



Should U.S. Recognize Peiping?

by Nicholas Roosevelt

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(Public opinion in the United States, as well as in the rest of the world, has become focused on Communist China as a result of two far-reaching developments. The first has been the expansion of the civil war thrust between mainland China, controlled by the Communist government of Premier Mao Tse-tung and the island of Formosa, controlled by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The second has been the intervention of the United Nations, represented by its secretary-general, Dag Hammarskjöld, in the case of the 11 American fleet, condemned as spies by the Peiping government.)

Will these developments lead to war in the Far East? Or will they result in an easing of tensions in that strategic area? What should be the next steps in United States policy toward Peiping and Formosa? In this issue of the Bulletin one view is presented by Nicholas Roosevelt, former Minister to Hungary and distinguished writer on world affairs. In the issue of February 15 another view will be expressed by Senator William H. Knowland, Republican of California, leader of the Republican party in the Senate. (Editor.)

To form an enlightened opinion about the question, "Should the United States recognize the Peiping government?" it is necessary to consider (1) whether such recognition would imply an endorsement of the political system and ideals of that government, (2) whether it would involve turning over Formosa to Red China, and (3) in the event that recognition were to be decided upon as desirable, whether such recognition should be

extended forthwith and unconditionally or only when and if the government of Red China agrees to recognize the rights and principles commonly accepted by civilized nations in diplomatic intercourse.

Recognition Issue

Let us consider these three points briefly:

(1) The government of the United States recognized the government of the U.S.S.R. in November 1933. By no stretch of the imagination could this routine diplomatic act be twisted into approval of communism or of Soviet imperialism. Similarly, recognition of Red China in no way would imply approval of the methods or the political ideals of the Peiping government. Rather it would be merely a diplomatic acceptance of the reality that the Peiping government is the *de facto* government of present-day China. It is not amiss to note here that many students of Far Eastern affairs believe that if the United States had recognized this government six or eight years ago our relations with China might have been better than they have been under the policy of nonrecognition.

One of the diplomatic arguments against recognition of the Peiping government is that the United States has for years officially dealt with the government headed by Chiang Kai-shek as the *de jure* government of China and that, consequently, to recognize Peiping would necessitate withdrawing recognition from the "Nationalist" government. This is true. But it should be borne in mind that at no time did the Chinese "Na-

tionalists" exercise sovereignty over more than a part of the mainland of China and that for the last five years they have not controlled a single square mile of the Chinese mainland. Thus in actual fact the continuing recognition of the so-called "Nationalist" government is nothing more than diplomatic prolongation of a political myth. One might just as well recognize one of the Russian grand dukes as head of the government of Russia as to make believe that Chiang is head of the government of China.

No Need to Relinquish Formosa

(2) Formosa never formed an essential part of the Chinese Empire and was never under the control of the republic. Its transfer to Red China would be so clearly against the interests of the free world that it is inadmissible. The Chinese Communists want it for two reasons: (a) to have a military outpost through which the U.S.S.R. and Red China could embarrass the United States and (b) to enable the Chinese Communists to liquidate or disperse and despoil those Chinese who fled to that island in order to escape the persecutions of the Red China government. Both these arguments work strongly in favor of preventing Formosa from falling into the hands of the Reds.

The fact that Formosa must be denied to the Reds does not justify using the island as the main base of military operations against the Chinese mainland. Military experts are agreed that an invasion attempted by Chiang's troops would be doomed to

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failure unless backed by the full might of the American Navy, Army and Air Force. The United States could not give such backing without, in fact, going to war with Communist China. Nothing would better suit the Soviet imperialists than to see the United States thus embroiled. Not only would such a war disastrously weaken the United States, but it would make it impossible for us to help Europe curtail new Russian plans of aggrandizement on that continent. Moreover, it would mistify Soviet propaganda throughout Asia that the United States is determined to impose its will on the Asian peoples by war. Greater folly than all-out war by the United States against Red China is hard to imagine.

Incidentally, one of the arguments in favor of placing Formosa under

a trusteeship of the United Nations or an international body is that this would keep it out of the hands of the Chinese Communists and at the same time deprive the Peking government of the propaganda argument that Formosa is a threat to mainland China.

(3) It is axiomatic that should the government of the United States decide to extend recognition to the Peking government, it would not do so until such time as several points of expediency had been met, one would be condemnation of the non-fulfilling by the Peking government of those diplomatic rights and economic safeguards which are the basis of relations between civilized nations.

Even should these conditions prove impossible to obtain, and recognition thus to be indefinitely postponed,

no valid reason exists for continuing to act on the assumption that support of Chiang and the Chinese Nationalists is an indispensable prerequisite to continuing or ending the control of the mainland by the Chinese Communists. Chiang is the *de facto* head of the government in Formosa, thanks to the overwhelming and largely unheeded generosity of the American government. Why not recognize him as such and put an end to the de facto practice that the Nationalist government is the government of China? The main objection to keeping Formosa out of the hands of the Communists continues to be the fear that the political and military interests of Chiang Kai-shek will be thereby injured.

It is true that the Nationalist government has been unable to bring about a settlement of the Formosa question. This is due to the fact that the Nationalist government has been unable to bring about a settlement of the Formosa question. This is due to the fact that the Nationalist government has been unable to bring about a settlement of the Formosa question.

FOREIGN POLICY SPOTLIGHT



Untapped Resources of the U.S.

In the course of the now closed United Nations meeting of October 27, at which Secretary of State John Foster Dulles reported on the success of negotiations for a Western European Union, Secretary of the Treasury, George M. Humphrey asked how much the new arrangement would cost the United States. Mr. Dulles cheerfully replied that it would *not* cost us another nickel cent, and this seemed to reassure the budget makers.

The coming TV program, however, could have been made highly educational for the voters who are also taxpayers if it had been taken to explain that the cost of world leadership cannot be measured in terms of money alone. In fact, the less emphasis we place on the material contribution we intend to make to the non-Communist

world, the more we are likely to attract investments and resources of the most important kind to our own shores. An effective program of foreign aid must begin to be conceived. The question of our leadership on the global scene is a matter of our success or our failure as a nation.

A Share-the-Culture Program

Since we started trading with foreign countries in 1492 with the Marshall plan, followed by NATO, Point Four and other programs there has been a good deal of talk, but most of it is bitter, about the "rich" and the "poor" philosophies of both. The who-should-aid-whom question has perplexed a S. should aid program to anyone in the United States, but perhaps the recipients of our aid may

be able to help us. The United States has a vast supply of resources, but it is not using them to the full. We have a surplus of goods and services, but we are not exporting them to the full. We have a surplus of labor, but we are not using it to the full. We have a surplus of capital, but we are not investing it to the full. We have a surplus of technology, but we are not sharing it to the full. We have a surplus of talent, but we are not using it to the full. We have a surplus of resources, but we are not using them to the full. We have a surplus of goods and services, but we are not exporting them to the full. We have a surplus of labor, but we are not using it to the full. We have a surplus of capital, but we are not investing it to the full. We have a surplus of technology, but we are not sharing it to the full. We have a surplus of talent, but we are not using it to the full. We have a surplus of resources, but we are not using them to the full.

Such is the case with the Russians and Chinese, but it is not the case with the Japanese. The Japanese have a surplus of goods and services, but they are not exporting them to the full. They have a surplus of labor, but they are not using it to the full. They have a surplus of capital, but they are not investing it to the full. They have a surplus of technology, but they are not sharing it to the full. They have a surplus of talent, but they are not using it to the full. They have a surplus of resources, but they are not using them to the full.