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3 November 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: [ ]  
SUBJECT: Meeting of Joint Policy Committee

1. Present at meeting of the Joint Policy Committee at 11:30 this date were: Mr. Joyce, [ ] Mr. Roosevelt, [ ] and [ ] taking notes.

2. Mr. McCargar opened the meeting by stating that the purpose was to examine the question of a chairman for the Albanian committee. He stated that the Balli Kombetar (BK) has proposed Hasan Dosti as chairman, and that it is desirable to settle the long delayed question of the chairmanship.

3. [ ] stated that Dosti must agree to serve under another chairman, if not given it himself, and that "influence" on him might be necessary. To [ ] question as to whether Abas Kupa definitely would refuse to accept Dosti as chairman [ ]

[ ] replied that we had informal assurances to that effect. [ ] expressed the thought that we should seek an alternative chairman agreeable to the Committee, inasmuch as the BK will not accept Kupa. To this Mr. Joyce said that we have been assuming that the BK would have the chairmanship, and that we must find a member of BK with whom Kupa will work. [ ] summed up by stating that we need: 1) a firm statement from Kupa that he will not accept Dosti as chairman; 2) inasmuch as State and OPC want a member of BK as chairman, what would Dosti's attitude be regarding another member of BK taking that post. All agreed with this statement.

4. [ ] pointed out that Dosti heads one group within BK, while Abas Ermenyi leads a younger, more liberal and active group, having a good record. In reply to a question from [ ], [ ] noted that the U.S. looks on the chairmanship as more or less of a "front" position, and that Kupa is illiterate. [ ] then asked whether there was any chance of giving Kupa added standing, in some operational capacity. No definite answer was forthcoming on this point. [ ] then suggested that operatives in the field be asked to influence the BK to offer another candidate, if Dosti were unacceptable. We can, of course, tell the Committee who is to be chairman.

5. Mr. Joyce asked about the Kryezin brothers, whereupon [ ] and [ ] discussed the apparent liaison of one

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with Tito, and the domination of the other by Kupa. [ ] then remarked that an alternative suggested by the BK might be worse than Dosti; he presented Andoni as a possible compromise. [ ] added that Andoni's wartime record was clean. He is only 29 to 32 years old, and therefore less prestigious among the Albanians. To Mr. Joyce's question about any respected older man in Albanian politics, [ ] mentioned H. Machi, member of the General Committee and of BK.

6. [ ] pointed out that the BK alone has a sizable following in Albania. [ ] then pointed out that a rotating chairmanship would bring in the military members, a poor policy. It was then agreed by all that the field would be asked whether all of the Executive Committee rejects Dosti. [ ] added that a solution of this chairmanship question is urgent. He then asked whether OPC and State absolutely insists upon BK chairmanship even if an alternative is agreed upon. Mr. Joyce replied that he would have to consult others at State and preferred to try BK. Mr. Roosevelt stressed that the Committee must not be allowed to split.

[ ] stated that [ ] would be asked to explore the firmness of Kupa's objection to Dosti and to advise Kupa to accept Dosti if possible. [ ] commented that we might have to read Kupa out if he refused and all agreed that we must avoid this if possible. [ ] stated that the field must explore the situation with Dosti and persuade him if possible. This will be left up to [ ] and we will get his reactions to the situation. [ ] stated that we should explore the extent of Kupa's opposition, being conciliatory with him. Mr. Roosevelt added that there should be two separate paragraphs in the cable to the field, one explaining the problem on resistance to Dosti, and the other, resistance to a member of BK. We ought to indicate definitely that BK has the chairmanship as a right. Mr. Joyce added that Kupa should not be allowed to think any other solution existed than a BK chairman.

7. [ ] stated that he definitely preferred the cable to be on an exploratory basis to determine how strong are the Kupa-Kryeziu objections to Dosti and BK, but agreed with [ ] that the cable should stress the urgency and state that if Kupa's attitude was definitely negative, another BK man should be considered.

8. [ ] stated that Kupa can only provide a list of recruits on 10 November and that only four people will be ready for operations. We cannot meet the December 1 deadline for Malta and have no alternative sites. We have, therefore, decided to postpone reconnaissance until suitable bases have been found.

9. [ ] then reported the results of the first infiltration and asked whether there was a place available in Germany or elsewhere for personnel sent to us. Mr. Joyce then commented that both parties must keep each other informed on general Balkan developments and that State will be kept au courant even though not represented at Joint Policy Committee meetings. The meeting closed at 12:30.

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