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B. UPSWING's Attitude Toward CARETINA.

3. In July 1956 GRUESER stated more or less flatly that CARETINA was controlled by the Soviet intelligence service and had a mission in West Germany (see KONN 1369, 19 July 1956, and ECLA 20026, 20 July 1956). GRUESER stated in August 1956 that he was convinced that CARETINA had an "SIS" mission (see PULL 5173, 14 August 1956). Thus, based on opinions expressed by UPSWING officers, CARETINA was regarded by UPSWING as a Soviet agent. UPSWING also made vague references to the old world war II mystery of whether or not Gruppenfuehrer und General Major der Polizei MUELLER, head of Amt IV of the NSMA, was a Soviet agent. As is known, CARETINA worked directly under MUELLER as head of the St. Detachment Rote Kapelle. At that time we had to assume that UPSWING would take some action to substantiate or disprove their own suspicions.

C. UPSWING's Actions.

4. [redacted] debriefed CARETINA for NUBACH on 31 July, 1 and 3 August 1956. CARETINA notified [redacted] that he was ill during 4 and 5 August and then on 6 August, he informed [redacted] that he had been employed by a "German Service" with a salary of 1500 DM per month. According to CARETINA his "German Service" had instructed him that he could talk to the Americans about his experience in the USSR but could touch on no other period of his career. GRUESER was queried on 13 August 1956 and stated that he personally had interviewed and employed CARETINA for UPSWING (see FRAN 1422, 8 August 1956, and PULL 5173, 14 August 1956). Whether CARETINA informed GRUESER that he was being debriefed by the AIS during the period 31 July through 3 August or whether UPSWING discovered this through another channel, we do not know. We would hazard a guess that CARETINA phoned GRUESER and told him in order to force UPSWING to employ him, probably hoping at the same time that this would give him bargaining power with the AIS for a more permanent and lucrative arrangement. In the same conversation during which GRUESER stated that UPSWING had employed CARETINA, he added that UPSWING firmly believed CARETINA to have a mission for Soviet intelligence in the Federal Republic.

5. During the same interview of 13 August 1956, GRUESER told [redacted] that CARETINA had attempted to get some type of "certificate" from SAVATA and had failed. [redacted] deduced that GRUESER had provided the "certificate". [redacted] reported in Memorandum for the Record; Subject: Conversation with GRUESER, 13 August 1956, "while GRUESER did not say what the certificate was about, the context was such that it might well be something needed in connection with (CARETINA's) denazification, legalization or right to a pension". In October 1956 [redacted] reported a conversation with Mr. BENJAMIN of CIC during which BENJAMIN stated that it was a rather disturbing fact that UPSWING had provided the necessary certificate for CARETINA in view of the general suspicions.

6. On the basis of the "certificate" provided by UPSWING, CARETINA is now fully reinstated in the Federal Republic. He told [redacted] in February 1958 (see SCFA 20300, 6 February 1958) that "he, CARETINA, has now, as he puts it, achieved 95% of what he has been fighting for for the past two years to gain official recognition of his permanent civil service tenure and the rights associated with it". Again in April 1958 [redacted] reported (SCFA 21301, 16 April 1958), CARETINA now has a pension of ca. 750 DM per month; he has a Civil Service status of "Kriminalrat zur Wiederverwendung" and is in theory awaiting an assignment to a suitable vacancy receiving the equivalent of his pension. His wartime promotion to the rank of Kriminalrat is recognized. His service subsequent to his transfer to the GASTARU (Amt IV of the NSMA) including his eleven years in Soviet prisons and concentration camps counts toward his retirement. Reviewing what we know of the events (as listed above), it seems fairly definite that UPSWING is responsible for CARETINA having legalized himself in West Germany with the status of a civil servant, while

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holding the suspicion that CARETINA was a Soviet agent. One other remark by @RISCHKE which points to @UPSWING's support is that CARETINA is technically a deserter, having voluntarily joined the Red Army with his hostile agent @KENT. @RISCHKE was more emphatic about the fact that @UPSWING did not bring up the deserter charge in talking with CARETINA (see File 5173, 11 August 1956).

D. Conclusion.

7. Reviewing the above, the apparent contradictions are obvious. We have attempted to understand @UPSWING's handling and attitude toward CARETINA in order to prepare ourselves for our own approach to CARETINA. Following are some of our theories:

a. If @UPSWING believed CARETINA to have been sent back to the Federal Republic on a Soviet intelligence mission, why did the organization assist him in regaining full rights as a German civil servant thus sacrificing any control or pressure the organization could have exerted in blocking his legalization? It is probable that @UPSWING felt that in dealing with a former German official of CARETINA's rank more was to be gained by being friendly and cooperative than by a hostile attitude. This attitude would appear to have failed if @OTTO's remarks in January 1957 are true, i.e., CARETINA is a "hard nut to crack", and based on the fact that @UPSWING is now willing that @KUBARK talk to CARETINA, with no caveats placed on the discussions.

b. If @UPSWING received the material photographed by [ ] from CARETINA's briefcase, what action has been taken on the basis of some of the leads and information? If no action has been taken, why not? @UPSWING has never notified @KUBARK that any information was received from CARETINA. Consequently we cannot ask direct questions and are completely in the dark as to what investigations or operational action has been taken. There is a possibility that information developed through CARETINA's leads was embarrassing to @UPSWING, but if this is true why is @UPSWING willing for us to have direct, unlimited access to CARETINA? Or has @UPSWING placed restrictions on CARETINA when talking to the Americans of which we are unaware? These questions can only be answered by a) talking to CARETINA b) probing further with @UPSWING.

c. In view of @UPSWING's alleged interest in the UJDRIZZLY complex, styled by @UPSWING as an outgrowth of "Rote Kapelle" survivors, was CARETINA interrogated on members of the UJDRIZZLY complex? @UPSWING has given @KUBARK no evidence that such an interrogation occurred or that CARETINA provided any background information on members of the UJDRIZZLY group. Answers to this question will also have to await direct contact with CARETINA and further probing with @UPSWING.

8. One factor which has to be considered in reviewing the @UPSWING/CARETINA relationship is CARETINA himself. As far as we can deduce from @UPSWING's few comments and [ ] reporting, CARETINA is not a passive personality. He took full advantage of the German respect for rank in making his approach to @UPSWING by doing it through a former subordinate, @REGER. @RISCHKE, although not an RSHA member during World War II, did come under the command of the Sonderkommando Rote Kapelle during his service with the Abwehr in Brussels. CARETINA probably took advantage of this former relationship. @OTTO who had no World War II connection with CARETINA and who dealt with him "anonymously" appears to have had little success in interrogating or breaking CARETINA. From this we deduce that CARETINA probably set the tone of his relationship with @UPSWING and when he discovered that he was not going to be employed as a ranking staff member, he refused to cooperate in any way.

9. In conclusion we can only repeat our question of why did @UPSWING permit CARETINA to become uncontrollable? Was or is @UPSWING afraid of antagonizing him? of forcing him to report fully and completely? As to the reason @UPSWING has not passed any CARETINA reports (if received) to

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KURARK, one possible answer is that UPSWING has not been prodded very persistently to pass the reports promised in August of 1956. Another answer, as mentioned above, is that some of CARETINA's information may be embarrassing to UPSWING.

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