


VIA: Air Pouch
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. SGAA-10428
2662



JUN 26 1954

TO : Chief, SE

DATE: 16 June 1954

FROM : []

SUBJECT: GENERAL— OBOPUS/OBHUNT

SPECIFIC— Mounting of Friday Mission, Phase I

REF.: SGAA-10427 (KAPOK 2661), 16 June 1954

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

Headquarters Action Required: None, for information and files

1. We are enclosing the following documents herewith:

- a. Report from [] on [] and [] reconnaissance and planning for Friday Team mounting between 18 and 21 May 1954.
- b. [] log of the (Identity 1) trip to deliver Friday Mission to (Identity 2) 26 through 30 May 1954.
- c. [] report on the infiltration of Friday team.

2. A critique of the mechanics of mounting this team and attendant security considerations will be prepared as soon as the team debriefing has been completed.

Enclosure:

- 1. Report on reconnaissance (page 6 under separate cover)
- 2. []'s log
- 3. Report on infiltration
- 4. Identities (under separate cover)

DESENSITIZED

per CSN 43-43

18 June 1954.

JLK/WFH/br

Distribution:

- 3 - Wash (w/encls.)
- 1 - Vital Docs. (w/encls.)
- 1 - XO (w/encls.)
- 1 - Chrono (w/encls.)
- 1 - Subject (w/encls.)
- 2 - OBOPUS (w/encls.)

Removed from Project *Obsidious*

CS Classification: *none*

JOB # *63-697/18*

Box: *7* Fold: *#1*

RESTRICTED TO SE/YA

SECRET



██████████-2662
16 June 1954

JUN 26 1954

June 3, 1954

DESENSITIZED
DESENSITIZED

per CSN 48-43

MEMORANDUM FOR: [] []

FROM: [] []

SUBJECT: General - Preparation for Friday Team infiltration
Specific - a. Survey of the border
b. Casing of (Identity 1)
c. Planning of operation

1. On May 18, [] [] and [] [] went to Ioannina by Greek commercial aeroplane to lay plans for the infiltration of Friday team. Their mission consisted of:
 - a. Surveying the border and selecting the best possible infiltration routes leading to the area of operation.
 - b. Collecting up-to-date border intelligence, necessary for the detailed briefing of Friday team.
 - c. Casing of an appropriate pick-up point in the bay of (Identity 1) for the delivery of the team by the (Identity 2).
 - d. Coordination of the entire operation and the careful planning of a dependable procedure covering the team's activities throughout the period starting at the debarkation point until the team's penetration to Albania.
 - e. Liaison with the Greek Intelligence Services and the Greek Army.

They proceeded as follows:

A. Survey of the border.

1. Upon their arrival at the Ioannina airfield, [] [] and [] [] separated, the former having been picked up by the PKP major (C.O. of the Intell. Unit) and the latter having proceeded to Ioannina by the airline bus. No greetings or signs of recognition were exchanged in the airfield.
2. While in Ioannina [] [] did not meet the PKP major or [] [] in public. On May 19, [] [] was picked up by a PKP jeep and was delivered at a point outside Ioannina, where he was later picked up by the PKP major and [] [] in the latter's station wagon. They immediately proceeded to the Battalion HQ's of (Identity 3), where they arrived at 1145 hours of the same day. The purpose of their visit to the Battalion HQ's was to request permission and an escort of soldiers for

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SECRET

KAPOK

Enclosure No. 1 to SGAA-10428

KAPOK-2662

16 June 1954

Page 2

JUN 26 1954

security and guidance, since the PKP major was totally unfamiliar with the border conditions. (Identity 4), Commanding Officer of the Battalion immediately provided us with an escort, a jeep and an experienced officer, (Identity 5), former Battalion G-2 officer.

[] explained to (Identity 5) that he and [] were interested in surveying the border in the (Identity 6) area (this area having previously been recommended to [] by the PKP major as a good infiltration point).

The group now comprising the PKP major, (Identity 5), [], [] and 4 soldiers plus the jeep drivers proceeded along the (Identity 3) - (Identity 7) highway to the closest point leading to the point (Identity 6).

At about half the distance between (Identity 3) and (Identity 7) and directly under the bulk of the barren mountain of (Identity 8) which is entirely commanded by an enemy observation post, situated on the summit of the same mountain, (Identity 5) indicated to the group, point (Identity 6). This consists of a rocky peak, approx. 2,500 feet high, to the NE of (Identity 8) and connected to it by an undulating saddle covered with green grass but no other vegetation.

It was immediately (but for the first time) realized that an access to point (Identity 6) would have been observed by the Albanians on the summit of (Identity 8), in its entirety and could hardly be mistaken as a normal army patrol, due to the time factor, the large number of the group, etc.

[] then requested that the group split and a smaller group be formed which, by carrying rifles and with adequate approach, could be mistaken for a Greek Army patrol.

He also suggested that if this were not feasible the whole operation should be altogether cancelled. At this point and for the first time the PKP major expressed his opinion regarding the operational possibilities of said point, by saying that whoever had recommended (Identity 6) as a good infiltration point was a "criminal."

(Identity 5) who had recently made a minute survey of the entire border sector, then suggested that point (Identity 6) could be approached by another route, a longer one, starting from the main Greek border post of (Identity 9). This route eventually lead to point (Identity 6) via the ridges of (Identity 10) and (Identity 8), along the border line.

This route offered the following advantages:

SECRET

SECRET

KAPOK

Enclosure No. 1 to SGAA-10428

KAPOK-2662

16 June 1954

Page 3

JUN 26 1954

1. A team coming from (Identity 9) could be easily considered as a normal patrol.
2. The group's approach via (Identity 7) and (Identity 9) up to a point near the summit of (Identity 8) was unobserved by the enemy post.
3. (Identity 9) post, being responsible for this part of the border could furnish all necessary information for the technicalities of a proper approach.
4. It afforded a complete survey of the area.

The PKP major accepted (Identity 5's) suggestion without any reservation whatever. [] and [] did not express any particular interest in the selection of this route for the simple reason that (Identity 9) area was already well-known to [] and the area between (Identity 9) and (Identity 6), that is to say the regions of (Identity 10)-(Identity 8) were not of prime operational importance, the first being mined and the second, commanded by the enemy. They nevertheless accepted the suggestion with willingness for the reasons mentioned above. [] also informed [] on the spot, that it was to the interests of the office to direct the attention of everybody concerned to the border area East of (Identity 9) because base was already considering infiltration of the team West of this post.

The group accordingly proceeded to the town of (Identity 7) where the PKP major with (Identity 5), [] and [] disguised themselves as plain armed soldiers and proceeded to (Identity 9) post.

At this point a trusted soldier-guide was picked up and the group now consisting only of 5 (the usual composition of a border-patrol) started climbing the slopes of Mount (Identity 8) along the border line. The survey was completed without incident and a number of photographs of some operational interest were obtained.

The survey yielded negative results regarding an infiltration point but positive ones regarding exfiltration possibilities from (Identity 11) to Greece. This conclusion was reached because the whole area of (Identity 6) is commanded by the enemy, is also devoid of natural cover or vegetation and is further altogether lacking in water.

The saddle connecting (Identity 6) to (Identity 8) is in all probability ambushed at night. It nevertheless affords many possibilities for a quick exfiltration to Greece.

SECRET

KAPOK

SECRET

Enclosure No. 1 to SGAA-10428

KAPOK-2662

16 June 1954

Page 4

JUN 26 1954

KAPOK

On completion of the survey, the group returned to (Identity 3) the same day.

The PKP major, [] and [] later repaired to the town of (Identity 1). [] was dropped in the outskirts of the town and a rendezvous was set for the next day.

B. Casing of (Identity 1) bay

On May 20, the PKP major, [] and [] proceeded in the survey of the entire (Identity 1) bay, with the purpose of finding a suitable point for the covert delivery of Friday team by the (Identity 2).

A point NW of the harbor was eventually selected affording pretty good cover, security and an easy approach by sea.

The position of this point was accurately pin-pointed on the map and day and night bearings were taken per Trohan's request. Another point 1/2 mile from the beach was selected where the team was to be picked up by the PKP truck.

C. Planning of operation

The following plan was arranged between the PKP major, [] and []

1. [] was to collect up-to-date operational intelligence on the border area between points (Identity 12) and (Identity 6). Special emphasis was to be exercised in the collection of information regarding enemy patrols, ambushes, troops, sheep and shepherds. This intelligence was to be relayed to Linaugh and eventually to the team upon their delivery to the truck.
2. The PKP major was to proceed with all the necessary liaison and coordination between his service and the Greek Army.
3. [] agreed to purchase food for the maintenance of the team, conducting officers, escort, etc. while in the border area.
4. A reception party consisting of the PKP major, [] and one soldier was to wait for (Identity 2) from 2200 hours to 0300 hours of May 27-28, 1954 at the prescribed beach point, bearing 220° on the main (Identity 1) bay light house.
5. A red recognition signal (letter "K" .) was to be flashed with a directional light in the direction of the lighthouse, every 10 minutes from 2200 hours to 2400 hours. On the other hand the approaching rowing boat was to ring a sheep's bell for recognition by the reception party.

SECRET

KAPOK

KAPOK

6. In the event of a failure to make contact on May 27, the same procedure was to be repeated by all parties the next evening.
7. All efforts were to be made so that delivery would be effected exactly at 2200 hours, in order to avoid the undue repetition of the recognition signal.
8. [] upon the team's departure, would follow from a considerable distance up to (Identity 3) in case of mechanical breakdown.
9. Communications between [] and [] during the infiltration operation were to be carried out by field telephone and in coded phrases.
10. (Identity 2) was to stand by out of the general vicinity of (Identity 1) until further notice by []. If the team was delayed in infiltration, [] upon appropriate notification by [], was to arrange via Athens for the delivery of the team to the boat. Meeting points and recognition signals were to be the same.
11. Upon the team's successful return, the PKP was to make all the necessary arrangements ~~for~~ transportation to a safe-house S of Ioannina. Base was to be notified immediately by [] whereupon a truck would be dispatched from Athens to pick the team up. For better security the team was to be delivered at a point 500 m. N of Amphilochia.
12. The PKP major was notified of the team's passwords.

Upon completion of above [] returned to Athens by Greek commercial airplane.

COMMENTS:

- a. The Greek Army and particularly the (Identity 3) Battalion Commander were very cooperative and their valuable help made the survey possible.
- b. The PKP major was everpresent throughout the operation and any action by [] and [] however unimportant or trivial, was first cleared with him.
- c. Other than the operational data enumerated above, the survey from Mount (Identity 8) revealed that any approach by land or by sea, to the town of (Identity 7) is liable to be observed and identified as normal or extraordinary by the enemy post unless silently executed by dark of the moon.
- d. The name of the PKP major discussed above is Identity 13.

KAPOK

16 June 1954

LOG OF THE IDENTITY 4
26 - 30 May 1954

JUN 26 1954

May 26, 1954

DECLASSIFIED
DESENSITIZED

1530 - Checked: Fuel - tanks full
Oil - full with 2 extra tins on hand
Water - Tanks full
Radio - checked out last night with signal strength of 5.
Batteries - All fully charged and filled.
Food - 9 cases 5-in-1 rations, 25 loaves bread, coffee, tea,
4 octopuses, 2 squid, 3 oka fresh fish, 5 oka fresh meat,
oranges, lettuce and other delicacies too numerous to
mention. Also 30 Dramine tablets.

Weather is extremely depressing - hot, overcast and very humid. Barometer 30.01 steady for last 24 hours. Light NE winds shifting every 2 or 3 hours. Entire crew have head colds and for them are jumpy and excitable.

1600 - People aboard, underway - 2100 RPM - NE chop so issued dramamine. Passengers playing cards and napping. Seem pretty comfortable.

2000 - Calm, black night - passengers on deck for few minutes then below to sleep.

May 27, 1954

0815 - M/S ALKIS passed close by loaded with cattle. We are between Ithaca and the point of Levkas. Barometer 30.0 - weather clear, light variable winds and practically no sea. Moderate swell NW running when cleared DOUKATON at 0845. R/M immediately became thoroughly seasick so secured watch pending his recovery. Two others feeling rather seedy but not actively sick.

Noon - lunch of boiled beef and rice greeted without much enthusiasm except for regular crew.

1400 - light NW breeze making little whitecaps as we approach Anti-Paxos. In lee of Anti-Paxos flat calm and sun slanting across wheat fields and trees casting late afternoon shadows. All passengers emerge blinking and squinting for a few minutes then return to their various places of refuge. Successfully passed (Identity 1) keeping about 1/2 mile inside it. School is not visible in small sea.

1730 - under lee of (Identity 2). Stopped engine and rigged an extension on exhaust pipe to silence engine. Rubber hose not quite long enough so extended it by a canvas sleeve. Finished product repulsive but effective.

Removed from Project

CS Classification: none

JOB # 63-697/18

Box: 7 Fold: #1

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Enclosure No. 2 to SGAA-10428

KAPOK-2662

16 June 1954

Page 2

JUN 26 1954

KAPOK

- 1900 - Ouzo and octopus followed by canned fruit. Asked base if had any traffic since our radio watch had been shut down during almost the entire day. Immediate reply - good signal, no traffic. Dusk now and going slowly up the middle of the gulf. Passed tanker working down about 3/4 mile away. We are making 3 1/2 knots at 600 RPM.
- 2100 - can see lights of town plus 2 red flashes, 1 green. Brought 2 red lights in range 101°T - obviously mark channel.
- 2120 - nearly ran down 2nd green lighted buoy due its light being unlit. This makes clear why 2 red and only 1 green.
- 2135 - turned to 040 T with wh. flashes aft bearing 220 T. 1 1/10 miles to run. Lights out. No fishermen visible in harbor, flat calm. Happily, music from taverna ashore is very loud.
- 2155 - stopped engine, lead gives 3 fathoms. Let go spare anchor with rope cable - no noise, not even splash.
- 2200 - boat away with me, rower, and two passengers. Course 040° mag. by hand compass. Dog barking ashore.
- 2205 - recognition signal from shore, slightly to right of course.
- 2210 - recognition signal again, answer with goat bell feeling rather ridiculous. Carried passengers ashore on back. Small fishing boat about 20 yds. away but believe no one in it.
- 2220 - back to ship which is invisible from 20 yeds. Boat away with remaining two passengers. Background music from taverna reaches crescendo ending in Ute solo.
- 2235 - boat returns. Ate some Spam and bread - the hold is not what you would call fresh and airy.
- 2350 - underway slowly - passed 1 open fishing boat 1/4 mile distance. Sent message to base - all O.K.
- 0100 - hove to in middle of gulf - set white lantern in rigging. Crew rather tired.
- May 28, 1954
- 0530 - underway. Raining, warm, muggy. Due to fact R/M is useless unless in absolutely calm water, I will not be able to be offshore as planned, but will have to find a cove someplace to wait in.

KAPOK

- 0600 - looked into islands of (Identity 3) and find there is a ferry which runs back and forth to (Identity 2). Will try Anti-Paxos. Removed exhaust extension and antennas since R/M already sick.
- 0900 - Anchored in cove just south of Plakka Pt. on East side of Anti-Paxos. Here we will sit until tomorrow. Five minutes after arrival one of the residents of the place hailed us from the cliff above - told him we were killing time for a day or two before going to (Identity 2). There is neither police, harbor police, or customs on this island. They have telephone to Athens. Barometer 29.95.
- 2100 - Nothing has happened all day - 1 caique passed by about a mile offshore just after sunset. I think we are as secure here as we would be anywhere.

May 29, 1954

Sunny and calm. Barometer 29.95 steady. Light variable breezes.

About noon received message to return (see Radio Log).

- 1300 - underway. Very happy. Sighted nothing until abeam of Ithaca when passed by Yugoslav M/S too distant to see name. So to end of day.

30 May 1954

Weather good - hazy and hot. Some swell from West.

- 1030 - sent message to secure radio watch.

- 1100 - tied up at ATLANTIS and discharged all property belonging there.

KAPOK

SECRET

Enclosure No. 3 to SGAA - 10428
2662
16 June 1954

JUN 26 1954

June 4, 1954

MEMORANDUM

TO: [] []

FROM: [] []

SUBJECT: Infiltration of Friday Team

DESENSITIZED

per CSN 48-03

A. Boat Trip

1. At 1500 hours of March 26, Friday team and [] [] embarked on the (Identity 1) and immediately repaired to the hold of the ship.
2. The team had already been briefed to stay below deck till further notice by the captain.
3. Practically immediately upon the boat's departure from OBATLANTIS the problem of access to the toilet was faced. This was only solved in the evening hours when the team was allowed to circulate on deck. No other solution was accepted by the team.
4. The next day the two team members got sick and ate nothing. The team leader lost his appetite as well and complained of weariness and exhaustion. Notwithstanding the excellent efforts made by the crew of (Identity 1), the team members by the end of the trip had lost their strength and stamina.
5. The (Identity 1) entered the bay of (Identity 2), in complete silence and in surprising precision of movement and direction at 2145 hours of May 27. [] [] a crew member, AIKNAVE and [] [] got in the rowing boat at 2205 hours without having seen the recognition signal from the seashore.

Following the prearranged bearings the boat approached the beach at about 2215 hours. Meanwhile the signal was seen flashing at intervals, much shorter than the prescribed 10'.

The landing was effected at a radius of accuracy of about 5 yards.

The boat returned to the (Identity 1) in silence and 25' later the other two members were safely and accurately delivered to the reception party.

The reception recognition signal had been flashed by the PKP major.

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CS Classifications *none*

JDF # *83-697/8*

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Enclosure No. 3 to SGAA-10428

KAPOK-2662

16 June 1954

Page 2

KAPOK

JUN 26 1954

B. Conducting of Friday Team to the Border

The reception party, consisting of the PKP major, [] and one soldier, conducted Friday Team and [] to the truck at the prescribed point.

There [] informed the PKP major and [] that the infiltration was to be attempted in the area W of (Identity 3) post. [] relayed to [] all the operational data he had acquired, related to that border sector.

The truck escorted by a PKP jeep departed at 2330 hours for (Identity 4).

At the Battalion HQs the (Identity 3) post guide (the same soldier that had guided the survey party previously) was immediately picked up and the team conducted by the PKP major and [] proceeded in the PKP truck towards (Identity 5)

Midway between (Identity 4) and (Identity 5) the team and conducting party descended and proceeded to (Identity 5) on foot.

This was done because the noise of the truck engine was liable to be overheard by the (Identity 6) enemy post.

The truck returned to (Identity 4). Along the way to (Identity 5) the team members complained of fatigue and exhaustion and declared that they felt that they could never reach (Identity 3) post.

The post was eventually reached after considerable delay and efforts. AIKNAVE had to be relieved of his pack and weapon because he had lost his strength and control. The team was put in the quarters of (Identity 3) post just as the day was breaking.

[] did not succeed in conducting the team to the observation post of (Identity 3), 400 feet above.

This was a drawback because the path leading from (Identity 3) to the observation post is directly observed by the enemy post of (Identity 7). The team was allowed to rest throughout the day of May 28. The team members were not allowed to leave the building.

At 1200 hours RNDOLLAR and [] disguised as soldiers carried the meal for the men at the observation post. Thus no extra activity was observed by the enemy. RNDOLLAR and [] stood in the observation post dug-out the remaining of the day surveying the plain of (Identity 8) and consulting the experienced observers. They were able to follow the activities of approx. 60 Albanian soldiers, various patrols, people, shepherds, farmers, sheep, etc.

KAPOK

SECRET

Enclosure No. 3 to SGAA-10428

KAPOK-2662

16 June 1954

Page 3

KAPOK

The infiltration route was selected.

JUN 26 1954

C. Friday Team Infiltration Procedure

At dusk of May 28, RNDOLLAR and [] descended from the observation post to (Identity 3) and ordered the team to pack up.

Exactly one hour before the team's departure the PKP major extracted numerous notes of his and proceeded telling [] of the various agreements made in Ioannina by [] and himself. He culminated by requesting from [] that he undertake to put a questionnaire to Friday Team covering certain PKP requirements as "per the agreement." [] answered as follows:

1. That he had not been informed of the [] discussions in detail.
2. That the team's mission was to reconnoiter and not to collect intelligence.
3. That he was surprised that such a request was made just one hour prior to the infiltration when it would be impossible for the team to assimilate any additional briefing.
4. That he might select some questions from the major's list in the effort to promote the cooperation between the two services.

The PKP major finally brought the following four questions:

- a. What battalion resides in (Identity 8)? Strength? HQs? Officers? weapons? posts? positions of?
- b. Enemy positions in (Identity 8) area; do they make use of dogs?
- c. Names of Sigurimi officers in area.
- d. Information on CE.

[] on receiving these questions told the PKP major that he could not limit them in space or time. The questions were not passed to the team.

Around 2000 hours the team escorted by the PKP major, two soldiers and [] departed from the (Identity 3) guard-post and via the observation post proceeded towards the selected border point. AIKNAVE who up to that moment was considered to be in full knowledge of the area soon appeared confused and perplexed as to the border positions and the land beyond the

KAPOK

border-line. Due nevertheless to the fact that he had been assigned by the team leader to guide the team once they had crossed the border-line,

[] allowed him to select his own approach to the border.

This proved erroneous because AIKNAVE lost his sense of direction in the dark.

With extreme caution and considerable effort the team was led to the selected point and approx. 100 yards from the river bed which forms the natural border at that point.

AIKNAVE had meanwhile lost his prestige with the other team members and the team appeared to have lost its nerve.

Upon RNDOLLAR's request for orders, [] suggested that it would be better to retreat to a safe and unobserved hide-out and make another attempt next day.

The team and escort remained in hiding throughout the day of May 29. Movement was not allowed except for two occasions during which [] took RNDOLLAR and AIKNAVE for observation.

The discipline of the team in spite of the lack of water, cover and a place to rest was remarkable.

AIKNAVE, only, appeared to have a marked proclivity for drinking water.

On May 29 and after additional observation the team departed at 2245 hours for the border point, as previously selected by RNDOLLAR and []

The PKP major and [] repaired to (Identity 2) in the morning hours of May 30.

[] was notified of the successful infiltration of Friday Team and [] departed for Athens, via Corfu.

COMMENTS

Insofar as the infiltration was concerned the operation was a success.

[] nevertheless is of the opinion that the plans should be simplified in future operations.

Efforts must also be made regarding the health of the teams while on board the (Identity 1).

It is suggested that the boat depart OBATALANTIS during the night so that the teams don't have to remain below deck.

SECRET

KAPOK

Enclosure No. 3 to SGAA-10428

KAPOK-2662

16 June 1954

Page 5

JUN 26 1954

On the other hand, the boat should approach the border region one or two days prior to the delivery of the team. A safe cover should be sought where the team members can recuperate from practically inevitable seasickness and recover their strength.

It is suggested that for operations W of (Identity 3) guard-post, the boat approach the littoral NW of (Identity 5). [] arrived at this conclusion after observation of the splendid techniques of approach of the (Identity 1) in the (Identity 2) bay.

Conducting of teams to Ioannina by truck is also recommended.

An excellent delivery point is also recommended along the road, one or two km. N of the town of Amfilochia.

(Identity 1) could approach the coast in very deep and calm water at a distance of 50 yards from the road. Teams from OBATLANTIS, delivered at this point, could be transported to (Identity 4) in a maximum of 7 hours.

The crew of (Identity 1) should be commended for the material and moral support they gave Friday Team.

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

Att. to

FROM: *SURF*

NO. *9706 570A 10428*

DATE *16 June 54*

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. <i>surf</i>		<i>22 JUN 1954</i>			
2. <i>Carson</i>					
3. <i>DeLong</i>				<i>J</i>	
4. <i>Wong</i>				<i>WA</i>	
5.					
6.					
7.					
8. <i>[]</i>					<i>- Carded</i>
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

BY HAND ONLY

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T R U E N A M E

Annex to Enclosure No. 1 to SGAA-10428

16 June 1954

Page 6

JUN 26 1954

TIME TABLE FOR VARIOUS DISTANCES

<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Note</u>
Ioannina	Filiates	3 hours	By car
Filiates	Sayada	1.00'	" "
Sayada	Arkoudi	0.45'	On foot
Arkoudi	Eglise	1.20'	" "
Eglise	Likojanit	1.00'	" "
Likojanit	Tourle	1.00'	" "
Tourle	Sayada	1.45'	" "
Filiates	Igoumenitsa	0.50'	By car

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per GSI

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CS Classification: *none*

JOP # *63-69718*

Box: *7* Fold: *#1*

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TRUE NAME

Enclosure No. 4 to SGAA-10428

~~2706~~
16 June 1954

Identities for body of dispatch:

1. M/V POSEIDON
2. IGOMENITSA

Identities for Enclosure No. 1

1. IGOMENITSA
2. M/V POSEIDON (Request cryptonym)
3. FILIATES
4. MAJ. TSOUMANIS
5. LT. HATZOPOULOS
6. TOURLE
7. SAYADA
8. LIKOJANIT
9. ARKOUDI
10. EGLISE
11. SARAQIN MOUNTAIN
12. ORLE
13. THOMALDIES

Identities for Enclosure No. 2

1. MADONNA SHOAL
2. CORFU
3. SIVOTA
4. POSEIDON (Request cryptonym)

Identities for Enclosure No. 3

1. POSEIDON (Request cryptonym)
2. IGOMENISA
3. ARKOUDI
4. FILIATES
5. SAYADA
6. LIKOJANIT
7. QAFIE BOTES
8. KONISPOL

DESENSITIZED

FOR USE

Removed from Project
CS Classification:
JOF #63-697/18
Box: 7

Obsidious

none

SE/YA

SECRET