

KNIX

16 November 1950

FROM: [ ]

TO: [ ]

SUBJECT: Intelligence Critique, First Body Operation

1. The abortive attempt on 3 November was so jumbled with last-hour preparations by the packers and communication briefers that, perforce, the intelligence briefing was rushed - too much to be assured that all of the information and instructions were absorbed. Actually, the hurriedness was apparent to the teams and the psychological atmosphere detrimental to any kind of reception. (Individual team briefings were given while the men were eating their evening meal, another evidence of the general pressure.) None of the intelligence material was skipped - such as it was - but the rapidity of its delivery could not leave me with a feeling of a satisfactory performance. In my opinion, a minimum of two-hours is required for the task, primarily because of laborious translations.

2. The second briefing on 11 November was wholly satisfactory. There was sufficient time at my disposal to give a measured approach to the entire briefing. Emphasis could be placed in the right proportion; important points could be reviewed; questions could be answered with studied care; and maps could be pondered together. While I do not deem the material the best available (much of it bears an F-6 rating), all that was pertinent was assembled and carefully presented. This time, minds were not cluttered with a torrent of technical communications instructions; these had been given at a saner pace throughout the preceding week and this intelligence briefing received full attention.

3. Two things were lacking, or so it appeared to me. First, decent maps. The maps - particularly the mediocre reproductions thereof - were wholly inadequate in number and quality for planning purposes, certainly miserable in quality for operational use. The finest map possible is the ZRCrown 1:200,000 (north and south section) chart of HBpixie. Less than four copies are available here. On 29 September 1950 3 HBpixie maps north of the 41st parallel, scale 1:200,000 were forwarded to BGMiddy, HTStein to be reproduced in accord with FRAN 1026-FRAN 942. There was no response to these requests and the maps finally were reproduced here with inferior equipment operated by untrained people under difficult circumstances. The resultant product was inferior and makeshift; in my opinion a rather sorry commentary.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

TOP SECRET

KNIXON

COPY 1 OF 3 Copies

51778

KNIXC

4. Second, the amount and reliability of intelligence left considerable to be desired. It is a situation that improves however as sources are cultivated and closer liaison effected with brother services. At the moment much of our intelligence is relatively old and unconfirmed. We are uncertain of enemy AA batteries, radar, and enemy aircraft strength; our information on prospective drop zones is slim with the minutest possible information on alternate areas; and, as previously stated, the bulk of our files is F-6.

5. It might not be an unworthy idea to provide future drop teams with background lectures during their training period. This has been suggested before and, as a matter of fact, such a background lecture is being drafted by this office now.

TOP SECRET

KNIXON

COPY 1 OF 3 Copies

51778  
Copy 2 of 6 copies