

VIA: AIR  
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EGFA-11552

~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE  
FROM : Chief of Base, Frankfurt

DATE: 29 July 1956

INFO: COS

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/CALL  
SPECIFIC— Identity One

REFERENCE: EGFA-11064

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B26  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

SUMMARY OF IDENTITY ONE'S ACTIVITIES SINCE LAST REPORT

1. Identity One returned to [ ] home 26 June and departed 3 July. He desired to catch up on his correspondence, visit contacts in the area, and possibly talk to a few local businessmen about employment. He hoped that [ ] or [ ] associates might be able to introduce him to prominent business people who possibly would be able to give him useful hints even though they might not be able to help him themselves. Since Identity One's last visit, he has visited friends and associates in North Germany, visited his son, who is attending his old school, and gave testimony at the hearing concerned with the continuing pension rights of the widow of Reinhard Heydrich (see reference, paragraph 13). No publicity resulted, though he may be recalled to testify further in this case.

2. As Identity One had suggested that [ ]'s colleagues might be more inclined to introduce him to useful contacts if they first got to know him socially, [ ] in the role of an interested and sympathetic friend, invited a group for the evening of 27 June to talk about Russia. Three ODACID officers came to [ ]'s home that evening. Identity One did most of the talking during a three-hour conversation, primarily about Soviet labor camps and the Soviet Union in world affairs generally, but also related some anecdotes about his wartime counterespionage activities in France. [ ]'s colleagues found the conversation extremely interesting, but, though they regarded Identity One with considerable respect, did not seem to warm to him personally. (As they explained the next day, they felt that he is probably an unreconstructed Nazi and that he did not seem to feel guilty enough about the inhumane things he must have done as a "Sicherheitspolizei" officer in France.) At any rate, the Acting Principal Officer explained to [ ] the next day that he could not possibly introduce Identity One to any of his German contacts, since he would appear to be acting in his official capacity, though he had previously offered to do exactly that. (This made it possible for [ ] who, Identity One had hoped, might be able to arrange an introduction or two himself, to plead the necessity of following the Acting Principal Officer's lead without seeming to be unsympathetic. [ ] is in fact entirely sympathetic but had not intended to involve himself personally in any case.) No security blunder of any kind took place during the evening and [ ] feels that, if anything, it strengthened his cover story.

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3. Identity One spent 28 June 1956 in the city apparently visiting the Polizei Praesidium where he found a number of old friends and acquaintances. In the course of the afternoon, Ralph E. Winger of Los Angeles, the person through whom Identity One originally re-established contact with [ ] had been in correspondence with Winger about the visa of a young German whom Winger is taking to the United States for a year's study at the Los Angeles College), appeared in [ ]'s office. Winger met Identity One and arranged to visit Identity One's family 15-20 July. The evening of 28 June was spent at the home of a local ODACID officer with two second-echelon members of the SPD in North Rhine Westfalia. (The invitation had been issued previously to [ ] and Identity One was later invited to attend as well.) Identity One was very quiet during the evening's discussion, which passed without incident. Identity One did have a great deal to say after arriving home, making it clear that he regards the SPD position, both foreign and domestic policy, as vague, opportunistic, unrealistic, and generally disreputable. His own position is strongly pro-Adenauer on foreign policy and roughly FVP in other respects.

4. On 29 June Identity One slept and wrote letters at home until noon and then left for Cologne to visit other contacts in the area. He returned late the evening of 2 July. It was at this point that he presented the request for advice and assistance in securing a covert job with FJLESSON as described below, paragraphs 9 through 12.

5. Identity One spent the day of 2 July in the city on unknown business of his own. The evening was spent in conversation and preparations for his departure the following morning. On 3 July he departed for Bochum, where he expected to visit a friend who spent several years with him in the labor camps in the Vorkuta area.

#### IDENTITY ONE'S PLANS FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE

6. Identity One's plans for the immediate future are as follows:

- a. 3 July Visit friend in Bochum.
- b. 4 July Go to Wuppertal to secure some sort of recommendation or testimonial statement from a former associate. Later proceed to Koenigs-winter a. Rhine.
- c. 4-7 July Attend "Spaetheimkehrer" meeting in Koenigswinter.
- d. 8-14 July (ca) Travel - Cologne, Coblenz, Wiesbaden, Frankfurt.
- e. 15-20 July (ca) Spend at his home.
- f. After 20 July Travel to Munich where he has an appointment on 26 July. Possibly with an UPSWING agent.
- g. 28 July Will be at home to celebrate his birthday.

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His further plans seem to be less well settled at this point, but he does intend generally to make full use of his quarter-fare railroad privilege until it expires on 15 August. After this he intends to spend several weeks at home resting, reading, and possibly writing.

OPPORTUNITIES OPEN TO IDENTITY ONE FOR MAKING A LIVING

7. At the beginning of this visit it was obvious that Identity One had re-shaped his ideas about his future somewhat in the course of talking to friends in the past two weeks. He is inclined toward industry, but is pessimistic because he feels he has returned five or six years too late to get in on the ground floor and ride up with the boom. He fears finding himself on a treadmill without much future. The Gestapo albatross, is, of course, also an impediment. He believes he is certain to be unacceptable to the labor members of any "Betriebsrat" which would be called to approve his employment. At this point in the visit he seemed less psychologically committed to returning to his old field than he appeared to be two weeks ago, though the realities of his situation still moved him in that direction. He will not be hasty, since he knows he cannot afford to waste time with a false move, and he can get along on his "Spaetheimkehrer's" bonus with some scrimping until the end of the year.

8. Identity One discussed the feasibility of writing a book or a few magazine articles, which no doubt would bring him a sizeable sum of money. Source material at his disposal offer two opportunities as follows:

a. Assassination of Heydrich. Identity One secretly and alone hid the official report on the assassination of Heydrich, consisting of two packages three inches thick, in a building in the Thueringerwald (Soviet Zone) in early 1945. This report includes the report proper, a supplement with technical annexes, and photographs. Identity One is confident it is still there unless the building has been torn down, but is reluctant to personally attempt to retrieve it because of the possible risk of arrest, or the possibility of making himself an object of suspicion in the eyes of UPSWING or CAVATA. He feels that an article authenticated by these documents, if written up in a journalistic style, might sell, even though the events are long since history. Identity One spoke of successes an acquaintance of his had had in selling a similar account to Der Spiegel. [ ] remarked he might be better advised to offer the article to a U.S. publication of the Time or Life type as this would no doubt be more profitable. [ ] offered to inquire from a friend on the TIME-LIFE staff, who is both informed and discreet, whether the material would in fact be of interest. [ ] had in mind a former KUBARK officer, who is now on the staff of LIFE, and could actually be consulted in this way if necessary. The maneuver would have the effect of tying one thin string to Identity One's memoirs which could be developed into a more extensive attachment if appropriate.

b. "Die Rote Kapelle" Operation. Identity One thinks he could successfully write a profitable book on "Die Rote Kapelle." A certain

author, W. E. Flicke, wrote a superficial book, blown up with fiction, on "Die Rote Kapelle" and one entitled "Funkmeldung Nach Moscow," which were published by a firm (name not divulged by Identity One) in Bern. While vacationing at Lake Constance, Identity One visited this publisher under a false name to talk to him about this matter. The publisher not only voiced great interest, but made a tentative offer to subsidize the writing and publication of a book on the subject of "Die Rote Kapelle" Operation. This has stimulated considerably Identity One's interest in ferreting out later developments in various aspects of the "Die Rote Kapelle" Operation complex by hunting up old associates who are familiar with them and are glad to sit down and talk over "old times" on this subject. Identity One is of the opinion that a book of the sort he has in mind would go a long way to underscore the Soviet threat to Germany by dramatizing the skill and care and effort and expense that went into creating an elaborate network years before it was activated. He also attaches importance to establishing the vital distinction between a legitimate resistance movement of the type which led to the 20 July 1944 attempt to assassinate Hitler, and cold-blooded high treason in the interest of an enemy country. Identity One thinks a number of communist conspirators of the Schulze-Boysen type were able to escape unscathed after Germany's defeat by holding themselves out as patriotic members of the anti-Nazi resistance and that many of them are sitting today in positions of influence and importance from the point of view of Soviet Intelligence. He believes his book would help to combat the complacency he detects among the German people generally on this subject. (NOTE: The only name Identity One mentioned in this connection was [ ] who he characterized as having had some very odd associations.) [ ] believes that Identity One intends to make another visit to the Swiss publisher of Flicke's book, on "Funkmeldung Nach Moscow."

9. When Identity One returned to [ ] late in the evening of 1 July, he launched at once into an account of an employment possibility which he had discovered and asked for advice and help in applying for it. He explained that he had heard from a friend in Cologne that the Federal Republic Ministry of Interior had in the previous few days secretly circulated, presumably to CAVATA offices, a request for suggested candidates for a position in the German element of the FJLESSON staff organization. The position is described as a "Referat" concerned with the evaluation of political information on the USSR in the light of NATO plans and policies. The minimum qualifications of candidates include a fluent speaking and reading knowledge of Russian plus an unspecified degree of the country's area knowledge, and a fair or serviceable knowledge of either English or French. (NOTE: During the discussion, it emerged that the friend in Cologne who told Identity One of this job possibility in strictest confidence is a CAVATA officer, an old and close friend, and the CAVATA officer who was originally sent to Identity One's home to contact him in February of this year. His name might be Identity 2, though Identity One used this name as that of a hypothetical person at the beginning of his explanation, only later making it clear that he was referring to his friend in Cologne.) Identity 2 is not in a position to help Identity One procure this position.

Identity One cannot himself, he says, simply walk in, describe his abilities, and ask for suitable employment without betraying that someone has given him secret information and perhaps exposing his informant. He is requesting another old friend of his to arrange an interview for him with CAUSA, at which he thinks he may be able to sell himself, but he is not overly optimistic about the possibility of actually getting the interview. He apparently felt that a better line of approach lay in working through [ ] to make contact with "the right man" at ODACID in Bonn, a man whom he described as one who would have connections to both FJLESSON and German organizations, including presumably the FedRep Ministry of the Interior. This man, he believed, if oriented by [ ], might be willing to suggest his name to the appropriate German authority as an ideal candidate for the job. "The right man" would very likely already have knowledge of the program concerned, but if not, he would be presumed to have heard of it through legitimate channels and could not in any case be questioned, thus covering Identity One's own source of information and the fact that he has been the unauthorized recipient of secret information.

10. Identity One seemed to be genuinely excited at the possibility of landing a job so nearly tailor-made to his abilities, tastes, and needs. He remarked that it would pay about DM 1800 a month and would not only give him a chance to rehabilitate his financial position, but that it would establish him in a position from which he could later move directly back into the "Staatsdienst" within his former grade, rather than having to start several grades lower. He also immediately proceeded to speak of the job as a cover CART type of employment in which he could start at once to work actively against communist services. He laid emphasis on a discreet approach as being the only way to start in the job and from the beginning assume a false name which would conceal his true identity and protect him from Soviet inquiry. He also mentioned such possibilities as being able to make a direct approach to Soviet intelligence officers personally known to him for operational approaches, if this should become desirable, or even to fellow labor camp inmates, now rehabilitated, who might again be resident in Moscow.

11. [ ] gave every evidence of hesitation at Identity One's request to help him in this way and raised a variety of tentative objections as follows:

a. Assuming he were able to find and convince "the right man," would the Germans welcome suggestions from a PBPRIME source? Would it not be better to work through German connections?

b. Why did Identity One seem to think of the job as a sort of actively operational business, rather than a research-and-evaluation desk job? Identity One stated that he felt, given the opportunity, he could turn it into the sort of thing which needed to be done, even under formally international auspices.

c. [ ] remarked also at a suitable point that "the right man," if he was "the right man" would probably also have connections to the PBPRIME circles professionally interested in talking to Identity One about his past activities. (NOTE: Identity One had stated earlier in the visit that he was not ready to talk to KUBARK types.)

Identity One had fairly ready answers to all such objections. As to the last, specifically, he said that he had no objection at all to talking to KUBARK-type officers as long as he was not in the position of a patsy to be exploited and dropped. He would be happy to converse with them for a couple of weeks or more and to cover the ground for them thoroughly, if they in turn were to help him toward getting the job he had in mind. (NOTE: It is clear that Identity One would never agree to a debriefing for a week at twenty-five Deutsche Marks per day. Furthermore he remarked that the intelligence services know just about all there is to know about "Die Rote Kapelle" Operation from debriefing his associates. He apparently does realize, however, that his special knowledge of how the facts hang together and the story behind the facts cannot be duplicated by any other single person, especially in view of the insight he gained into the Soviet side of the picture during his years of interrogation -- and believes that he could use this knowledge for bargaining purposes.)

12. Without entering here into any detailed analysis of this proposal of Identity One, it may be said that [ ] does not believe there is any substantial likelihood that it represents an effort to stampede him into disclosing a KUBARK connection. (If so, it was properly fielded and failed.) There is perhaps a somewhat less remote possibility that it was intended as some sort of gambit to draw [ ] into compromising himself over a somewhat longer period, though this does not seem very likely, even if investigation should show that no such job or program actually exists in Identity Four. [ ] does not know enough of what may be involved to be willing to commit himself, but he is inclined to believe that Identity One is playing it straight in trying to turn even a fragile reed to account in a major effort to get himself back into the intelligence business in a tactically favorable position. This is not to say that his account of the FJLESSON job is actually precisely as stated, or even that he is particularly interested in it as such. It is even possible that he hopes to gain no more than contact with PBPRIME KUBARK types at a higher and more authoritative level than is likely to come out of responding to a letter of invitation. (He has described the experiences of friends of his who have done so.)

KUBARK OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE CONTACT WITH IDENTITY ONE THROUGH [ ]

13. The net result of the above initiative by Identity One is to give KUBARK an opportunity to make contact with him through [ ] - quickly and securely and without damage to [ ] cover. If it is thought preferable for any reason to refrain from doing so, it will only be necessary for [ ] to give Identity One an account of his notional efforts to find or interest "the right man." Two points should be considered before making the decision:

a. Identity One is in [ ] judgment not likely to respond to the standard CAVERVE approach until he has exhausted all other ways to exploit the potential value of his special knowledge to compensate himself in part for the eleven years he lost in the course of acquiring it, and unless he is sure that he has nothing to lose in the way of possibly prejudicing his chances of employment by a German service.

b. [ ] account of his failure to arouse any interest in Identity One on the part of PBPRIME officials close to FJLESSON and the FedRep Ministry of Interior will not be very plausible in view of the known general interest in talking to Identity One unless it is worked out in some way that does not at once occur to [ ] himself.

14. In conclusion it should be pointed out that Identity One, if his primary interest lies in meeting PBPRIME KUBARK type officials at a higher level and not primarily in finding help to get a German job, may possibly have in mind the notion of exploring whether a private KUBARK type arrangement, in which he supplies know-how, connections, and experience and that PBPRIME furnishes secure financial support and international facilities, could not be worked out. This could be true if [ ] impression that he has since their first meeting reassessed his chances of re-entering the German service, or his prospects after doing so, and now finds this somewhat less attractive or promising than he seemed to during their first meeting. If it is true, it would be natural for Identity One to adopt the most secure means available to him to make the first contact.

#### GERMAN INDUSTRY AS SPONSOR OF A CART SERVICE

15. Another line of thought voiced by Identity One is the possibility that German industry might be induced to support a sort of private CART service directed against communist infiltration. He recognizes this as a sort of day dream, but he does seem to feel that it would be a thoroughly practicable undertaking...that a dozen picked men operating in complete anonymity and without any executive powers could go a very long way toward uncovering communist penetrations into not only industry but public life (this would be in industry's long term interest) on a budget of \$5,000. a month and without being hampered by the political inhibitions which afflict the formal services, which he incidentally describes as being without any doubt thoroughly penetrated by the communist services. [ ], though watching for exactly this sort of thing, could not detect any indication that this portion of the conversation was in any way intended as a veiled proposal made to or through him.

#### STATE OF [ ]

16. [ ] does not believe that the recent extended period of fairly intimate association with Identity One has damaged [ ]. On the contrary, it has probably done something to strengthen and confirm it, since Identity One was able to observe [ ] daily routine, meet several of his associates, and had no reason to conclude that [ ] was anything other than he seemed. The most delicate aspect of the relationship has been [ ] reaction to Identity One's account of his past intelligence activities and present intelligence interests. [ ] has handled this generally by appearing to assume that the past, though fascinating in itself, is largely of historical interest and that his possible future activity in the same field is principally a German affair. [ ] has appeared also to sympathize with his unenthusiastic attitude toward talking with the various foreign services who have made some effort to make contact with him if interviews with him are to follow the normal pattern of giving all he knows

without receiving any substantial return and so losing whatever bargaining power his information might represent ... by no means necessarily in a pecuniary sense. Finally [ ] believes that the fact that he has continued to occupy the position of a sympathetic but disinterested friend, has not for instance come up with any sort of proposal of an intelligence nature, even though Identity One allowed plenty of time for such action to be taken if [ ] had connections with PBPRIME intelligence, has done a great deal to confirm Identity One's impression that [ ] essentially naive with respect to such matters -- naive enough even to respect his confidences.

#### ASSESSMENT OF IDENTITY ONE AS A SOVIET OR GERMAN AGENT

17. Again without detailed analysis, it should be mentioned that the discussions with Identity One during their second meeting have left [ ] more convinced than previously that the man is at this time a free agent, not under either Soviet or German control. This impression approaches moral certainty when [ ] is with Identity One and subject to the impact of his personality. After a few days absence, [ ] begins again to wonder about some of the bizarre aspects of Identity One's story, and professional skepticism revives, along with the reluctance to commit himself to a judgment which might turn out to be wrong. For what it is worth, however, after fifty or sixty hours of conversation with the man -- without being able to interrogate him -- [ ] offers his still tentative but strong conviction that Identity One has been essentially honest with him. There has been no discussion of course of the possibility that Identity One was doubled by Identity 3 or Identity 4, but [ ] can easily imagine that Identity 3 did escape as Identity One tells it, and the fact, if it is a fact, that he allowed Identity 4 to escape at the end of the war is no evidence that he had been doubled. He had at that point already decided to seek Soviet custody (see paragraphs 18 and 19 below) -- he has since said that he felt certain they would not shoot him and that he thought the worst would be three to five years in prison -- and it could not have been in any way in his interest to shoot Identity 4 or turn him over to Allied authorities who would simply have repatriated him after a while in any case. As for his account of his years in the USSR, if he did spend six years of it in a labor camp, he can hardly have been working for the Soviet service. This is a fact which can be checked with other prisoners, and if it is true, it is not likely that he would accept Soviet control, except as a temporary expedient for repatriation, at the end of his imprisonment.

#### IDENTITY ONE'S TRANSFER FROM THE FRENCH TO THE RUSSIANS AS A PRISONER OF WAR

18. At this second meeting Identity One stated that it was his express desire to be turned over to the Soviets by the French, but did not elaborate on how this transfer was accomplished. He states the French were not aware of his identity, and the Russians did not know until he, himself, told them. He was motivated to do this because he believed that he had a unique opportunity to render a last service to Germany by placing before the Russians incontrovertible evidence of Western duplicity in dealing with the USSR during the war and convincing them that the West was not only basically inimical but actively concerned to limit Soviet

advantage to be gained to help drive a wedge between the four united powers confronting Germany and so bring into existence an area of maneuver in which post-war Germany could benefit by playing off one side against the other. He allegedly had material with him to support this. He mentions a PBPRIME official sent as a special envoy to determine whether the French resistance movement was so completely dominated by communist elements that establishment of a post-invasion French government under communist control would be likely, and to explain that in that event, the Western Allies would have to re-consider their long-term strategy, since Communist control of post-war France was as much to be avoided as continuing German control. Identity One further states that he overheard that these documents, including the one covering the incident described, were brought to the personal attention of Molotov. Identity One had not bargained with eleven years in Soviet prisons. He expected to be shot soon or released after two or three years. He is not prepared to admit any fallacy in his judgment, and believes he may well have contributed to the estrangement which actually did come about.

[ ] should add that Identity One's telling of the above is much more convincing than the bald statement of it here. Although he disapproves in principal of accepting any such story without a great deal more searching examination, it is perhaps possible, given the conditions in Germany at the end of the war, and Identity One's probable disorientation as his world fell apart, that it is somewhere near the essential truth.

#### MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION AND COMMENTS

19. Identity One was interviewed twice immediately after his arrival in Moscow in 1945 by Identity 5, to whom he described the over-all operation of "Die Rote Kapelle" Operation. He believes on the basis of Identity 5's reactions during this interview that the Soviets had not begun to realize the extent to which "Die Rote Kapelle" Operation had contained and controlled their entire apparatus in France and elsewhere in Western Europe until after the end of the war.

20. Identity One intends to maintain his present residence (see reference) until he has definitely found employment.

21. Data on four pieces of mail which [ ] mailed for Identity One on 27 June is forwarded as Attachment B.

22. During Identity One's temporary absence on 1 July, [ ] searched the personal effects which he had left behind. He seemed, however, to have taken with him his notebook, address book, letter file, and other documents which he carries in his brief case.

23. As a device to avoid entangling himself with Identity One more deeply than necessary, [ ] suggested that it would be better for Identity One himself to speak to the TIME-LIFE correspondent in Bonn about the possibility of marketing any articles he might write rather than asking [ ] to consult his friend in New York. Identity One responded to this suggestion without much

enthusiasm and made it clear that he hoped [ ] might have occasion to meet the correspondent and broach the matter to him. Since there is nothing pressing about this [ ] allowed it to remain vague but feels that the most plausible course of action for him to take would involve at least a gesture in the direction of getting a tentative estimate of the saleability of the sort of thing Identity One might write.

24. Upon Identity One's departure [ ] gave him gifts of clothing for his family, and coffee for his wife, and whisky and tobacco for himself. [ ] also offered to help him out with a cash loan, but Identity One declined with thanks saying that he preferred to avoid creating any further debts.

25. Identity One had previously asked [ ] to cast about for ways of ascertaining the present addresses of Claude Spaak and Antonia Lyon-Smith (referred to in the reference dispatch covering the first meeting with Identity One). [ ] told him during the present meeting that he had no inspired suggestions and thought that the best way to make contact would be to direct letters to likely addresses or to the appropriate government offices. Identity One obviously prefers to determine the correct present addresses before writing to either of these ladies.

26. In the course of his series of conversations with Identity One [ ] has obviously gathered a great many miscellaneous items of information relating to his past activity which he cannot easily recall and set down in written form. It is suggested, however, that he might be given the opportunity of contributing whatever data and clarification he can to specific questions which may arise in the course of any future dealings with Identity One.

APPROVED:

[ ]

ATTACHMENTS

A-B Separate Cover

Distribution:

3 - EE (DIRECT), w-att u/s/c  
2 - COS w-att

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ATTACHMENT A TO EGFA-11532

IDENTITY LIST

Identity One - ~~Heinz~~ Pannwitz, Chief of Sonderkommando "Rote Kapelle"

2 - "Weber"

3 - Trepper

4 - Kent

5 - Abakumov

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ATTACHMENT B TO EGFA-11532

MAILED 27 JUNE 1956

Letter to Archiv fuer Wehrmachtsfragen, Corneli-Muenster, bei Aachen

Letter to ~~(Herrn) Roland~~ <sup>X ADD. W. GER.</sup> NOSSEK, Frankfurt/Main, Wiesenau 19

~~(Herrn Krim, Dir. a. D.)~~ <sup>X ADD. - W. GER.</sup> NAUCK, Goslar, von Gartzenstr 13

Card to inquire whereabouts of brother, who was Personalchef of HP in Berlin

Europa Verlag, Bad Reichenahll, Mozartstr 1

Card to inquire address of Mitarbeiter ~~(Dr.)~~ <sup>X</sup> Waldemar Lentz, who in Dec 55 wrote the article "Schlaeft Europa in Strassburg" (?)

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