

TOP SECRET

8 July 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: []

SUBJECT: []

Disagreement with COP'S Reaction to []

1. This telegram shows that our operators in [] are allowing themselves more freedom of action than their experience or knowledge of Albanian affairs warrant. They indicated to us that they were planning to announce the formation of a committee on July 2 and after that they discovered the difficulties in forming such a committee. This indicates the local operators must not make sweeping basic decisions without first consulting Washington. They may make soundings of the situation and suggestions but not basic commitments.

2. We cannot expect to get very far by basing our action on a double cross; Albanians are much more skillful at that than we are and they will almost certainly doublecross us first of all and most of all. It is of course possible that ABAS XUPI is fooling us just as much as he fools ZOG. He may be phoning ZOG about our efforts to win him away, as Italian sleuths listen. The point here is that we should not base our action on a double cross.

3. In view of developments in Rome, it seems to me we cannot hope to succeed in this without some sort of basic agreement with the Italians. In any case they now know much about this action (a) from their own intelligence service and (b) because every disgruntled or impetuous Albanian runs to tell them. If the Italians are against the project they can cause extreme embarrassment up to the very highest international circles—they look upon Albania with as jealous an eye as we do on Cuba; they consider it their pigeon.

4. The "riot act" of point 10 sounds too much like a pep talk before a High School football team. Not for 500 years, if ever, have such talks been effective in Albania. It is a land of conspiracy, run by conspirators. And we are now engaged in a tough, dangerous conspiracy. We must act accordingly.

5. Point 10-f is based on misconception. When have the Albanian people ever decided their fate? Some of the men who help drive out Hodza with guns will take over power with guns. Let's stop kidding

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

DOWN GRADE PER
CLASSIFICATION REVIEW DIVISION
TOP SECRET

731082
COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES
Frank

ourselves by pretending we're fooling Albania about that.

6. Point 10-g. Doesn't this make us look naive? How are a handful of Americans and Britishers in Italy or Egypt going to give Albanian exiles ample opportunity to present their case to the people under the noses of Hodza's army, Hodza's cops and Russian NKVD? Why didn't the powerful XOXE present his case? This promise must sound unreal to Albanian conspirators.

7. Point 11. (Committee Statute) No reference should be made to territorial integrity. Independence and sovereignty of present Albania should suffice.

8. Point 11-(6). This point should be eliminated. Whom are we fooling by this? Certainly not the Albanian conspirators. They know they are going in with guns and that one group will retain power with guns. We're not fooling the Albanian people (a) because they know who always rules Albania, and how; and (b) because we're not going to broadcast to them that we're about to free them.

9. Point 11-(7). Certainly the General Committee can't be formed in Italy by our operator. It is a political body based in the U.S. As our operator says, it is a front. How can this large body possibly advise the conspirators on all problems? The composition of the General Committee should be of a nature that would not arouse the suspicions or hostility of the conspirators, but they should not determine its membership. Plainly our operator on the spot must make suggestions and ascertain attitudes toward possible combinations, but the commitments he gave are too sweeping and, as far as I am aware, unauthorized.

10. Our devotion to government by the people must not blind us to Albanian realities. If this conspiracy is successful the conspirators will set up a government in Albania and must do it quickly. There can be no interregnum. They must manage matters with a strong hand to prevent external complications. We must bear that in mind constantly. We are actually picking out a government. Eventual elections will come after a government has established itself. This process cannot be reversed.

11. The General Committee should be announced—as the other national Committees have been announced—but the small Committee should not be announced. And the General Committee must not know what the small Committee is doing.

C. OFFICE

cc: ADFC

TOP SECRET

COPY 2 OF 5 COPIES