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AUG 23 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
VIA: THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)
SUBJECT: Report of Conversation With King Zog

1. The attached report to DCI, on the conversation conducted by [] with King Zog, was prepared in the form of a direct report in view of King Zog's request that certain information be conveyed directly to you.

[]
FRANK G. WISNER
Assistant Director for
Policy Coordination

Enclosure: Report

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16 August 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Conversation With King Zog of Albania.

1. The following report contains information which was given me by King Zog with the request that it be transmitted directly to you.

2. I called on King Zog of Albania at his suite at the Mayflower Hotel on 15 August 1951, in accordance with arrangements made by telephone, and explained that I had been directed by you to convey your compliments and to discuss any matters which he may wish to take up. Since I already knew the King as a result of previous conversations in Egypt, during which we discussed various Albanian questions of mutual interest, he received me very cordially and spoke with what appeared to be complete candor. This particular conversation lasted approximately an hour and a half and covered a considerable number of details. The message which he asked me expressly to convey to you follows:

(a) The following four specific points are of special importance from the U. S. viewpoint in connection with Albania:

(1) A pro-Soviet Albania represents a potential threat of 100,000 armed men behind Yugoslavia's back.

(2) The Soviets are enlarging and improving seven existing airfields in Albania and building two additional new fields. These fields are obviously not intended for activities directed against Yugoslavia since the Soviets have adequate facilities for air operations against Yugoslavia from Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary. The logical assumption is that the development of these air facilities in Albania is directed toward the Mediterranean and the U. S. bases being developed in North Africa.

(3) The Bay of

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(3) The Bay of Valona provides facilities for basing a naval force that could be used effectively against shipping in the Mediterranean and the Adriatic.

(4) The Island of Saseno has facilities for a submarine base from which the Soviets could paralyze shipping in the Mediterranean and the Adriatic.

The above four points illustrate the significance of Albania and the threat which a Soviet-controlled Albania presents to the western world. The King has misgivings concerning Yugoslavia's true intentions since she has not sought defense agreements with Greece, Turkey, and the U. S., and he considers it essential for the United States to take prompt action with respect to Albania in order to break the Cominform encirclement of Yugoslavia and thereby exert a possible influence in bringing Yugoslavia more definitely into the western camp and also reduce the Soviet threat to the Mediterranean and the Near East.

(b) In the King's opinion, three possible courses of action towards Albania exist. These are:

(1) An invasion of Albania by the U. S. armed forces. This he considers an unrealistic and impractical thought which we can dismiss.

(2) An invasion of Albania by an Albanian force to be assembled and led by the King. He could bring together 8,000 to 10,000 men, recruited from among the various Albanian groups scattered throughout the world. This possibility is not particularly desirable because it could be readily interpreted by the Soviets as an act of aggression on the part of the countries within which the invasion elements are assembled, equipped and trained.

(3) The present Communist regime in Albania could be overthrown by an insurrection developed within the country under the King's leadership. In this instance the action would have all the earmarks of a spontaneous Albanian activity which

could less readily

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could less readily be described by the Soviets or other interested countries as an act of aggression or foreign intervention, and is therefore the most desirable and practical method of solving the Albanian problem.

(c) The King stands ready to do what he can should the U. S. wish to call on him in connection with any Albanian activities.

3. The King was particularly emphatic in asking me to assure you that he does not seek restoration of the throne but his interest in the problem is purely that of a patriotic Albanian who wishes to help his country, that he feels that he is in the best position to lead any kind of a resistance movement, and that as proof of his lack of self-interest, he undertakes to invite a U.N. Commission to supervise the establishment of any post-insurrection system of government which the Albanian people may themselves desire to have. He indicated that he felt the United States could do two things in the immediate future, which would hearten and strengthen the position of the anti-Communist Albanians and make it difficult for the present Albanian regime to pose as the sole champion of Albanian territorial integrity. These two things are:

(a) The U. S. should make a declaration to the effect that it stands firmly for the preservation of the territorial integrity of Albania.

(b) The U. S. should induce Greece, Yugoslavia and Italy to declare that they undertake not to seek any Albanian territory by force of arms, and that in the event they have any territorial claims against Albania, they will seek adjustment of these claims through the machinery and methods established for the solution of such problems by the United Nations Organization.

4. In parting the King expressed his pleasure at having had this meeting and repeated that he is ready to place himself at our disposition whenever we should wish to call on him.


Chief, EE-1/OPC

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