

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

FDP-9/JLH

NO.

DATE

20 September 1951

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. OSO FDP/Chief		SEP 20 51		[]	<p><u>Hand Carry</u></p> <p>Here is the OSO proposal to contact the league of Mt's resistance group which I previously orally outlined to you</p> <p>3 to 4 and 5 -</p> <p>The proposal doesn't appeal to me because not only are we forced to deal with the BKT outside the country, but we are also forced into a liaison with the Italians.</p> <p>4+5 To 6</p> <p>Suggests the Italians can be eliminated by using the men presently in Greece and believes the BKT leaning can be countered by pairing the candidates with NCA Men acceptable to us.</p> <p>NOTES the original approach was made to NCA and believes the NCA has grounds to approach</p>
2.					
3. OPO EE/Chief		25 SEPT		[]	
4.					
5.			28 SEPT	[]	
6.		OCT - 2 1951		[]	
7.		OCT 3-		[]	
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
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14.					
15.					

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

on its own. The overture to NCAF is
prima facie evidence the League of the Mts is
willing to talk to any group and []
could provide NCAF Types or others who
represent the Curios ISF to make the
contact.



OCT - 2 1951

6 to 4 and 7:

I am opposed to any action through
the BKI people in Italy. Having no dealings
with the BKI, nothing we do can be construed
by them as an instance of bad faith. Obviously
the League of the Mts. wants to get in
touch with the NCAF, but was never allowed
to do so. Please try to develop a
scheme which would allow us to pick up
the threads within the country or if that
is impossible, then in Greece. We do not
want to undertake anything that can give the
BKI in Italy hope of political support
from the U.S. Do you agree?



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		REC'D	FWD'D		
					<p>⑦ To ① + ② OCT</p> <p>On the 3rd of [] returned stating he did not now believe a joint Team was practical and proposed his group in Greece contact the League of Mts on an intelligence mission to determine the STATUS + strength of this group. By W/T a report would come + BCFIENO could make up its mind on the operation on the basis of the field report. In addition to W/T [] offered the services of 2 couriers. It seems to me this would not immediately benefit H/W/igh or BCFIENO and that we should survey our own resources to determine if H/W/igh has people to pick up the threads and follow that lead before using BKI advisors. Inside the point CSO operated using BKI men have not been washed out but are simply being held in an inactive STATUS.</p>
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12.					
13.					<p>APL's Com. CONC. with small Survey of H/W/igh that a CSO approach F-est is in order to be followed by BCFIENO Taking over operations in event anything is doing.</p>
14.					
15.					

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MEMORANDUM

20 September 1951

TO : Chief, FDP, OSO *SMH*
Chief, EE, CPC

FROM : FDP, OSC []

SUBJECT: Contact with National League of the Mountains

1. On 17 September, [] mentioned that [] was interested in mounting an operation designed to contact the leaders of the National League of the Mountains, an Albanian resistance organization described in SODB-42023. [] stated that, as agreed with OSO at the time of the dissemination of the report, details of this operation would be worked out in collaboration with the Albanian Branch, OSO.

2. Study of the problem by this Branch leads to the conclusion that the approach to the League must, if it is to be either effective or secure, take place through the BKI, even though the League's appeal was not directed to any one party.

3. A breakdown of the leaders listed in the above-cited report shows seven of them to be Roman Catholics, and thus almost automatically closely tied to Gjon Markagjoni. Of these Catholics, Don Zef Oroshi, the League president, is described by a BKI source as "a fiduciary of Markagjoni," while Preng Kol Gjonmarkaj is Markagjoni's cousin. Of the Mohammedans, the most prominent, Haki Bushati, comes from a family which has long been allied with that of Markagjoni. From these facts alone, it appears difficult to approach the League through any group but BKI, from which Markagjoni is inseparable. The attempt to use members of any other group would merely involve us in complicated regional, party, and personal conflicts.

4. Another reason making it desirable to use BKI members is that at the present time we should avoid any action which could be interpreted by BKI as an instance of bad faith, lest the organization's leaders feel justified in accepting tempting Yugoslav offers currently being tendered them.

5. Though use of BKI by CPC has so far been precluded by the issue of the former's exclusion from NCFR, it is believed that a solution can be found in the form of a direct OPC invitation to BKI, through OSO, to participate in an operation to be conducted entirely independently and

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without the knowledge of NCFM. A direct and non-political approach of this nature should allow the exploitation of BKI's capacities and make for relatively good security, since the number of Albanian emigres privy to the operation would be held to a minimum number of persons sharing common loyalties.

6. Such an approach would require notification of Italian Intelligence. It is believed, however, that OSO can obtain Italian consent for exclusively American use of BKI personnel as long as it is clearly understood that no third service is involved.

7. OSO has available in Italy one Albanian leader of a prominent northern Catholic family, who would be appropriate for this operation. From other personnel presently in Greece, it is believed that a satisfactory team of four or five men, including a w/t operator, can be formed.

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