

SECRET

114

12 December 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Agenda For a Review of BGFIEND

A. A Critique Of BGFIEND Operations.

1. A review of present training facilities.

a. The present system for screening recruits from the overt camp prior to their being removed from the camp, and of existing provisions for the elimination of unsuitable personnel. (Assessment, interrogation by FJCap personnel)

b. An analysis of the short-comings of the Hambuechan Estate and a determination of its future role in training.

c. An analysis of the probable serviceability of the new training area and a determination of when it will be in service and for what size groups. (Division of racial groups, adequacy during winter months, privacy, etc.)

d. A discussion of the type of w/t houses required, their location, and the probable time of their availability. (Security of trainees, staff required, etc.)

e. A determination of the size and type training and house-keeping staffs required presently and for scheduled operations, breaking the requirements down into types and dates required. (Who can be recruited locally, who must be recruited here.)

f. A discussion of further control measures to be taken at the overt camp to insure security against penetration for maintenance of discipline, and for the physical fitness of the men. (Discuss solutions for the overall logistics problem imposed by scattered training sites.)

B. An Examination of the Mechanism of Infiltration From the Departure From the Training Area to Actual Infiltration.

1. Problems involved in moving the bodies out of HTSTEIN securely. (DF Agenda)

2. Problems involved in holding the bodies in LCFLAKE in the event of operational delays. (Morale, security)

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3. A detailed analysis of preparations for the first body drop including:

- a. Equipment packing problems. (Trained personnel, facilities, shortages of equipment)
- b. Problems involved in the final political briefing of infiltrees (necessity for oral briefing).
- c. Aircraft operational problems, including weather determination. (Changes in type aircraft, in basing of aircraft)
- d. The last minute reject problem. (Problems of holding, of temporary disposal for reorientation, of final disposal.)

4. Consideration of infiltration by boat.

5. A review of the problem of servicing the teams once infiltrated.

- a. Commo-wise - the shortcomings of the motorola.
- b. Commo-wise - the problems inherent in w/t communications, servicing, availability of intelligent trainees (Poles versus Pixies).
- c. Propaganda-wise - handbills and throw-away radios.
- d. Supply-wise - the problems of air resupply of the teams and/or clandestine boat supply. (Instructions given to the first infiltrees reference resupply, arms caching.)

6. A review of the problems inherent in exfiltration and debriefing.

- a. A review of the existing system for taking charge of exfiltrates at the border and for debriefing them. (Facilities, security, attitude of Flakes.)

- b. The problem of removing bodies from LGFLAKE to a safe area such as DTFLOOR for reorientation and rest.

C. Determination of Alternate Courses of Action in Order to Meet Changing World Conditions.

1. Implementation of Present Plan. A review of present Fiend capabilities, vis-a-vis the scheduled objective of infiltrating a

total of 50 men by 30 June 1951 (including w/t operators) and an analysis of any further support required to meet this established objective and the objectives of the psychological warfare phase.

2. Extension of Present Plans Through December of 1951:

a. Plan A: An estimate of required expansion of BGFRIEND facilities in the six months following 30 June, assuming the extension of present cold war conditions. The objectives will be for:

(1) The initial 50 men to intensify the organization of resistance elements within Pixieland and to perform limited acts of sabotage, penetration of the Party, character assassination, etc.

(2) The teams to be supplied by air with arms for caching in an amount sufficient to equip 500 men.

(3) All other operational measures be taken necessary to weaken or eliminate the usefulness to the Cominform of Pixieland as a basis for operations against TPROACH as specified by the 6 December 1949 review of BGFRIEND.

b. Plan B: An estimate of the required expansion of BGFRIEND facilities assuming rapidly-deteriorating world conditions. Under such circumstances the objectives will be:

(1) To put 50 more infiltrees into Pixieland during the six months following 30 June 1951, with the purpose of expanding the arms caching and organizational facilities to ready a guerrilla force of 1000 men at a given signal.

(2) To have available for training at all times a reserve pool of 500 combat-fit Pixies. In order to accomplish this objective it is necessary to establish a rear-area base in North Africa, probably in Spanish Morocco or DIFLOOR.

c. Plan C: An estimate of the required expansion of BGFRIEND facilities, assuming either TPROACH is attacked or a general world war breaks out on or before 30 June 1951. In such an instance, the objectives will be:

(1) To use existing teams and drawing on the reserve pool for sufficient additional teams to activate 5,000 Pixie guerrillas, and to perform such other tasks as will deny the use of Pixieland to the GYPSIES.

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SECRET

- 4 -

(2) With the assistance of JBALERT to covertly supply 3,000 guerrillas with 180 tons per month by air and 2,000 guerrillas with 60 tons per month by clandestine boat delivery.

3. A Determination of the Additional Personnel and Facilities Required in Support of Operations in Any of the Above Eventualities:

D. An Analysis of the Possible Impact of Intensified BGFIEND Operations on the Political Balance in the Balkans, and a Determination of What Steps Should be Taken to Protect QKCIGAR National Objectives:

1. Discussion of the possibility of the BGFIEND operations resulting in a premature revolution in Pixieland.

2. Discussion of the readiness or adequacy of HTNEIGH to step into the resultant vacuum as a provisional government in this event.

3. The reaction of the TPROACHES in this event.

4. The probable reactions of the LCFLAKES and the measures which they might take to secure southern Pixieland.

5. The probable reaction of the (USSR) and the ~~other~~ satellites.

6. A discussion of the aims of QKCIGAR in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly vis-a-vis Pixieland, and of the readiness of QKCIGAR to intervene in Pixieland with force in support of HTNEIGH.

7. A discussion of present political temper of HTNEIGH, of other Pixie emigre groups, and of the question of broadening HTNEIGH to give it additional strength. (Orness group, BKI, Lassman, and evolution of a plan for handling the committee more firmly in the future. (Lieb))

8. An analysis of all information available as to present KMULGER, LCFLAKE, and TPROACH operations into Pixieland in support of their national objectives.

E. In the light of all the foregoing, a determination will be made of the minimum and maximum objectives for operation BGFIEND during 1951.

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