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DISPATCH NO. OIRA- 3211
BGFINESSE
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TO : Chief, WE

DATE 12 March 1954

FROM : []

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Plan OBSTACLE, Albanian Exile Political Activities

SPECIFIC— KUPI-KRYEZIU Attempt to Discredit NCFA and []
Gaqi GOGO Effort to Defend []

Source : []

Evaluation : B-2

Date Info : 15 February - 2 March 1954

Date Acquired: 5 March 1954.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 302B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

- Forwarded herewith is a translation of Source's reports concerning a) the KUPI-KRYEZIU attempt to discredit NCFA and [] by submitting letters of protest to the governments of the United States and Great Britain via their local embassies; and b) GOGO's private initiative of addressing a letter to Secretary of State DULLES in defense of []'s NCFA activities. Also attached herewith is a copy of the GOGO letter itself which, addressed to the local American Embassy, was brought to the attention of []
- Attachments are evidence of the merciless campaign now under way to sabotage the reconstituted NCFA and to discredit its direct American sponsor. Source's report is characterized, of course, by a definite BKI slant but as a reading of the situation it is regarded as accurate. It should also be read as a harbinger of reactions to the planned future course of NCFA: the withdrawal of [] and his Rome set-up from the local scene will almost certainly be interpreted by Italians, as well as by the Albanians, as complete American capitulation under fire.

Enclosures:
2 - 1 report, 1 letter.

Prepared by:
[]
8 March 1954 *2 Encls*

Distribution:
4 - Wash w/encls }
1 - Source File }
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Enclosure 1 to OIRA-3211
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Abas KUPI-Said KRYEZIU Attempt to Discredit
NCFA and Its American Sponsor .

1. After having drawn up an improved constitution but before laying down its program, the recently reorganized NCFA entered a phase of confusion and uncertainty. Its present situation is one which can bring comfort only to its enemies, whether these be Enver HOXHA, TITO, or the extremist leaders of Agrarian Balli Kombetar. Criticism is rife in all Albanian circles and is being intensified by the Agrarian party's propaganda campaign.
2. Towards the end of February 1954 the Committee's American sponsor informed VERLACI and KLISURA that KUPI and KRYEZIU had drawn up letters of protest and consigned them to the local British and U. S. Embassies. Their communications, addressed to the State Department at Washington and to London's Foreign Office, alleged that [redacted] methods had become dictatorial, that he is unduly influenced by bad counsel, that the membership of NCFA's Executive and Consultative Committees is uselessly swollen, that the Committee does not function democratically because [redacted] dictates courses to be followed without allowing discussion, etc. etc. The protests ended by requesting that commissions of inquiry be dispatched to look into the situation and to take necessary remedial measures.
3. VERLACI and KLISURA suggested the two malcontents should be confronted on the following lines:
 - a) Point out that the step they had undertaken without the knowledge of their NCFA colleagues displayed a lack of loyalty, and could only further harm the Committee which is attempting to weather a storm of sabotage from other quarters.
 - b) Ask if the KUPI-KRYEZIU attitude was a strictly personal one, or whether it represented their Party lines.
 - c) Determine the specific nature of any revisions which they felt would improve NCFA.
4. [redacted] however, was unwilling to take the matter up in Executive Committee session, a step which would have served to clarify the position of KUPI and KRYEZIU. He did, however, leave Hasan DOSTI complete freedom to approach the two and request explanations. Thus, accompanied by KLISURA, Ndue GJONMARKAJ, and Muharrem BAJRAKTARI, DOSTI called on them. Neither denied having drawn up the protests in question, and the discussion soon became heated. Both asserted that NCFA members at that point had become nothing but puppets fully controlled by [redacted], that the Executive Committee had grown too large, that they did not recognize broadening of the Executive

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Committee to contain seven Christian members (sic), and that nomination of members to the Consultative Committee had been made without any sound criteria.

5. GJONMARKAJ pointed out that these were all objections which should have been raised long ago, not at a point when Committee reorganization had already been accepted and approved. He added that Executive Committee members had previously agreed that all important undertakings were to be discussed and agreed upon before any action was taken. In reply to this justified reminder KRYEZIU became furious and remarked that neither he nor KUPI stood in need of BKI or of GJONMARKAJ (i.e., Albanian Catholics). At this point KLISURA entered the discussion which showed signs of getting beyond control. BAJRAKTARI then told KRYEZIU that an exclusively Moslem Committee could not serve the Albanian cause, and that the principle of proportional representation along religious lines has been in effect since the time of Prince William of WIED and that its value has been frequently confirmed since then.
6. Despite the attitude displayed during this meeting, KUPI completely reversed his stand during the course of a subsequent Executive Committee reunion which was attended by [] and presided over by the latter's British opposite number. During this session, in fact, KUPI implicitly accepted NCFA's constitution and structure by approving a motion to publish the names of Executive Committee members in NCFA's organ "Shqiperia".
7. As recently as two weeks ago the positions of both KUPI and KRYEZIU were utterly different from those they now profess. At that time KUPI was fully determined to remain in NCFA although he appeared to be mortified at having to share power with thirteen colleagues. For his part, KRYEZIU put on a brave show of faith in the Committee, boasting of his contribution to its reorganization; he was not able, however, completely to hide his inner discontent and his tacit agreement with the propaganda line of the Balli extremists. Now, since the arrival of Colonel OAKLEY-HILL, the two have assumed an arrogant and aggressive attitude. Both have reestablished their temporarily interrupted relations with dissident Balli leaders who previously regarded them as traitors for having agreed to NCFA's reorganization. This reconciliation is undoubtedly the able work of Col. OAKLEY-HILL.
8. This situation is aggravated by what is regarded as a tactical error committed last November when [] invited each Party to submit lists of members recommended for welfare assistance. This led to a period of euphoria: those already receiving assistance believed that their income was about to be doubled, while the less fortunate felt that they too were to become the recipients of regular subsidization. Three months passed, however, and the happy day did not materialize. Agrarian Balli leaders fanned the flames of resultant malcontent and created a united front of criticism. BKI did everything in its power to oppose this campaign, but the effectiveness of their counter-campaign was largely destroyed by the fact that welfare funds had actually been cut.

9. The most demoralizing aspect of the entire situation as far as Albanian patriots and nationalists is concerned, is [] lack of clarity of vision, his uncertainty, and his failure to follow a strong line. If he were to take an energetic stand all problems could be resolved. His hesitations, interpreted as indicating his fear that he will not be able to withstand the pressures being exerted by the British and their followers, are harmful to the Committee and to the Albanian cause.
10. [] errs in failing to take advantage of the full support which the Albanian Democratic Union is desirous of giving him. He would do well, it is believed, to give greater weight to the opinions, comments, advice, ideas, proposals and suggestions of BKI, a body which is determined to entrust its entire political future to following the lines laid down by United States policy. BKI leadership is politically mature and well balanced, is characterized by the breadth of its views, and is of definitely pro-United States sentiments. None of this should be taken to mean that NCFA's American sponsor is expected to follow a BKI-dominated line: it is only advised that he should carefully consider BKI, as well as all other views, in order to avoid those errors which detract from his prestige and which neutralize the efficacy of his undertakings.
11. On 26 February 1954 Gagi GOGO exhibited to VERLACI a letter which he had prepared for submission to United States Secretary of State John Foster DULLES, and asked him to sign it. GOGO's paper denied the assertions contained in the KUPI-KRYEZIU protest addressed to the Governments of the United States and Great Britain, concerning the alleged inefficiency of the reconstituted NCFA and the shortcomings [] . It set forth the undeniable merits and positive accomplishments of [] but because it contained the following phrase it did not meet VERLACI's approval: "With this letter we believe that we are also interpreting the opinions of Muharrem BAJRAKTARI and of Atlant KOCI". Asked why BAJRAKTARI and KOCI had not been directly requested also to act as co-signers, GOGO expressed his fear that the two would inform the British of his undertaking. VERLACI stated his view that the initiative's clandestine nature was neither expedient nor dignified, and advised that an open and above-board stand should be taken in defense of [] . GOGO, stating that the American had not been informed of the effort on his behalf, refused to accept the VERLACI view, and later proceeded to obtain signature of his petition by most of NCFA's Executive Committee members.
12. GOGO subsequently met with VERLACI, GJONMARKAJ, and KLISURA, and again presented his petition which still did not bear the signatures of BAJRAKTARI and KOCI. On this occasion, with an implicit "or else" in his request, he asked for KLISURA's signature. At this point all three of the Democratic Union leaders subscribed the GOGO document. At the same time they made it clear that they did not fully approve the course being taken, that they were signing because of their solidarity with [] whom they consider the victim of unjustified attack by KUPI and KRYEZIU, that they felt they should have been consulted in advance regarding steps to be taken for his defense, and that, in any case, the letter in question should also bear the signatures

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Page 4.

of BAJRAKTARI and KOZI. BKI is desirous of supporting GOGO in any worthwhile efforts on behalf of [] In this case, however, his behavior did not meet with the Democratic Union group's approval, and his initiative (whether [] is aware of it or not) is regarded as indicative of weakness on [] part.

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C O P Y

Enclosure 2 to
OIRA-3211 (K [redacted] Italy 3070)

The Honorable John Foster Dulles
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

2 March, 1954.

Excellency:

We have recently come into the knowledge of a letter which was addressed to Your Excellency and to the Honourable Anthony Eden by Mr. Abaz Kupa and by Mr. Said Kryeziu. This letter according to our information, was written on 15 February and was delivered to the American and British Embassies in Rome.

This letter, signed by Mr. Kupa, as leader of the Legitimist Political Movement, and by Mr. Kryeziu, as leader of the Farmers and Peasants Party, who are both members of the Executive of the National Committee for Free Albania, requested from Your Excellency and to the Honourable Mr. Eden to send an Anglo-American commission to Rome to investigate the behaviour of your NCFR representatives ([redacted]) and Mr. Archibald Lyall.

We, the undersigned, address this letter to the Honourable Secretary of State alone, and we do not concern ourselves with the matter of the British. We are not concerned with the British because the letter which was sent to Your Excellency and the Honourable Anthony Eden by Mr. Kupa and by Mr. Kryeziu is obviously an attempt to discredit your representative, ([redacted]).

We, the undersigned, would welcome an investigating commission too and urge you to comply with the request of Mr. Kupa and Mr. Kryeziu. We sincerely believe that such a commission will find that [redacted], far from being discredited, will be proved to be an extremely capable representative for Your Excellency's Government.

All of us are aware of the patience and loyalty ([redacted]) has shown for the Albanian cause and we have on several occasions wondered how he can maintain a civil manner toward elements like Mr. Kupa and Mr. Kryeziu, who have asked so much from him and given so little in return.

In their letter to Your Excellency, Mr. Kupa and Mr. Kryeziu assert that ([redacted]) has acted in an arbitrary fashion in the recent reorganization of the National Committee for Free Albania. That charge is unjust. The claim was made that the reorganized NCFR has been robbed of its democratic principles. This is not true either. The new Committee is sufficiently broad in structure that the democratic processes are working, and that is the principal reason why Mr. Kupa and Mr. Kryeziu are discontent.

Encl (2) OIRA 3211

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