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DOCUMENT NUMBER

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DISPATCH NO. FJBA-8391

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CLASSIFICATION

24 JAN 1956

TO : Chief, FE DATE _____

FROM : Chief of C. J. Base, [REDACTED] INFO: Chief of Station, [REDACTED]

SUBJECT { GENERAL : Operational Reporting
 SPECIFIC : POCAPON

REFERENCE : FJEW-3846

1. For the answer to most of the questions raised in reference we invite your attention to FJB-2215, dated the same day that reference was prepared. POCAPON did explain what happened. Unfortunately our report of this event was not considered before reference was dispatched.
2. Reference raises, however, other basic questions upon which we desire to comment.

a. In the first place, as reference puts it, "the KUBARK-POCAPON relationship is unusual." We cannot help but wonder if you appreciate how unusual it really is. When we first started seeing POCAPON he was high in his government and we saw him on an official basis, but, of course, kept the meetings as secret as was possible or practicable. In the early days of this relationship, when POCAPON was in a position to do some if not all of the things that KUBARK wanted done in Japan, a more willing cooperator could hardly have been found. Through his support POCUNATE was established and the entire basis for the POCALATE project stems from him. All the while he consistently met our requests for information and assistance when such was in his power. We saw him certainly in an official capacity. With his loss of government position he was naturally not in a position to be of the same type and degree of assistance to us, but in our relationships with him since then he has always seemed to us to be completely frank and, as far as we can tell, honest. POCAPON is not obligated to us, as reference points out. On the contrary he takes a real risk politically every time he sees us and we have yet to demonstrate to him whether or not we believe his political future is worth more active support from us. At any rate, in our opinion he has given immeasurably more help to us than he has received.

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Date: 2005

- b. POCAPON is not controlled, says reference; nor will he be, in our opinion. But our relationship with him as it exists today is, we believe, unique. An example of the moment: On 8 January 1956 POCAPON called [] by telephone from a hotel on the Izu Peninsula (where he had gone for the week-end) to tell [] that he had become quite ill and that he wished [] to come down and spend a few uninterrupted hours with him. We had been trying to arrange a meeting with POCAPON for some time but had been unable to because of his heavy and full schedule of travel on Party business, yet as soon as he was forced to break his schedule he called. Of course this is not control, but it is cited as a factor in the unusualness of the KUBARK-POCAPON relationship.
- c. POCAPON is not obligated to KUBARK unless he feels some obligation for the things that we have helped do for his country. We have done little if anything for him personally. But he feels, we believe, a certain degree of obligation to us in that we have at least tried to be helpful. We saw to it that arrangements were made to help [] we encourage him at every turn, we listen to him when it is unwise for him to be seeing ODACID representatives, we are friendly to him and toward his aspirations as far as we know those aspirations. If this causes obligation on his part, as it seems to in a peculiarly Japanese sense of the word, then we are just that much ahead.
3. Our relationship to POCAPON is that we provide a sounding board for him which might more properly be handled by ODACID. In no sense can we ask or expect him to "report accurately all the possibilities of a given situation..." All that we can expect, and we believe all that we should expect given the circumstances of today, is what he wants to give. When we do give him EEI, as we have done on many occasions using the broadest sense of the word EEI, he has responded seemingly to the best of his ability or to the limit of his desires.
4. If it is within the interests of ODYOKE to have one of the primary political figures in Japan tell KUBARK what he thinks on this or that subject, receive from KUBARK and apparently be strongly influenced by ODYOKE thinking on this or that problem or event, express publicly more often than not the ODYOKE view on this or that subject, then we believe this is a relationship that should not only be continued but should be greatly encouraged and built up. As far as we can tell, POCAPON has been a staunch friend of KUBARK since our first contact with him. We believe he can continue to be if we so desire. If he becomes the top man locally whatever relationship KUBARK has with him will be important, but it is up to KUBARK to decide, and this must be decided soon, what that relationship will be. We could possibly have an important part in making this man the Prime Minister (provided his political star be in the ascendant) if that were our desire, and by so doing could influence the Japanese Government along many lines

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of ODYOKE interests. He may become the Prime Minister without our help. This would make him no less a friend of KUBARK and ODYOKE, but the obligation he would feel toward us would be simply as described above.

5. Despite all that we have said above, though the following has no particular bearing on the past KUBARK-POCAPON relationship, the following factors should be noted for the record.
 - a. According to various reports, including one from Headquarters, there is some question re POCAPON's rightist background and possible current connections. This is a factor which certainly should not be overlooked in any appraisal of him as a person, as a political figure or as both where ODYOKE interests may be concerned.
 - b. We know from many sources, most of them overt, that POCAPON is not politically astute in the normal sense in which that term applies to Japanese politicians. He is generally termed as being "too nice" or "too gentlemanly" to seriously engage in the rough and tumble back-stage manipulations of every day Japanese politics. In the same vein, he has apparently too much integrity to meet the demands of those who would back him financially for a price.
 - c. His reported break with  (some sources say this was only for public consumption) has possibly done him no good politically in that he may well have lost the support of a faction within the Party that totals some sixty members.
 - d. While POCAPON is generally admired as a man, from what we have been able to learn to date, he is not respected from the standpoint of practical politics. This ties in closely with point b above.
 - e. The struggle going on within the Liberal-Democratic Party for positions of power will probably be won by those persons, such as ~~KONO~~, ~~*KISHI~~, et al, who are experts at political-infighting. They apparently see POCAPON as at least one of the main obstacles in their way toward success and thus are likely to do all they can to "get him." As stated above, this field of political intrigue is not a field where POCAPON is expert and he will probably be "gotten" by his adversaries.
 - f. There is always the possibility that POCAPON will be betrayed, will be sold out by such people as ~~MIKI~~ Bukichi while they are posing as his friends.
 - g. POCAPON's seeming inability to obtain a favorable press (the competitors of ASAHI and others seem to be against him) is another factor that bears watching or at least noting. His apparent inability to get and keep his name before the public through provocative statements or action is considered to be a liability.

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6. With reference to paragraph 4 above, it seems hardly likely at the time of writing that POCAPON will become the Prime Minister. Because of many of the things stated above, but largely, possibly, because he has no funds and little prospect of raising sufficient funds in time, it is likely that he will be defeated and may never really enter the running. Despite all this, however, we believe that it is important for Japan Base to maintain a working relationship with POCAPON and that it is important for KUBARK, despite the statements contained in reference, to build and foster this relationship so that no matter what the future holds this so far apparently friendly and important man will continue to maintain a friendly and helpful relationship with KUBARK, if that is what KUBARK desires.
7. Your comments are solicited. Contact reports with POCAPON since our last forwarding are forwarded by separate cover.

[]
Chief, Section F

Enclosures:

12 POCAPON Contact Reports (1 cy ea)
(14 Oct, 17 Oct, 21 Oct, 22 Oct,
1 Nov, 1 Nov, 4 Nov, 26 Nov, 3 Dec,
23 Dec, 23 Dec, 30 Dec)

11 January 1956

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