

VIA: Air Pouch
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. SGAA-10430
[REDACTED]-2664

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[REDACTED]
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, SE

DATE: 16 June 1954

FROM : C

gls

SUBJECT: GENERAL— OBOPUS/OBHUNT

SPECIFIC— Security and Mechanics of Friday Mission, Phase I

REF.: SGAA-10428 (KAPOK 2662), 16 June 1954
SGAA-10429 (KAPOK 2663), 16 June 1954
DIR 04298, 11 June 1954

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES CLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

Headquarters Action Required: None, for information and file

1. In recognition of Headquarters' desire for operational details we are forwarding the following comment.
2. On security:
 - a. Re SGAA-9802 (KAPOK 2579), 1 May 1954, Para 7. There is a large time factor inherent in an attempt to establish a cover correspondence. We must allow at least a month for the exchange of letters between agent and agent's friend if agent is at OBATLANTIS. For this reason, we have doubt as to the practicality of this device. We will, nevertheless, try harder to apply it in the future.
 - b. We have confirmation from the LOFLUTTER of RNDOLLAR that the location of OBATLANTIS is not known to the team.
 - c. RNDOLLAR confirmed he did not know the name of the service vessel and appreciated the importance of changing the name if he had happened to learn it.
 - d. Insofar as the security of the team's mounting is concerned, we know of no inadvertent exposure or betrayal. The movement of Friday from OBATLANTIS to the border occurred without a hitch until AIKNAVE's funds described in SGAA-10428 (KAPOK 2662), 16 June 1954. This was recovered by C J good judgment in advising the team to hide throughout the following day.
 - e. The team had no difficulty penetrating Albanian territory and RNDOLLAR assures us that the brush fence they had to climb through could not have provided evidence of their presence in the country. He explains that it is far too wild for use by border units as a signal of penetration.
 - f. The team's use of the spring was bad security as we have information that water points are watched. The team was so briefed.

Removed from Project *Obsidious*
CS Classification: *none*
JOB # *63-69718*
51-28A
MAR. 1949

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- g. It seems that RNDOLLAR selected hiding places well. It seems we were unduly apprehensive about the cover problem on the mountain.
- h. As stated elsewhere, we regard the approach of the entire team to AIPIGEON's house as very bad security. We do not plan to mount the team again without RNDOLLAR's agreement to make the final approach alone.
- i. We find no fault with RNDOLLAR's handling of the challenge incident as reported to us. We have just received DIR 04298, 11 June 1954. Our answers below are keyed to it:
 - a. No. Friday was fully armed at encounter.
 - b. There was no apparent connection between the location of civilians and AIPIGEON's house. RNDOLLAR cannot explain what these men were doing at that particular point.
 - c. Covered in SGAA 10429 (KAPOK 2663). The team moved in single file at 15 meter interval. On first attempt AIRBRED and AIKNAVE waited in AIPIGEON's yard while RNDOLLAR approached the house alone.
 - d. Also reported in SGAA 10429.
 - e. Night was moonless and no effective artificial light was on in the area. There is a difference of opinion as to whether challengers saw the two team members. All agree they were probably heard. They could have been seen because they saw the challenger. The challenger was not attempting to conceal himself, however, while team members were. The duration of the encounter was extremely short - possibly 15 seconds.
- j. A return to the same spring used on the infiltration when only two hours from Greece was nothing short of asinine. RNDOLLAR agrees but was unable to control his men.
- k. Security from the time the team exfiltrated until it was delivered to us at a rendezvous point south of Ioannina was good. There follows a chronological account of this period:

1 June

- 0300 - Crossed border into Greece
- 0400 - Reached coast at point R 408532 and found source of fresh water
- 0410 - Began walking toward (Identity 1)
- 0600 - Reached point 1 km. NW of (Identity 1) near beach
- 0730 - RNDOLLAR removes weapons, rucksack, etc. and leaves for (Identity 1). AIRBRED and AIKNAVE remain behind

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- 0830 - RNDOLLAR contacts sergeant of (Identity 1) military post who phones directly to C.O. of (Identity 2)
- During day - soldier from (Identity 1) post takes food and water to AIRBRED and AIKNAVE. RNDOLLAR remains at post
- 1700 - KYP truck arrives at (Identity 1) and picks up RNDOLLAR, then rest of team. Team remained in truck until arrival at KYP safe house south of Ioannina.
- 2230 - Team arrived at safe house

2 June

Remain in safe house all day

3 June

- 1300 - Leave safe house for rendezvous with OBOPUS truck at Emin Aga, 33 km. south of Ioannina.
- 1400 - Team transferred to OBOPUS truck

4 June

- 0130 - Arrival at Anapolis safe house

2. 1. RNDOLLAR has assured us that AIRBRED and AIKNAVE know nothing of the mission plans beyond the fact that RNDOLLAR was to contact AIPIGEON. This knowledge was unavoidable as the team was briefed to present at the selection of a dead drop with the principal agent.
3. Comments on the mechanics of mounting Friday.
 - a. We believe that security may be further served in the future by delivering team to a point in the vicinity of R 425524 in the service vessel. They would then climb to an observation point with , observe the area for a day and infiltrate the following night. This procedure would eliminate all reliance on KYP except for border intelligence. This seems a secure method during the dark of the moon because of the proven extreme effectiveness of the service vessel's muffler at slow speeds. We are convinced that the vessel could neither be heard nor seen from the enemy post at (Identity 3) under these circumstances.
 - b. It is apparent that we will have to permit our team to recuperate for a day from the effects of their sea voyage prior to landing them. This will require the selection of a secluded cove near the area selected for landing the team.
 - c. We can further improve the physical comfort of the team by minimizing the length of time they are required to remain below decks for security reasons.
 - d. From experience gained from the recent infiltration we will cut down the amount of food given the team and limit that food to sausage, a Cretan cheese

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called Maturu that does not induce thirst and concentrated rations. Conversely, the amount of water carried will certainly be increased and we will request that water discipline be stressed during training.

3. Past efforts to restrict the amount of armament carried by agents have met with violent resistance. They insist on festooning themselves with weapons and ammunition in a manner reminiscent of Pancho Villa. We doubt that we will be able to make much headway in amending this encumbering practice. ?

4. We hope Headquarters will find the above useful and we will attempt to clarify any points neglected here as thoroughly as possible at your request. K.

Rmw
RMW/WFH/rs1

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Enclosure:

1 Identities (under separate cover)

21 June 1954

Distribution:

- 3 - Wash (w/enc. under separate cover) ✓
- 1 - Wash (Vital Doc. w/enc. under separate cover)
- 1 - Chrono w/1 copy enc.
- 1 - Subject w/1 copy enc.
- 1 - XO w/1 copy enc.
- 2 - OBOPUS w/2 copies enc.

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R U E NAME



Enclosure to ----- SGAA-10430

~~MARK~~ 2710

16 June 1954

Identities:

- 1. Skala Sayiadhas (R 444510)
- 2. Filiates
- 3. Maje Ligojanit (R 469529)

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per CSN 4842

Removed from Project
 CS Classification:
 JOP # 63-69718
 Box: 7 Ford: #1

Obsidious
none

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