

**TOP SECRET**

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3020  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

1 March 1950

**MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD**

**SUBJECT:** Meeting on FIEND of 27 February 1950

**REFERENCE:** (a) GPF Memorandum, Recommendations For BOFIEND

1. A meeting to discuss the future course of FIEND based on the reference paper, was held in ADPG's office at 4 p.m. on 27 February 1950. Messrs. Wisner, [redacted], [redacted] were present.

2. Mr. Wisner stated that he felt that in the future our relationships with the British should have greater flexibility and that we should follow up the British suggestion that either of us could approach other services on phases of the operation which were handled unilaterally.

3. Mr. Wisner then reviewed the course of British-U. S. relations on FIEND enumerating the ways in which he felt that both the British and ourselves had failed to play our parts in the operation. The British had failed us in providing bases and propaganda boat facilities, had seriously hurt the security of the operation by the conduct of their agents in Italy, had conducted VALIABLE in an unprofessional fashion, had sabotaged the concept of a general policy headquarters in Washington, had generally slowed-down the operations and had perhaps established some sort of covert unilateral relationship with Tito. OPC for its part had shown a lack of clarity in executing the operation and had not made sufficient real operational contributions. Mr. Wisner stated, however, that he felt that the weight of omission and error was against the British and that this was the main reason why OPC wished to go ahead on a more independent basis.

4. Mr. Wisner and [redacted] both indicated that the British Services and Foreign Office are at present somewhat embarrassed by the British performance in FIEND over the last few months. Mr. Wisner stated that our approach to the British at this time should be on a friendly and conciliatory (or nonrecriminatory) basis, but that we should get a firm and clear

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW DIVISION

REF ID: A66000 JAN 1950

**TOP SECRET**

COPY 2 OF 8 COPIES  
38257

**TOP SECRET**

agreement as to the future course of FIEND on a more flexible basis.

5. [ ] brought up the question of the priority of FIEND stating that he felt it should have a lower priority than in the past. This was agreed to particularly in regard to Bulgaria. [ ] said that this priority would be reflected in the cut-back in the size of the operation, but that the smaller operation which we are now going to undertake should be pushed with all possible vigor.

6. Mr. Wisner stated that the Department of State Foreign Office objections on FIEND should be more specifically stated than in the statement in paragraph 1 of the reference paper. It was generally agreed that Southern Austria and Ciresalca were out so far as the operation was concerned and that Greece could only be used for exfiltration purposes. Mr. Wisner and Mr. Offie stated that they did not feel it was necessary to secure State Department approval before approaching the Greeks for a holding base for agents coming out of the target area.

7. Mr. Wisner asked whether the present OPC-OSO relationship and the attitude of OSO in regard to the Italian Services was not the real obstacle to OPC operations in Italy. It was agreed that this was the major block, although there were other objections. It was decided that in view of OSO's position and the lack of a well established OPC Mission in Italy, it would be unwise at this time to attempt to use Italy in connection with FIEND.

8. There was a discussion of the security question involved in using the French Services. It was decided that this did not prohibit an approach to the French for facilities. Mr. Wisner designated [ ] and [ ] to prepare a detailed paper outlining the OPC position on FIEND and the line [ ] was to take in his talks with the British upon his return to London.

#### 9. Decisions Taken

It was decided that

a. OPC-British cooperation on FIEND should be more flexible in the future with either service entitled to make separate approaches to other NATIONAL SERVICES FOR ASSISTANCE or collaboration on certain specific phases of the operation. We will continue to have a joint operation at the policy level and on certain economic and propaganda activities (excluding the boat), but OPC will disengage itself and handle operational matters connected with infiltration on a unilateral basis.

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

b. OPG should make a unilateral approach to the French for certain operational facilities and should in actual fact operate more closely with the French in the future on operational matters than with the British. However, before a final decision is made on this we will ascertain more clearly the capacity and stability of French Services in view of present scandal.

c. The Albanian National Committee should be brought to New York and Paris as soon as possible.

d. [ ] should press the British to take economic measures against Albanian trade in Trieste and that we should investigate the possibilities for interfering with this trade through pilferage and the like.

e. We should make a joint U.S.-British approach to the Greeks for exfiltration facilities in the name of the committee and that further State Department approval is not necessary to make this contact.

f. A special meeting in London as suggested by the British is not necessary. [ ] will handle the negotiations upon his return.

g. [ ] and [ ] will prepare a paper outlining the exact position Mr. Bullock is to take in London.

[ ]  
Coordinator, Branch B, Staff II

**Distribution:**

Office 1 of 8  
[ ] 2 of 8  
[ ] - 3 of 8  
[ ] 6 of 8  
[ ] - 4 of 8  
[ ] 5 of 8  
Registry 7 and 8 of 8

TOP SECRET

COPY 3 OF 8 COPIES

38557