

# SECRET

31 January 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

SUBJECT: Arms Drops into Albania

1. During the 15 December meeting to discuss Project BGFIEND, [ ] expressed the opinion that "we should be in a position soon to put small amounts of arms into Albania".

2. Some of the problems which would be raised by a sudden requirement to make a series of parachute drops of arms into Pixiiland would be the following:

a. [ ] advises that presently the Air Force has no supply of air drop Containers available, nor are they in procurement. He feels that the British probably would have a supply of either the "H" or pannier-type. To assist in designating the type Containers best suited to Operation FIEND, Mr. Rucker in Colonel Whisner's office has bulletins showing the breakdowns of the arms components of the various standard World War II drop kits.

b. Sterile, or unmarked, cargo chutes also are not available and would have to be specially ordered and manufactured. In [ ] opinion, their procurement would only be a matter of several weeks.

c. The Air Force has no trained "packing specialists" for Containers in Europe at the present. To insure correct functioning of the chutes, it is either necessary to have a trained specialist to pack them at the Air Base from which the Drop Mission would be launched (Stuttgart) or, alternately, to have the chutes prepacked in this country by trained personnel. Prepacking raises another problem, however, because the cargo chute should be inspected just prior to the drop for signs of deterioration if it has been packed more than 60 days.

3. If it is considered desirable to take at this time the preliminary steps which would enable us to make arms drops the moment they are required, the following details should be taken care of:

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a. An estimate of the probable types and numbers of Containers, automatic weapons, mortars, demolition kits, medical supplies, and ammunition required should be prepared.

b. An order should be placed to procure the necessary number of Containers and chutes.

c. For the arms themselves, there are three potential sources of supply.

(1) Possibly they can be supplied out of stock by Support. This should be investigated when the exact requirements are known.

(2) Alternately, arrangements might be made for them to be set aside out of foreign weapons reserves held by General Van Fleet's Forces in Greece, or U. S. Forces in Germany.

(3) As a third alternative, arms could be set aside in this country in a Government Warehouse out of the larger amount of military equipment presently being assembled for shipment to the Western European nations under MAP.

In Case (1), the arms could be packaged here in the Containers and crated in the Support Warehouse for shipment directly to the Drop Base.

In Case (2), the technician could be dispatched with proper authority to requisition arms from local Army sources and to pack them at the Drop Base. The empty containers and chutes could be shipped to him upon their receipt by Support. The above assumes that the Drop Base will be in the same country in which the arms are drawn.

In Case (3), arrangements could be made through the State Department for the desired equipment to be pigeonholed as a "special reserve" from the larger amount of equipment for MAP. After a suitable interval, the arms could be covertly transferred to the Support Warehouse for repacking and shipment to the Drop Base. In the event that it is decided that there will be a unilateral approach to the French Special Service or that of another power, this procedure would be simplified since the arms could be shipped directly to that country under MAP and then diverted covertly to the Drop Base for packaging.

4. In conclusion, it might prove of value in projects other than BGFIEND if the specialized equipment required for air drops was under procurement and if a nucleus of trained drop personnel had been reformed and was immediately available.

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