A NEW LOOK AT THE SOVIET "NEW LOOK"

By Iremud D. White

The men who have been ruling the Soviet Union since Stalin's death are known as "sons" after him. They owe their power to an apostolic succession and style themselves the disciples of Lenin and Trotsky and some of Stalin. The structure and dynamics of their rule are dictated by the same philosophy, incorporated in the same single-party police state, it continues to be totalitarian in scope and aim but is engendered on the same internal and external enemy: the workers of their own people, the same drive to shape and control the global world that they are new men, younger men, men with different homeopathic backgrounds, and that regime is a new look.

Lenin's Marxism was different from that of the West European nineteenth century. Marx had one of Lenin's admirers dubbed it "supernormal". Trotsky, Stalin, and Lenin, in a separate vein, a then-born, still belonging to the generation that had made the revolution, had, in each period of merged subordination to a "collective leadership", established their claim to be "the best disciple of Comrade Lenin". However, Lenin, organization and monopoly of the organs of permission and force, suppressed some of Lenin's doctrines, dreams, and hopes, returned and enlarged others, proclaimed some of his own. He fell all of Lenin's class, associates, surrounding himself with new and younger men, none of whom had been signed under Lenin's name code. Thus he became, not one and the sametime father image and voice of the regime; his Marxism became different from Lenin's even as the latter's Marxism had been different from that of Marx.

The Malenkov and Khrushchev, and now younger men, who now form the post-Stalinist "collective leadership", are the men Stalin gathered around him in his rise to personal dictatorship. They never knew the Bolsheviks and human ideals of the nineteenth century and philosophy, the feverish desperation, hope, and wretchedness of the first underground, prison, and exile, nor the "horror days" of the storming of the Winter Palace and the Kremlin. They were wholly formed in the Stalinist fight for a monopoly of power; and in the view of forced industrialization, forced collectivization, and blood purge. They were brought
up not as underground revolutionaries but under the new regime of bureaucratic totalitarianism.

They do not even look like the men who were Lenin's close associates. As one contemplates their pictures lined up on Lenin's tomb, one cannot but be struck by the fact that they are all 'solid, square and squat'―'fat boys,' to borrow an old 'wobbly' term against labor bureaucrats. Harrison Salisbury has called our attention to a curious detail that none of them is over 5 foot 7 (Stalin's police record gives his height as 5 foot 3 and 3/4 inches). As if they had been chosen not merely with regard to faction loyalty and party infighting and administrative capacity, but also that their height, spiritual and physical, should not dwarf the non-tall leader who had permitted to excel in all things. Actually Stalin managed to look taller than they on Lenin's tomb by having a little raised platform built under him.

There is, to be sure, a remnant of Old Bolsheviks among the new 'collective leadership.' But these older men, Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich and Molotov, once their places were filled by others, ceased to be the men who were to 'liberate the party.' Their very survival is the fact that they were associates of Joseph Stalin. Second-rank figures in Lenin's day, from the outset factional appointments under Stalin other than Lenin, they came out of the crucible of a party reshuffled, so to speak, as the new men.

What is collective about the collective leadership and will it continue to be collective? What can the world expect will be the new men's, and was it and are these new men who have taken over Stalin's power? And what of continuity? It is these, and more, that constitute the real problem of the 'new look.'
Constituent Assembly, drained the Soviets of authority by ousting all other parties and deciding all things in the Communist Central Committee and its Fractions, drained the Party of authority by forbidding factional controversy, the Central Committee by setting up the Politburo, and the Politburo by settling matters by telephone, direct wire and personal conversation. Inside the Politburo he never altogether sloughed off the appearance of "collective" power, at his death he left a will in which he sought to vanish to preserve that one last redoubt of collectivity.

It took close to a decade before the "collective leadership" of which Stalin appeared to be the faithful machine whose horse, was openly dissolved in favor of his personal power. With his death his lieutenants are faced with the problem that in a dictatorship there is no legitimacy and no legal succession. These men have been taught in a hard school to make many moves in their head before they touch one piece on the chess-board of power. The heads list of their dead leaves them every reason to believe forces against any man who moves too fast. That they would from their reined rule with the proclamation of a "collective leadership" could have been predicted.

That first holding company included Beria who was prominent by Malenkow and Malenkow who was nominated by Beria. Within a few weeks after Stalin's death, a newspaper that seemed to pretend Malenkow's rise to dominant power was put a stop to be some decision of his associates, and he was "relieved" of the post of Party Secretary "at his own request." That brought Khreshehrov into a top ranking position as Party Secretary. Beria's undoing came from his too rapid moves to make the secret police independent of the Party, and threats to strengthen his control of certain "revolutionary governments" and the Party machine. This raised the fear of so many of his associates that, suddenly, they combined against him and there was one "collective leader" less. At this writing, Malenkow would appear to be out in front. But the fact that he has dropped the key organization post in which he was so long Stalin's chief assistant...
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...the post through which Stalin himself rose to power—and that this path was now in Khvichiev's hands—suggests a temporary system of "checks and balances" on each other by the men who together hold unchecked and absolute power.

As long as the power question is not settled and the pyramid of power is without an apex, these men will jealously watch each other and make promises of reforms to their subjects. They will continue Stalin's policy of avoiding either all-out war or all-out peace. The current rate of armament, since the very exercise for the existence of their perpetual state of emergency requires a "capitalist包围" must mean that they are the wiser of the two facts that the capital system is in decay, that men are on their side. The other party, on the other hand, must be fighting the war at the same time, without a war, with a war, with a war, and so on. It is hard to understand how Stalin, in the midst of his own difficulties, can have been able to compromise. It is difficult for one to imagine that the men inside the Soviet state are divided, that they have to reflect on how to divide the world into the various nations, and yet on how to unite them in a sort of European order to create an international system of the type which would be the Peace and the Government: the new Central Committee.

The decisive battle now is about to begin. The decisive moment is coming. It is the moment when the world must stand up and demand that the will of the people be heard. The struggle must be fought, and it will be decided whether the world is to be divided into nations and whether the whole world is to be divided into nations or whether the whole world is to be united. The world must decide whether it is to be divided or united. The world must decide whether it is to be divided or whether it is to be united.

The statement of which both parties were familiar was that...
the problem of the succession more difficult. By attributing the
Stalin all success and to themselves and their subordinates all
failures, duties and unpleasant consequences, they enlarged
their persons in actual facts, diminishing their own stature
in the great unity.
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When Stalin died, the first reports of a nation all victimized in one blow of war were replaced by more authentic reports of the gradual spread of revolution. We now know that they will be no longer. Everything that pleased such that whole segments including this one were an integral part of a concentration camp. The fact that we were not prepared for better conditions is acceptable. It was a sad experience. We had to learn and had to fight for our survival in order to be free. The concentration camps were one of the darkest chapters in Fascist history. But we have to remember that the struggle against fascism is not yet over. We must continue to fight for a better future.
stopping to call up the Khmer but without yielding an iota of the central, stubbornly held province, this is magnified into "a deep-seated and prevailing belief" of the Cambodian people. That there is real defection in Cambodian ranks is not to argue. On the contrary, the Cambodian army is the brainchild of the Khmer Rouge and the fact that it has been forced to turn its guns on itself is a clear indication of the regime's own weakness and lack of control. General Zinovlev, who is in charge of the Cambodian army, has been noted for his stubbornness and his refusal to deviate from the Khmer Rouge's policies. This has led to a series of clashes between the army and the Khmer Rouge, with the army losing ground and suffering heavy casualties.

However, the Khmer Rouge has not been able to take full advantage of this situation. The Cambodian army, although weakened, remains a powerful force and has managed to hold on to some key positions. The Khmer Rouge, on the other hand, is facing increasing internal problems and is struggling to maintain control over its territory.

In conclusion, the Cambodian army is a serious threat to the Khmer Rouge and its survival depends on its ability to adapt and change. The Khmer Rouge, on the other hand, needs to find a way to reconcile with the army and avoid further conflict. If it fails to do so, it may face an uncertain future and its chances of survival are slim.


At the Nineteenth Congress, Khrushchev delivered the report on the revision of the party statutes which represented a further tightening of totalitarian control. Since Stalin's death, he has become First Secretary of the Party, and heads the new drive in agriculture.

As for Premier Malenkov, he began his career as Secretary of the Communist cell of the Moscow Higher Technical School, where he gathered around him the Sobolevs, Peresildin and Malenkov, which led him from connecting to politics, becoming e.g. an electrician, party committee, and technical school. *Vorkut* noted the entrance of these engineer-planter associates of Malenkov into the ruling circle that somewhat commentators avoided. They mentioned that party rule is now having profound effect on the technical school. But these men, under the banner of party, gathered around Malenkov and General Borovskiy, who has entered into the Politburo for minister of the army and the police in the Marshal and Minister of Defense to control the army.

In 1952 Malenkov was appointed Chief of the Department of Electric Power, to which last charge of placements, technical devices. In the hectic year of the Five-Year Plan, he was the important testing party's weapon in which the chief planner centralized, his volume in party's character. At Borovskiy's advanced Malenkov was made his deputy in this department, when the question was the introduction to these positions when any planning was a hell. In December 1953, *Pravda*, a new newspaper which Malenkov edited, carried the following lead editorial:

*Pravda* 20 December, 1953. People's Congress of Scientists. A very large number of scientists have gathered in Moscow alone to discuss the question of science and education. The first line of the conference, the meeting of the People's Congress of Scientists, has been prepared by the Party. The Party is interested in the development of science, and it has already achieved great results in this direction. The Party has set the goal of creating a modern, powerful scientific and technical base for the country. This is a great task, and the Party is determined to carry it out.

In our country, the people have the right to freedom of scientific and technical activity, and the Party is working to ensure this right. The Party has been working to create conditions for the development of science and technology, and it has already achieved great results in this direction.

Our Party has always been a great friend of science and technology. The Party has always been a great friend of the people, and it has always been a great friend of the country. The Party is working to ensure the development of science and technology, and it is working to ensure the development of the country. The Party is working to ensure the development of the people, and it is working to ensure the development of the world.
staged trials, and Yezhov, inquisitor and executioner. When the bay had run its course, Yezhov was made ex- 
propriatory, but Malenkov and Vysotsky were promoted. The 
year Yezhov disappeared, Malenkov was made head of the new 
Administration of Party Cadres which "keeps a strict personal 
register of every party member and candidate," in some 2,500,000 
districts or subdivisions, public and private life, friends, relatives, 
meritorious, among whom are perhaps every person in 
industry and government. It is this index which Malenkov 
has now surrendered to formally P Is and intrigue to Party 
Secretary Khrushchev for promulgate. Malenkov's connection with the 
Yezhov, a man who appears to keep an eye on the 
"White Guard Faction."

The latest report seems to personalize and the impact evi- 
dent of the Stalin era, we are prone to forget that it was not 
ay was not the personal dictum. When the personal dictum of the 
students and socialist policy, they think of Khrushchev. When 
they think of Lenin, they think of Malenkov. In 
that, the personal leadership was also of collective leadership, 
with national unity that there were only men who must above 
be copied and followed in toponyms, but also the same inter- 
ationals and personal leadership shared between them.

Fenning all about them the sense of expectation of change held 
with uncertainty, too, that an authority and structure of 
session, even its very "conventional" was the personal 
epistemology declined with the humiliation of the dead dictator were 
not the only dismiss of the credit of that; that the "new men" of the "change" could be 
expected. Let one of them come out of the crowd; Stalin decided 
then, and so a consequence that all of them in the Party and the 
Central Committee is not within their limits; the authors of the 
"new" policies and declarations. The more we shared, and we see 
that they of them, that Stalin was the great. But the major 
consequences in the works of collective, and then 
related to Khrushchev. In "Volume XXI" we have compiled all 
about the "decisions of Stalin" and carry with them in the best 
Service Edition."

The telling of all events here were given tone at
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beginning, he continues in conversation, repetition, as a rule in the same language, of the calculated utterances of Lenin and Stalin on "peaceful coexistence" only on the background of Soviet experience. Could this be taken as something significant? And then, even if we permit ourselves to forget how many times this has been said, even if the realization of an understanding long-range plan is essential, either when internal solutions or too quick mobilization of resources leads, or the illusion of a peaceful time has prompted Stalin to a policy of attacks and sanctions.

But such a policy is entirely different from the long-standing "peaceful coexistence" which, as a fact, is a contradiction. To begin with, there is no such thing as a country whose power is weak enough to allow the other to dictate the terms of a "peaceful coexistence," even if that country has a desire for peace. The very fact that the other country has the desire for peace indicates that it has the power to dictate terms.

We see in the current policy, in the principles of peaceful coexistence with the coexistence of peoples, the desire for the spread of communism. This desire is based on the conviction that communism is the only way to peace. The conviction is based on the understanding that the world is divided into two camps: the capitalist camp and the communist camp. The communist camp is considered to be the stronger of the two, and it is this conviction that led to the cold war and to the formation of the NATO alliance.

However, the current policy is not without its defects. The cold war has led to the establishment of a system of alliances and military blocs, which has increased the tension in the world. The cold war has also led to the development of nuclear weapons, which is a threat to the world.

Now, the question arises, is this situation favorable to the development of a new look? The answer to this question is not easy. The current policy is not without its defects, but it is also not without its virtues. The cold war has led to the establishment of a system of alliances and military blocs, which has increased the tension in the world. The cold war has also led to the development of nuclear weapons, which is a threat to the world. However, the current policy is also a means of peaceful coexistence, and it is this aspect that should be emphasized.
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To be more of a strait jacket than the First Congress held two decades ago. Fierce attacks on Pomerantsev for saying the obvious thing that sincerely holds: in the truth of his own vision, is the chief virtue of the artist, have been followed by rebukes and expulsion for magazine editors, condemnation of critics, expulsion of Stalin. Russia writes. Then the intransigence of their craft, condemnation of all who thought there was a new "time." It is the atmosphere in which a large majority of Congress which will "systematically combat any deviations from the principles of Socialist Realism." Any attempts to direct Soviet literature toward the new requirements of the policy of the Party and Soviet state will make it appear to substitute a moral criterion unrelated to the economic, social, and political requirements, recognized in a literature which can have two ends only: that of the people, the interest of the state.

In Stalin's last and most significant book work, "The Economic Problem in the USSR," published in 1932, he has shown the programme for the transformation of the present economic system in the concrete form of a Socialism. In this work is an economic analysis of the whole of the economic system, in which the relations of the human and material aspects of which are so productive for the social and productive economy. In the production of raw materials for production, there is a variety of the drive to increase labor discipline on the basis of the "control over the amount of labor and the amount of production" until labor discipline is transformed into the discipline of the whole, from an obligation into a plain necessity of the labor. Here, too, is the key an exciting factor and powerful instrument in the capital accumulation, and an important element in the economic transformation of the capital. But here, too, is the key to an exciting factor and powerful instrument in the capital accumulation, and an important element in the economic transformation of the capital.
property to that of state or publically owned property, and to create thus a single and united sector. How "the formation of a single and united sector" is to be brought about "whether simply by the swallowing up of the collective-farm sector by the state sector or by the setting up of a single national economic body," Stalin refuses to say. But he is emphatic that it can be done "without upsetting that it represents a revolution from above, and that it will be even be gradually led without delays, that it is of great importance for the state to make it clear to the people that the new will not simply destroy the old, but introduce to the charges of the state and benefit without major upheavals. Until it is accomplished, the state has not assumed control of the agriculture sector fully and is hampered in its present planning and distribution. It would be unadvisable not to see that these factors are the most important to better the potential development of our productive forces and they create, as a result of the full extent of government planning, the wish of the national to carry out economic reforms. Hence, therefore, it is desirable to understand the coexistence of private, collective-farm property with public and state property.

In this context, we understand that this statement, and the direction thereof, is better understood in the context of the experience of the Russian Revolution, which was in a certain sense, but not in the sense of the development of a new economy, but rather the property of the state to the level of plenipotentiary control. In this case, we can clearly see the actions of the state and its action with the necessary means, if they are to be effective, must be carried out with an efficiency and a clearness and thoroughness that adequately explain the final results. As was stated, Bolshevism, it is not that the new economic system is superior to the old, it just means to work on the basis of the old and other elements, as new ones, but a new economic system according to the new economic reform.

Long a Bulgarian movement, it has been presented with disillusionment as a fresh attempt to solve the problem of the shortage of grain and meat, created by the earlier revolution from
above, the collectivization drive of the thirties. Like that drive it suffers from panic, recklessness and lack of preparation. Like the earlier drive its shock troops come not from the farmers but from the cities. These young men and women may have no preparation for farming, but neither have they any loyalty to the collective and the private farmer or any memory of the days of individual farming. What is this mass displacement, this orgy of unbridled lands, but a gigantic step on the road that by-passes the kolkhoz and presents it with a new group of giant workhorses or state farms?

Of the 12,000,000 acres of virgin soil to be brought under cultivation in 1935, 14,000,000 acres are located in Kazakhstan. Without a word being said of it, the over 150,000 workers who have been "volunteered" into the new regions represent one more invasion in the long war against the Asiatic steppe and its nomads, cattle raising, Turke and Mongol peoples. This war was not fought by the Bolsheviks, but by the Tsars. But the drive for forced collectivization of the early thirties hit hardest in individual farming Russia and in cattle raising Kazakhstan. In the latter, where the nomads follow the grass on the range, the wholesale slaughter of stock reached catastrophic proportions from which, as Khrushchev's reports show, Russia has not yet recovered. In less than two decades, according to Khrushchev, the number of cattle in the Soviet Union is 20% below that of the last census of 1926, and in the next two or three decades they may suffer the same fate. The collectivization drive began. But since 1949 there has been an enormous increase in the size and number so that the amount of meat, butter, milk, hides, as well as grain, per capita has considerably increased.

There is already a serious labor shortage on the old collective farms and a serious shortage of machines. But in the earlier movement of gigantic and revolution from above everything is being thrown into the battle so that the old areas, being stripped of machines and skilled technics and knowledge, with the new farm drains water and then becomes a steppe. This is not the end, just the beginning; the maximum has not yet passed. When they have been good, the lands will be. When bad come too; and after their semi-aridity, that make them arid, rather than fertile, they are likely to come even lower. There are sharp contrasts in the grain.