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No. 3 of 3

COVER SHEET

PW ANNEX to Project BGFIEND

Code Name BGFIEND

Developed by: [ ] 3 Oct. 49  
as Officer Date

Coordinated with: [ ] 10 Oct 1949  
PB I Date

[ ] 7 Oct 1949  
Operations Officer Date

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

[ ] 10 Oct. 1949  
COP Date

[ ] 5 October 1949  
COS Date

Approved by: [ ] Oct 12 / 1949  
CPP Date

\* Except for Paragraph 3 (Opn. Control). Communications from Home Office to PW operators in field, and vice versa, must follow FIEND command channels, since PW operators are under direction of the Field Chief.

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7 October 1949

SUB-PROJECT OUTLINE

Sub-Project: PW ANNEK to Project BGFIEND

Type: Operational

1. References:

- A. BGFIEND Project Outline TS #30884.
- B. Plan for Albania (TS #31143).
- C. Memorandum from PB II to PB I, 18 July 1949 (TS #31143).
- D. Memorandum from PB II to GPP, 9 September 1949 (TS #31678).
- E. Attachment "A" Propaganda Themes.

2. The Proposal:

- A. The Objective: Current United States policy toward Albania contemplates the restoration of Albanian independence by overthrowing the present Moscow-controlled regime, and replacing it by an enlightened government acceptable to the people of Albania, and with aims and objectives harmonious with those of the United States in that area.
- B. The Problem: To mount a propaganda attack and to maintain it during the appropriate phases of Project BGFIEND in order to create conditions favorable to a coup d'etat.
- C. Facts Bearing on the Problem:
  - I. The following basic background data were considered in deciding on specific propaganda themes (see Attachment "A"):
    - a. 45% of the 1,000,000 plus Albanians are reported illiterate.
    - b. There are three major ethnic groups: The Ghegs in the mountainous center and north of the country; the Plainsmen of the coastal area; and the Tosks in the south. There are also three religious groups; Moslems - 70% of the population, Greek-Orthodox - 20%; Catholic - 10%. Most of the Catholics are in the north; the Christians in the south are Orthodox.
    - c. Albanian society is largely tribal. Any regime can "govern" beyond the plains and towns only to the extent that it avoids antagonizing the tribesmen in the hills. Albania as an independent, national state is more an

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artificial creation of power politics than an expression of national will.

- d. 80% of the population is agricultural or pastoral, yet Albania is only about 75% self-sufficient in food. This figure would be considerable smaller but for the very low standards of living.
- e. Aversion to the Hoxha regime pervades approximately 80% of the population, because of the mountaineer's traditional resistance to coercion, the serious economic situation and the military and political leaders' lack of prestige. The population, instinctively opposed to pan-Slavism, dislikes the present regime as much because it is pan-Slav as because it is oppressive.
- f. Communications are primitive, yet an effective grapevine facilitates the rapid spread of news, rumors and propaganda.

II. The targets of the attack are:

- a. "The enemy" - i.e., the present regime, members of the Communist Party, and Soviet-appointed stooges in the Army and civilian administration. (A sense of insecurity already exists among a majority of the present regime; this action should try to stimulate it to the point of panic.)
- b. The general population, including the rank and file in the Army, whose hatred for the present regime should be channeled toward effective revolt.

III. To be effective the propaganda attack must be carefully planned and fully coordinated with all other activities of BGFIND.

D. Recommendations for the executions of the PW attack:

1. METHODS:

- a. The Free Albania Committee's activities should be guided and exploited by public relation experts.
- b. A series of VOA and BBC broadcasts should be focused on the work of the Free Albanian Committee, and, should take appropriate note of the Greek Government's sympathetic attitude toward it.
- c. A craft should carry a radio transmitter beamed on Radio Tirana's wave-length and strong enough to overpower it. Broadcasts should be daily, for approximately fifteen minutes each evening. (The announcer's voice should be

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from records, in order to avoid any possible deviation from from the script and to insure the greatest degree of security.) The broadcast should be a newscast, with emphasis on Albania, the Balkans and Europe.

- d. Continual leaflet drops in bulk should be coordinated with supply drops to agents and workers in Albania who will redistribute leaflets to local groups. This measure - necessary because of the high degree of illiteracy among Albanians - will result in the availability of information at strategic points from where the word-of-mouth campaign can be launched. These leaflets should give the latest news and should instill in Albanian leaders a feeling of responsibility toward the country as a whole. The source and purpose of the supplies (the Free Albania Committee) should be made explicit.
- e. Continual leaflet drops to co-workers recruited by our agents in the hills should also be undertaken.

## II. Propaganda THEMES:

- a. All through the propaganda campaign, the impression should be maintained that the Free Albanian Committee is a well organized, efficiently functioning body whose efforts are thoroughly planned and amply supported.
- b. A detailed list of propaganda themes is presented in attachment "A". The themes will be represented by selected news stories which will report items to encourage thinking along the lines outlined in the attachment.

In employing the themes, it is important not to dwell upon Western concepts of harshness and brutality, but upon action against Albanian independence and upon foreign intervention or traitorous activity.

It is essential that confidence in the news be created and maintained. Every fact which can be checked should be absolutely accurate; plausibility and hard realism should characterize comments about Albanian life; timing of predictions should be such as to take advantage of completed action before the public is aware that such is the case.

Caution 1 Appeals to national sentiment must not be over-emphasized since tribal loyalty far outweighs national loyalty.

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### III. Preparation of PW Material:

- a. Material pertaining to the activities of the Free Albania Committee should be prepared by the public relations expert assigned to or working for the Committee.
- b. Broadcast material should be prepared aboard the radio ship in accordance with Part 3 (Operational Control) below.
- c. Pending the establishment of a base of operations, leaflets should be prepared (in cooperation with the British) and printed here.
- d. After the establishment of a base, but before a PW expert is stationed there, leaflets should be prepared here (in cooperation with the British) but should be printed at the base.
- e. After a PW expert has been attached to the base, leaflets will be prepared and printed there in accordance with Part 3 (Operational Control) below. (Note: Available material should be furnished to the British for information.)

### IV. Timing of the PW Operation:

The PW attack must be closely synchronized with the remaining principle phases of Project BGFIND:

- a. ~~Thorough~~ exploitation of the Free Albania Committee's activities should begin at once.
- b. The VOA and BBC broadcast series should be maintained during all phases of BGFIND. The themes and degree of emphasis of these overt broadcasts will depend on the existing situation at any given time and should be constantly coordinated between FBI and the Department of State.
- c. During the initial period of Phase II of BGFIND (Reconnaissance) leaflets should be dropped (not later than 1 November) announcing the Free Albania Committee stating its purposes, and reporting action completed to date. During the same period, broadcasts from the radio ship should begin.

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The following propaganda themes (detailed Attachment "A") should be employed during the initial and middle stages of Phase II: ANTI-SOVIET, ANTI-COLLABORATOR, CONFIDENCE IN FREE ALBANIA COMMITTEE. The degree of emphasis should be determined by the expert on the spot, in close coordination with and guidance by PB II. During the late stage of Phase II, the AWARENESS OF PROBLEM theme should be used.

- d. After Phase III (Infiltration) of BGFIEND becomes operative, leaflet drops to agents and co-workers should begin. During the initial and middle period of this phase, the following theme (described in Attachment "A") should be emphasized: FREEDOM IS ATTAINABLE, DETERMINATION, FEELING OF PARTICIPATION. During the last period, the SENSE OF UNITY theme should be played upon and should find its culmination in HATRED OF THE ENEMY.

E. Estimate of results of PW operation:

A carefully planned and executed propaganda campaign will contribute vitally to the successful preparation necessary for the Albanian people to resist and to contemplate the overthrow of the present Communist regime.

3. Operation Control:

- A. Many day-to-day details of the PW operation must be left to the discretion of the script writer aboard the radio ship and to the leaflet writer at the main base. Both these experts should draw on other field agents for political guidance. ~~However, direct communication between the PW field operators and PB II must be established for policy guidance as well as for guidance on day-to-day events.~~

4. Area of Operation:

- A. An operational base for BGFIEND will be established in a geographic area to be determined by PB I and FB I. PW activities will be conducted from that base.

5. Cover:

- A. A decision on cover for the radio ship and its crew can be reached only after a craft has been earmarked for the operation. The origin and type of vessel will necessarily influence this decision.
- B. The PW expert and his staff at the base should use the same cover as the other personnel assigned to the operation there.

6. Staff:

- A. The following personnel will be needed to carry out the PW operation in the field:

- I. One American radio-script writer. (If COP cannot provide a writer, PB II may be able to draw ~~one~~ SECRET COPY or COPIE top from its staff.)

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- II. One American PW field operator.
- III. Four translators.
- IV. One tested Albanian radio voice.
- V. Sufficient technicians to operate the radio station aboard the ship.
- VI. Two multilith press operators.
- VII. Personnel to operate aircraft for leaflet drops.

**7. Communications:**

- A. Communication channels established for BOFISND should be made available to and used by the PW experts in the field.

**8. Support:**

- A. One craft suitable for carrying broadcasting equipment.
- B. Aircraft for leaflet drops.
- C. Necessary broadcasting equipment, including a kite antenna, to be installed aboard the craft.
- D. Two recording machines.
- E. Two playbacks.
- F. Two multilith presses (Type 1250).
- G. Necessary power sources (generator).
- H. Paper and ink supplies for leaflet printing.
- I. Necessary repair and spare parts for the broadcast and printing equipment.
- J. Two typewriters.
- I. PB II will furnish guidance on types of equipment to be procured.

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ATTACHMENT A

**BOFRIEND PROPAGANDA THEMES**

The following list of propaganda themes is presented in the suggested order of exploitation. These themes will be represented by selected news stories which will report items to encourage thinking along the lines outlined. Each theme should be supported throughout the propaganda attack. However, emphasis should gradually shift along the way, until item (1) below becomes the signal for direct action:

(a) Anti-Soviet. Cite facts which exemplify how the communist regime is responsible for:

1. Deteriorating the Albanian economy (such as the drain on food supplies by the Army).
2. Disrupting relations with neighbors.
3. Making Albania the pawn of USSR power interests.
4. Instituting terror against simple Albanians.
5. Setting father against son.

(b) Anti-collaborator. Characterize Soviet-Albanian collaborators as:

1. Weak little men.
2. Selling out their country's welfare.
3. Plotting against the freedom of action of true patriots.
4. Weakening the courage of the populace.
5. Enriching themselves.

(c) Confidence in National Committee. Emphasize the variety of elements and breadth of interests represented in the Committee by exploiting the huge and responsive international audience for the Committee's voice. Predictions of the Committee should be timed in such manner that they can be observed working out before the entire population, thereby bolstering confidence.

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(d) Awareness of problem: Descriptive material should develop the essential elements of the political and economic problems, all of which derive from Moscow's domination:

1. NKVD.
2. Informers.
3. Former German prisoner-Gestapo terror.
4. Collaborators.
5. Threats of neighbors.
6. Control of currency in USSR hands.
7. Expropriation of merchants.
8. Land reform, channeled for USSR advantage.

(e) Freedom is attainable. Exploit the support of all elements by:

1. Citing the numbers of people ready to help in Albania.
2. Citing the strength of the powers already combined against the USSR.
3. Detailing the history of Albanian self-determination.

(f) Determination. Assume constantly that courage and firmness can overcome long odds - "better an eye plucked out than a head lost"; conversely, emphasize the weakness and character of the appeasers (especially including Hoxha).

(g) Feeling of participation. Word of mouth dissemination of information should increase the sense of participation:

1. Lines of communication should be established for ventures whose only importance will be in drawing in large numbers of people.
2. Stunts, such as lighting of fires on hill-tops at specified moments, should be arranged.
3. Passive resistance should be encouraged.

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Attachment A - Cont'd.

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(h) Sense of unity.

1. Simple codes should give information to large group of co-workers.
2. Numbers of local Committees should be exaggerated.
3. Exploits of agents should be reported in detail.
4. Channels of communication should be shown to be protected by the general populace.

(i) Hatred of enemy. Vilification of the USSR and of collaborators should be based upon active incidents:

1. Assassination or imprisonment of revolutionaries should be itemized.
2. Murdered hostages should be martyred.

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