albanian espionage in Western Europe is carried out primarily through the Albanian Legations in Rome and Paris, whose activities are not of sufficient importance to justify CE operations directed

**TOP SECRET**

86057

**TOP SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

against them. However, adequate CE coverage of the Albanian Legation in Rome is obtained through our normal liaison with the Italian Service, and in addition, we have as previously noted turned over Project THREESOME to the Italian CE service, with the understanding that we are to share in the product. CE coverage of the Albanian Legation in Paris, on the other hand, is not made available to us due to the limited exchange of information between the Paris Station and the Surete Generale.

3. Subversion and Defection.

- a. 1 January 1952 to 31 December 1952: The only present opportunity for subversion of Albanian officials is through Project THROTTLER, which has been previously discussed. In January 1952 the Albanian Branch Chief was sent on TDY to Paris in the effort to induce defection of the Chief Albanian IS man in the Albanian Legation there. This effort was unsuccessful, due to a variety of factors including the tight surveillance maintained on the individual in question by other representatives of his Service, and the strenuous objections of the Surete to independent efforts by CIA to conduct operations on French soil. The only other Albanian defection possibility in the West was the Press Attache of the Albanian Legation in Rome. Although we studied this possibility, efforts in this direction had to be dropped due to the lack of a sufficiently secure cut-out to make the necessary contact. Since the British Service had requested that they be allowed to attempt this defection in the event that we were unable to do so, we have now turned the operation over to them with the understanding that we shall share in any product.
- b. 1 January 1953 - 31 December 1956: There are no present plans for this period.

4. Penetration Operations.

The activities of Albanian diplomatic installations are not believed of sufficient importance to justify physical or personnel penetrations, except in the case of our being presented with a ready-made opportunity. Such an exception is the double-agent case, THREESOME, described in para. II-4-d above.

5. COMINT Procurement.

Extensive operations are carried out in Italy in cooperation with Italian Naval Intelligence to monitor Albanian communications. However,

**TOP SECRET**

**SECURITY INFORMATION**

these come under the jurisdiction of STD and the Italian Branch rather than of the Albanian Branch.

6. Liaison and Penetration.

Not applicable.

7. Intelligence Support.

Other U. S. agencies give little if any attention to Albania, and no effort to increase the utilization of their capabilities is therefore contemplated.

8. Amputation.

As already indicated, Albanian activities have been cut to the minimum. Further amputation is not contemplated except under circumstances not foreseeable at the present time.

PART VI: Plans and Programs to Implement Section C of SO Mission:

1. Headquarters.

In view of the very limited nature of Albanian operations and the fact that we have no personnel within Albania itself, the present Headquarters structure is believed perfectly adequate for our needs. Because of the non-existence of any travel between non-Communist countries and Albania, infiltration of personnel into the country necessarily demands installations of an only partially covert character and no attempt to organize a thoroughly clandestine service would therefore be justified.

2. Staff Officers:

The use of staff officers under durable cover and not identified with CIA is unnecessary to the implementation of our limited program of Albanian operations. There are only two main points from which, short of war, we can definitely plan on basing operations, i.e., Italy and Greece; in addition, there is a slight possibility of eventually carrying on joint operations from Yugoslavia in cooperation with UDB, although such a course is not now contemplated. In neither Italy nor Yugoslavia can our representatives, because of more important commitments, be expected to carry on such operations except on a liaison basis, and liaison arrangements rule out the use of any but superficial cover for the case officers concerned.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

The Greek country plan envisages the establishment of a clandestine service under durable cover on which we would be forced to rely exclusively should our present liaison arrangement become no longer practicable in the future. However, under such a fully clandestine arrangement it is unlikely that Greece will any longer be of use as an operational base into Albania; operations into that area require and probably will continue to require the partially covert facilities normal in a wartime operational situation, and such facilities cannot by their nature be hidden from the local security services.

3. Cover:

See para 2 above.

4. Agents:

There are no plans for the recruitment of long-term agents except in connection with Project THROTTLE, which has been previously discussed.

PART VII. Plans and Programs to Implement Section D of SO Mission:

1. Stay-Behind Nets:

Not applicable.

2. Evacuation:

The evacuation of agents in Greece, Trieste, and Italy forms a part of the evacuation plans of those areas.

3. Bases:

In case of war, certain selected Albanian agents in Greece, Trieste, and Italy will be evacuated in accordance with the respective plans of those areas, to the North African base. Plans for allotment of space for personnel and supplies will be arranged with the competent persons at such time as a base is secured and we have some possibility of planning realistically.

4. Stockpiling.

- a. D-Day to D-plus-90: It is assumed that no operations will be mounted into Albania during this period, since all available facilities will be devoted to more important areas. No stockpiling of materials for this period is therefore necessary.

**TOP SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

- b. D-plus-90 days to D-plus-12 months: Although the extent of Albanian operations cannot accurately be foreseen, it is safe to assume that during this period and the one which follows such operations will be at their height, in order to obtain accurate information on the enemy actions and intentions in regard to the area. For purposes of requisitioning, we should therefore count on dispatching up to ten teams of about four men each, and normal allotments of arms, ammunition, W/T sets, and miscellaneous supplies should have been requisitioned accordingly.
- c. D-plus-12 months to D-plus-24 months: During this period, we should assume, for requisitioning purposes, that five four-man teams will be dispatched in each six month period.
- d. D-plus-24 months to cessation of hostilities: During the final phases, stockpiling will be based upon current requirements for Albanian operations, which are impossible to determine now.  
Note: The above statement of our intentions is superficial, but is believed adequate to indicate the probable scale of our operations. A detailed list of items to be stockpiled cannot be drawn up at the present time. A study of what is needed should be made once the question of the North African base has been settled.

5. Reallocation and Regrouping:

- a. D-Day to D-plus-90: The senior staff officer presently concerned with Albanian operations in Rome could be placed in charge of OSO operations from the North African base, assisted by the junior staff officer now working on Albanian operations in Athens.
- b. D-plus-90 days to D-plus-12 months: An additional complement should be added to the staff handling the Albanian operations from the North African base. It should include two operations officers; an officer competent to instruct in parachuting, small arms, escape and evasion, and other para-military activities; and three reports officers, one of whom should be a CE specialist.
- c. D-plus-12 months to D-plus-48 months: In the last two phases, increase or decrease of personnel should be governed by current strategic needs and previous experience.

**TOP SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

6. Personnel, Facilities, and Supplies:

As has been emphasized elsewhere, the importance of Albania in general is minor. However, in the period D plus 90 days to D plus 24 months, it may require considerable attention intelligence-wise, to determine the enemy's intentions in regard to it. Even so, in view of the pressing demands of more important areas, there is little if anything which we would be justified in doing now to facilitate a possible, but nevertheless very uncertain, expansion in time of war. We shall make use of the two or three persons we currently have who have had some Albanian operational experience, and shall supplement them as possible with others who are not area experts but who have such general operational, reports, or CE training as is necessary.

7. Support of Wartime Military Mission:

- a. Any discussion of this question is difficult until the wartime military mission in regard to Albania is known. We can conjecture, however, that the OSO function will be limited to ascertaining the general nature of the enemy's intentions in regard to Albania, and that in pursuance of this objective our activity will reach its peak during the period D plus 90 days to D plus 24 months. It will then probably decline, since the enemy's intentions will in all likelihood be of no more significant proportions than our own insofar as Albania is concerned, i.e., in effect to neutralize it as did the Germans in World War II, as an area where neither side has anything to gain and each has much to lose in manpower and effort should any attempt be made to make it a major military base or to capture and control it.
- b. The OSO mission probably will be, at least initially, to ascertain whether or not the above hypothesis is correct. To do so requires only such elementary intelligence operations as are involved in the infiltration, by air or other means, of agent teams able to do spot OB reporting. Since this is primarily what has been done in the past, our effort needs no reorientation.

8. Military Type Units:

The needs in regard to Albanian operations are so small that planning for a military-type unit to service them alone would be inappropriate. If an overall SE Division military unit were to be established, an Albanian unit might well be incorporated in the T/O for this unit.

**TOP SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

9. Intelligence Opportunities:

There is no present reason to believe that the war-time situation in Albania would be substantially different from that with which we are now faced. Because of its geographical location, it will necessarily play a very limited role in any new conflict; it is far removed from the main routes of advance for land forces and has no advantages as an air base, suffering instead from many disadvantages as compared to other areas which probably will be Soviet-controlled in time of war; logistically it is untenable because it is unconnected by rail or major road routes with adjacent countries; and, finally, it would be the most illogical of European countries in which to attempt to stage a landing operation against a hostile and powerful defender. For all these reasons, the "confusion and chaos" which war may bring in many areas will probably be absent here, unless directly fomented from the outside. The task of fomenting such conditions would be a formidable one, and it is beyond the purview of this paper to discuss its desirability, the organization of resistance being an OPC rather than an OSO responsibility.

The necessity of taking advantage of any particular war-time conditions of chaos and confusion which may come about is recognized, but in this case too many unknown factors make such planning impractical at present. It is worth noting in this connection, however, that should Albania be considered important enough from a resistance point of view in war-time for OPC to make an all-out effort, it would be possible for us to supplement the activities of our own intelligence missions by briefing OPC's teams to collect the type of spot intelligence necessary for an understanding of the intentions of the Soviet Union in regard to this area.

10. Long-term Operations:

As previously stated, there are not now nor are there likely to be in war-time any long-term clandestine operations in Albania.

PART VIII.

Plan for Coordination of Operations and Activities with Other Divisions and Areas and, insofar as Appropriate, With Other Offices of CIA and Other U. S. Agencies:

No special planning is necessary in this regard since only one non-SE Division ( ) plays any important role in Albanian operations. The working relationship with the Italian Branch continues unaltered since the time when it formed a part of this Division. No other CIA Office or U. S. Agency has any significant collection possibility for, or interest in, Albanian operations, and no coordination is therefore necessary.

# TOP SECRET

## SECURITY INFORMATION

### PART IX. Plan for Logistics and Support.

#### 1. Personnel Needs, Including Recruitment and Training.

- a. A personnel action has already been submitted on an individual believed competent, after necessary training, to assume the duties of Albanian Branch Chief. There are no further present needs.
- b. Two to four junior staff officers will be recruited against available slots in the period from 1 January 1953 to 31 December 1956.
- c. From the above personnel, suitable individuals should be available to replace if necessary the two staff officers abroad, in Rome and Athens, who devote all or most of their time to Albanian activities.
- d. Except for possible Albanian language instruction, no training other than that routinely available is needed for the above personnel. It is believed that language instruction by a former field agent now in this country can be arranged when necessary.

#### 2. Headquarters Structure and Organization.

The present Headquarters structure is believed perfectly adequate for the needs of Albanian operations.

#### 3. Operational Facilities Needed Abroad and in the U. S.

No special operational facilities are needed in the U. S. Facilities already available at the Athens Station suffice for Albanian needs.

#### 4. Supplies, Both Current and Stockpile Needs.

At such time as the North African base becomes available, a detailed requisition will be made for a stockpile of supplies sufficient to meet the needs of 20 ~~four~~-man teams. Current needs are small and can be met from supplies presently available at the

#### 5. Base.

The question of a North African base is believed to be receiving all necessary attention from the competent authorities.

**TOP SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

6. Support and Facilities Requirements, Including Communications, Operational Aids, and Others.

The only support requirement is for Albanian currency. It is believed that this requirement will soon be met through the purchase of currency from UDB.