

Notes.

22 Oct 51 FIEND/VALUABLE Meeting

I. POLITICAL (External):

(a) It was agreed that 1952 must be the year of decision in the Operations. The Spring of 1953 well may be the limit to which the present level of morale within the country can be maintained before serious deterioration strikes. The Foreign Office has informed the State Department that its policy includes an independent Albania. VALUABLE is awaiting a statement from the Foreign Office that will recognize the urgency of the situation and will permit a stepup in their activity. The State Department's position is analagous. FIEND is expecting a similarly strong shift in policy within 3 months. Until such instructions are received, FIEND is committed to maintain its present level of operations.

(b) State's policy toward the Yugoslav-sponsored Prizren Committee is one of watchful waiting. The real motives behind this group can be questioned and outright attacks on the NCFA can be answered, but violent anti-Yugoslav (or Prizren) outbursts must be avoided.

VALUABLE stated that the British Ambassador is to be instructed to represent the following to Tito: (1) Great Britain favors an independent Albania, (2) the true designs behind the Prizren Committee would like to be understood, and if they are not politically or militarily ambitious, that (3) an understanding between the two committees would be desirable. VALUABLE urged that such a frank representation be made in concert with the U.S. It was agreed, as preliminary, that State and the F.O. inform Tito of the combined stand for Albania's independence; er, that Albania's 3 neighboring countries -- Italy, Greece, lavia -- must denounce any predatory interests in Albania.

VALUABLE feels that Tito desires only a change in the communist government of Albania that will renounce the Cominform and be friendly toward Belgrade. As a second choice, Tito might prefer an Albania orientated toward the West.

(It was noted that unless a firm policy is provided that will allow an all-out operation against the Hoxha regime, an operating agreement between the two exile committees will be to no avail no matter what benevolence exists in Tito's motivation).

(c) VALUABLE reported that they had reason to believe the Albanians have no territorial ambitions for Albania; that Italy would be pleased to leave Albania to the British and Americans; that Italian fears were for a partitioning of Albania between Yugoslavia and Greece; and that Italy was operating only a few minor intelligence missions in to Albania.

(d) & (e) Conditions in Greece remain favorable for continued operations.

II. PROPAGANDA:

(a) There is a need to sustain the will to resist among the people of Albania, but, at this time, not to raise it. Care must be exercised in the application of the usual forms of propaganda, plus the use of newspapers as cover with re-supply and body drops, propaganda-supply drops, and the possible employment of propaganda-agent operations, i.e. the sabotage of Radio Tirane. It was agreed that pure leaflet raids should be limited to one every two months during this so-called interim period.

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(b) No quarrel existed that unity within the NCFa must be further developed and that action in concert -- in the name of the NCFa and not individual parties -- must be urged continuously.

(c) Regarding the extent of leaflet raids: one every two months was the formula generally agreed upon.

(d) FIEND pointed out the delicate nature of the problem of offering editorial advice or guidance to the VOA. It was agreed that efforts would be made to improve the timing of releases so that the BBC could use them. And it was thought that better use should be made of the Press, American, British, and foreign, i.e. Italy, Greece, Turkey, New Zealand, etcetera.

(e) VALUABLE stated its desire to go slow on the Prizren Committee in the event that FIEND/VALUABLE, some day, might be in the position to use that committee. As stated before, any NCFa propaganda countering the Tito people should follow the line of skeptical questioning of motives -- providing there are no extreme provocations. If at all possible, propaganda should work toward the nullification of the Prizren Committee's intent.

(f) The Rome representatives of FIEND/VALUABLE were delegated to draft a revision in the directive governing propaganda which would allow the NCFa to counter whatever efforts the Prizren Committee expends to discredit the NCFa or in any way lower its prestige.

(g) FIEND agreed to review its VFA policy whenever VALUABLE presented a case, in VALUABLE'S view, that deviations or diversion from the overall propaganda line had occurred. This statement was a matter of assuring VALUABLE that VFA would not operate at any tangents from the line in other propaganda media.

(h) Everyone agreed that the Albanian people knows painfully well the cruelties of communism. Propaganda now must emphasize the positive approach and de-emphasize the negative. It was desired that leaflets should minimize editorial text and make the best use of cartoons; that the mailing campaign be accelerated; that a slogan and/or sign should be developed at the soonest; that the possibilities of including material in goods shipments to Albania be further investigated; --

(i) and that more be done in publicizing the NCFa to the world, particularly in the realm of NCFa news events notable enough to be used by world news organs.

(j) In the matter of propaganda supply drops -- scarce or barter-type items -- FIEND and VALUABLE are to exchange technical data and to collaborate on suitable items, but are to operate individually.

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**3. FOLLOW-UP PREPARATIONS**

(a) Valuable stated that clearances from the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff were absolutely required (perhaps with certain legislation) before funds could be made available to (1) establish an Albanian battalion in an International Brigade, (2) stockpile weapons and other materiel, (3) commence training, and (4) develop an officer cadre. It was stated, however, that it was believed to be in the charter of Valuable to begin officer training at Malta immediately.

In this connection, Fiend stated its proposal to expand the present force of the Guard Company to 500 men and to develop an officer and non-com corps from that number.

While these proposals might suggest a duplication of effort such is not necessarily the case. Under this arrangement a total force of 1,000 men (possibly 10 per cent of which would be officer corps) would be raised and trained, albeit in different tactics perhaps with different arms. Here then is the real problem of effective coordination.

It was agreed throughout that a Follow Up Force cannot be effective until the Albanian military (Army), now believed to be sympathetic but nonetheless restrained, is a certain factor on the side of an uprising. The actual FUF, then, is envisioned as a small unit (perhaps 300 men in each group) to move from Greece, from the North, and from the Central coastlands in to three "free zones" or isolated bridgeheads that would operate to call out the sympathetic elements of the Albanian military and to arm the ready civilians without delay and so effect an entirely feasible appearance of an internal eruption. Such an operation must be a simultaneous one, done swiftly, and not even undertaken until complete success of the strategy is assured (INTELLIGENCE). Heavy type weapons would not be involved. Arms for some 10,000 would be required. And above all, the keystone to such an operation is the known understanding on the part of the Albanian people that this operation is the absolutely real thing. (Intensive leaflet raids with hot texts would have to precede the actual operation by only a few days). It must be so planned that once wholesale military defection occurred there would be every outward appearance that the disturbance was entirely internal. Hence the mass defection must be immediate, and if it is to be that explosive then it is obvious that great preparation must precede the very launching of the scheme. The meeting was in complete agreement that the FUF operation rests on the subverting of the Military. In order to thrust inside to the three enclaves (in to which supplies would be dropped and from which the civilian nationalists would be armed) the following would have to be done:

1. Secure the connivance and assistance of Greece and Yugoslavia;
2. or, operate with Greek connivance and an attitude of "benevolent neutrality" from the Yugoslavs;
3. or, depend upon Greek connivance and seaboard landings. Particularly the logistical phase of the operation involves the USAF and the RAF.

Large quantities of food supplies would be required for at least as many bodies as are supplied with arms. Two weeks has been given as the time factor in gauging the amount of food necessary to sustain the fight.

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Communications should be established beforehand; and sizeable commo-teams would operate from each of the free zones.

VALUABLE stated that it could see no possibility of such an operation before the Spring of 1953. One year, it was agreed by all, would be needed for the preparations.

(b) (Attitude towards the Committee on the matter of FUF):

It appears essential that the NCFEA not be given any opportunity to build itself as an Emigre Government or even the likely government for the post-liberation. We should, rather, expect the NCFEA to plunk themselves -- later -- as favoring a UNO sponsored election. FIEND/VALUABLE wishes to avoid a civil war after the liberation.

In the approach to FUF the insecurity of the NCFEA must be a vigilant consideration.

Once FUF is in, then, and only then, should the NCFEA rise; but it must only support the operation, not pretend to run it.

(c) (Planning):

(See paragraph a above)

PROPOSED FIEND/VALUABLE PHASES OF PLANNING:

1. First, a meeting of FIEND/VALUABLE minds on the drafting of the initial plan for SS and OPC;

2. Second, the presentation of this agreed plan to respective Chiefs of Staff (this assumes approval from the F.O. and the State Department for a more aggressive line in Albania).

3. Third, a Combined Chiefs of Staff review of the plan in the presence of SS and OPC consultants.

The "Planning Base" should be Athens. The "General Operating Base" -- quartering, training, equipping, & stockpiling -- should be located in N. Africa from where the operation will be mounted.

#### 4. INTELLIGENCE

(a) The best that is available is believed already obtained from the Greek services. That intelligence is fuzzy and not in the mainstream of FIEND/VALUABLE interests. Interrogations of refugees occur far too long after the exfiltration occurs under the Greek system. It now seems desirable that FIEND/VALUABLE post an interrogator in northern Greece. This is to be the responsibility of

VALUABLE feels that Italian intelligence is not what it should be (in view of their shipping trade with Albania and their Embassy there); FIEND believes that, perhaps, the Italians are draining the only intelligence available to them after all.

It was understood that the FIEND/VALUABLE intelligence exchange program now is as complete as can be expected.

The real problem of securing better intelligence may disappear when better agents are operating. Intelligence could be improved, also, with the exploitation of high-level (or higher) defectors. Among other other things, FIEND/VALUABLE would look favorably upon any scheme to defect an officer, for example, from divisional level.

(b) Regarding the "Rome Embassy" defector, it was decided that the potential defector be encouraged-- or at least the project encouraged--to defect to us, providing he "works his passage" with useable intelligence, not the platitudes of a politician. It was agreed that VALUABLE will manage the contact, determine the man's creditability, and, if reasonable, effect the defection.

(c) VALUABLE will assist FIEND in collecting and passing on information that is of particular use to VFA.

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## 5. POLITICAL (Internal-NCFA)

(a) VALUABLE stated its position re the NCFA: it should be relegated to its proper function. (Here a discussion followed about the problem of ejecting the NCFA from "Operations." VALUABLE feels that this meddling alone can be no grounds for reorganization or reconstruction). VALUABLE desires to re-do the Committee to (1) increase the power and the appeal of the NCFA, (2) to prevent the committee from becoming a two-party organ, and (3) to make it a real, capable committee, not merely a group of people. FIEND'S views are substantially the same, that is to give it a wider balance. The true function of the committee was reviewed to be as follows: (1) a cover, (2) a propaganda source, and (3) a body of Albanians interested in welfare (Under no circumstances could operational matters be accepted as within the province of the NCFA).

It was concluded that a structural change in the Committee would be preferred that would eliminate the present two-committee system and that would establish one committee (a true NCFA) with functional sub-committees appointed from time to time and as situations arose that would absorb those members, for example, who would lose out on the shuffle to a single, larger committee.

Agreement was not reached, in its entirety, on the proposition by FIEND that certain sub-committees deal with the future problems of Albanian, i.e. the Civil Affairs Committee. As a matter of fact, VALUABLE reserved judgment on this question until a later date.

As for the sub-committees under the new concept, Propaganda will be the most important; welfare next. The Military Junta should remain, but as a clandestine, unpublished offshoot of the NCFA (stripped of the information previously provided on certain operations; henceforth FIEND no longer will come to the Junta for team leaders and team makeup).

It was agreed that the composition of the NCFA is always subject to change. It is not a "closed shop" and it would be well for the members to be aware of this.

(c) Kryeziu is not to be fired from his position, simply censured in a severe manner.

(d) It was agreed that the prestige of the NCFA within Albania may deteriorate unless action is forthcoming. It's Anglo-American backing prevents the Committee, now, from suffering more severe criticism from within. This arises from the population's weariness of ineffective representation (low-calibre infiltrees), its talk of things to come, and the incongruity of that talk with actual conditions with Albania.

(e) Discussed earlier.

## 6. OPERATIONAL (Past).

(a) A resume of FIEND operations was given: 39 bodies infiltrated, 12 remaining, of which 2 are known to be effectively operating, 5 leaflet missions, 31 covert flights totalling 46 hours over Albania, resupply drops totalling 8200 pounds of arms and supplies, 23 overt Commo flights; 33 of 39 bodies infiltrated went by air. Seventeen exfiltrated. Seven defected to Tito. Four were captured and are on trial. Of the remaining 12 bodies, 3 W/T operators are inside for each the three teams (Pine, Chestnut, and Walnut). No contact reported as of the beginning of this conference.

(b) VALUABLE; Four teams infiltrated, one made contact with Base, and, now, all are out. All infiltrations were made by sea, and one successful sea exfiltration was executed. VALUABLE'S conclusions: Albania is small. Closer integration of FIEND/VALUABLE operations is necessary. And our past use of low-level agents in teams has been considered more harmful than useful. As one result of this calibre

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agent employed, party interests have tended to supercede NCFA interests, or the interests of the nation. There was no quarrel that most of the inadequacies of the 1951 teams stemmed almost directly from the low type agents the Committee provided.

(b) Within reason, the Greek frontiers will continue to be useable in both directions except for members of the BK. And, it would be desirable to overcome this objection on the part of Greece to the BK.

(c) VALUABLE reported that an initial sea exfiltration has been successful and that this method is expected to be used in the future. Under certain operational conditions, this form of infiltration and exfiltration is at the service of FIEND. It is to be noted that the Royal Navy backs up these operations (with a second craft), but has yet to be pressed in to duty.

(d) Wholeheartedly agreed by all.

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7. 7. OPERATIONAL (Future)

(a) Plans for 1952:

1. FIEND intentions: (a) to train 8 to 10 W/T's by 1 June 1952, (b) to launch short term missions only in the future that will contact known personalities (mainly Army) and establish permanent W/T stations, (c) to effect special assignments such as defection, intelligence, and propaganda sabotage, (d) to continue resupply and leaflet raids, (e) to recruit on a high level--and to cease the recruiting of agents through the Guard Company. Like VALUABLE, it is the hope to make the 1952 operations decidedly covert.

2. VALUABLE intentions: In principle, the same. VALUABLE foresees the need for the closest coordination now that FIEND/VALUABLE intentions are the same and that the field of endeavor has narrowed.

The degree of coordination reached in the past is viewed as inadequate for future plans, although it represented about the limit of coordination granted under the policy of "operational disengagement." It was the sense of this meeting that keener coordination is highly desirable.

8. SECURITY

(a) NCFA. It was admitted that from the peculiar Albanian Grapevine and from their prolific letterwriting the NCFA usually knows about as much about an operation as the operators. The NCFA is to be taken out of operations entirely.

(b) For the smaller, more clandestine operations of 1952 the Guard Company and other camps shall be by-passed completely in the recruitment of agents.

(c) Previously discussed.

(d) The habit of writing letters is known to be betraying our plans to the Italians and Greeks for certain. The only solution, then, is to limit the amount of information obtainable by these ceaseless authors.

9. TRAINING: To be discussed in a special meeting of trainers.

10. DISPOSAL:

(a) VALUABLE reported its successful use of the Farm Labor Scheme in England which affords considerable security and answers part of the moral obligations. It was noted that VALUABLE has not been plagued

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with the problems of hanger-on families. One of the purposes of this Farm Labor Scheme is to prevent a wider distribution of Albanians and thus make them unavailable in the event they are needed (FUF). Later, these men are to be taken in to the British International Brigade.

(in view of the Guard Company's impotence as a source of agents for a truly clandestine operation, FIEND is to study the advisability of using that unit as a disposal area).

It was deemed well worth investigating the purchase of a plantation or some colonial property in some part of the world where people to be disposed of could collect. The initial outlay of capital was realized, but so was the idea that the investment could become self-sufficient at least.

Although offered to FIEND, FIEND will make every attempt not to use the services of the British Farm Labor Scheme. The conclusion of some solution to the disposal problem is still a matter of negotiation with the IRO in Geneva.

11. MATERIAL AIDS TO OPERATIONS:

FIEND's airfleet may be used by VALUABLE providing certain operational conditions are met, such as required of VALUABLE's sea vessel. The same generous offer was made by VALUABEE, as a matter of fact, concerning its boats.

It was conceded that Phot Recce will be needed before the Follow-Up-Force is launched.

The problem of securing Leks was noted to be acute.

12. MISCELLANEOUS:

There may be some method of conducting economic warfare if it can be ascertained which companys in the West are doing business with Albania.

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