

SECRET KAPOK

AIR

SGAW-8660

MAR 14 1955

ATTN

Chief, SE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 302B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

OBSIDIOUS
Operational Comments

REFERENCES: SGAA-13850, 29 January 1955
SGAW-8367, 14 February 1955

SGAW-4805, 19 August 1954
SGAW-4894, 14 May 1954

1. With regard to your request in first reference, final Headquarters concurrence will be dependent upon your comments on paragraphs 4 and 5 of second reference. If the termination of AIRBRED and the action of AIRNAVE in disclosing his association in the initial OBSIDIOUS infiltration have not seriously endangered the security of the operation, it is our belief that another attempt to contact AIRPIGEON is warranted and is the only practical way of determining the extent of the operation, if any, and progressing any further with its development (para 6 of second reference). In further consideration of AIRNAVE's disclosures, we would appreciate field traces on Khevet Dema (para 5 of SGAA-13206, 17 December 1954).

2. Although we are inclined to credit the failure of the December infiltration more to AIRPIGEON rather than to RNDOLLAR, we have not totally discounted the possibility that the former had not been recruited and that AIRBRED may have decided to drop out of the operation because he either suspected or was aware of this fact. This possibility is admittedly slight. Nevertheless, it should be considered and plans should be implemented for checking this out completely during the next infiltration.

3. The presence of AIRBROWN at any meeting between AIRPIGEON and RNDOLLAR should be sufficient to confirm one way or another the actual recruitment of AIRPIGEON in July of 1954, and if true, whether he wishes to continue in his role of principal agent. If AIRPIGEON wishes to continue as P/A, or has experienced a change of heart subsequent to the last meeting with RNDOLLAR, the latter will be exonerated of any suspicion of lying during past debriefings. His retention as team leader of OBSIDIOUS

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or in the ranks of agent standbys, whatever the case may finally be, would be warranted because of his extensive training (W/T, etc.), operational experience and ability. If the attempt to contact AIPIGEON is unsuccessful, AIRBLOWN's account of the infiltration should still provide some basis for assessing RNDOLLAR and further determining the advisability of continuing the operation. Since we have already reported (para 3 of second reference) that RNDOLLAR's statements during his debriefing by the operations section appear to be plausible and true, the use of AIRBLOWN in the capacity mentioned above should be considered as a routine check on RNDOLLAR. A check of this kind should be periodically applied to all of our agents assigned to or engaged in any of our operations.

4. Assuming a successful infiltration next summer we would appreciate your comments on the third reference and para 3 of the fourth reference. Naturally, the establishment of a primary means of communications between AIPIGEON and base is paramount and should be given first consideration. With regard to this, we would appreciate a report of the communication plan (alternate D/D, recognition signals, danger/safety signals, etc.) being prepared for RNDOLLAR, as well as a report on his training.

5. In addition to a primary means of communications (MO etc.), an emergency link is also important and would partially eliminate the uncertainties which arise when the normal means of communications are interrupted. This has already been experienced in OBSIDIOUS. Again assuming that the infiltration next summer will be successful, approximately one year will have passed since AIPIGEON was allegedly recruited and recontacted. In examining the operational feasibility of employing letter communications in OBSIDIOUS, AIPIGEON could be queried on the following: extent of Sigurini interest in AIPIGEON family; possible censorship of his mail; names of friends or relatives outside Albania to whom letters could be occasionally written without necessarily alerting the opposition; whether it would be more secure to have the mail correspondence initiated by AIPIGEON or by a cutout in the United States; and what cover story would be best (request or offer of material aid, etc.) for initiating mail correspondence.

6. AIPIGEON's capabilities, which at this time do not appear promising, will be the deciding factor in the extent of communications used in OBSIDIOUS. It would be foolhardy to overburden him with tasks beyond his comprehension or ability. Therefore, it is advisable to assess AIPIGEON thoroughly as well as to investigate the possibility of refining the operation during the next infiltration. We will then be in a position of knowing exactly what we have in AIPIGEON as a P/A so that the operation can be developed accordingly.

7. In addition to your comments on the above and the second reference, we would appreciate receiving the name of AIPIGEON's wife and any biographical information which RNDOLLAR may be able to provide.

SE/1-bk 8 March 1955

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2 - SE/1 1 - C/SE