

AIR

SGAW-8367

14 FEB
14 1955

ATTN

Chief, SE

OBSIDIOUS
December Infiltration

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

- REFERENCES: 1. SGAA-13562, 12 January 1955
2. DIR-29396, 15 December 1954
3. SGAA-13721, 21 January 1955
4. SGAA-13206 (KAPOK-3092), 17 December 1954

1. We shared your disappointment in OBSIDIOUS team's failure to locate the dead-drop container, though the dead-drop site was searched, and re-establish contact with AIPIGEON. It is hoped that your review and recommendations for future consideration of OBSIDIOUS will help clarify some of the questions which have been raised at Headquarters because of recent developments. Some of these questions, which will be discussed subsequently, arose due to our misunderstanding of the objectives and the plan for the second phase of the OBSIDIOUS operation.

2. It was not realized here, until receipt of first reference, that no attempt would be made to contact AIPIGEON unless arrangements for such a meeting were made through the dead-drop. This misunderstanding could have possibly been avoided if we had received your plan for the December infiltration or had had notice of your intentions following your receipt of second reference. Under the circumstances, we were obliged to rely on your original plan for the second phase of the operation. We would appreciate knowing if RNDOLLAR was provided with an alternate course of action in the event that nothing was found in the dead-drop. Your comments on why RNDOLLAR was instructed (Operational Briefing--SGAA-13684) to leave the safety/danger signal in the "danger" position would also be appreciated.

3. Although RNDOLLAR is one of our most able agents we believe that he should be rechecked concerning the entire OBSIDIOUS operation. His failure to inform his case officer of the rendezvous arranged with AIPIGEON for 25 May 1955 (para 3, second reference) appears to have been intentional, and it is quite possible that he failed to inform us of other

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pertinent information concerning the operation. His answers, however, to questions reported in third reference do appear plausible, and we hope they have been reasonably confirmed by his second LCFLUTTER. Since AIRBLOWN does confirm at least the veracity of RNDOLLAR's account of the December infiltration (para 5, first reference), continuation of his services in the OBSIDIOUS operation could be a means of further confirming the actual recruitment of AIPIGEON. To date we have no proof other than the word of RNDOLLAR that AIPIGEON was actually recruited in July 1954.

4. AIRBRED's eleventh hour refusal to accompany RNDOLLAR on the December infiltration came as a surprise to Headquarters. Although never considered one of our more intelligent agents, AIRBRED's loyalty to us, and his devotion to duty has always been respected. In view of this, the reasons behind his recent action are of concern to Headquarters, especially since the examination made by the physician failed to confirm an attack of appendicitis. AIRBRED could have decided to withdraw from the mission because of: a) "cold feet," b) falling out with RNDOLLAR, and c) fear that the operation had been compromised because of AIKNAVE disclosures. Until we receive more information, Headquarters is inclined to believe that it was due to a falling out with RNDOLLAR. There is no question of RNDOLLAR being headstrong and difficult to work with at times. As a matter for the records we would appreciate your comments concerning the reasons why AIRBRED dropped out of the operation and if the final parting was amiable as far as AIRBRED was concerned. What measures are being taken on the Island of Paros for checking his activity as an added precaution with regard to the security of the OBSIDIOUS operation?

5. We agree that you had no alternative but to await the OBSIDIOUS team's exfiltration before investigating AIKNAVE's security violations (fourth reference). His disclosures to associates are not in themselves too damaging, but they do have serious security implications when associated with the area of operation. If AIKNAVE had made it known to his fellow compatriots that he had infiltrated the Konispol area with RNDOLLAR it would not take much imagination to realize that a member of RNDOLLAR's family was the intended target. If this is the case, the operation may have been blown to the Albanian colony in and near Athens. Further, we would have to consider the possibility, if not assume, that this information eventually would come to the attention of the Sigurimi. Therefore, it is important that AIKNAVE be queried and LCFLUTTERED relative to this matter as soon as possible. If it is determined that the area of operation had not been compromised, we suggest that AIKNAVE be warned that serious consequences will follow if he continues to discuss his past work for the Americans.

6. We are in agreement with your tentative plans which call for RNDOLLAR to attempt a personal contact with AIPIGEON during the next infiltration, even though the same difficulty may be experienced with regard

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to locating the dead-drop. It is our belief that this is the only practical way of determining the extent of the operation, if any, and of progressing any further with its development. A personal meeting between AIPIGEON and RNDOLLAR will also provide a means of improving the present system of communications. This is absolutely necessary if we are to expect greater exploitation of AIPIGEON. It is suggested that any plans for a personal meeting be similar to the original contact plan (surveillance of house, etc.) in order to minimize the danger involved and to insure that AIPIGEON is still free and at home. For reasons of security the rendezvous scheduled for 25 May 1955 should not be kept.

7. We would appreciate your views on the operational feasibility (dogs, shepherds, etc.) of mounting the next infiltration before June 1955 if your recommendations for the continuance of this operation is favorable and Headquarters concurs.

SE/1-bk
8 February 1955

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