

DISPATCH

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DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.

EGMA-44213

TO Chief, EE Chief, SR
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MICROFILMED
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HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

200-6-1
Field File 1181

FROM Chief, Munich Base

DOC. MICRO. SER.

DATE

17 August 1959

SUBJECT LCIMPROVE/EQUAL/CARETINA/OPERATIONS
CARETINA's History of the Sonderkommando Rote Kapelle.

RE: "43-3"- (CHECK "X" ONE)

XXX MARKED FOR INDEXING Att.B.

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ACTION REQUIRED
See Para. 6

INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED
BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

- A. EGMA-42334, 28 May 1959 (not sent BOB) *cy. CARETINA*
- B. EGMA-43172, 14 July 1959 *JE holding*

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2003 2005

1. Forwarded herewith as Attachment A is CARETINA's history of the Sonderkommando Rote Kapelle and its work against the Soviet espionage and underground nets in France and the Low Countries. The report should, chronologically, have preceded Reference B., the account of CARETINA's imprisonment in the Soviet Union following World War II. As explained in Reference B., we processed the report on his imprisonment first in order to gain more insight into CARETINA's attitude toward and experience in the Soviet Union. The attached report has not been received by UPSWING, according to CARETINA, and he is most insistent that it should never be passed to UPSWING. We must assume that all the information in the attached report was obtained by his Soviet State Security, KGB, interrogators during his ten and a half years imprisonment in the USSR. We have not, as yet, gone over every point with him to ascertain exactly what he told his KGB interrogators but the Soviet State Security Service had ten and a half years of continuous interrogation to obtain the information.

2. Three of CARETINA's personal and emotional traits should be noted in reading the attached. All three are understandable in terms of his background but do color his interpretation of events although he attempts as objective a presentation of events as possible:

a. CARETINA was an official of Amt IV, sub-section 2 A, of the RSHA, which in effect means he was a Gestapo officer. His efforts to portray Amt IV, the Gestapo, in a more favorable light are obvious. At the same time he lectures against the use of "executive" measures, i.e. police measures, as being less effective than counterespionage operations. He obviously does not wish to recognize the fact that the RSHA was primarily a police security force, dependent on police power to carry out its security responsibility, and this same police power enabled him to run the large and complicated counterespionage operations known as the Rote Kapelle.

b. CARETINA, as many of the former German Army officers and security police officials, is very emotional over the post-war effort to describe the Soviet agents working in the Rote Kapelle complex as "anti-Nazi resistance fighters". CARETINA is obsessed with making the record clear that these people were traitors, spying against their native land on behalf of an enemy power. We have not pointed out to him that most Western intelligence services know the Rote Kapelle complex to have been a complex of Soviet espionage nets and have no illusion about the "resistance" claims of the members. This would have involved revealing too much of our own knowledge of the Rote Kapelle complex.

c. CARETINA considers himself, even today, as a professional counter-espionage officer and counter-espionage operations are his dominating passion. His conclusions to the report include his apologia for running complicated double-agent and radio play-back operations as opposed to arresting and imprisoning spies. Here again he reveals that he was aware of the Gestapo methods in spite of his efforts to whitewash the German security police. He has not admitted yet that he was able to mount an operation the size of the German control and playback of the Soviet principle agents because he had the complete support of the German military and security police organs in France and the Low Lands. He still thinks in terms of an

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intelligence service that has absolute power and, so far, refuses to take into consideration the fact that the only services with that power today are the Soviet services and some of the satellite services in their individual countries. He has also refused to recognize the other fact contributing to his large and successful CE operations which is: the wartime conditions and the German DF'ing created an ideal situation for mounting the extensive playback and penetration operations which the Sonderkommando Rote Kapelle directed.

3. Anyone who has read the British Rote Kapelle Study Part II will be immediately struck by CARETINA's assumption that his Sonderkommando had almost complete control of all Soviet and Communist espionage/underground nets in France and the Low Lands. The British advance a fairly positive theory that the two Soviet principle agents, TREPPER and KENT, played back against the GRU Headquarters in Moscow by the Germans, were able to notify Moscow through French CP communication channels, unknown to the Germans, of the German control of the Soviet espionage networks. CARETINA has not been interrogated directly on such a possibility but his report makes it fairly clear that he believes that his Sonderkommando, through the German DF'ing and monitoring facilities, had at least located most, if not all, of the secret transmitters and through his penetration of the French CP, the transmitters were controlled. He does state in the report that his greatest concern was the possibility of a French CP clandestine transmitter establishing contact with Moscow before the Germans could make certain of controlling it. If CARETINA's information on the depth of the German penetration of the French communist nets and resistance groups is accurate, the British theory is weakened. CARETINA's description of how the Germans attempted to neutralize and seal off TREPPER after his escape also bears on this question. CARETINA believes that they were successful in their effort to plant in Moscow's mind the suspicion that TREPPER was being used by the Germans as provocation after his arrest because of the message the Moscow Headquarters sent the French CP to have nothing to do with TREPPER and warning against German provocation. CARETINA is firmly convinced that KENT was not practicing a triple-play when he was under German control. The British may have more information than given in the Study Part II to substantiate their theory because the whole matter of the German penetration and control of the French CP nets and French resistance is touched on very briefly in the study. The British may not have wished to reveal how deeply the Germans had penetrated the resistance because of the reflection on their own operations in the field.

4. CARETINA believes that counterespionage operations should be of a positive, aggressive nature and yield positive results. As he states, he wished to achieve more than the negative results of simply monitoring the activities of the Soviet nets and feeding the answers to the Director permitted by the German military command. His ultimate goal was to split the USSR from her Western Allies because he was convinced that any hope for Germany to survive as a nation lay in a quarrel between the two dominating elements of the Alliance, the East and the West. He used his radio play-backs to achieve this goal by feeding the USSR both factual and colored reports on the activities of the Western Allies. His goal and his efforts to achieve it, all led to the trip to Moscow with KENT.

5. Information which does not appear in our files on the Rote Kapelle and which CARETINA includes in his report is following:

a. The company, "Helvetia Handelsgesellschaft", founded by the Sonderkommando Rote Kapelle to explain KENT's financial support to his GRU masters after the "Foreign Execellente Raincoat", SIMEXCO and SIMEX had been dissolved by the Germans was not found in the British Study. The British Study confirms CARETINA's trip to Spain (see Station Comment to para. 74 of Attachment A) but assumes that it was connected with an investigation of one of TREPPER's agents. CARETINA explains that it was in connection with the German-backed company.

b. CARETINA recalls vaguely that TREPPER's mistress, Georgina de WINTER's first (or only) husband was an American. Inasmuch as the

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final pages of the Personality Index to the British Rote Kapelle Study Part II of the copy in Munich Base are missing, we cannot check the information given under de WINTER's name. Munich Base copy of the Personality Index ends with page W.6., last name on page being "WIEGNER, Helmuth". We do not recall having read before that de WINTER had had an American husband.

c. KENT's remark to CARETINA that the GRU had documented him (and Michel MAKAROV) with Uruguayan passports because the GRU, or the Soviet IS, had access to authentic Uruguayan passports and this was the easiest way to document an agent, seems to have some current significance. Uruguay was still a fairly active, Soviet intelligence operational area as of 1956/57, if [] remembers correctly.

d. "ANDRE", the operator of the last French clandestine radio transmitter located by the German DF'ing equipment, could not be definitely identified in the British Study, (see Station Comment to para. 75 of Attachment A).

e. CARETINA states that 90% of the intelligence fed to the Director, GRU Headquarters in Moscow, was factual, whether only for a few days or weeks, but at the time of transmission it was true information. This might have accounted for the fact that the Director maintained radio contact with the Soviet nets in France even if suspicion of German control had arisen.

f. CARETINA's comment on the Belgian families of SPAAK and JASPAR to the effect that some members of the family were very active in their pro-Western sympathies and assistance and another member of the same family would be pro-Communist or pro-Soviet, was something new to us. CARETINA believes that such leading families as the SPAAK's and JASPAR's were re-insuring themselves through this division of sympathies within the family. He states that this was typical of numerous, prominent, Belgian families.

g. CARETINA offers some explanation of one of the more puzzling aspects of the UPSWING UJDRIZZLY/Rote Kapelle investigation as known to us from UJDRIZZLY discussions with UPSWING. UPSWING included in their UJDRIZZLY target groups those men who were connected with and survived the plot to kill HITLER on the 20th of July 1944. In para. 21 of Attach. A, CARETINA recalls a conversation with Kriminaldirektor Horst KOPKOW during the latter days of WW II when KOPKOW remarked that the 20th of July plot was an indication that the Rote Kapelle investigation had not been carried far or deep enough in Germany. UPSWING has included the group of survivors of the 20th of July plot in their UJDRIZZLY targets without ever clarifying the evidence which made such persons targets. Information may have been uncovered by the RSHA which did show Soviet and Communist connection to the Plot and which UPSWING possesses but it seems more likely that this is a result of the German military and official prejudice that a loyal German officer would not attempt to kill the German Commander-in-Chief, even though that Chief were HITLER. In any case UPSWING is not sharing information with KUBARK on such matters as reported in EGMA-43174 of 22 July 1959 concerning Georg Peter DOHM and Wilhelm KUEPPERS.

h. The extent of the German penetration and control of the French communist nets and French resistance nets was new information as stated in paragraph 3 above.

6. For Headquarters comments and action:

a. CARETINA was placed on LWOP in July 1959 to enable Munich Base to catch up on the processing and forwarding of his production to Headquarters. We are forwarding a dispatch, as soon as possible, covering the problems we face in continuing our contact with CARETINA. In preparation for

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Headquarters advice, approval or disapproval which we shall be requesting, it is urged that the attached report be carefully read to enable Headquarters to advise us whether there is any purpose and value in continuing the CARETINA contact. There are numerous points in the attached report which need amplification and clarification but contact with CARETINA will not be resumed until some guidance from Headquarters has been received.

b. [] recalls that during the summer of 1956 when [] was in Europe for the purpose of debriefing CARETINA, a BOEMELBURG (with various spellings of the name), appeared at the American Embassy in Paris and was allowed to disappear without being questioned. When [] returned to Headquarters, a trace on BOEMELBURG revealed that the French had been seeking a BOEMELBURG since 1945. Munich Base files contain a reference to a document, D-3956, which was a "United States Army request for any information on Karl BOEMELBURG because the French and Belgian authorities want him". The request is dated 1948. It seems logical that the French and Belgian interest was in Obersturmfuehrer u. Kriminaldirektor Karl BOEMELBURG, Chief of the Bds (German Security Police High Command) Amt VI in France during WW II. The latter concentrated on penetrations of the French Communist Party and, according to CARETINA, was successful in this. The Soviets were also very interested in the Amt VI BOEMELBURG as CARETINA reported in reference B. We would, therefore, appreciate learning from Headquarters what information was received from Paris concerning the BOEMELBURG who appeared at the American Embassy ca. August 1956 and what information was obtained concerning the French interest in BOEMELBURG. CARETINA is under the impression that Kriminaldirektor Karl BOEMELBURG died in Germany in 1947. The latter's son lives in Munich and is an acquaintance of CARETINA. If it is of any interest to trace the senior BOEMELBURG's movements after WW II or to ascertain whether he is living, CARETINA can contact the son.

c. Almost all of the names appearing in CARETINA's report are listed in the British Study Part II and attached Personality Index with some variation in spellings which we have noted. As mentioned above, the last pages of our copy of the British Personality Index are missing and we do not have the background data on Georgina de WINTER. We would appreciate all available information on de WINTER and any identification of the French CP clandestine radio operator "ANDRE", mentioned in paras. 75 and 76 of Attachment A.

d. Finally, the British Rote Kapelle Studies, Parts I and II, and the Personality Index are still classified TOP SECRET. If we are to do any detailed interrogation of CARETINA on the Rote Kapelle, information from the British Studies will have to be used. Headquarters' comments are requested.

7. The attached report was translated as literally as possible to retain the character of CARETINA's own report. It should be remembered that CARETINA wrote the attached without the benefit of files, entirely from memory, which accounts for the rather disorganized form of the report. We have attempted to clarify with Station Comments and parenthetical comments where it seemed absolutely necessary but have also left the report in its original form as much as possible. Attachment B is an index of the names appearing in the body of the report and was prepared to facilitate indexing.

APPROVED: []

Attachmer. A & B herewith

Distribution:

- 3 - EE w/atts A & B
- 2 - SR w/atts A & B
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- 2 - BOB w/atts A & B
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ATTACHMENT A TO EGMA-44213

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HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE ROTE KAPELLE

1. The name "Rote Kapelle" (Red Orchestra) was selected by the Security Police (German RSHA) during WW II to designate a specific sector of Soviet espionage. The transmittal of espionage material during the war was done primarily by radio, i.e. on the air. The concert on the air had its conductor in Moscow in the "Director". Therefore, the name "Rote Kapelle" came into being. The name was extraordinarily appropriate for the functions it covered and, thus, was much more extensively used to indicate, quite simply, Soviet espionage after the war. It is unmitigated nonsense to attribute other motives to the selection of this name as did the journalist Margret BOVERI in her book, "Verrat im 20. Jahrhundert" (Treason in the 20th Century). She wrote on page 56, "The name 'Rote Kapelle' was a derogatory, collective term adopted by the Gestapo. The term 'Rote Kapelle' was used so that all the people involved in the trials of 1942/43 could be thrown into one pot and sentenced in toto." It appears almost as though the reader is advised to regard the poor members of the Rote Kapelle as pitiful victims of the Gestapo. The political police under a dictator always possessed enough power to avoid using such cheap tricks.

2. I am forced to mention this point because post-war publications have publicized individuals who were direct collaborators with the Soviet intelligence service and treated the traitorous nature of their espionage activities very casually, if touching on that aspect at all. Guenther WEISENBORN, a leading member of the Nordwestdeutschen Rundfunk (Northwest German Broadcasting System) who moves around West Germany as a cultural representative, wrote that the work of the Rote Kapelle was resistance work against the Nazi regime. To equate high treason with illegal resistance is asking too much of the current younger generation who again must carry arms. A bad education in the free expression of private opinion is underway if the government ignores such Babylonian confusion in the understanding of high treason and does not firmly oppose this type of publication. Until now little has been done about this in the Federal Republic. The young citizen now bearing arms is again asked to take an oath. The judge before whom he would come must look only at the facts and the young citizen cannot justify himself by stating that he was confused by various publications which he read. More important is the fact that the damage already done may have a fatal effect on the nation and its allies. The warm reception given Guenther WEISENBORN during his post-war trip to Moscow is evidence that Moscow is pleased with publications of this type.

The Roll-Up of the Rote Kapelle During the War

3. Admiral CANARIS' Abwehr (German military intelligence in WW II) was initially responsible for this area of operations. Amt IV E of the RSHA possessed the executive power to bring such cases before the courts. The Abwehr also controlled the Direction Finding companies (DF'ing) which only

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during the war were developed into technically good, and smooth operating units. As far as I can recall the first enemy radio transmitter was "fixed" by a motorized DF'ing unit in 1940 at the very beginning of the French campaign. Previously DF'ing had been performed with some degree of success but there were always difficulties. The Abwehr had the upper hand because the most important agent groups always used radio communication during the war. CANARIS himself asked the Security Police to play a bigger role in this work. Within the RSHA, Amt IV A 2 was selected as the central office instead of Amt IV E. This was done because IV A 2 was responsible for sabotage, acts of terror and assassinations which were practical results of agent activity. I do not know whether there were any personal reasons, such as resentment against the chief of IV E, involved. The DF'ing companies had detected many transmitters, mostly in the German sovereign area and therefore undoubtedly belonging to the enemy. We knew the radio peculiarities and style of the English radio transmitters and thus deduced that the new radio transmitters must be working for Moscow. The unknown radio links were monitored and the messages recorded without, in the beginning, being able to decode them.

4. The first penetration of the Rote Kapelle complex occurred in Brussels. Quite by chance the German military police walked into the Rote Kapelle complex in the course of investigation of a black market group but the true nature of the Rote Kapelle elements were not recognized. TREPPER, the "Grand Chef", who accidentally entered the apartment, immediately grasped the situation and was able to escape arrest by a very clever performance. A short time after that the DF'ing companies successfully fixed one of the Rote Kapelle transmitters and through this captured the "Professor", WENZEL.

Station Comment: The British R. K. Study states on page 36 that MAKAROV, SUKOLOV @KENT's radio operator, and DANILOV, assistant to MAKAROV, were both arrested in December 1941. On page 42, the British Study states that WENZEL Johannes or Hans WENZEL, @HERMANN, PROFESSOR, CHARLES and possibly HEGENBARTH, was arrested on June 30th of 1942 while transmitting for JEVREMOV. The British Study says that TREPPER visited the house where the Germans had seized the transmitter and was taken by the Germans. "But his acting and his cover were good enough to secure his release and he was able to warn SUKOLOV before further damage was done." CARETINA's account of TREPPER having been picked up during the black market raid appears more plausible because had the Germans seized TREPPER when they raided MAKAROV's and DANILOV's radio transmission, it is unlikely that they would have released him without further investigation.

With WENZEL's arrest and the capture of the radio transmitter and operators, voluminous material and many persons fell into the hands of the Security Police and now, possessing the code book, the radio messages, previously recorded but not decoded, could be read.

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5. Among the messages were messages from the Director to KENT, ordering the latter to use his German connection with the Organisation Todt and the Wehrmacht to arrange a trip to Berlin where he was to look up certain addresses. The addresses were given clearly and were those of KUCKHOFF (Adam KUCKHOFF) and SCHULTZE-BOYSEN (Harro SCHULTZE-BOYSEN). He was given instructions how to carry out his mission, and to pick up the material in Berlin and forward it to Moscow via Brussels. If the radio silence of the Berlin group signified that that transmission could not be made from there, KENT was to establish a courier route between Berlin and Brussels (Station Comment: in order to bring the Berlin reports for transmission over the Brussels' transmitters). The Director was forced to reactivate the important apparatus in Berlin which suddenly had gone off the air because the Berlin agents were occupying much too important positions within the German government. The Director, through his handling, dropped the entire Berlin apparatus into our hands; he had not even instructed KENT after his trip to Berlin, to destroy the code book and select a new book. Such complete success had never been achieved before by means of DF'ing. During my imprisonment in Moscow, the GPU/MGB wanted complete information on this coup. They wanted to know, "Who was to blame for the total destruction of the German Rezidentura?" I am certain the Director suffered the consequences of my report which was fair because he was responsible.

The Berlin Rezidentura

6. The decoded material led to the arrest of the entire Rezidentura in September 1942. (Station Comment: The British Study states, page 49, "The arrest of the SCHULTZE-BOYSEN and HARNACK groups in August, 1942 seems to have been largely the result of WENZEL's betrayal of his cypher and the consequent reading of traffic intercepted between Belgium and Moscow for some time back.") All the Germans working for the Soviets in Berlin were separated and had no contact with each other. KENT's firm (Station Comment: SIMEXCO) was in close contact with the German military administrative offices and from the orders he received from the Germans had made profits of several million Reichsmarks. KENT's trip to Berlin was approved and sponsored by the Germans enroute to visiting the Leipzig and Prague Fairs on official business. During his visit to Berlin he visited various members of the Berlin Rezidentura (of the Rote Kapelle) but was careful to keep each member separate from the others. Moscow also planned to have von SCHELIHA's intelligence reports from the German Foreign Office transmitted on a special link with an individual code which KENT was to arrange.

7. Harro SCHULTZE-BOYSEN, cryptonym "CORO", was a 1st Lieut. in the Luftfahrtsministerium (Air Ministry). The other leaders of the Berlin groups were Arvid HARNACK, Oberregierunsrat in the Economics Ministry and his wife (Mildred Elizabeth HARNACK nee FISH); the author Adam KUCKHOFF and his wife (Grete KUCKHOFF). All of the latter were identified and arrested by means of the decoded messages and subsequent telephone taps, surveillance, etc. What was not uncovered by the latter means was revealed by SCHULTZE-BOYSEN's wife, Libertas SCHULTZE-BOYSEN.

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8. I will not go into detail about every member of these groups because enough has been reported about them by others who are perhaps better informed than I. I was in no way involved in the Berlin roll-up. The group had five transmitter/receiver sets at its disposal. This number was later increased by parachute agents. Originally the transmitters were located with: Adam KUCKHOFF; Arvid HARNACK; Kurt SCHULZE; Hans COPPI; BEHRENS (Karl BEHRENS or BEHRENS). Safe-houses were located at the residences of the following women: Erika von BROCKDORFF; Oda SCHOTTMUELLER; Ros SCHLOESSINGER.

(Station Comment: The above names all appear in the British Study and the information agrees except that SCHLOESSINGER is listed as a courier between HARNACK and COPPI.)

9. Regarding the Communist history of the members of the Rezidentura, not all of them were old-time Communists. The break-down of their political backgrounds is as follows:

A. Group who were members of the Communist Party prior to 1933:

SCHUHMACHER, Sculptor (Station Comment: Kurt SCHUMACHER in British Study. SCHUHMACHER is German spelling of name)

KUCKHOFF, Adam, author

SCHULZE, Kurt, in the German Navy, also one of the clandestine radio operators

SCHABBEL, Klara, Harry ROBINSON's mistress

SCHOTTMUELLER, Oda, SCHUHMACHER's mistress and Communist only through association with him; not a Party member

HUEBNER (Emil HUEBNER)

HUSEMANN, (Walter HUSEMANN), Communist through his father

WESOLEK, HUEBNER's son-in-law (Station Comment: British Study gives name as WESSELOCK, husband of Frieda WESSELOCK and son-in-law of Emil HUEBNER)

HARNACK, Arvid, Oberregierungsrat

RITIMEISTER, Dr. (Dr. Johann RITIMEISTER), psychotherapist

SIEG, Johann, journalist on the Berlin newspaper, "Rote Fahne"

GRAUDENZ, Johann, journalist

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GUDDORF, Wilhelm, Journalist on the Berlin newspaper, "Rote Fahne"

KUECHENMEISTER, Walter, publisher of Communist newspaper

KUMMEROW, Heinrich

B. Communist after 1933:

SCHULTZE-BOYSEN, Harro

COPPI, Hans

COPPI, Hilde

HARNACK, Mildred nee FISH

KUMMEROW, Ingeborg

STOEBE, Ilse, von SCHELLHA's secretary and mistress of HERRNSTADT. The latter is active in the East Zone today.

BEHRENS (Karl BEHRENS/BEHRENS)

KUCKHOFF, Greta

C. Those whose political history is unclear:

GRIMME, Adolf, former Minister of Culture

WEISSENEORN, Guenther, author

KRAUS, Professor Dr. (Prof. Werner KRAUS/KRAUSS), currently reported in Leipzig)

GEHRTS, Erwin, Colonel

The above listing is in no way complete because I cannot remember every name. It can be seen from the list that all of the above whose Communist history and sympathies were known to the government's counterintelligence organs had complete freedom of movement and some even were working in high government and military positions of considerable sensitivity. Following the big break between the German governmental leaders and the Communist Party in 1933/34, i.e. (when the CP was declared illegal), a lax attitude developed and Communism was not regarded as a great danger in spite of the fact that a Communist counterintelligence section was established to combat Communism and considerable experience had been gained in the fight against Communism. Everything went along so calmly during that period that one

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could almost believe that the Communists had become obedient citizens and members of society, which was actually true in the majority of the cases of Communists. Unquestionably one fact was completely disregarded which was that as long as a pact between Germany and the Soviet Union existed, the German Communists would be ordered by Moscow to remain quiet and would only dare to become active upon Moscow's express order. If an attack on the Soviet Union was planned, the political and other background of all persons holding important positions should have been reviewed. If such a careless performance could occur in an anti-Communist dictatorship, how much more easily it can occur in a free and powerful democracy. The great espionage cases of SORGE in Japan, HARNACK, von SCHELIHA, and SCHULTZE-BOYSEN would not have occurred if the proper precautionary measures had been taken.

10. Although the German Communist Party no longer existed, in theory, after 1933, the Soviets had a long list of people, overtly Communists prior to 1933 and still under Soviet influence, who could be used later. This was very negligent on the part of the Germans. In the list were:

- A. KUMEROW, Heinrich, working for Moscow long before 1933, actually as early as the 1920's, in the field of economic espionage. Due to the fact that he was a very capable engineer, he had access to extremely valuable information and provided the Soviets with all of it.
- B. GRAUDENZ, Johann, Communist journalist and a correspondent for American newspapers in Moscow. He had been expelled from Ireland for Communist activity! After that he had lived in various parts of the world.
- C. SIEG, Johann, born in the USA and working on the Communist newspaper, "Rote Fahne" in Berlin.
- D. GUDDORF, Wilhelm, also employed as a journalist on the "Rote Fahne".
- E. RITMEISTER, Dr. (Johann), worked as a psychotherapist in the Berlin institute headed by Professor GOERING, the uncle of Reichsmarschall GOERING. RITMEISTER had been expelled from Switzerland because he was too leftist in his politics.
- F. KUECHENMEISTER, Walter, publisher of Communist newspapers in the Ruhr and Rhineland areas. As early as 1918 he had been involved in the Communist-inspired revolt among the sailors of the German Navy.
- G. SCHULTZE-BOYSEN (Harro), he had, as had the atomic spy Klaus FUCHS, founded a radical, left-wing group in 1933 while he was in the university. He actually made no secret of his political sympathies.

The above is an indication what the German government knew prior to the

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round-up of the Rote Kapelle.

The Actual Roll-Up

11. The majority of the meetings with all the agents/sources were held in the homes of SCHULTZE-BOYSEN, HARNACK and KUCKHOFF. Licentious parties were held during which feminine charms were not only displayed but exploited. I am today still acquainted with a family, the husband and wife of which had participated in such celebrations. Libertas SCHULTZE-BOYSEN used every wile she knew to win the confidence of the husband who was working in radio counterintelligence during the war. Frau SCHULTZE-BOYSEN was a very passionate woman and her actions caused a quarrel between the two husbands which, in the long run, probably averted an even greater misfortune.

Station Comment: Source will be asked to provide the name of the family with whom he is still acquainted.

The clothing the women wore to these parties was even scantier than those worn by models modelling bathingsuits. Gefreiter (Lance-Corporal) Horst HEILMANN, who was employed in the Radio Counterintelligence cryptographic Section, was Frau Libertas SCHULTZE-BOYSEN's complete slave sexually. SCHULTZE-BOYSEN through his uninhibited and spirited enjoyment of life could captivate, not only his own wife, but other women which he did in the cases of the dancer Oda SCHOTTMUELLER and Countess Erika von BROCKDORFF.

12. Professional "conspiratorial" methods were ignored by this group and, therefore, they were not respected or seriously considered by the long-time, dedicated Communists. The latter were extremely skeptical of the activities of the SCHULTZE-BOYSEN, etc. groups insofar as they were aware of the activities. The parlor-pinks were driven by completely negative motivation. They wanted as much freedom as possible to enjoy their lives and they wanted power. Some wanted power more than others. I shall attempt to describe from memory some of the individuals in more detail because these people are typical of the intelligentsia, capable of, and inclined towards treason, whom one encounters repeatedly as traitors. It would be very useful to give an honest account of the human, in fact all too human, aspects of the events to those completely different circles attempting to make heroes of the members of the Rote Kapelle.

13. Harro SCHULTZE-BOYSEN: He was an intellectually stimulating and very temperamental young man who easily won over other people and induced them to follow him. He had sought his "great calling" in various types of jobs but had not found it. He was interested in everything but pursued no interest to the end. The current talk that he was on the threshold of a brilliant career in the Reichsluftfahrtministerium has no factual basis except in the post-war efforts to glorify the "heroes" of the Rote Kapelle. Certainly nothing was known of his possibly brilliant future during the war. His handsome wife, Libertas, was the one who obtained an increase in salary

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for him which enabled them to marry. She was working as an Arbeitsdienst-fuehrerin (work supervisor) in Karin Hall, GOERING's representational country estate outside of Berlin, when GOERING asked her, jokingly, if it weren't almost time for her to get married. She retorted immediately that GOERING himself was to blame because her fiance earned so little in the Reichsluftfahrtministerium that he could not support a family. GOERING made a note of the name and shortly thereafter SCHULTZE-BOYSEN was promoted with an increase in pay and so they were married.

14. SCHULTZE-BOYSEN, because of his burning ambition, bitterly resented his slow and insignificant rise. His pride caused him to place the blame on others. By others he meant the Nazis at the time, before that it had been the Weimar Republic and if it were possible, it would have been the monarchy. Had this man ever lived under the Soviet regime, he would have been hung! SCHULTZE-BOYSEN was clever enough not to express such ideas too openly but his ambition found another means of expressing itself. He was the identical type of many young careerists in the National Socialist State except that they sought success in their own country and found it --- which, after all, did not lead to a happy end in their cases either. SCHULTZE-BOYSEN was never trained in Communist ideology nor was he an idealist as his father claimed or as has been read into some of his statements and letters. He was, quite simply, a dictator by virtue of his character and entire personality. Any means were justified in his eyes to overthrow the existing order and put himself in power. The only thing he really recognized was "I". All of his work for the Soviet Union was, in the final analysis, for "ME"; the constant effort to satisfy his egocentric drive was evident in everything he did including his private life, his sexual life, etc. The work for Moscow offered him the only opportunity to overcome the barriers of his immediate and hated environment and with one jump gain a position on the very top. He wrote in his farewell letter, "A death which befits me". He did not recognize law, conscience, guilt, or any need for justification. None of these were necessary in his world. He was most exalted by the feeling that he was master of life and death. Typical of the romantic intoxication in which he lived was his insistence on standing guard, wearing his uniform, while the illegal posters were put up, posters which had been written as a result of heated debates. He was completely a child of his time, a political dreamer armed only with his intense egotism and like so many of the young people of that time. SCHULTZE-BOYSEN, however, chose the side of the enemy, anticipating a faster rise by this method. His ambition was to be Minister of War in the German Soviet Republic.

15. The yearning for recognition and power, albeit of a different type, was also possessed by Arvid HARNACK, Oberregierungsrat in the Wirtschaftsministerium. HARNACK was very much SCHULTZE-BOYSEN's intellectual superior. He was a cool thinker but suffered from hot-headed arrogance and an intellectual thirst for power. Even his cohorts in the Rote Kapelle complained about him. He indulged in such biting irony during an argument that he drove his opponent out of the discussion by sheer weight of argument. He was described generally as an intellectual snob. He studied in the United States where he met his wife, Mildred nee FISH, I believe, at the University of Wisconsin.

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16. He made many contacts in Moscow during his visit to Russia. He was shown more esteem while in Russia than he had ever dreamed of receiving in Germany. His connections with the Soviet Embassy in Berlin and his serious political discussion in both Moscow and the Soviet Embassy in Berlin were very flattering during his young, impressionable years. This is a dangerous weapon the Russians employ. Young ambitious scientists, journalists, and visitors from all countries receive a welcome in Russia accorded them no where else in the world. The Government is directly interested in such visits and government leaders take a personal interest. The visitors experience only kindness and enticing dreams of the tremendous possibilities offered by this enormous Russia result. It goes without saying that representatives of the Soviet IS are always present and working on tightening the connection. HARNACK was well schooled in ideology. He wrote a short tract for the cause on capitalist monopolies, containing nothing new inasmuch as LENIN had covered this ground thoroughly. HARNACK's tract outlined the path for Germany very clearly, as he conceived it, which was primarily to become the German Soviet Republic following the Soviet pattern. He wanted to hold the post of Economic Minister in his future German Soviet Republic but he desired to attain this position through his espionage on Moscow's behalf and not by means of Communist Party work. His personal "I" was foremost in his case in spite of his ideological training. The dream of power and position dominated him.

17. Libertas SCHULTZE-BOYSEN, nee HAAS-HEYE, wife of "CORO" (Soviet cryptonym for Harro SCHULTZE-BOYSEN), played a very important role in the work. She played her biggest role, however, when, during the roll-up of the Rote Kapelle, she betrayed to the last person her fellow collaborators. She was an interesting and beautiful woman. Above all, she was a woman with an enormous sexual appetite which was never satisfied. She was always the aggressor and she had success, as much as she wanted. She used her sexual weapons frequently in carrying out the work of the Rote Kapelle. Several men were recruited into the net because she enslaved them. The work in the Rote Kapelle fascinated her with its promise of wild, stormy adventure accompanied by desire. She came from an aristocratic family and had had no political training. There was not the slightest trace of ideological motivation in this woman. It is difficult to judge whether she tried to save her life while she was in prison by all her sexual advances. She did, however, betray her friends because of a sexual experience. She entered into lesbian relations with her fellow women prisoners. When the judge/prosecutor, Dr. ROEDER (Dr. Manfred ROEDER) was questioning her, she said, very sweetly to him, that although the Gestapo had searched her apartment they had not found everything. At her instigation, Dr. ROEDER ordered the officials to check the panel of her bedroom door. They found there a packet containing hundreds of pictures of Libertas in the nude, etc. One wonders what her purpose was in introducing the pictures into the trial and why she wanted Dr. ROEDER to see them. The primary fact regarding this woman was that her dynamic sexuality was the driving force behind everything she did.

18. I have described the above three types to show something of what the situation was viewed from the period when it occurred. This is the

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reality and not as it is so often described today. There were, naturally, other dedicated people who used their great intellectual powers in the service of their own convictions and were destroyed through treason. There were wives who unquestioningly followed their husbands, Frau HARNACK being one example.

19. KENT reported to the Director after his return from Berlin and suggested that the Director establish direct communications with Berlin. This was attempted by the Director with several agents, parachuted into Germany, who were taken in by Erika von BROCKDORFF and the COPPI family. The agents were German Communists who had emigrated. One was named Albert HOESSLER. The third drop brought Heinrich KOENEN, the son of a former Communist Reichstag Deputy. As instructed, KOENEN looked up Ilse STOEBE who at the time had been in prison for more than two weeks. Moscow was not well informed. KOENEN had in his possession money and a receipt for more than \$6,000 signed by von SCHELIHA of the Foreign office before the war in Warsaw. The journalist Rudolf HERRNSTADT had used von SCHELIHA's financial difficulties while in Warsaw to recruit him for the Soviet IS. Later HERRNSTADT had placed his mistress Ilse STOEBE as von SCHELIHA's secretary and this operation was running very well. HERRNSTADT is reported to be the head of an institute in the East Zone today and is probably involved in intelligence work. Von SCHELIHA was one of the Director's highest paid agents, having once received more than 30,000 RM. His group was completely separate from the "CORO" net.

20. Agents were being parachuted into all parts of Germany by Moscow up to the very end of the war. They were seized almost 100%. I believe not one of them escaped. The English Airforce also dropped some of Moscow's German agents occasionally which astounded us. Veterans from the Red forces in Spain during the Civil War were in the majority. These men always enjoyed a special trust in Moscow. They must be carefully watched now and in the future. Many of them work today in official or semi-official jobs in the Federal Republic. In my opinion they are always vulnerable to an approach by Moscow. It should not be forgotten that the younger of these men are today only forty years old!

21. The roll-up of the Rote Kapelle was quite thorough which resulted in an impression in the RSHA that all active elements had been destroyed at the time. Kriminaldirektor (Horst) KOPKOW, the specialist in IV A 2, told me after the assassination attempt on HITLER of 20 July 1944, that the investigation of the Rote Kapelle in 1942 should have been more extensive than it was. I do not know whether this statement was based on facts discovered during the investigation of the assassination attempt. We had no time than to discuss this in detail. The Rote Kapelle members who received sentences, as far as I can remember and I cannot remember all, were:

SCHULTZE-BOYSEN, Harro, death sentence

SCHULTZE-BOYSEN, Libertas

HARNACK, Arvid

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HARNACK, Mildred

KUCKHOFF, Adam

KUCKHOFF, Greta, was pardoned

GEHRIS (Col. Erwin)

COPPI, Hans

COPPI, Hilde

SCHULZE, Kurt

BEHRENS, Karl

SCHOTTMUELLER, Oda

BROCKDORFF, Erika von

SCHLOESSINGER, Rosa

SIEG, Johann

GUDDORF, Johann (believe CARETINA intends Wilhelm
GUDDORF)

RITTEMEISTER, Dr. (Johann)

KUECHENMEISTER, Walter

PAUL, Dr. Elfriede, KUECHENMEISTER's mistress who re-
ceived a prison sentence and was released by the
Soviets in 1945; reportedly Minister of Health in
Lower Saxony as of 1945.

SCHUHMACHER, Kurt

SCHUHMACHER, Elisabeth

SCHABEL, Klara

HUSEMANN, Walter

HUEBNER, (Emil)

WESOLEK (WESSELOCK)

GOLLNOW, Herbert

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HEILMANN, Horst

GRAUDENZ, Johann

KRAUSE, Frau (KRAUS, Anna)

KUMMEROW, Heinrich

KUMMEROW, Ingeborg

SCHELLHA, (Rudolf von SCHELLHA)

STOEBE, Ilse

KOENEN, Heinrich

HOESSLER, Albert

WEISSENBORN, Guenther, received a prison term

GRIMME, Adolf, received a prison term

(Station Comment: According to the British Study all of the above were executed with the exception of: Greta KUCKHOFF as noted by CARETINA; Rosa SCHLOESSINGER; Karl BEHRENS; Walter KUECHENMEISTER; Dr. Elfriede PAUL as noted by CARETINA; Emil HUEBNER; Herbert GOLLNOW about whom there is some doubt; Heinrich KUMMEROW, also some doubt; Heinrich KOENEN; Guenther WEISENBORN and Adolf GRIMME as noted by source. Regarding Ilse STOEBE, the British Study says she was "almost certainly executed." Ingeborg KUMMEROW does not appear in the British Study. UPSWING has mentioned an Albrecht and Grete KUMMEROW in UJDRIZZLY discussions, presumably connected in some way with Heinrich KUMMEROW.)

22. The entire Soviet apparat in Germany was relatively unimportant but very successful when it is considered that it was a small apparat. The disadvantages for the Soviets resulting from the anti-Soviet measures instituted in Germany after 1933 prevented the Soviets from working on the very broad basis to which they were accustomed. They were very lucky with their improvised apparat in Germany. We were unlucky. Their operations could have been nipped in the bud, as I was once able to do. If the radio communications of the "CORO" group had been successful in the beginning, they would certainly have been located very early and neutralized. The most important intelligence could scarcely have reached Moscow because KENT was responsible for relaying the reports (Station Comment: Source means that KENT had not had sufficient time to forward the information from Brussels before the Germans seized him). No emergency or secondary channel of communication for passing intelligence in case the radio communication failed was provided. All of the technical equipment of the Rezidentura had been supplied in great haste. Looking

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back over the impressive Soviet intelligence history prior to 1933, the German territory was, in any case, relatively immune to a large scale Soviet intelligence attack from Moscow. France and Belgium, where the Communist Party was not outlawed and where the Party could work as it wished, are examples of this. From this it is clear that a law declaring the Communist-Bolshevik activity illegal does reward any country.

France - Belgium - Holland

23. I have reported first only on the German section. The first penetration of the Rote Kapelle was in Brussels by means of DF'ing as I have already mentioned. The first radio transmitter which was detected did not bring extensive results. It was only after the seizure of the "Professor's", the German Comintern agent WENZEL's, radio transmitter that the code book was available and with this the roll-up in Germany. Although everything started later in Berlin, it was possible to take immediate action and practically neutralize everything in Berlin. The clean-up operations could not progress as rapidly in Belgium, not only because this was a foreign country which had some bearing on the work, but primarily because in the west Moscow-trained agents were working and they used clean, conspiratorial (operational) techniques and made no mistakes. There was no comparison with Berlin with its non-homogenous and insanely mixed working teams. No one in the West broke the rules for conspiratorial (operational) work, except possibly the leaders themselves who frequently could not conceal in their overt lives their Soviet origin and Soviet mentality. This was primarily Moscow's fault. The selection of agents was very good and suited the purpose. The only fault was that many Jews were among the agents and the latter were always in danger because of anti-Semitism and they, in turn, could threaten their handlers. This makes it even more astonishing that this group could obtain so much from German military and civilian offices.

24. Another factor contributing to the difficulties encountered in the roll-up in the West was the extensive and continuous help given the espionage nets by the members of the Communist Parties of the various countries. The difficulties encountered were the disappearance and concealment of agents, the rapid and frequent changes in couriers, the many safe-houses available for radio transmitters, etc. It should be noted that KENT was well informed on the possibility of DF'ing long before his own group was "fixed". Some agents were spread thinly through the Communist circles and certainly had no contact with the overt, known representatives of Moscow because of the excellent compartmentalization. For this reason the first penetration of the espionage apparatus depended on monitoring and decoding radio messages.

25. OTTO (Leopold TREPPER), "Le Grand Chef", had had years of experience in the West which enabled him to carry out conspiratorial work to the best advantage.

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(Station Comment: CARETINA uses "OTTO" throughout the report for Leopold TREPPER because "OTTO" was the name by which TREPPER was known in the Sonderkommando. We have substituted TREPPER for purposes of clarity.)

No matter how much training in operational techniques the other Moscow agents had had in Moscow, they often made serious errors when first arriving in the West. They were much more likely to err because of their lack of Western experience than the Western agents placed under them. I have reported elsewhere on this, for example, how KENT had been trained in Moscow along the lines of the official propaganda of the Soviet CP in what to expect in the West and had believed what he was taught. (Station Comment: CARETINA has written separate reports on both KENT and TREPPER which will be forwarded as soon as possible.) He stocked up to the point of making himself ludicrous on leather shoes and cigarettes when he first arrived in the West because he was convinced that these articles were available only on the day he saw them in a store. This was a typical Soviet reaction, i.e. to buy as much as possible when the wares were available, which I experienced personally as late as 1956 in the Soviet Union. Even the trained intelligence officer, destined for a mission in the West, was not told at the time he left Moscow on his mission that there was a difference between the domestic Soviet propaganda and the facts in the outside world. KENT himself said, in commenting on the naive and, in his case, dangerous behavior of Soviet Russian intelligence officers, that this stemmed from the general mistrust to be found in the Soviet Union. If, for example, an instructor in operational techniques had explained the difference and KENT had reported this, the instructor would have been sentenced according to Article 58-10. No MGB investigating official looking into the case would have known the truth because they believed implicitly what they were taught. For his own security, a man would not contradict official statements even though the success of the work in which he was engaged was at stake. It probably should be noted that the Soviets no longer make these mistakes today (mistakes of behavior in the West). KENT's incredible capacity, unbelievable for so small a man, to eat and drink derived from his Soviet background. It was amazing to see the waiters in restaurants and bars always recognize him even though he had been in the place only once or twice because his enormous orders of food and drink were so conspicuous. He ordered the meat course two and three times. He ordered and drank Vodka and other highly alcoholic drinks by the half bottles or more. Some of the other young Soviet officers behaved in exactly the same way. It was reminiscent of accounts of the lives led by the owners of the large Russian estates long ago. A normal stomach could not have digested such masses of food and drink but a Soviet coming from a simple background, which almost all did, rarely had concentrated nourishment and had to stay alive by consuming masses of soup, sohi; a type of porridge, kascha; and black bread. I never ceased to be amazed while in the Soviet prisons at the quantity of this type of food a Soviet stomach could handle. Accustomed to food of this type, the Soviet agents in the West stuffed themselves with the same quantity of Western food --- naturally many suffered from heart and stomach disorders. Details such as this are not unimportant in intelligence operations and I mention them to point out what should be noted on both sides.

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26. KENT's legend in Belgium, that of a Uruguayan national, caused him some difficulties also. He himself found the legend unfortunate and thought that Moscow had taken the easy way out. It occurred once that the new Consul for Uruguay in Brussels moved into his pension and the well-intentioned female owner of the pension wanted to introduce the two "Uruguayans" to each other. KENT almost had to flee from the pension because he was not prepared to converse with a consul or any other citizen of his alleged, native country. He was not satisfied that he had not attracted attention to himself through this incident. When I discussed this with KENT, he said that Moscow had good connections with Uruguay for obtaining original passports and had, therefore, sent him out with the Uruguayan legend. I thought to myself that from a counterintelligence point of view it would be very advantageous to arrange for Moscow to obtain original passports from a few selected countries.

Station Comment: CARETINA, a confirmed counter-intelligence and espionage operator, cannot resist making operational suggestions. He is suggesting that for a service working against the Soviet IS, planting original passports for Soviet IS use, would assist in the identification of Soviet agents.

When the first traces of KENT's intelligence group were picked up in Brussels through DF'ing about the beginning of 1942 and he had to leave Brussels immediately, it was not easy for him to travel via Paris and other French cities to Marseilles with a Uruguayan passport. KENT was not the only "Uruguayan", MAKAROV also had a Uruguayan passport under the name of Carlos ALAMO.

27. Returning to the identification and neutralization of the Soviet nets, the first group identified in Brussels toward the end of 1941 or early 1942 was KENT's headquarters. In the Headquarters were the following:

KENT, himself

TREPPER (Leopold)

ARNOULDT, Rita, German Jewess and long-time Communist (Rita BLOCH nee ARNOLD/ARNCULD)

SPRINGER, Isador, Arnouldt's lover, German Jew, old Comintern agent (British Study states that Flora van VLIET was SPRINGER's mistress)

POSNANSKA, Sophie, alias Anna VERLINDEN, Polish Jewess, long-time Communist (POZHNENSKA or POZNANSKA are spellings in British Study)

RAICHMANN (RAJCHMANN), Abraham, Polish Jew and expert in producing false identity papers.

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GRUBER, Malvina, RAICHMANN's mistress

GROSSVOGEL, Leo

MAKAROV (Micheal or Michel)

DANILOV (Anton)

Etc.

Although all the members of the Headquarters group were not accustomed to visiting the house which had been fixed through DF'ing, many of them knew each other. In spite of the fact that the group was acquainted among themselves, the German counterintelligence organs' coup was feeble because the group had followed the rules for clandestine operations very strictly. KENT was the primary disciplinary force in demanding obedience to operational security. The first arrests did not produce a key to the code which left the long messages still uncoded. KENT had decoded almost everything himself for this group. KENT and TREPPER fled immediately to Paris when the first arrests were made. Most of the information came from Rita ARNOULDT and Sophie POSNANSKA. This slowed down our progress because the two women simply did not have important information. Physical descriptions with aliases which we obtained were not very useful.

28. The second group was detected and identified in Brussels about the middle of 1942. This was the group of the old Comintern agent WENZEL. Johann WENZEL, also called "HERMANN" or "The Professor", had fled from Germany in 1933. Prior to 1939 he headed a Communist underground group in Belgium which was assigned special missions. Belonging to WENZEL's group were Germaine SCHNEIDER, WENZEL's mistress; her former husband Franz SCHNEIDER; and Franz RAICHMANN (Station Comment: Whether this is a mistake for Abraham or whether another RAICHMANN is involved will have to be ascertained from source. We have no previous record of a Franz RAICHMANN.). JERNSTROEM, the alleged Finnish student whose true name was JEFREMOV (Konstantin JEFREMOV, with aliases Erland JERNSTROEM, HOPMANN, PAUL, PASCAL, BORDO and possibly MANOLO) took over the leadership of WENZEL's group following the capture of the first group. JEFREMOV was a Soviet officer from the technical section of Soviet intelligence (probably GRU). All of the above and many others were arrested when the German counterintelligence organs made the second raid. Encoded and decoded messages fell into German hands during the raid due to the fact that the transmitter had been fixed and raided while still transmitting. The agents had no choice but to hand over the code book. For the first time the Germans had the information necessary for successful round-up of the entire apparatus. The Berlin net was identified through the decoded messages. The number of arrests increased and the interrogations could be compared, one prisoner being played off against another.

29. The next group neutralized was that of Anton WINTERNICK (name given

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as Tino WINTERINK in British Study) in Holland. The couriers between Brussels and Holland, including Maurice PEPER, were in German hands as a result of the arrests in Brussels. About this time an outline or indication of the commercial cover used by the Soviet intelligence service began to emerge. The "Grand Chef", TREPPER, whose true name was not yet known, had together with his friend Leo GROSSVOGEL, also a Polish Jew as was TREPPER, founded a textile import and export firm in 1940 under the name of "Au Roi de Caoutchouc" or "Foreign Exoellente Trenchcoats". TREPPER, under an alias, and GROSSVOGEL were the owners. KENT had been trained in Moscow to sew microphotographs into textiles. The textiles were then exported to other countries where they were examined for content. When the microphotograph messages were recovered they were taken to the "legal" (i.e. Legal Rezydentura) headquarters in the local Soviet Embassy and the latter forwarded the messages via diplomatic channels to the Director in Moscow. In some instances the goods were exported directly to Moscow but such goods could contain agent reports only with the approval of the highest authority in Moscow. The company was established and was to have branches in Copenhagen, Oslo, Stockholm and Czechoslovakia. The plan was to sell trenchcoats containing intelligence material in one of the neutral Scandinavian countries. The branch of the main company in the neutral company was then responsible for the next step in forwarding the intelligence reports. This plan was never put into operation. The company served, however, very well as channel to official German offices. At the beginning of 1941, long before the outbreak of the German-Russian war, Moscow ordered an expansion of the contacts with official German representatives in Holland, Belgium and France. A new firm was established for this purpose and the new firm was SIMEXCO.

30. SIMEXCO as a company had shareholders who were both Belgians and from neutral countries. The "Grand Chef" remained in the background as the founder. SIMEXCO was incorporated as a procurement company for construction supplies. The German organizations, especially the Organisation Todt, gladly accepted bids on procurement of supplies from companies of this type because a large quantity of supplies was being concealed in the occupied countries which were needed and would be requisitioned if found. The Soviet intelligence cover company, SIMEXCO, served German interests very well in performing this mission. SIMEXCO earned a good reputation, made a good profit, and naturally received from the Germans all support necessary to insure "freedom of movement" inasmuch as travel was necessary to ferret out the necessary materials. Under SIMEXCO auspices, KENT was able to travel undisturbed to Berlin, Leipzig and Prague, provided with German papers from German military administrative offices --- enabling him to assess German achievement as shown at the fairs along with his other work.

31. Due to the success SIMEXCO had, Moscow ordered TREPPER to establish a similar company in Paris just at the time hostilities started between Germany and the Soviet Union. I am jumping ahead in the chronology of the history of the roll-up of the Rote Kapelle but TREPPER's achievement should be mentioned here. Whereas SIMEXCO made possible for Moscow KENT's freedom

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of movement and thus enabled KENT to pass on the extremely valuable intelligence "CORO's" (SCHULTZE-BOYSEN's) group had collected in Berlin, TREPPER through his firm in Paris was successful in penetrating the headquarters of the German military commander of France. The firm in Paris was SIMEX, founded in late summer or fall of 1941. The company director was Alfred CORBIN, a Belgian. The business manager was GILBERT, alias for the "Grand Chef" (TREPPER), and the secretary was "DUBOIS", alias for Hillel KATZ. A branch of SIMEX was opened in Marseilles with Jules JASPAR, a Belgian, as head. They had learned not to place exposed foreigners and Jews at the head of the concern and its branches because the anti-Semitic trend in the German Government would only result in unnecessary risks. JASPAR was the brother of a former Belgian Minister President. The history and motivation of JASPAR's connection with Moscow was never really clarified. We had noted an unusual thing among the Belgians which was that one side of the family would have Western sympathies and the other was inclined toward Moscow. This was a form of re-insurance for the family.

32. We found that the trail of those who had fled the Low Countries led to Paris. The bulk of the messages were going via Paris. In this case DF'ing was again responsible for the real penetration of the Moscow Director's Paris net. We had also made more progress through the usual criminal/detective methods. The investigation developed faster primarily because the agents had to turn over their reports for radio transmittal which enabled us to maintain indirect contact with the agents through their radio stations.

33. The first radio station which fell into our hands in Paris was that of the SOKOL couple, Dr. Herz SOKOL, a Czech Jew, and his wife Miriam SOKOL. Dr. SOKOL had been interned by the French at the beginning of the war. He came in contact with TREPPER through the Russian emigre MAXIMOVICH (Basil Pavlovich MAXIMOVICH) who was also interned. Thus SOKOL became an agent for Moscow's IS. The question would logically be asked whether Moscow did not have a previously established net in Paris. The emphasis had been on Brussels where everything had gone very well. In Paris TREPPER had to start building a net through his own efforts. He was successful. Not only did he establish the radio station of Dr. SOKOL but the radio station in Le Pecq near Paris in the residence of "Robert" and "Lucie", aliases for Pierre and Lucienne GIRAUD, (Station Comment: British Study gives names as Leon and Suzanne GIRAUD, with aliases "ROBERT" and "LUCY"), as well, where a young Spanish radio operator worked. TREPPER accomplished all of this on his own without help from Moscow shortly before the war started with the Soviet Union. The SOKOL couple were close friends of Mme. Claude SPAAK, wife of Claude SPAAK. She supported the SOKOL's financially, knowing that they were Moscow agents which we did not know at the time.

34. The second radio station in Paris, Le Pecq, was also detected by DF'ing. The Spanish radio operator escaped and we were never able to find him. We did not know his name which in any case would have been an alias. He never cooperated with the Germans as DALLIN claims in his book, a book which contains a great many historical misstatements and false information.

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Station Comment: According to the British Study, the Spanish radio operator was Valentin ESCUDERO or ESCUDO who was working under TREPPER's direction. Prior to the fall of 1942 when he was assigned to the GIRAUD transmitter at Le Pecq, he had been working in GROSSVOGEL's communication set-up. His cover job was driver for the Wehrmacht and he was on this job when the GIRAUD's were arrested by the Germans. The British Study confirms CARETINA's statement inasmuch as it says "he is believed to have escaped".

35. The identification and neutralization of the radio stations did not suddenly provide us with an easy means of reaching the whole apparatus. Progress was made only by careful, detailed and thorough work. It is difficult today to recall each step and perhaps also not important. The fact was that some of the interrogations in Brussels, later confirmed by the interrogation of Mme. SOKOL, revealed the cover names of the leaders of the net. Everything pointed, naturally, to the "Grand Chef" and KENT because those two had the entire picture and not just one conspiratorial cell. It was very evident to the German CI organs working in the different countries which of the prisoners possessed valuable knowledge and which did not. The Soviet net had carefully obeyed the conspiratorial rule of "the need-to-know".

36. DALLIN's book is maliciously slanted in that he points up at every opportunity the Gestapo torture methods which drove the poor spy to confessing. DALLIN and other reporters of these events continuously differentiate between the Abwehr (German Military Intelligence in WW II) and the Gestapo (RSHA Amt IV). The entire investigation was the responsibility of the RSHA's Sonderkommando Rote Kapelle. All other units came under the command of the Gestapo whether Abwehr officers or other RSHA officers were included in the units; every one reported to the chief of the Sonderkommando. For the most part the men involved in the investigation were experienced, specially chosen, counterespionage officials of the Gestapo who carried out their jobs and who were not at all as the tabloids have painted them. The only requirement for the minor members of the Moscow apparatus was that they write what they could remember and describe those individuals known to them. Generally they knew relatively little. The professional criminal/detective investigation progressed by piecing together the small bits of information. TREPPER was caught by means of pedantic, dull, detective work and not through the use of terror or some chance piece of luck.

37. TREPPER was too cunning to have a notebook in which he noted such things as dental appointments. One of his agents remembered that he was receiving dental treatment but knew nothing about the dentist, location of office, etc. We had obtained from other sources a list of possible dentists who might be handling TREPPER's dental work. Thus through extensive surveillance, elimination of other suspects, the building and dentist were pinned down. All patients were watched during a pertinent period of time. TREPPER arrived. The dentist knew that the arrest was to occur although he had no concept of TREPPER's importance. When TREPPER sat down in the dentist's chair, the German officials appeared. TREPPER looked them over, sized up the

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situation very calmly, and said in his heavily accented German: "You have done some good work."

Station Comment: The British Study states that it was Alfred CORBIN who provided TREPPER with the name of a dentist: "CORBIN seems to have been reduced by interrogation to a state of mind in which he was anxious to tell the Germans anything he knew about TREPPER. The most he was able to produce, however, was a probable indication of TREPPER's dentist, TREPPER having been unwise enough to ask for CORBIN's advice on a dentist, and - as the Germans discovered - to take it." Pg. 43 of Part II British Rote Kapelle Study.

38. From the moment TREPPER was in our hands, the roll-up of the remaining Rote Kapelle was assured. TREPPER was much too clever to wish to die for a "lost cause". It was made clear to him that even during a war men of his stature and importance did not need to be tried and die although law throughout the world condemned such men to death. TREPPER did not need time to think over the proposition. He knew immediately what he wanted to do and, perhaps, what he had to do. Without hesitation he betrayed one colleague after the other. He made meeting arrangements so that we could pick them up. While he was meeting them. He would then order his people to tell us everything and they obeyed him, telling us all that they knew. Up to that point we were very successful. The Rote Kapelle could have continued to function without TREPPER because we had not penetrated too deeply. We would have had to work on one section at a time. TREPPER, however, changed the whole situation with one blow. The apparatus lay completely exposed, totally paralyzed, because TREPPER agreed to cooperate in a radio play-back against Moscow. No acts of violence were necessary, contrary to the reporting of our unsolicited historians. Whoever has actually engaged in this type of operation knows that it is not possible to engage in such a complicated operation as a radio play-back with a man who has been badly treated and bad treatment includes an unfriendly attitude toward the potential double-agent during the very first conversation. Those laymen who think always in terms of flogging, etc. should have seen, just once, the willingness with which the spies, so pitied by them, cooperated with us. TREPPER told us much more than we ever hoped and much more than was necessary under the circumstances. The reason for his betrayal must be discussed separately. What TREPPER had not betrayed, for example cells in the internal French Communist Party network about which he probably was not informed, was revealed to us through the play-back against Moscow.

39. TREPPER betrayed all: Hillel KATZ, TREPPER's most trusted man; ROBINSON's entire group which was totally unknown to us; the brother and sister MAXIMOVICH and their group which included VOELKNER, PODSIADLO, Anne-marie HOFFMANN-SCHOLTZ, etc.

Station Comment: Basil Pavlovich MAXIMOVICH
Anna Pavlovna MAXIMOVICH
Kaethe VOELKNER
Johann PODSIADLO

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The picture of his activity before and during the war emerged more and more clearly but there was simply not enough time to concern ourselves exclusively with TREPPER and his past. What was not relevant to our war-time investigation was not pursued. There were too few officials and too much work. HIMMLER ordered TREPPER bound hand and foot -- the criminal officers in charge of him and TREPPER himself laughed at this order. We freed him after a short, token period from the ridiculous restrictions. Those "on top" thought of the "Grand Chef" as a wild animal requiring caretakers such as are necessary in a zoo and as described today in adventure stories in illustrated magazines. It was very difficult to convince those on top that the counterintelligence officers handling such a really great spy must treat him as an officer and man of honor. Our relationships with both TREPPER and KENT were the best possible.

40. We pursued those lines of TREPPER's activities which had originated prior to the war and continued during the war. The MAXIMOVICH brother and sister were from one of the best Russian families of the Czarist period. They were emigrés and had been educated and raised with the help of Catholic Church organizations. The brother was an engineer and the sister a doctor. They were well known in Paris emigré circles. Because of the typical Russian homesickness for "Little Mother Russia", they had contacted the Soviets in Paris and it all led, eventually, to TREPPER. They had been interned by the French at the beginning of the war because of suspicion concerning their involvement in emigré support societies. They met Dr. SOKOL during internment. With the help of high-ranking German officers they were released. German officers always have a weakness for aristocrats and the two were employed by the German occupation as interpreters. When this occurred TREPPER moved in directly and SOKOL was withdrawn as a cut-out. The MAXIMOVICH's were approved by the Director and recruited as full-time Soviet spies. The subsequent comedy played by the Russian aristocrats, the MAXIMOVICH's, and the German, monarch-loving officers would have to be played on a stage and cannot be described. All of the exclusive, blue-blooded society of former aristocrats wanted nothing to do with HITLER while simultaneously carrying out his orders most obediently. They would have preferred, naturally, to have a "beloved" monarch as a ruler because they would have played a much bigger role. The sanatorium of the woman doctor MAXIMOVICH proved the perfect atmosphere for German officers of the latter type to meet. Mme. MAXIMOVICH was very distinguished; she complained with them about the common, plebian atmosphere of the present; and they, in their discussions, betrayed, quite unwittingly, all their professional and military secrets. TREPPER received a wealth of intelligence from that circle. A secretary, recruited through her lover for intelligence work, was found (Station Comment: Kaethe VOELKNER, secretary in the German Kommandatura in Paris, recruited through Johann PODSIADLO). The charming brother MAXIMOVICH, working as an interpreter, was very successful with women and the woman HOFFMANN-SCHOLTZ sacrificed her professional and patriotic honor for this happiness which she found late in life (Station Comment: Anne Margarete HOFFMANN-SCHULZ, British spelling, was employed in the Militaerbefehlshaber of the German occupation in Paris). I am certain that many of these

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conceited gentlemen of German officer clique used the subsequent events (i.e. arrest of the Soviet spies) as an excuse to adorn themselves with the halos of long-suffering resistance fighters who were persecuted for being anti-Nazi. It could have been a very good joke on the German military hierarchy if there had not been a bitter war in progress in which soldiers were dying on the front lines. This type of conceit (speaking of the snobbism of the German officers) is generally stronger than any service regulation or normal, human intelligence. Such conceit is found not only among the military. All foreigners employed in the German official headquarters, whether during the war or currently, should be screened by counterintelligence organs but frequently the German officials employing foreigners are too proud to allow such screening. Regulations covering this were not always mandatory although they were certainly needed. The success a hostile intelligence service achieves can often be attributed to the faults within one's own ranks.

The ROBINSON Group

41. The ROBINSON group did not have a professional or operational link with TREPPER before the war. The ROBINSON group had been working for years for the Comintern and ROBINSON was one of the latter's most courageous and outstanding workers who had devoted his entire life to serving the Comintern. He had never married, officially, his mistress SCHABEEL (Klara SCHABEEL) in Berlin although she had a child by him, simply because he never had time for marriage. He was the same ardent revolutionary in 1942 that he had been for the past twenty years. Only the unusual circumstances of the war forced TREPPER and ROBINSON to contact each other in the interest of espionage operations. TREPPER had built a new net, the "silent net" (sleeper net), which was to be activated only in an emergency. The "silent net" was not permitted to have any contact whatsoever with groups or individuals who in the past or in the present had been identified as pro-Soviet, for example, the Communist Party and its various front organizations. The intelligence material from the "silent net" was needed but there could be no connection between TREPPER's net and the "official and unofficial" (Communist) organizations except at the very top and through only one contact. The single point of contact was ROBINSON, one of the most successful and accomplished conspirators. I cannot describe his extensive connections in France and the rest of Europe because they are too numerous. Three of his closer co-workers were: Louis MOURIER; a document expert whose name I have forgotten; and the most important, the Swiss engineer Maurice AENIS-HAENSLIN who placed his Swiss neutrality and his large apartment at the disposal of the service.

Station Comment: The "document expert" is possibly Marcel Alphonse Charles ROUGE, stated in the Personality Index of the British Study to have been an agent of Henri ROBINSON in France, probably concerned with the fabrication of identity

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documents and passes; apparently escaped arrest during the general round-up of TREPPER's and ROBINSON's groups in 1942-43. Medardo GRIOTTO is also listed in the British Study as an Italian printer and engraver who provided both ROBINSON and TREPPER with false papers and stamps.

AENIS-HAENSLIN's apartment was equipped with innumerable, secret, concealment places which were built into the walls, the floor and into every possible piece of furniture. There were secret documents practically everywhere, including financial accounts, reports, raw material collected together, etc. The eight to ten room apartment of AENIS-HAENSLIN was used by us as a safe house, meeting place, etc. One of our penetration agents lived in the apartment for several weeks. During the latter's idle time he searched for new concealment places and found as many as we had in our original search. The secret drawers were so cleverly constructed that all of the furniture would have had to be taken entirely apart in order to find all of them. Our agent would casually and accidentally rest his hand on a spot and a secret drawer would shoot out of the piece of furniture or wall. He would report this immediately and then start feverishly hunting for more hiding places. This showed clearly that when working against a professional conspiratorial net, nothing is too small for careful investigation. Unfortunately during the war we lacked the necessary manpower for this type of careful investigation and we often had to be satisfied with only the larger aspects.

42. AENIS-HAENSLIN was sentenced to death but Switzerland protested and demanded his release. I do not know whether there was ever an exchange but I would think not because AENIS-HAENSLIN would have represented much too great a danger for German interests and for the success of the radio play-back if he had been in Switzerland. It is certainly possible that he survived the war in spite of the death sentence. He was used for innumerable courier trips and, therefore, knew a large part of the Soviet apparatus in Switzerland. Inasmuch as there were discussions later in Karlsruhe between the Swiss and German police concerning the "Rote Drei", it is probable that the Swiss intervened again on AENIS-HAENSLIN's account. Participants in these discussions certainly still are available and would know the outcome.

Station Comment: The British Study reported AENIS-HAENSLIN in Switzerland as of 1948. An UPSWING report, MGL-A-3036 of 17 Aug. 1950, reported him to be connected with a Swiss firm, UNIPECTINE, as of August 1950.

I will cover the fate of the other, above-mentioned persons later because they were partially involved in the playbacks.

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Other Radio Stations in Paris

43. The other radio stations in Paris had not been activated, although technically equipped to go on the air. Hillel KATZ, TREPPER's secretary, had immediately, when ordered to do so by TREPPER, turned over all the hidden radio equipment. TREPPER was actually not informed of all the equipment. It was only from Mosoow, in the course of the play-back, that we learned about the supply of radio equipment held by the French Communist Party and through the French CP we learned of the latter's planned, internal radio net of seven lines inside of France. Through this almost two truck loads of technical equipment fell into our hands. Later the equipment belonging to OZOLS and his radio station, not yet activated, fell into our hands. Still later, fall of 1943, the last line was located by means of DF'ing as contact with Moscow was being made. This was the last radio link which made its existence known to us and we did not have enough information to move in on it. The details on the radio stations are mentioned here as a general explanation of the situation in the Paris area.

Lyon Radio Station

44. The Lyon radio station was seized while it was transmitting. The radio station had been established by an agent of the Soviet Military Attache in Paris. The agent's name was something similar to SCHREIBER (Station Comment: Hesekil SCHREIBER with aliases Georges KIEFER, "CAMILLE", and "GEORGES"). SCHUHMACHER, with alias "ROGER" (Otto SCHUMACHER, spelling in British Study), and Isidor SPRINGER from Brussels had fled to Lyon when the apparat in Brussels collapsed and they were working with the Lyon station. When the station was fixed by means of DF'ing and raided, one member of the station was killed during the resistance offered by members of the station. I think, if my memory is correct, that the man killed was SCHREIBER. Isidor SPRINGER committed suicide in the Lyon prison by jumping from a top floor. SCHUHMACHER was taken into custody.

Marseilles Radio Station

45. The radio station in Marseilles had been set up well in advance and was intended to become active after KENT fled from Brussels and Paris to Marseilles. Aside from necessary groundwork, little else was accomplished by this station. Margarete MARIVET (Mme. Marguerite MARIVET with aliases Mme. Madeleine MATENOT or MATELOT) and Jules JASPAR were not really suited or trained for the work. KENT, somehow, seems to have resigned himself. He later told me that his situation there had been such a contrast to his extremely active work in Brussels that he was unhappy and that in his heart he had already broken with Moscow. He would have preferred to withdraw with BARCZA (Marguerita BARCZA, KENT's mistress) and lead a quiet life. Only the fact that Moscow, i.e. the Director, was so irresponsible

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in directing his agents, asking everything from the agents and providing no support, had made him dissatisfied with matters as they were. He had never trusted TREPPER, also, and was convinced that in case of danger TREPPER would think only of himself and desert all the others -- which he did.

46. We had received reports of KENT's presence in Marseilles. Kriminaldirektor BOEMELBURG (Obersturmfuehrer Karl BOEMELBURG or BOEMMELBURG) in the company of some other officials went to Marseilles which was in unoccupied France at the time. BOEMELBURG arrested KENT, his mistress Margarete BARCZA, and her child. I do not know to what extent the French police were involved in the arrest but they participated to some degree. BARCZA and KENT travelled with the German officials from Marseilles to Paris. The two slept in the same hotel room with an official so that their connubial life was never interrupted. The statement in various publicized stories that BARCZA was arrested later is false. The landlord and neighbors where KENT and BARCZA lived in Marseilles never learned that the two were arrested but believed that they had fled hurriedly to avoid arrest. The other members of the Marseilles group were also arrested and brought to Paris, later taken to Berlin. The role of the brother of the former Belgian Minister President, Jules JASPAR, as a Moscow agent, was never clarified (as mentioned above).

The Radio Play-Backs

47. TREPPER's as well as KENT's agreement to cooperate in a German-controlled, radio playback against Moscow was obtained in the very beginning. The radio traffic was immediately resumed on all radio links which had been detected by DF'ing and were under German control. There were no technical problems. The "handwriting" of the original Soviet agent operator had generally been recorded on tape so that our German operator could quickly practice and reproduce the rhythm of the Soviet operator's "handwriting". This enabled us to substitute German operators almost immediately. Some of the Soviet operators continued to work on their sets under our strict control. As I recall WINTERINCK, WENZEL and MAKAROFF did this. Using the original Soviet operator was done only for a short time because the danger of a control sign which could be sent to Moscow was always present. Actually this danger was not too serious because every Soviet agent realized that the death sentence, an automatic sentence for espionage conducted on behalf of the enemy during the war, had been waived only as long as the agent was willing to cooperate. Some of the leaders of the Soviet Rezidentura, including TREPPER and KENT, were not even on record as being charged with espionage before a military court.

48. In the beginning the controlled radio sets were played back against Moscow for the purpose of feeding the enemy effective deception as rapidly as possible and with the secondary purpose of identifying other members of the Red Rezidentura in order to eliminate the entire Rezidentura. The

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officers of the military and security police counterintelligence organs were so fascinated by the hunt for Red agents that they were incapable of conceiving a long term operational plan. The radio links under our control which the enemy, the Director, was able to spot as German-controlled, were immediately discontinued and a new play-back started from the reserves of captured sets and agents. Our counterintelligence was able to provide a continuous supply of new agents for this purpose -- all of the Soviet agents thus used had done sufficient damage to the German cause to warrant their arrest.

49. As a result of my experience in the investigation of the HEYDRICH assassination, I had made some far-reaching proposals regarding a completely new plan for exploitation of captured enemy radio sets to neutralize and paralyze resistance movements. In order that my proposals could be understood, even could be considered, the top officials to whom they were presented had to discard the habitual executive type of thinking.

Station Comment: Source used the word "executive" throughout this report in the sense of police and legal action, i.e. executive action means arrests, passing sentence, imprisonment, execution, etc.

MUELLER, Chief of Amt IV of the RSHA (Gruppenfuehrer u. Generalmajor der Polizei Heinrich MUELLER), had pigeon-holed my proposals because of the internal struggle for power within the RSHA. A new security chief had not been appointed since HEYDRICH's death. MUELLER did not want to take the entire responsibility for such a radical and extensive change without a superior to back him. He realized very well that, due to the great shortage of professionally trained men, the stage would rapidly be reached whereby the constantly renewed and increasing resistance strength infiltrated by the enemy into occupied territories could not be combatted by executive methods. If, on the other hand, it was desirable to penetrate and paralyze the enemy's organization in order to eliminate danger from that quarter, radio play-backs and double agent operations, necessary to accomplish this goal, would require intelligence, factual information and not deception, in order to build up the enemy's faith in his "real" success. To accomplish this an entirely new approach and type of thinking was required and no one had even dared consider such an approach until then. In short, the enemy would have to be given as factual, credible, and ample information as possible, without endangering ourselves. The enemy had to be given truthful information which would interest him and was not dangerous to us. To accomplish this during the war required the highest authority because everyone engaged in the war had, until then, considered every soldier as an item of secret information.

50. When the new chief for the Security Police was appointed, MUELLER returned to my proposal regarding long-term and extensive double operations because MUELLER would no longer have to take full responsibility for the decision. I was asked by MUELLER to take charge of the controlled radio play-backs instituted with the captured Rote Kapelle members in Paris in

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line with my early proposals. During the period when I was reading into the operation, I was shocked to see how the play-backs had been directed. It was amazing that the Director in Moscow continued the radio contact and had not long before discovered that they were German controlled. Before various nets were rolled up, a distinctive, alive and bubbling character was evident in all the work. The various nets had emphasized military intelligence as one could read from the decoded messages. After the roll-up the reporting was lifeless, dull, and limited to insignificant details which the German army was willing to release. The reporting resembled the work of a journalist who wants to stretch his article out for the maximum number of words. The "officials" lacked the initiative and courage to assume any responsibility and everything used in the play-backs had to be approved by the highest authority to avoid any "flaps". I obtained in Berlin the necessary authority to act freely and independently.

51. TREPPER and KENT accompanied by Mme. BARCZA were living in a villa in Paris in which Kriminaldirektor BOEMELBURG resided and in which were housed the so-called "noble prisoners". The latter were prominent politicians, military leaders, espionage agents and resistance leaders. TREPPER had a well-furnished room and private bath, a radio, his own shaving equipment, good food and many other comforts. He could walk in the large park belonging to the villa although under guard when he did. KENT and BARCZA had a large room with the same comforts. Hillel KATZ and SCHUHMACHER @ "ROGER" were also housed in the villa although both had received the death sentence. The latter's sentences had been commuted on the basis of TREPPER's cooperation. KATZ and SCHUHMACHER's sentences would never have been carried out if TREPPER by his escape had not caused Berlin to decide that the two were no longer necessary and ordered them turned over to the proper authorities for execution. KATZ and SCHUHMACHER had never really been needed to mount the radio play-back but the commutation of their sentence was a gesture of good-will toward TREPPER. TREPPER certainly was not bothered by such considerations in his own actions.

52. I had many discussions with TREPPER about the Rote Drei in Switzerland because this net originally came under my jurisdiction. I had been told to do the ground work in Paris in preparation for the neutralization of the Rote Drei. The Kommando, headed before my arrival by Kriminalrat (Karl) GIERING, was concerned primarily with TREPPER as the most valuable agent. KENT had never been activated in a double play. It was obvious from the careless handling of his radio links that he was of little interest. KENT's link, "EIFFEL", had to be operated on a much larger scale because the link was based in Marseille where the radio transmitter was located. If the transmissions were not made from Marseilles, the problem was faced of how to prevent Moscow spotting, by means of the Soviet Direction Finding equipment, that the transmissions did not originate in Marseilles. The Kommando had a unit in Marseilles which would have enabled the operation to be run much better than it was. TREPPER and KENT, the two chiefs, were not exactly flattering in their remarks about each other and the Kommando was inclined to side with TREPPER. In addition TREPPER had shown himself

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more willing to give information on the Swiss net which would assist us to determine at which point we could penetrate the net. This was not his own idea but he agreed without resistance. The neutralization of the French CP illegal radio repair and work shops was also in progress. Most of the French members had fled and had not been found. As I recall, information concerning the repair shops and store houses used by the French CP in Paris for radio equipment was obtained over TREPPER's radio link by requesting from Moscow technical assistance for the Rezydentura's radio set. There was a great deal of work for the numerically small Kommando and it was superficial work because we could not, then, dig any deeper.

TREPPER's Escape

53. I had made a habit of sharing a bottle of wine with TREPPER every few days but during September 1943 had had to neglect him because of the pressure of work. On 15 September 1943, TREPPER asked that a medical prescription provided by a German doctor for his heart trouble be renewed. He had a heart ailment somewhat similar to angina pectoris. His prescription was obtained from a druggist in a large apothecary store of several floors located in the St. Lazare Station. I was absent, by chance, when TREPPER made the request so TREPPER's guard asked Kriminalkommissar (Heinrich Josef) REISER, my deputy, for permission to drive TREPPER to the apothecary shop. REISER granted permission. When Kriminalobersekretar Willie BERG was notified that he was to accompany TREPPER, BERG called REISER's attention to the fact that BERG and the chauffeur would have to go alone with TREPPER because no other officials were free. REISER reportedly agreed in any case. Whether REISER did approve or not has never been known because after the fact no one wanted to take the blame. I returned from my official conference and shortly thereafter BERG came to my office and told me that TREPPER had escaped. BERG was so upset that I immediately asked some of the officers to keep an eye on him to prevent any attempt at suicide. TREPPER's escape caused a sensation, naturally, because he was regarded as the "Grand Chef" of Western Europe, excluding Spain and Portugal.

54. The entire area in which he escaped was immediately searched with no success. BERG provided the following report on the events of the escape:

BERG and TREPPER went by car to the large drug store in the St. Lazare Station. The chauffeur remained in the car before the entrance where they entered. The store had several flights of very narrow, winding stairs leading from the ground floor to the first (European) floor where the prescription was to be filled. BERG and TREPPER climbed the stairs to the first floor. The stairs were so narrow that only one person could go up or down at a time. While the saleswoman was taking care of the prescription, BERG stood next to TREPPER sunk in very deep thought. BERG's only daughter who had died quite some time prior would have had her birthday on that day. BERG's wife was very ill and also very

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depressed by the daughter's death. BERG was reflecting on his private troubles although, he said, only for a few seconds. TREPPER disappeared down one of the winding stairs and out a street entrance other than the one before which the car was standing. The store was on a corner and had two entrances on two different streets so the chauffeur saw nothing.

Reconstructing the escape at the place it occurred confirmed BERG's account. Any attempt to follow TREPPER in the crowded streets of Paris was hopeless. It should be added that BERG had from the beginning trusted TREPPER, presumably too much.

55. The great question which was never answered as far as I was concerned was what really happened. I had been chief of the Kommando only a short time. The former chief, Kriminalrat GIERING, had withdrawn because of his health. His close, "per du" friend was BERG and both were on "per du" terms with Kriminaldirektor BOEMELBURG. All three had very good relations and personal contact with Gruppenfuehrer MUELLER, chief of Amt IV. In fact BERG was MUELLER's cigar procurer during the war. BERG never made an official trip to Berlin that he did not talk to MUELLER personally, probably passing on local gossip from Paris. BERG was known to gossip and his personal honesty was not the highest. The question I asked myself was: Was it not possible that an operation had been planned, timed to coincide with the arrival of the new chief (source) so that it would go unnoticed? Investigation and careful observation, however, revealed nothing to support my suspicion. BERG was honestly very upset by the escape and his emotional state was not assumed. MUELLER's reaction from Berlin was also authentic and a typical "desk" reaction.

Station Comment: The British Study views TREPPER's escape as possibly linked with TREPPER's "triple-play", a British theory that TREPPER although ostensibly submitting to German control in the double operation had somehow managed to notify or maintain contact with the Soviets. The British Study, page 44 of Part II, describes a visit to "a shop" made by TREPPER shortly after his arrest in December 1942. The Study states that TREPPER told SPAAK after his, TREPPER's, escape that he had such a good understanding with his captors that he was allowed to visit a shop while meeting his agents on German orders and his German guards watched from a distance. During the visit to the shop he had passed a report to a woman agent whom he had not betrayed to the Germans. On page 57 the Study states that "TREPPER, practicing much the same ruse as he had used in smuggling out his 1942 report, escaped from the custody of his German guard." In view of the British theory, the woman who prepared TREPPER's prescription may have been the agent, TREPPER claimed to SPAAK, he had not betrayed to the Germans. TREPPER may also have been building a cover story to protect himself against the time when he returned to the USSR. There is insufficient space here to comment on the complicated French CP communication link which

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the British Study suggests may have been used by TREPPER while the latter was still in German custody.

56. Berlin, apparently in a state of shock, completely forgot to answer my urgent teletype message concerning the escape which I sent to the RSHA Headquarters. There were at least five minutes of total silence before the biggest and most worrisome question came back: "How are we going to tell HIMMLER?" I replied to say nothing which was their reaction after they had recovered from the initial shock. Later hundreds of questions and requests for the most minute details arrived. We had to give the smallest bit of information; BERG was to be imprisoned on MUELLER's personal order. MUELLER sent his personal message on the teletype which was: "How could anyone leave the side of a criminal?" We had tried to indoctrinate him with the basic principle that it was impossible to run a double operation of long-term value and treat the enemy officers who were risking their lives as criminals. The storm center finally became the practical means to be used to track down and find TREPPER. I then clearly told Berlin that no trained man, including BERG, could be spared and that Berlin should send trained, competent replacements. Furthermore, I said that imprisoning the Kommando officers and staff would have a very bad psychological consequence. All individuals initiative would be killed if the men thought that in a dangerous undertaking failure would be blamed on an individual's carelessness, they would relapse into bureaucrats of the worst type. Omelettes cannot be made without breaking eggs. The crisis regarding the confidence and trust in my subordinates was relieved after a few days and none of the participants suffered afterward. Six weeks later the mood in the RSHA Berlin had so completely reversed that they were then of the opinion that TREPPER's escape was actually a benefit inasmuch as the measures taken as a result of his escape produced more information than would have been uncovered otherwise.

57. During my years of interrogation later in Moscow, TREPPER's escape was covered in the smallest detail at least ten times. I could never discover any clue to support the suspicion that a previously prepared plan had been made for the escape. In the beginning the Soviets took the point of view of interrogating me that TREPPER had escaped with our connivance in order that he could penetrate the cadre of the French CP for us. The Soviets regarded his escape as provocation. Next the Soviets attempted to convince me that Willi BERG was a close, trusted friend of TREPPER and a Moscow agent. The interrogators did not make much progress with the theory that BERG arranged TREPPER's escape on Moscow orders. The whole purpose of that attack was too obvious, i.e. to provoke me and possibly make me tell something in anger. They also told me, in connection with trying to provoke me regarding BERG, everything which BERG, allegedly their man, had reported about me after the war. Such stupid statements were made at that time that they could not possibly have originated with BERG.

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Search For TREPPER

58. The RSHA Berlin was convinced at first that the radio play-backs were finished because TREPPER needed only to go to the French CP and Moscow would have the report via some courier or other means of communication. The RSHA Headquarters was of the opinion that all the play-backs should be stopped. Orders came at the same time to turn Hillel KATZ and SCHUH-MACHER over to the police officials for immediate imprisonment.

59. I had to tell KENT about the seriousness of the situation because he was also in danger. I would say KENT was at his weakest and most depressed state during that time. He obviously expected the worst would happen. I did not take such a gloomy view and made it very clear to KENT that everything depended on keeping the radio play-backs alive. I asked KENT to write a report, based on his knowledge of the workings of the minds in Moscow, on what he thought Moscow's reaction would be if TREPPER suddenly announced that he had escaped from the custody of German counter-intelligence. KENT produced a brilliant and comprehensive report for me. In his answer, he described the thinking, the mistrust, and the entire internal structure of the Soviet organization. I later realized, after years in a Soviet prison, that KENT had put down the irrefutable truth. From his report I obtained a good background in the Soviet organization and its peculiar mental processes which served me well during my experience in the Soviet Union.

60. The tactical lines of the comprehensive search for TREPPER were determined by circumstances and what knowledge we could obtain. The outside world knew nothing of the police investigation. TREPPER, "le Grand Chef", was unknown to the general public. Newspaper announcements and placards bearing his photo were posted in the larger railway stations and in all border stations of France only. He was described only as an escaped enemy agent whose capture would bring a big reward. Simultaneously KENT announced on his radio link to the Director that he had seen TREPPER's picture on placards stating that the Germans were looking for TREPPER. KENT asked for instructions as to what he should do and what all of this meant. The Director answered promptly, as we expected, that KENT was to break off all contacts and not assist TREPPER in any way; the French CP should be warned because this was all probably provocation. The Director now emphasized KENT's work. We allowed TREPPER's radio link to die after two or three messages so that Moscow's suspicion of provocation would be strengthened. Later Moscow itself warned the French CP over "ANDRE's" link in very strong terms against TREPPER. TREPPER was completely isolated by these acts within three days. No one would touch him. The French CP was no longer concerned with him and the Party representatives did not even appear for the regular meetings which TREPPER had arranged. TREPPER had continued meeting with the Party people every fourteen days in a Catholic Church as an emergency measure. They frequently used the confessional booth for their discussions.

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61. The entire TREPPER complex was thoroughly and rapidly reviewed by the Kommando to detect any loopholes. Many of TREPPER's contacts and many of his known meeting places were not, however, investigated due to lack of time and personnel. Very important among those overlooked was TREPPER's mistress, de WINTER (Georgina de WINTER), who certainly should have been thoroughly investigated long before. It was very difficult to locate a person, recently arrived, through the Paris residence registry. Nevertheless, de WINTER was quickly located working in a children's home. Her first husband was reportedly an American. Up to that time it had not been known that she had a child by TREPPER, a son born about 1940. The old question, "Ou est la femme?" was also pertinent in TREPPER's case. He had gone directly from the apothecary shop to de WINTER in the children's home and a half-hour later was in a deserted villa on the outskirts of Paris. His flight was followed step by step. TREPPER was in luck because we arrived at each place about twenty to thirty minutes after he had left. Quite often the beds in which the two had slept were still warm. The trail led after several days to Mme. SPAAK, the wife of Claude SPAAK. She had not kept them in her house overnight but had turned them over to a church worker who sheltered them for a short time. Mme. SPAAK also played another role in TREPPER's escape; she was responsible for a large sum of money which TREPPER had held in reserve. The key, a sentence containing the word "parapluie" (umbrella), was sufficient for de WINTER to collect the several hundred thousand francs which Mme. SPAAK had left with the Belgian representative of the Red Cross in Paris. This man, a Belgian count, had apparently carried out other missions for Mme. SPAAK because he appeared shortly thereafter at the Claude SPAAK apartment which we had taken over. Before entering he asked the concierge whether everything was all right with Mme. SPAAK. The "concierge" was one of our men. When the count entered the SPAAK apartment, he was greeted by the German police and asked to produce his identity papers. He was allowed to leave and promptly berated the "concierge" for not having told him that the SPAAK apartment was occupied by German police. Mme. SPAAK mobilized all possible help for TREPPER. This included Antonia LYON-SMITH, the daughter of an English General, and French groups who had radio contact with London and with the Belgian Government in Exile, headed by Paul Henri SPAAK.

62. All of Georgina de WINTER's contacts were traced and questioned. Most of them had fled and in that case we placed our people in the empty apartments. Among those who had fled was a sixty-five year old widow, Mme. MAY, whose husband, a poet, had been dead for twenty-five years. MAY's apartment was occupied by French police officers who were assigned to help us in the search. While in the apartment the French police found a cache of weapons. Mme. MAY returned finally to her apartment on a Sunday. She was immediately taken into custody and questioned. She admitted that she had come from TREPPER's hiding place and that another meeting as well as emergency meetings with TREPPER were arranged. Mme. MAY was a very resolute and energetic woman and a fanatical French chauvinist. In spite of the promises we made to her, she did not want to reveal anything. She screamed at us, kicked me quite vigorously in the leg and hit me over

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the head with the handle of her umbrella. Finally she gave us the information. Although we took every precaution, we were unable to catch TREPPER. He was much too much of a specialist in clandestine meeting arrangements to allow himself to be taken by surprise. We realized that again we had missed him. Again he sought refuge in a home for old people and children. When we questioned the people in the home, we obtained a lead to de WINTER's and TREPPER's child who was hidden in the Maquis area of Correze and Limoges. The woman, charged with the care of the child, was brought to Paris under the cover of investigating a kidnapping in order to conceal the German interest in the child. Working from this lead, we located de WINTER working as a farmer's helper on a farm about 150 km. from Paris. She and TREPPER had been forced to separate when Mme. MAY was arrested. De WINTER was arrested in the late evening to avoid attracting attention in the area. The Kommando, not having had an opportunity to eat anything during the day, stopped about midnight, after arresting de WINTER, at a small cafe fairly near the place of arrest. Having drunk a large quantity of wine, de WINTER asked to go to the toilet. Two women from a nearby German unit were summoned to accompany her to the toilet and search her. A complete and thorough body search was made. In the course of the search, 100,000 French francs and a letter was found on her body. The letter was written, apparently, by a French woman and contained instructions and a plea for help directed to an address in Grenoble and one or two addresses on the Swiss border. The people asked to help were told that an important individual was fleeing from the Germans and needed shelter for a night or should be passed on to other persons who could shelter him. The important individual would identify himself by a certain name. The writer of the letter was later identified as Antonia LYON-SMITH. Her father was reported to be an English artillery general with MONTGOMERY's army in North Africa and later in Italy. She had been staying with relatives (in France) at the beginning of the war but was not interned because she was not yet eighteen years old. When she had her eighteenth birthday, her relatives arranged for false French identity papers to protect her. Through her friendship with Mme. SPAAK, she was approached with a request to assist French nationals who were escaping from the Germans by introducing them to people she knew. As the daughter of an English general, she could scarcely refuse to help.

63. LYON-SMITH was a young, proud, and very honest girl who made such a good impression on us that I arranged to stop the court trial and prison sentence which would have resulted from her actions. More should be written about her because my former colleagues have stated that the English counterintelligence officers who interrogated them spoke of her in a very derogatory manner, as if she had been working for either Moscow or the Germans which in both cases is complete nonsense.

64. De WINTER's arrest led to the arrest of Mme. SPAAK and many other people. De WINTER talked about TREPPER's personal habits, their intimate relationship, their private jokes, etc. I decided to place another announcement in the newspapers. TREPPER had, as a matter of fact, written me a letter on the second day of his escape, apologizing for his action. His

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letter read like an adventure novel. He claimed that a control agent sent directly from Moscow had shadowed him in the apothecary shop and commanded him to escape if he did not want to be shot. I thanked him for the letter by means of a newspaper announcement and asked him to call me on the telephone, all of this in disguised language which he would understand. After my newspaper announcement I talked to him on the telephone four or five times but never for more than two minutes. He would not remain on the line for more than two minutes and two minutes were not sufficient in Paris to track a telephone call. He claimed in his telephone conversations and in two letters that he wanted to maintain our cordial relationship no matter what happened. When we ran the newspaper announcement written in the intimate language he and de WINTER used between each other and stating that the boy and she were with us, he phoned again. He implied in his telephone conversation that he would like nothing better than to return but for unstated reasons could not.

65. Mme. SPAAK, her husband and their two children had fled from their French residence. She was captured by German officials in Belgium but only she was found. She talked openly and freely, withholding nothing in the belief that we already knew too much. Her testimony agreed with the facts as we knew them. What we did not know and learned from her was that she had supported the SOKOL's; she claimed, out of pity. She had sent a message through her contacts to her brother-in-law (Paul Henri SPAAK) concerning TREPPER and had arranged with TREPPER to use this channel of escape. Her contact man was arrested. He insisted that he had never assisted TREPPER at Mme. SPAAK's behest and although he was confronted with her, they both stuck to their original statements. We never were able to obtain the facts. While I was in prison in Moscow, I obtained some information which leads me to believe that Mme. SPAAK was telling the truth. The contact man had stuck to his original statement with iron nerves, insisting that he was innocent. An examination of the literature in his apartment had revealed that he was a sincere admirer of HITLER. At the time of the interrogation, I had considered the possibility that Mme. SPAAK was possibly taking revenge on the man. I had the impression that there had been a very close relationship between the man and Mme. SPAAK at one time.

66. In spite of her involvement with TREPPER, Mme. SPAAK was a very likeable woman who made an unforgettable impression. She was a serious, calm woman who looked at everyone with her large, protruding eyes in a composed fashion. Obviously she had followed her parlor-pink sympathies. She regarded all of her actions as an intellectual game and could never bring herself to sacrifice her comfortable living to become an effective and active worker for any cause. She was above all an artist with very modern taste in painting which the pictures, painted by her and hung in her apartment, indicated. Although we felt a great pity for her, she was too deeply involved for us to help her. She and Mme. MAY were brought to court with the others and sentenced to death. Mme. MAY actually received two death sentences, one for aiding the enemy and the other for concealing weapons. An order existed at that time that HITLER must review every death sentence passed by the courts against foreign women. He changed Mme.

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MAY's death sentences into 10 years in prison but let the death sentence remain for Mme. SPAAK. It was evident to us that his action resulted from the fact that Paul Henri SPAAK was leader of the Belgian Government in exile in London. I personally petitioned Berlin to have the sentence commuted on the grounds that Mme. SPAAK was needed in the search for her husband, the brother of the Minister President. My petition was immediately approved. I proposed to Berlin that Mme. SPAAK be asked to assist in the search for her husband with the promise that the death sentence would never be carried out if her husband was found and both of them remained in prison for the remainder of the war. Berlin agreed clearly and unequivocally to this proposal. Mme. SPAAK was in the military prison of Paris-Fresnes in which the security police kept all their prisoners but which was administered by the military authorities. The only exception to the rule were the "noble prisoners", security police prisoners who were housed in BOEMELBURG's villa and those prisoners, KENT, BARCZA, and LYON-SMITH, housed in my villa. I proposed to Mme. SPAAK that she send her husband a letter through her children in which she outline the German offer. She had asked the prison officials prior to writing the letter whether we would and could keep our word. The officials arranged for her to talk with me once more. I once more wrote Berlin asking for reassurance and emphasizing that in this case I had to keep my word. I received a firm, positive answer that the promise would be kept. After the second assurance, Mme. SPAAK wrote the letter as instructed and inclosed two small dolls which she had made out of her own hair for her children. The children, who were living with their grandmother in Brussels, received the letter. The father must have learned of the contents of the letter but he had not appeared as of the time we withdrew from Paris. At the time of the German withdrawal from Paris, the transportation of the Paris-Fresnes prisoners was handled by the military prison administration. I know positively that the commutation of the death sentence into a prison sentence in Mme. SPAAK's case was never revoked. I had always believed that she was taken to a prison in Germany. This belief was supported by the fact that towards the end of the war, in April 1945, I received a radio message from Kriminaldirektor KOPKOW of the RSHA while I was in Heiligenberg on Lake Constance asking my opinion of an exchange of Mme. SPAAK for German prisoners. Inasmuch as I had no particular opinions, I did not express myself one way or the other but from this letter I had always assumed that Mme. SPAAK had been exchanged before the end of the war. I was confronted in Moscow with the accusation that Mme. SPAAK had been executed while still in Paris-Fresnes. I simply did not believe this. Since I returned from the Soviet Union, however, I have heard that she was reportedly executed. If that is a fact, a horrible mistake occurred somewhere because as far as my Kommando and the Security Police were concerned, the change of death sentence to prison sentence had never been reversed. The responsibility can only lie with the administrative offices of the prison where the commuted death sentence may have been overlooked in the files. It was neither possible for, nor the responsibility of my Kommando to supervise the prison transport from Paris during the final hectic days of the withdrawal. It is most regrettable that all of our efforts to save this woman's life were in vain because of a stupid and horrible administrative mistake.

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Station Comment: The British Study places all emphasis on Claude SPAAK as TREPPER's assistant. The Personality Index of the Study under Claude SPAAK has the following: "The confidence which TREPPER reposed in SPAAK suggests that he was a well-known and well-tried friend of the USSR if not of the GRU." It then outlines the various steps by which Claude SPAAK assisted TREPPER and de WINTER after TREPPER's escape from the Gestapo. There is relatively little mention of Suzanne, Mme. Claude SPAAK, except: "SUZANNE was arrested in the Ardennes, interned in Fresnes Prison until her execution on 12 July 1944." Ruth PETERS, who was living with Claude SPAAK, became Mme. Claude SPAAK No. 2 and was working with him in assisting TREPPER during the time Suzanne SPAAK was in prison according to the Study. Horst KOPKOW, mentioned by source above as having written regarding the possible exchange of Suzanne SPAAK for German prisoners in April 1945, worked very closely with the British at the end of the war. It should also be noted that in the body of the British Study Part II appears the statement: "TREPPER told SPAAK etc;" "TREPPER himself, after his escape, gave SPAAK an instance of, etc." which would indicate that the British either questioned Claude SPAAK himself or obtained his story through his brother Paul Henri SPAAK. From the two sources, Claude SPAAK and KOPKOW, the British should have fairly positive information regarding Suzanne SPAAK's execution unless Claude SPAAK, wanting Suzanne out of the way in order to marry Ruth PETERS, and KOPKOW, to protect himself, did not give the facts.

67. From that time on the search for TREPPER was unsuccessful. Many new contacts were revealed, however. Arrests were made and much new information obtained. The families living on the Swiss border to whom Antonia LYON-SMITH had written the letter found on de WINTER were arrested. They were all Belgians who were living illegally on the French border after having fled when the Germans marched into Belgium. Antonia had spent a vacation there one summer at the recommendation of Mme. SPAAK. Antonia knew all of the people personally. They were for the most part former Belgian government heads and were transported back to Belgium via Paris. None of them were connected in any way with the Rote Kapelle. The search after TREPPER was so extensive that innumerable persons were involved whose names I cannot remember. I shall try to name the more prominent.

68. The third of the SPAAK brothers (Charles SPAAK according to the British Study) was imprisoned with his mistress for a few days. His mistress was pregnant so we cleared up as soon as possible the extent of their involvement in the Rote Kapelle complex. He and his mistress were released after a few days. He was very grateful for this completely humane treatment which was normal in Kommando in any case but he thought he had been given special treatment. After the war he interceded for members of the Kommando. While the latter were being interrogated he helped them with favorable statements and sent them food packages in prison.

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69. Antonia LYON-SMITH lived in my villa with the Kommando, sharing a room with one of the secretaries, for more than three months. I did not allow her to be brought to court, as stated above, because she would have received a fairly severe sentence for helping the enemy. Purely humane motives led me to arrange this, without Berlin's knowledge but with the approval of the head of the military court which was handling all Rote Kapelle cases. My actions were inspired neither by an effort to obtain LYON-SMITH's collaboration in an espionage operation nor by a sexual interest in her. She had become involved in the war machine through an unfortunate series of circumstances and as the daughter of an English general, she simply could not refuse to do whatever was asked of her to assist, allegedly, the Allied cause. Her relatives in Paris with whom she lived were extremely bitter and filled with hatred (presumably against the Germans). She, on the other hand, did not share their bitterness although they did not conceal their feelings from her. She ate breakfast every morning with me and those of my staff who worked most closely with me. I undertook various psychological tests to determine exactly what her attitude and feeling toward Moscow was. By instinct she was definitely hostile to the Soviets. She had never known the true nature of the group she met through Mme. SPAAK. I once offered, joking but pretending to be very serious, to have her put over the Spanish border so that she could report to the English Consul in Spain who would arrange for her transportation back to England. She begged me not to do this because, she said, she would immediately be imprisoned in England as a German spy; no one would believe the truth. I then asked her if she would report what good treatment she had received in my Kommando. She replied that she would certainly not make any such report during the first three years because she would be imprisoned if she did. I released her to her relatives toward the end of 1943 or early 1944 on her word of honor that she would not leave Paris. We checked on her regularly and I know that she kept her word. She had made such a good impression on me that I had never doubted that she would keep her word. We left her in Paris when we withdrew. She is reported to have been treated much worse by her own people than by us, the enemy. There were various indications of this. Later in Berlin I explained the entire case and was never reprimanded for my actions.

70. De WINTER was also kept in BOEMELBURG's villa as one of the "noble prisoners". She was transported to RSHA custody in Berlin a few weeks before the withdrawal from Paris. I have never learned what happened to her. One of the Russian officers, I think it was MAKAROV but am not certain, was taken to the RSHA in Berlin at the same time. The latter had been with my Kommando in Paris before the withdrawal. Kriminalobersekretar Willi BERG headed the transport.

Station Comment: The British Study states that Michel MAKAROV was executed after being taken to Germany. Unfortunately the last pages of the Personality Index, attachment to the British Study, are missing from Munich Base' copy so the final British information on Georgina de WINTER is not available in Munich.

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The Radio Play-Backs, "Funkspiele"

71. After TREPPER's escape the radio double operations against Moscow were concentrated on KENT's radio links. Moscow had reacted as we hoped and ordered all contact with TREPPER to be dropped. KENT received instructions from Moscow to contact "SOLYA", true name General OSOLS (Walde-mar OZOLS with aliases SOLJA, SOKOL, "The General", "Z", "Marianne"). "SOLYA" was ordered to put at KENT's disposal radio equipment which "SOLYA" had concealed. Moscow's orders were carried out exactly and the operation was successful. "SOLYA" did not have a large net in Paris but his connections in the rest of France were excellent. Most of his connections scattered around the country were well suited for intelligence work although not at all suited to sabotage or terror activity, which was perfect for our needs. KENT's official headquarters, as far as the Director was concerned, was Marseilles but this was inconvenient for us. At this time KENT received orders from Moscow to move to Paris in order to step up the active work in that area. The move made the radio communication much easier for us because we could place the emphasis on intelligence originating in Paris itself without making this conspicuous in Moscow's eyes.

72. I had finally achieved, after long negotiations with different military and political headquarters in Paris, permission to send only true and interesting material on our controlled radio transmitters. The sources of the intelligence which we sent to Moscow were the following:

- a. I C Oberbefehlshaber West (G 2 of the Supreme Western Command)
- b. BdS, Dr. KNOCHEN (Chief of the Security Forces, Standartenfuehrer u. Oberst der Polizei Dr. Helmut KNOCHEN)
- c. Hoehere SS und Polizeifuehrer SS Gruppenfuehrer OBERG (General-leutnant der Polizei Karl Albrecht OBERG)
- d. BICKLER, chief of Abteilung VI beim BdS (SS-Standartenfuehrer Hermann BICKLER)
- e. The German Embassy in Paris
- f. The German Trade Mission in Paris
- g. French Ministers, through direct contact
- h. German officers interrogating PW's, especially luftwaffe officers.
- i. Personal interviews with wounded PW's in hospitals.
- j. Catholic Church and Jesuits, through direct channels
- k. RSHA Berlin, information obtained from German Ministries.

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In addition to the above, we used journalists, diplomats, propaganda organs, etc. Very few of the above, maximum four or five, had any knowledge of the use made of the material they provided. Every day I received a copy of the secret monitoring report of the enemy radios. There were only three copies of this report in Paris. Using all of the material available to us, we would study, evaluate, and edit the reports collected by the authentic Moscow agents reporting to the principle agents under our control. The intelligence from the authentic Moscow agents was included only when it had been carefully evaluated and judged in terms of the material we had on hand. Most of the Moscow agent reports were destroyed because they were too dangerous for us. We also put "SOLYA" on firm financial basis so that he could travel and pay his agents.

Finances

73. Finances were the cause, naturally, of constant complaints to the Director. We had been successful in obtaining \$10,000 from Moscow which the Director arranged through Switzerland. We had also had a large sum of money placed at our disposal through a complicated arrangement with the Soviet Ambassador in Sofia. The latter transaction was carried out by an alleged merchant who could travel in Bulgaria and had arranged letter drops and clandestine meetings. When, however, the companies founded by TREPPER and KENT (i.e. Foreign Excellente Raincoat/Trenchcoat; SIMEXCO; SIMEX) had been dissolved, Moscow's suspicions could be aroused by a report which might slip by our monitoring system. The first thing to do, obviously, was to start black market operations and establish another company which would provide an authentic source of funds for KENT. Agents, working under "SOLYA" and latter under LEGENDRE (Paul Victor LEGENDRE, @ "GOUPIL"), were infiltrated as employees into a trading company in Paris. Their mission was to ascertain the black market possibilities while working as regular employees. I often had occasion to deal with "SOLYA" myself under the cover of an army purchasing agent interested in purchasing technical oils, fats, coca beans. (Station Comment: "SOLYA" had no knowledge of the German control of KENT so was completely ignorant of source's intelligence activities.) The trading company in Paris in which "SOLYA" and LEGENDRE's agents were working was too restricted for our purposes. We, therefore, founded a firm, "Helvetia Handelsgesellschaft", in Monte Carlo during December 1943 and opened branches in Paris, Madrid and Geneva. The fact that the home office was in Monte Carlo was indication enough that very slippery businessmen were involved. The firm in Monte Carlo was placed in contact with one of the kings of the black market along the French and Italian Riviera, a Corsican. This was accomplished through Italians in Paris and Madrid. The firm did not open its branch in Geneva as planned because the RSHA suddenly took action against the "Rote Drei", a most unfortunate move done entirely on Headquarters' initiative. The RSHA in Berlin took action for some whimsical reason and completely without my knowledge although the "Rote Drei" had clearly been included in my field of responsibility.

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74. The branch of our firm in Madrid had to have Spaniards primarily, at least as the front men. Italians and French were in the background, of course, and behind all of them was the Sonderkommando. The brother of the head of FRANCO's bodyguard was one of the Madrid stockholders. The firm used a bank, one of the directors of which was an enemy national. This particular man, the bank director, said, in regard to the black market activities, that when it is a question of making money such things as nationality and patriotism do not matter. Through the bank we obtained connections with all enemy countries abroad. The money which Moscow transferred for our use could be forwarded through the latter channels. Before our commercial organization could be properly exploited, the invasion of France occurred. Our agents were able, however, to work under the cover of the firm and the finances for the controlled Soviet nets could be logically explained by the firm. None of the company's founders and members knew, naturally, the true purpose of the firm. The control and direction of the company did not represent extra work for the Kommando because the company ran itself. The simple desire to make money was the driving force of the business and was sufficient to make it successful. I received, early in 1944, an offer of a large wolfram delivery from Madrid through the channels of the company. This was, of course, illegal, but it was a sizeable offer concerning sixty to seventy tons per month to be delivered to the free harbor of Bayonne. As far as I was concerned, a transaction of this type was a by-product of the main purpose of the firm but Berlin was very interested in the wolfram. I had to go to Madrid, begin negotiations and obtain samples for Berlin. Our chiefs in the Armaments Ministry were very happy with the whole deal and wanted to complete it -- but it was already April (1944). The invasion began in June and I assume that no deliveries were made. This is only an example of the small by-products which developed from the entire work on the Rote Kapelle complex.

Station Comment: The British Study, page 64, contains the following: "In April 1944 (CARETINA), leader of the Sonderkommando controlling the penetration and deception service against the R. U. in France, paid a visit to Spain. The purpose of this visit is unknown, but it is possible that he was following up some lead into Russian intelligence: see, for example, TREPPER's story of a Russian agent passing through France to the Iberian Peninsula in June 1941, etc." We found no mention of the "Helvetia Handelsgesellschaft" in the British Study and assume from this that, at the time the British prepared Part II of the Rote Kapelle Study, the existence of the German-controlled firm was unknown, at least the German control and purpose behind the firm was unknown.

75. The danger that Moscow would learn of the true situation of its Rezidentura haunted me night and day. TREPPER had escaped. We had to take precautions against the possibility that the French CP would seize the initiative and institute independent radio communication with Moscow. During the search for TREPPER, a radio transmitter of which we were aware

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but had not touched went on the air. The transmitter was literally in our hands within three days. Action had to be taken as fast as possible. I would have preferred to wait a little longer before seizing the transmitter but through a misunderstanding, the transmitter was seized almost as soon as the DF'ing had definitely fixed the location. The radio operator ANDRE, who was caught in the act of transmitting, managed to cut the veins in his wrist and neck before he could be stopped. He was rushed to the hospital, streaming blood, but his life was saved. His neck and hands were put into plaster casts so that he would not again attempt suicide. We had to question him in this condition. His messages were quickly decoded. We found the first query to the Director from the French CP concerning TREPPER and the reply from the Director, instructing the French CP to have absolutely nothing to do with TREPPER because he probably had been doubled by the Germans. This was exactly the reaction we wanted from Moscow. We could not find the agents who were connected with the transmitter and consequently did not locate TREPPER.

76. ANDRE was afraid of us at first but when the officials put a cigarette in his mouth and lit it for him, fed him as though he were a small child, he became talkative. His life story was typical of a Soviet agent in France. He said to us, "You are humans. If I had known that I would not have cut my veins. You will understand why I acted as I did after you have heard my history." ANDRE was by profession an electrician, if I remember correctly, and he had lived in the provinces where he was a dedicated Communist. The Party had great confidence in him and had given him some delicate missions to perform. One day a man, whom he did not know, visited him. The unknown man told ANDRE that as a trusted comrade he was to perform a special mission. He was first ordered to go to another village from where he would be passed along, step by step, to the Belgium border. He would be taken over the border and put aboard a Soviet freighter in one of the Belgium harbors. This occurred and he sailed to Leningrad. He had not been allowed to say farewell to his family before leaving. From Leningrad he was sent on to Moscow where he was well received and asked, as a comrade of the proletarian class, whether he was willing to undertake a special mission to which great honor would be attached. For a year he was trained in almost all operational techniques of intelligence work. Before departing he was given recognition signals, promised that a radio set would be brought to him which must be concealed, and finally was ordered to break all connections with the Communist Party. He had been thoroughly impressed during his training with the idea that if he should fall "into the hands of the enemy, the class enemy," he would be tortured in the most horrible fashion. Believing this, he had cut his veins when he was captured. In addition Moscow had demanded of him that he not allow himself to be captured by the enemy alive in order that he not talk. He was returned to France as he had left ship to Belgium and then passed from village to village into France. When he arrived the CP had already started a press campaign against him. He was expelled from the Party as a traitor and none of his former friends would even look at him. He, of course, was waiting for the visitor who would give him the recognition signal and the radio set. After several years had passed the visitor came. ANDRE received his radio

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equipment and went to work.

Station Comment: A rather hasty examination of the entire Personality Index attached to the British Study did not provide further identification of ANDRE. The only remotely possible identification we could make was: "EVE": Radio operator for Henry ROBINSON's organization in France in May 1941. French national. Born ca 1904. Communist sympathizer but not a Party member. Radio-electrician by occupation; served in heavy artillery regiment of French Army; apprenticed to and subsequently employed by PATHE.

77. We continued the transmission on ANDRE's transmitter but nothing came of it. We had guessed that Moscow would notice the interruption in ANDRE's transmission and would become suspicious. ANDRE did not appear before a military court because he was being held for possible future use. His was the last radio transmitter we detected. From then on the danger that a French CP transmitter would become active was ever present. It was true at this time that the leading cadres of the French CP were distracted because they were completely occupied in strengthening the Party's position in the Maquis in preparation for "X" day when they wanted to be certain they would play a decisive role. The Party was working with all groups of the Maquis in an effort to infiltrate their men into the top positions of the Maquis. Their penetration efforts were done under the cover of French nationalism. Complete groups of the Maquis were composed only of Communists who were provided with weapons and organized into cadres in preparation for a civil, or in their terms "class" war. We were well informed on the Party's activities along this line and did not fear the leading cadres. It was obvious to us that something had to be done for the benefit of the Party leaders who, in turn, would pass the news on to the intelligence section. It was thus we hoped to silence the latter section.

78. The elimination of the French CP radio links was actually a disadvantage for our planning. I decided, therefore, to rebuild radio communication, not to serve the Party cadres but as a support for the Soviet intelligence work. The radio link would be available, through our plan, to the French CP if the latter wanted to send an emergency message. We undertook our enormous task.

79. Waldemar OSOLS (OZOLS), alias "SOLYA" (SOLJA), allegedly a Lithuanian general, had been working for the Soviets in Paris since the Spanish Civil War when he had won Soviet confidence by his efforts for the Red side. KENT claimed to have known OSOLS in Spain but I doubt this. The two did not know each other when they met for the first time. "SOLYA" had a contact with the Soviet Military Attache in Paris (when the Soviet MA was still in Paris) and with TREPPER. He was supposedly working independently after the war started but he did not have a radio operator. During the entire time we were in Paris OSOLS was ignorant of the German control behind his work for Soviet intelligence. At the end of the war when KENT and I were in the Soviet Headquarters in Paris, OSOLS still knew nothing of the role the

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Germans played in KENT's operations. I was told during my interrogation in Moscow that OSOLS had been brought to Moscow to report. This may be but I have no proof of it.

80. Capitaine Paul LEGENDRE had been the head of a resistance group, operating in the south and center of France, which the German security police had partially destroyed. A number of his people were seized including his wife. She was at the time (when LEGENDRE came into Source's controlled group) in the Ravensbrueck concentration camp. He himself was being sought and his name was on all wanted lists. He hid in Marseilles and had begun to work again in a small way. The connection with LEGENDRE was through "SOLYA". LEGENDRE was helped financially (by the Germans) and offered a radio operator because, allegedly, his reports were important enough to transmit by radio. He was grateful and honored by the offer. It was soon evident that he was a good Communist and had excellent connections with the Party. All of these attributes made him ideally suited for our purposes. He was allowed to continue believing that he was working for Moscow. Being an intelligent man with some concept of the entire situation, he realized himself that the emphasis should be on intelligence work. Consequently, he directed his espionage activities toward the harbors and shipyards in Toulon working for the Germans. The security weaknesses of the latter were quickly revealed to us by his reporting. We would intercede, however, only if a real threat existed. We stopped sabotage proposals from his group with the excuse that Moscow's approval must first be obtained, nothing without the Director's approval. As a former soldier, he understood this type of discipline. The answer given him, allegedly coming from Moscow, was: "Intelligence work is more important at the moment and should under no circumstances be endangered. Sabotage must be approved by us before any action is taken." We finally summoned LEGENDRE to Paris because we needed his excellent connections with the French CP and to prove to him that the "Soviet Rezidentura" was supporting him. The group in Marseilles continued to function for a long time. Our radio operator, "JOY", working with the group, was responsible for the radio traffic with the central headquarters in Paris and so everything went as we wished.

81. In order to make absolutely certain of LEGENDRE's allegiance to KENT and prove to LEGENDRE that KENT was a very important man, it was arranged that Mrs. LEGENDRE should be released from the Ravensbrueck concentration camp, allegedly by means of bribes and KENT's well-placed contacts in Germany. The result of this was that LEGENDRE had complete confidence in KENT although his wife's release was not an unmixed blessing for LEGENDRE because it offered certain obstacles to his love affair with his secretary. LEGENDRE generally received instructions from "SOLYA" but occasionally directly from KENT. Reliable and rapid communication with the provinces which would enable the intelligence material to be brought to Paris for rapid transmission to Moscow was lacking. Beside his connections in the provinces which had already been activated, LEGENDRE was given the task of finding young Communists with proper qualifications whom we could train as radio operators and simultaneously in clandestine operational techniques. We were very strict in our "conspiratorial" techniques. Any member who made the smallest mistake was severely reprimanded by KENT.

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KENT's rigid discipline was respected by old soldiers such as "SOLYA" and LEGENDRE and made them always stand at attention in his presence. Our own security was served to the best advantage by careful observance of "conspiratorial" methods as taught in the Soviet training courses and practiced in Soviet clandestine operations.

82. LEGENDRE found among the young French Communists both trained radio operators who could be put to work almost immediately and young men whom we trained ourselves. Although they were all Communists, they were under very strict orders not to reveal their Party affiliation to avoid arousing mistrust among the non-Communist members of the resistance organizations. As far as these young Communists knew, they were working as radio operators for the Allies and the ultimate destination of their messages was London. Not one of them was told that Moscow was behind the entire operation. The only information given them was that the men who contacted them and served as out-outs were members of the French CP and for the rest the "conspiratorial" discipline served to keep them in line. After completing the training and with a minimum knowledge of their organization, the young Communists were assigned to a radio station which we had detected and were monitoring and frequently told to develop their own contacts and sources of intelligence. The radio communication and the whole operation worked magnificently. I had, during the period when this operation was at its peak, hundreds of reports from the Communist penetrations of the resistance passing over my desk every day. The number of agents whom we were controlling increased and, most important, not one of them knew of the German control behind the entire network. Neither LEGENDRE or "SOLYA" ever knew that the Germans were controlling their nets. They were played until the last day. I can't remember the exact number of principle agents but there were more than thirty. They were all well paid, by the Germans naturally, and all believed that they were being paid by either "Moscow" or "London".

83. In my report on the "Internal French Net" (Station Comment: To be forwarded as soon as possible), I have already described how we handled this network, how the radio operators controlled by us agreed to continue reporting on the Allied landings after the invasion. If a personal account of how we controlled the underground is desired, the American Air Force Captain (Station Comment: Major M. J. GATEWOOD) can be consulted. He was shot down, found shelter in the French resistance and thereby came in contact with the organization controlled by our Kommando. He was brought to Paris and eventually put over the Spanish border, all arranged through radio communication controlled by us. This occurred shortly before our withdrawal from France. We passed the American flyer through the very heart of the territory occupied and ruled by the Maquis. GATEWOOD, as a result of his own experience, can give the best description of how securely and confidently my people moved among the ranks of the resistance.

84. The organization controlled by our Kommando within the resistance groups was so extensive that we ourselves did not know all details and names. The basic skeleton was composed of more than two hundred people,

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all of whom were sources of intelligence. There were seven radio stations. In spite of the size of the organization, we maintained a very strict centralized control. The whole organization obeyed and no one acted without prior approval or against orders. Occasionally we had to condone some action because disapproval would have aroused suspicion and caused the central directing powers to be accused of "cowardice". Such action occurred generally among the youth groups. The directing, controlling cadre was pyramidal in shape with KENT at the top and nets radiating from every member of the leading cadre, hanging from each man like bunches of grapes. The agent or working level had, naturally, no knowledge of the leaders because the exact same system as used in Communist "conspiratorial" operations was used. All of the functions of the internal net are described in detail in my report on this subject.

Intelligence Material Passed on the Radio Links
to Moscow

85. The information which we passed to Moscow was already touched on briefly but it was a very important aspect of the entire operation. When I first took over the Kommando, the level of reporting had to be built up again to the factual and current reporting, typical of the Soviet nets before we assumed control, in order that Moscow's suspicions not be aroused. The basic principle on which we compiled our intelligence for Moscow was to send interesting intelligence, not obviously deception, which would keep Moscow interested but would not enable the Director to detect the German origin. At the same time, we were seeking positive gains for ourselves through the two-way radio traffic. We hoped to learn, on one hand, of Moscow's continuing interests or targets in both the political and military fields and, on the other hand, to be able to direct Moscow's interest to areas of knowledge wherein we ran no risks and in which Moscow was not previously interested. For example, a report that the German Foreign Office in Berlin had made contact with the Western Allies brought an immediate reaction from Moscow. This report was followed with a report that RIBBENTROPP personally was handling the negotiations and reactions in the Soviet press were forthcoming from the two reports which we fed Moscow. Our first task was to whet Moscow's appetite for intelligence on the political situation, the Church, and in the world of business. Too much emphasis had been laid, during the first period of the radio playbacks, on military intelligence. During the early days the Kommando had been satisfied with answering the Director's queries and requirements. They also had to avoid passing too much military intelligence and as a delaying tactic, they had larded the military reports with miscellaneous intelligence. A complete change of policy and direction occurred (Station Comment: Source implies when he took command of the Kommando). The replies to the Director's queries became the smallest part of the messages and we succeeded in eliciting questions from the Director based on intelligence we had volunteered. Within two or three months we knew exactly where the Director's interest lay and what the Director's targets were. We often

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inserted material which a member of the Kommando had suggested and which appeared to be a good idea even though we risked having the Director reply that there was no interest or that the report was nonsense. At the appropriate time, i.e. when we felt we had a clear picture of the Director's attitude, KENT sent a message that he would like to know whether he and his apparatus had been successful, had contributed to driving out the Nazi occupation from our "Rodine" (native land) in conjunction, naturally, with the victorious Red Army; and furthermore, only the Director with a world-wide picture of events could decide which intelligence sent by KENT and his apparatus was of real interest. This type of flattery with a mild overtone of reprimand was loved by the Director and generally such a message was immediately acknowledged.

86. The Soviets naturally were interested, within the field of military intelligence, in all technical information on weapons, all intelligence on troop units brought from the Eastern Front to France for rest and rehabilitation, on all new troop units destined for the Eastern Front, and all information on dates of transfers and changes in the command structure of the German Army. We received questions on the coastal fortifications along clearly defined stretches of the Atlantic Coast and canals. The latter questions seemed strange and inexplicable. Queries of this type were seldom and were limited generally to only one village. If we received a query of the latter type we sent, for example, the following reply:

All guard posts are held primarily by Russian volunteers. It is surprising that the guards are all armed with the English Sten machine pistol, a weapon which is cheap and easily assembled. An informant has said that Germany purchased the Stens through a neutral source with a promise that the weapons would not be used on the Eastern Front.

This type of message brought an immediate reaction because, although not stated, it was clearly implied that the weapon, allegedly in the hands of the guards, had been sold with English knowledge. If the Russians had asked the English how the Sten machine pistol came to be in the hands of German guards, England could not and would not have been able to explain, both for reasons of prestige as well as lack of knowledge. The Sten machine pistols had been "played out" of England in an English play-back operation, allegedly, for mass delivery to resistance groups and in reality for us (the Germans had then given them to the Russian volunteer guards under German command). Through such operations, we could compile our messages for Moscow, covering all fields of interest, and the information was 90% true, i.e. true at the time of the radio transmission or for a few days before or after the transmission. Frequently the Director would find the intelligence sent over the radio transmission confirmed in the press a few days or weeks later. The Director was shown time and again that his apparatus in France had access to high-level sources who were reliable and authentic.

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87. The Director was very distrustful of his Western Allies because the Director regarded as quite normal and practical from the standpoint of the Western Allies the possibility that the Western Allies would join forces on European soil and attack the USSR. The Bolsheviks smelled the misalliance between the Western Allies and the USSR. I recounted before (see Attachment A to EGMA-43172 of 14 July 1959) the story told me by the Red Army Political officer while I was in a Soviet prison: KAGANOVICH had gone to the front when the Soviet Caucasian Front was collapsing to try to bolster morale; the Soviet officers asked KAGANOVICH what was delaying the Second Front and he answered, "You want a Second Front? We are happy that they (Western Allies) are not shooting at us!" - which should have been obvious to all (Station Comment: Source is referring to the inevitable, in his opinion, hostility between the USSR and the Western Allies). The inner relationship of the entire Alliance was certainly revealed by the query about the landing strength of the Western Allies. I did not dare to reply on my own responsibility and forwarded the query to Berlin. Berlin forwarded the decision to the Fuehrer's Headquarters. The Fuehrer and Commander-in-Chief (HITLER) answered eventually himself and gave a figure for the landing strength which was considerably less than the actual figure. After we sent the answer to the Director, the latter replied with another question: Was this really an invasion or only a feint? and this question must be answered definitely and exactly.

88. Toward the end of 1943, I sent a long, detailed, political report about the internal political situation in Germany; the dissatisfaction with the Nazi leadership; the unexpressed hopes of the military, financial, big industrial circles, and the clergy for the future; and in short a cross-section of opinion of all classes in Germany. Before transmitting the message, I showed Dr. KNOCHEN, the Commander of the Security Forces in France, the entire report. KNOCHEN was so astonished that he said, "My friend, that is all accurate. If I had such a report on England, I would pay 100,000 marks for it. How can you pass such intelligence?" A well traveled journalist, working in my Kommando, who had helped compile the report, said that I would never receive permission from Berlin to transmit the report to the Director. I was convinced that Berlin, rather the RSHA, would approve it and bet six bottles of champagne which I won within twelve hours. The report was sent by the RSHA in a circular letter to all officials involved in radio play-back operations as an example and training for their work. How could such a thing occur? This was a typical example of how a dictatorship operates. Within the RSHA the officials could not grasp the fact that the report was true. The RSHA officials automatically assumed that the report was a very sophisticated deception. The government officials had swallowed the propaganda believed by the "faithful" for so long that they were oblivious of the intellectual and emotional trends within the German people which were obvious to anyone with a brain. What was more important was that the moneyed, propertied classes who were losing more and more of their possessions would rather lose the war to the West than see everything they owned disappear in dust and ashes. The same propertied classes were violently opposed to the East and were afraid that Bolshevism would automatically accompany complete collapse.

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For this reason I could transmit to Moscow a message which was true but which would not harm my country and fellow Germans. If Moscow wished, Moscow could have seen clearly that although the Soviets were shedding their blood in the common cause of the Alliance, the German people were 100% pro-Western and had no love for the Bolshevik experiment of which they had seen enough on the Eastern Front. The Director reacted angrily, as we expected, with an ideological tirade, the only one we received on the radio link, against Nazi Germany. The RSHA simply could not comprehend the significance of the exchange of messages. The opinion in the RSHA was that we could safely feed such material to the East but never could send it to the Western Allies because the latter would exploit the information. The report was sent to the Chief of the play-back operations against the West along with the other counterintelligence officers.

89. The typical bureaucratic official and thick-headed military officer, both, are worthless for operations such as our radio play-backs which demand a feeling and understanding of human beings. The man for this type of work must be a man with an active and intelligent understanding of the political situation, not a Party politician but an intelligent political analyst. I mention these details because even in Moscow I was asked during my interrogation how it happened that permission was given to send the message containing the report. After the war the Soviets realized that the report was 100% true which they would never have recognized or admitted to recognizing during the war because of the ideological blinders they wear. The gentlemen in the RSHA in Berlin were the same. If the Soviets had seriously considered the information in our radio message concerning the orientation of the German people toward the West, they would have been angry at the German people for blocking the progress of Communism in Germany. Had this occurred, the Soviets would probably have made much too heavy demands on the Western Powers which the latter, simply to keep face, would have had to refuse. We saw far reaching consequences from our radio message, much farther reaching than Berlin saw. We were not wrong in our estimate of the East but on the other hand we were far off in our estimate of the West. The idea of a trip to Moscow (on Source's part) developed subsequently out of this general train of thought and the problem of the trip was solved, in any case, by an invitation from Moscow.

Station Comment: Source's trip to Moscow resulted from messages sent to the Director concerning KENT's alleged German, anti-Nazi co-workers and was apparently a joint plan of Source and KENT.

Results and Successes of the Radio Play-Back Operations Against Moscow

90. The Director had not found it necessary for the two and a half years (life of the radio play-back operation) to strengthen our area (France) or to call in reserves. Even a visit from a controller, a common practice for Soviet espionage nets, had not occurred although we had urged the

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Director to send one. When TREPPER was still in our hands, Moscow had announced that a controller would visit the apparat. We had requested the visit under various pretexts, first on TREPPER's radio links and then on KENT's link. Over KENT's radio link we had justified our need for consultation with the controller by the desirability for the controller to see with his own eyes how much the work had expanded and confirm the fact that financial assistance was necessary to support the expanded activities. Moscow assured us that money would be forthcoming via an American bank but we were asked to arrange the necessary channels. We had accomplished this by founding our international firm, "Helvetia Handelsgesellschaft". Unfortunately the military developments intervened and a transmittal of funds was impossible. Moscow was firmly convinced that everything would go as planned. We had covered all eventualities in our planning for the controller's visit and had no fears about his visit. About this time we wanted to start our biggest "coup" which was to introduce the "German resistance members". The exact steps to be taken to accomplish this were not planned in advance because so much depended on the personality of the controller. As far as Berlin was concerned I had almost complete freedom of action.

91. As stated above, Moscow's interests and intentions had been completely revealed to us through the radio play-backs. Not only Moscow's tactics regarding the military situation but Moscow's plans for the internal French situation were known. We had provoked Moscow with such demands as: "A very reliable comrade, presently the head of one of the larger Maquis organizations in which a strong right element is present, would be most useful in our work. May we take him away from his present job?" Moscow replied: "No, he is not to leave his present mission because he can exercise great influence where he is. You (KENT) are not to touch him or compromise him. You will find other workers who are free to help." Through such exploitation of the radio operations we were able to ferret out all of Moscow's technical reserves and co-workers.

92. We were successful in guiding Moscow's interest toward targets which we had selected by means of harmless reports, unsolicited from Moscow. Through this channel we could, therefore, exercise some influence, thanks to the peculiar mentality of Moscow.

Controlled Internal French Radio Traffic

93. We had an exact knowledge of our own security weaknesses as a result of the detailed reporting on the invasion area, a very important area for us, and on the Supreme Western Headquarters. We knew that in certain French villages everyone from the mayor to the goat-herder was working against us along intelligence lines, a situation which made it impossible to maintain any secrecy. The best example of this was ROMMEL's Headquarters. He had an official Headquarters in which he did not live and an ^{un}official Headquarters in which he did live. I had received a radio message giving all details accurately of his two Headquarters. I warned

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the Headquarters to be somewhat more careful. A certain Major BRINK was in the I C (G-2) and BRINK in civilian life had been an ossified district judge. He was angry because he had not been out in on the work on the Rote Kapelle. In the absence of his commander, he issued an order to me to arrest the entire French group within twenty-four hours and submit a complete report to him. The justification for the order was that the French group was too dangerous to be allowed to remain free. The order was signed by Generalfeldmarschall von RUNDSTEDT who, of course, had no information on the significance or background of the command. If I did not carry out the order within twenty-four hours I could be brought before a military court because we were at war in France and the Supreme Commander West was the highest authority. This ridiculous command stemmed entirely from stupid resentment which BRINK had disguised under a command. I would have had to arrest more than 180 people in the area. This was impossible for practical reasons and would have ruined our entire operation. It was also morally reprehensible because in building up our operations and also to identify the honest and intensely nationalistic Frenchmen who might be driven to action, we had encouraged the latter to become active. Such nationalistic Frenchmen might have, in the course of events, become active against us but we had certainly pushed them toward action. It was so simple for a high-ranking general to sign an order to be executed within twenty-four hours, the order was then issued from a Wehrmacht desk and if not obeyed, we were the miscreants. To execute this particular command the entire population of a village would have had to be arrested. With the support of SS and Polizeifuehrer OBERG, still imprisoned in France today, and all the influence and strength I could muster, I fought the command. OBERG personally phoned HIMMLER and the RSHA Headquarters in Berlin turned to HIMMLER. I contacted JODL in the Fuehrer's Headquarters. When the command went to von RUNDSTEDT to withdraw the order, it originated in the Fuehrer's Headquarters. All that ROMMEL's staff would have needed to do when our warning was received was to set up a flying Headquarters for ROMMEL who, in any case, was always on the move. No matter what they did, the French would have continued to report on every new Headquarters and pass the information along to their cut-outs. The only real danger was that the reports might not reach our Kommando but it is hopeless to try to explain such complicated counterintelligence support to a rank-conscious officer who assumes from habit that he only needs to think of a command and it will be executed.

94. Proposed acts of sabotage had to receive prior approval in our well-disciplined organization and they were disapproved almost 100%. In cases where we could not securely disapprove the proposal, we sent our own special cadres to carry out the sabotage. Some type of sabotage was performed for purposes of cover and deception but visual evidence was the only evidence. In this way we got away with our alleged sabotage.

95. One of the positive products of our internal French network was an expansion of our knowledge of the French underground organization.

96. We located many persons who were on the wanted list. For the most part they remained hidden and undertook no action. They generally were

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frightened into hiding by the fact that they were being looked for by the "Gestapo". This was due to the reputation of the Gestapo. The Allied broadcasts were largely responsible for spreading the "reputation" of the Gestapo and thereby paralyzing the work of many people.

Station Comment: Source, as a former Amt IV Gestapo official, is naturally implying that the Gestapo did not earn its "reputation", the "reputation" was the result of Allied broadcasts!

We found this quite helpful at times because people on the wanted list remained in hiding and presented no problems. Some of them worked in organizations controlled by us, preparing "political opinions" for the orientation of Moscow or London, depending on the case. We found appropriate work for all of them which chained them to their hiding places. In order to impress a man who looked worthwhile to us, we would have him warned that the Germans were going to search a village on such and such a day and that he should disappear for the day. The search would actually be made including his original hiding place and he would be very impressed with the organization which warned him. The most prominent man in this category was a former Vice-Governor or some such former high official from the French African Colonies, also of course, a delegate of the French Parliament, who gave the impression of being very pro-Soviet.

97. We received considerable scientific intelligence, new inventions and improvements. Some of the intelligence was collected for Moscow and some for London. All reports went, naturally, to Berlin and from the reports several valuable items were obtained according to the German Scientific Institute.

98. Hidden stores of weapons, explosives, and fuel were located by us and for tactical reasons we moved them to other storage areas, mostly our own. We also gave trusted agents the mission of finding weapon caches and storing them until they were needed. We financed the buying of weapons and paid bonuses for each weapon procured. One of the most astonishing results was a delivery of German machine pistols which had been missing from a German weapons store for six months. In order to uncover the source of the German weapons, we ordered, through our controlled agent, more weapons and then put the storage area under observation. The Germans selling the weapons were seized. The Italians were so generous in selling their weapons that they could be purchased from at least half the men in any unit.

99. One of the more insane problems we faced was that of the mayor or prefect of the towns and villages. Most of them belonged to resistance groups and were, therefore, under our control. Such officials were dangerous because they had authority and were obeyed by the people. They could make very stupid mistakes. We were forced to withdraw some of them from their official and legal contact with the German officials to avoid trouble. The excuse used for such an order was that the French mayor or prefect was

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too valuable and would be needed later for important work. They should, therefore, under no circumstance expose themselves in short-term, active work. They were ordered to remain quiet, put on a friendly face for the Germans and allow no suspicion to be attached to themselves. This system worked perfectly.

100. The many-sided nature of the activities in which we became involved is too voluminous to cover here. Only a few examples are cited above to show the variety of operations in which we were involved. The most satisfactory result of all our operations was that executive measures (i.e. arrests, imprisonment, executions, etc.) were avoided and no court sentences or blood-shed resulted.

Conclusions

101. It is impossible to list accurately the manpower we saved with our organization because the organization ran itself. The conspiratorial system demanded a peak to the pyramid where everything finally was pulled together and which was unknown and unseen by the lower echelons. In spite of the variety of operations, the entire operation was a success. For example we were involved in the case of five millions of German "soldier marks" which had been smuggled out of Rumania into France by our firm, "Helvetia Handelsgesellschaft"; we had to keep a close watch on all underground activities; we obtained quinine which the German Army desperately needed and other such articles which were unobtainable in Germany because of the bottle-necks in production, etc. Our Kommando was sufficiently strong in manpower to direct our operations but if emergency action was necessary other agencies had to assist us. Unfortunately French agents and police officials were assigned to us for emergency measures such as surveillance, occupation of apartments, etc. because we did not have the manpower. The French were not at all hesitant to plunder and in a state of war nothing could be done to prevent plundering.

102. The technical side of the operations, the radio traffic, demanded many technicians on duty day and night to maintain the radio operations. Four to five radio operators were needed for the direct traffic and at the same time we were training illegal radio operators to be infiltrated into the various Soviet nets. I have reported previously about the unfortunate betrayal we experienced during the latter days in Paris. That report also describes the behavior of the radio operators, how they continued to transmit after the Allies had rolled over them (Station Comment: This is contained in the report on the French Internal Network, not yet transmitted to Headquarters). We were both impressed and depressed by the young Frenchmen in their early 20's who obeyed Moscow's orders with no hesitation, much better than they obeyed the orders of their native country, France.

103. When we left Paris, we left the entire French internal radio net in tact with "SOLYA" and LEGENDRE as the heads. This does not mean either

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of the two knew every unit or member of the organization. They certainly knew most of the organization because much came under their direct supervision. Quite a number of stations had radio operators whom we had placed. The latter stations continued in operation and their work was neither influenced or controlled by "SOLYA" and LEGENDRE. At the very last we gave "SOLYA" a complete transmitting/receiving set and a signal plan which was intended for future use. The plan could not be realized because when the Allies moved into Paris, a Soviet representation accompanied them. A radio link between us and "SOLYA" would have had no sense, as far as Moscow was concerned, when "SOLYA" had direct access to Soviet officials. KENT's and, therefore obviously, my radio communication with France was broken in order that our radio communication with the Director would not be endangered after our withdrawal from Paris.

Double Operations as Opposed to Executive Measures

104. In weighing the relative values of executive measures versus double-agent, play-back operations, our experience showed that there is no question as to which is the most valuable. Executive measures (i.e. police measures), perforce, lead to violent measures, to the use of suppressive power. In any case Moscow wanted and promoted the exercise of force (by the Germans) because Moscow knew only too well that violence always produces martyrs and martyrs are the best seed for the dragon's teeth, i.e. the most dedicated fighters for Moscow's cause and the most effective and enduring symbols for Moscow's cause spring from the seeds of violence. The punishment which the executive organs inflicted forced a man, threatened with such punishment, into a dead-end street. Having no escape, a man in this position was forced to fight to death and that was exactly what Moscow desired and demanded. If such a man survives imprisonment which alone is martyrdom for many spies, he will spend the rest of his life as a fanatic working for the cause for which he was imprisoned. He has no choice except to do this because he must make his suffering pay off; he must reap some reward for his suffering. The stiffening and delineation of the front between the two camps (East and West) is increasing. For this reason double operations should always be used although it means great determination and expenditure of intellectual effort. Only if the enemy has no opportunity to make martyrs of his followers, if it is possible to choose any other path than that of inflicting punishment, then all other paths remain open and the possibility of converting, perhaps recruiting, the enemy remains. If it was possible for us to achieve so much through double operations during the war, how much more can be done in peacetime. The professional handling of double operations to achieve the maximum results must, however, be the life career of a small circle of capable, counterintelligence men.

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ATTACHMENT B TO EGMA-44213

NAMES FROM ATTACHMENT A FOR INDEXING

- X - not filed in 200-6-1-32
1. AENIS-HAENSLIN, Maurice
@MAURICE, @MARIUS, @ROBIN?
DOB: 20 Feb 1893
POB: St. Denis, Switzerland
Soviet Agent
Listed in Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 41, 42.
- X - not filed in 200-6-1-33
2. BARCZA, Marguerita nee SINGER
Nickname: Grete @La Blonde
DOB: 14 Aug 1912
POB: Saaz, Czechoslovakia
Mistress of SUKOLOV
Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 45, 46, 51, 66.
- X - not filed in 200-6-1-34
3. BEHRENS/BEHRENDTS, Karl
@KARL
DOB: 18 Nov 1902
POB: Berlin, Germany
Soviet Agent
Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 8, 9, 21.
- X - not filed in 200-6-1-36
4. BERG, Wilhelm
Nickname: Willi
DOB: 1 March 1891
POB: Biessellen/Kreis Osterode (East Prussia), Germany.
Obersekretar of Amt IV of the RSHA at Paris Rote Kapelle
Sonderkommando.
Para: 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 70.
- X - not filed in 200-6-1-37
5. BICKLER, Hermann Christian
@SCHMIDT, @WINKLER, @MAIL, Pietro
DOB: 28 Dec 1904
POB: Hottweiler/Lothringen, Germany
SS-Standartenfuhrer during WW II.
Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Atts A, C, E, F, G.
EGFA-20300, 6 Feb 1958
Para: 72
- X - not filed in 200-6-1-38
6. BLOCH, Rita nee ARNOLD/ARNOULD
@JULIETTE, @VULIA
Soviet Agent
Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 27

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7. ~~BOEMELBURG~~, Karl
@BOIS, @MOLLENBURG, Col., @BERMELEBURGER
DOB: 28 Oct 1885
POB: Berlin, Germany
Ref: EGMA-43172, 14 July 1959, Att. A, B
EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Atts A, E, F, G
Kriminaldirektor, Amt IV, RSHA, during WW II.
Para: 46, 51, 55, 66, 70
8. ~~BROCKDORF~~ or ~~BROCKDORFF~~, Erika von, nee ~~SCHOENFELD~~
DOB: Unknown
German national *in Germany*
Soviet Agent
Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 8, 11, 19
9. ~~COPPI~~, Hans
@STRAIMANN
German National *in Germany*
Soviet Agent
Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 8, 9, 19, 21
10. ~~COPPI~~, Hilde
German National *in Germany*
Soviet Agent
Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 9, 21
11. ~~CORBIN~~, Alfred
French National *in France*
Soviet Agent
Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 31
12. ~~DANILOV~~, Anton
@ANTONIO, @DESMETS, @de SMETS, @de SMITH
Red Army Lieutenant; Soviet agent
Soviet National *in USSR*
Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 4, 27
13. ~~ESCUDERO~~ or ~~ESDUCO~~, Valentin
DOB: 7 May 1914
POB: Madrid, Spain
Soviet Agent
Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 34

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14. ✓ GEHRTS, (Col) Erwin
cit. Germany German National; Luftwaffe officer in WW II
Soviet agent
Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 9, 21
15. ✓ GIERING, Karl
DOB: ca 1890
POB: Berlin, Germany
Kriminalrat; Chief of the Communist Counterintelligence Department
of Amt IV, BSHA.
First Chief of the Rote Kapelle Sonderkommando, Paris, early 1943.
Ref: EGMA-43172, 14 July 1959, Atts A & B
Para: 52, 55
16. ✓ GIRAUD, Lucienne (Suzanne)
✓ @LUCY
French National *cit. France*
Soviet agent
Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 33
17. ✓ GIRAUD, Pierre (Leon)
✓ @ROBERT
French National *cit. France*
Soviet agent
Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 33, 34
18. ✓ GOLLNOW, Herbert
DOB: 13 July 1911
POB: Germany
cit. Germany German National and Oberleutnant in OKW Hqts. during WW II.
Soviet agent
Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 21
19. ✓ GRAUDENZ, Johannes or John C. G.
DOB: 12 Nov 1884
POB: Danzig
Soviet agent
Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Ref: EGQA-81010, 14 Aug 1956, Att. A
Para: 9, 10, 21
20. ✓ GRIMME, Adelf []
✓ @GRIMSE
DOB: 31 Dec 1889
POB: Goslar-Harz, Germany
Soviet agent
Former Director of Northwest German Broadcasting System.
Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Ref: EGQA-81010, 14 Aug 1956, Att. A
Para: 9, 21 >

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21. ~~X~~ GRIOTTO, Medardo
Nationality: Italian *ca. Italy*
Printer & engraver
Soviet agent
Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 41
22. ~~X~~ GROSSVOGEL, Leon *200-6-1-66*
@PIEPER. @ANDRE for JEFREMOV's group; @LEO for SUKOLOV's group
@XAVIER. @GROSSER, Andre in France.
DOB: 21 Nov 1904
POB: Lodz, Poland
French National
Soviet agent
Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 27, 29, 34
23. ~~X~~ GRUBER, Malvina nee HOTSTADTEROVA *200-6-1-67*
DOB: 6 Dec 1906
POB: Jaborkretz, CSR (?)
Czech National
Soviet agent
Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Ref: EGQA-81010, 14 Aug 1956, Att. A
Para: 27
24. ~~X~~ GUDDORF, Wilhelm
@BRAUN, Paul
DOB: 1902
German National *ca. Germany*
Soviet agent
Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 9, 10, 21
25. ~~X~~ HARNACK, Arvid
@ARVID; @HANNECKEN
DOB: ca 1901
POB: Germany
German National *ca. Germany*
Soviet agent
Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 15, 16, 21
26. ~~X~~ HARNACK, Mildred nee FISH *ca. Germany*
Wife of Arvid HARNACK
POB: USA
German National by marriage
Soviet agent
Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 7, 9, 15, 18, 21

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27. ~~Z~~ HEILMANN, Horst or Wilder
 ~~U~~ HAYMANN
 German National ~~in Germany~~
 German cryptographer in OKH Signal Center WW II.
 Soviet agent
 Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Para: 11, 21
28. ~~Z~~ HERRNSTADT, Rudolf
 ~~U~~ EHRENBURG (possibly)
 DOB: 18 Mar 1903
 POB: Gleiwitz, Upper Silesia, Germany
 Had CSR passport in 1941
 Soviet agent
 Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II
 Ref: Att. to EGBA-2177, 5 Jan 1953
 EGQA-81010, 14 Aug 1956, Att. A
 EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. C
 Para: 9, 19
29. ~~Z~~ HOESSLER, Albert
 ~~U~~ FRANZ, ~~U~~ WIEGNER, Helmut, ~~U~~ STEIN, Walter
 Soviet agent
 Parachuted into Germany in 1942
 Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Para: 19, 21
30. ~~Z~~ HOFFMANN-SCHULZ or ~~U~~ HOFFMANN-SCHOLITZ, Anne Margarete or Annemarie
 DOB: 1 Feb 1896
 POB: Windisch, Buchholz, Germany
 Soviet agent
 Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Para: 39, 40
31. ~~Z~~ HUBENER, Emil
 German National ~~in Germany~~
 Communist of long standing
 Soviet agent
 Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Para: 9, 21
32. ~~Z~~ HUSEMANN, Walter
 German National ~~in Germany~~
 Soviet agent
 Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Para: 9, 21
33. ~~Z~~ JASPAR, Jules
 DOB: 1 Mar 1878
 POB: Brussels, Belgium
 Soviet agent
 Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Para: 31, 45, 46

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34. ~~X~~ JEFREMOV, Konstantin
~~X~~ JERNSTROEM, Erland or Erik; ~~X~~ HOFMANN; ~~X~~ PAUL; ~~X~~ PASCAL; ~~X~~ BORDO;
~~X~~ MANOLO (possibly)
 DOB: 15 May 1910
 POB: Sawotzki, USSR
 Soviet National ~~cit.~~ USSR
 Red Army officer; GRU, Soviet Military IS, agent.
 Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Para: 4, 28
35. ~~X~~ KATZ, Millel ben Mordechai
~~X~~ DUBOIS, Andre; ~~X~~ Petit Andre
 Poss. id/w DUBOIS, associate of "JENNY"
 DOB: 24 Sept 1905
 POB: Chenzin, Poland
 Carried Palestinian passport as of 1928
 Soviet agent
 Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Atts. E & F
 Para: 31, 39, 43, 51, 58
36. ~~X~~ ANOCHEN, (Dr) Helmut
 DOB: 14 Mar 1910
 German National ~~cit. Germany~~
 Chief of Sicherheitpolizei and SD in France during WW II.
 Para: 88, 72
37. ~~X~~ KOENEN, Heinrich
~~X~~ KARL; ~~X~~ KOESTER, Heinrich Ludwig
 DOB: 12 May 1910
 POB: Koenigsberg, Germany
 Naturalized Soviet citizen ~~cit. USSR~~
 Soviet agent
 Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Para: 19, 21
38. ~~X~~ KOPKOW, Horst
 DOB: ca 1910
 POB: East Prussia, Germany
 Kriminaldirektor with the RSHA, Amt IV A2 during WW II.
 Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. C
 Para: 21, 66
39. ~~X~~ KRAUS, (Frau) Anna
 German National ~~cit. Germany~~
 Soviet agent
 Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Para: 21

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40. ~~X~~ ²⁰⁰⁻⁶⁻¹⁻⁷⁹ KRAUSE/KRAUSS, Professor Werner
 German National
 Language professor, member of OKW Interpreter Co. during WW II
 Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Soviet agent
 Para: 9
41. ~~X~~ KUCKHOFF, (Dr) Adam *ex Germany*
 German National and long standing Communist
 Soviet agent
 Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Para: 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 21
42. ~~X~~ KUCKHOFF, Margareta (Greta) (nee) ~~TORKE~~ *ex Germany*
 Wife of Dr. Adam KUCKHOFF
 DOB: 14 Dec 1902
 POB: Frankfurt am Oder, Germany
 Soviet agent
 Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Ref: EGQA-81010, 14 Aug 1956, Att. A
 Para: 7, 9, 21
43. ~~X~~ KUECHENMEISTER, Walter
 German National; author and publisher *ex Germany*
 Soviet agent
 Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Ref: EGQA-81010, 14 Aug 1956, Att. A
 Para: 9, 10, 21
44. ~~X~~ KUMMEROW, Hans Heinrich
 German National *ex Germany*
 Soviet agent
 Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Para: 9, 10, 21
45. ~~X~~ KUMMEROW, Ingeborg
 Wife of Hans Heinrich KUMMEROW
 Soviet agent
 German National *ex Germany*
 Para: 9, 21
46. ~~X~~ LEGENDRE, Paul Victor
~~X~~ GOUPIL
 DOB: 29 Apr 1878
 POB: Sens, Yonne, France
 Soviet agent
 Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Para: 73, 80, 81, 82, 103

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- X-ref file 200-6-1-57
47. LYON-SMITH, Antonia
 DOB: ca 1923
 English national
 English POW of the Germans in Paris in 1944
 Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. C & G
 Para: 61, 62, 63, 66, 67, 69
- X-ref file in 200-6-1-85
48. MAKAROV, Michel or Michael
 @ALAMO, Carlos; @CHEMNITZ; @CHARLES; @FEYS?
 DOB: 2 Jan 1905
 POB: Leningrad, USSR
 Soviet National
 GRU documents expert sent to Belgium, 1939 to work with GRU
 espionage net.
 Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Para: 4, 26, 27, 47, 70
- X MARIVET, (Madame) Marguerite
 @MATENOT or @MATELOT, (Mme) Madeleine; @MADELEINE?
 French National *ca France*
 Soviet agent
 Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Para: 45
- X MAXIMOVICH or MAXIMOWITCH, Anna Pavlovna or Pawlowa
 @AERTZIN
 DOB: 8 Mar 1901
 POB: Chernigov or Tschernigow, USSR
 Russian emigre in France, probably French National *ca France?*
 Soviet agent
 Sister of Basil Pavlovich MAXIMOVICH
 Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Para: 39, 40
- X MAXIMOVICH or MAXIMOWITCH, Basil Pavlovich
 @PROFESSOR
 DOB: 1902
 POB: Chernigov or Tschernigow, USSR
 Russian emigre in Paris; probably French National *ca France?*
 Brother of Anna Pavlovna MAXIMOVICH
 Soviet agent
 Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Para: 33, 39, 40
- X MAY (or MAI), fnu, (Madame)
 DOB: ca 1878 *ca France*
 French National, widow of French poet
 Soviet agent; assisted Leopold TREPPER, GRU agent, to escape from
 German custody in September 1943.
 Ref: EGQA-81163, 17 Aug 1956
 Para: 62, 66

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53. ~~MOURIER~~ ^{aka} ~~or MURIER~~, Louis
DOB: 4 July 1885
POB: Tercy, France
Soviet agent
Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 41
54. MUELLER, Heinrich
DOB: 28 Apr 1900
POB: Germany
Generalmajor der Polizei and Chief of Amt IV, RSHA in Germany during WW II
REF: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Atts. A & F
EGQA-81010, 14 Aug 1956, Att. A
EGMA-43172, 14 July 1959, Atts A & B
Para: 49, 50, 55, 56
55. ROBERG, Karl Albrecht
~~SCHUBERT~~
DOB: 27 Jan 1897
POB: Germany
Obergruppenfuhrer and Generalleutnant der Polizei, RSHA, during WW II
Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Atts. A & F
Para: 72, 93
- 201-287513 *Vol. de maks-aha*
56. ROZOLS, Vladimir or Waldemar
Aliases: "SOIYA"; SOKOL; "The GENERAL"; "Z"; "MARIANNE" for radio traffic.
Lithuanian origin, lived in Soviet Union, fought in Spanish Civil War in 1936, GRU, Soviet Military IS, agent in Paris during WWII.
Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
REF: EGQA-81010, 14 Aug 1956, Att. A
EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. C
EGMA-43172, 14 July 1959, Atts A & B
Para: 71, 73, 73, 79, 80, 81, 82, 103
57. PAUL, (Dr) Elfriede, nee VIKTOR
DOB: 12 Oct 1908 *via Germany*
POB: Kreuzburg, Germany
Soviet agent
Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 21
58. PEPER, Maurice
Aliases: ~~WASSERMANN~~, ~~HOLLANDER~~
Belgian National *Belgium*
Soviet agent
Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 29

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59. PETERS, Ruth
see Under SPAAK, Ruth Peters
60. PODSIADLO, Johann
German National, born in Danzig, Poland to Germany
Art teacher
Soviet agent
Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 39, 40
61. POZNANSKA or ^{aka} POZNANKA or ^{aka} POTZENESKA, Josefa ^{aka} "Sophie"
Aliases: Anna VERLINDEN; JOSEPHA; CANNETTE; SARA.
Polish National ca. Poland
Soviet agent
Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 27
62. RAJCHMANN or RAICHMANN, Abraham
Aliases: "FABRIKANT"; "MAX"; KARTENMANN; ROUSSEL, Arthur
DOB: 24 Sept 1902
POB: Dziurkow, Poland
Polish National ca. Poland
Agent of Soviet Military IS, GRU, at least as early as 1934
Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. E
EGQA-81010, 14 Aug 1956, Att. A
Para: 27, 28
63. REISER, Heinrich Josef
DOB: ca 1895
German National
During WW II Kriminalkommissar in RSHA; as of 1959 member of West
German BND.
Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. G
Para: 53
64. REITMEISTER, (Dr.) Johann
German physician, nerve specialist
Soviet agent
Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 9, 10, 21
- 24-24/138
65. ROBINSON, Henri
Aliases: BOYEN, Alfred; BUCHER, Albert Gottlieb; MERIAN, Alfred;
WEHRLI, Otto; "HARRY"; "LEON"; "LUCIEN"
DOB: 8 May 1897
POB: St. Gilles, Brussels, Belgium
French National
Agent for Soviet Military Intelligence, GRU, as of early 1930's and
prior to that Comintern agent.
Listed Personality Index to British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Ref: EGQA-81163, 17 Aug 1956
Para: 9, 39, 41

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66. ~~X~~ ROEDER, Dr. Manfred
 German National ~~cit. Germany~~
 (Presiding Judge at trials of Berlin Rote Kapelle nets during 1942/43)
 Para: 17
67. ~~X~~ ROUGE, Marcel Alphonse Charles
 DOB: 4 Sept 1911
 POB: St. Maur, France
 French typesetter or printer
 Soviet agent
 Listed Personality Index of British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Para: 41
68. ~~X~~ *not filed in 200-6-1-108* SCHELLHA, Rudolf von
 Alias: "ARIER"
 German diplomat during 1930's and until 1942
 Soviet agent
 Listed Personality Index of British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Para: 6, 9, 19, 21
69. ~~X~~ *aka* SCHLOESSINGER or SCHLOESINGER, Rosa
 German National ~~cit. Germany~~
 Typist
 Soviet agent
 Listed Personality Index of British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Para: 8, 21
70. ~~X~~ *not filed in 200-6-1-110* SCHNEIDER, Franz
 Aliases: "FRANZ"; "NIGGI"; possibly "CHIMOR"
 DOB: 19 Feb 1900
 POB: Basel, Switzerland
 Husband of Germaine SCHNEIDER until her death in Oct 1945 when he
 married Betty DEPELSENAIRE
 Soviet agent
 Listed Personality Index of British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Para: 28
71. ~~X~~ *not filed in 200-6-1-110* SCHNEIDER, Germaine, nee CLAIS
 Alias: "PAUL"; "SCHMETTERLING" or "PAPILLON"; "ODETTE"
 Belgian origin and Swiss National through marriage to Franz SCHNEIDER
 Listed Personality Index of British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Soviet agent from 1936 until death in Oct 1945
 Para: 28
72. ~~X~~ SCHOTTMUELLER, Oda
 German National ~~cit. Germany~~
 Dancer and sculptress
 Soviet agent
 Listed Personality Index of British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Para: 8, 9, 11, 21

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73. ✓ SCHREIBER, Hesekil
 Aliases: ✓ KIEFER, Georges; ✓ "CAMILLE"; ✓ "GEORGES"
 DOB: 30 Oct 1899
 POB: Poland
 Polish National *ex. Germany*
 Soviet agent
 Listed Personality Index of British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Para: 44
74. ✓ SCHUHMACHER or ✓ SCHUMACHER, Elisabeth nee HIHENEWSER
 Alias: ✓ "ELISAWETA"
 German National *ex. Germany*
 Wife of Kurt SCHUHMACHER
 Soviet agent
 Listed Personality Index of British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Para: 21
75. ✓ SCHUHMACHER or ✓ SCHUMACHER, Kurt
 Alias: ✓ "BEK"
 German National; sculptor *ex. Germany*
 Communist of long standing
 Soviet agent
 Listed Personality Index of British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Para: 9, 21, 51, 58
76. ✓ SCHUHMACHER or ✓ SCHUMACHER, Otto
 Alias: ✓ "ROGER"
 German National; fought in Spanish Civil War *ex. Germany*
 Soviet agent
 Listed Personality Index of British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Para: 44
77. ✓ SCHULTZE-BOYSEN or ✓ SCHULZE-BOYSEN, Harro
 Aliases: ✓ "CORO"; ✓ "CHORO"; ✓ "GEORGE"
ex. Germany German National; employee of German Air Ministry during WW II.
 Soviet agent *Received death sentence*
 Listed Personality Index of British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Ref: EGQA-81163, 17 Aug 1956
 Para: 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 21, 31
78. ✓ SCHULTZE-BOYSEN or ✓ SCHULZE-BOYSEN, Libertas, nee HASS-HEYE
 German National *ex. Germany*
 Wife of Harro SCHULTZE-BOYSEN
 Soviet agent
 Listed Personality Index of British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Para: 7, 11, 13, 17, 21
79. ✓ SCHULZE, Kurt
 Alias: ✓ "BERG"
 German National; long standing Communist *ex. Germany*
 Soviet agent
 Listed Personality Index of British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
 Para: 8, 9, 21

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80. SIEG, Johann *USA?*
POB: United States; emigrated to Germany in 1912, possibly retained American citizenship; fanatical Communist
Soviet agent
Listed Personality Index of British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Ref: EGQA-81163, 17 Aug 1956
Para: 9, 10, 21
81. SOKOL, Hersz/Herz or Henri
DOB: 26 Oct 1908
POB: Byelostok
Polish National *via Poland*
Pediatrician
Soviet agent
Listed Personality Index of British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 33, 40, 65
82. SOKOL, Miriam nee RACHLIN
Alias: *"MADELEINE"*
DOB: 1905 or 1908
POB: Kowienska, Poland
Polish National *via Poland*
Soviet agent
Listed Personality Index of British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 33, 35
83. SPAAK, Charles
Belgian National *via Belgium*
Brother of Paul Henri SPAAK and Claude SPAAK
Arrested by Germans in Oct 1943 on suspicion of implication in Claude SPAAK's espionage activities but no evidence found to support this suspicion.
Mentioned in section on Claude SPAAK in Personality Index of British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 68
84. SPAAK, Claude
DOB: 22 Oct 1904
POB: Belgium
Belgian National *via Belgium*
Brother of Paul Henri SPAAK and Charles SPAAK; first wife was Suzanne SPAAK and second wife was Ruth SPAAK nee PETERS.
Leader of Communist resistance group in France during WW II; instrumental in successful escape of Soviet GRU agent Leopold TREPPER,
Listed Personality Index of British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 55, 61, 66

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85. SPAAK, Ruth nee PETERS
Canadian National
Mistress and subsequently second wife of Claude SPAAK.
Assisted Claude SPAAK in French resistance group and probably in
escape of Soviet GRU agent Leopold TREPPER.
Listed Personality Index of British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 66
86. SPAAK, Suzanne
Belgian or French National *Received death sentence*
First wife of Claude SPAAK
Assisted Soviet GRU agent Leopold TREPPER to escape from German
custody in WW II.
Mentioned in British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II, in connection
with Claude SPAAK.
Para: 33, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 69
87. SPRINGER, Isidore
Aliases: "ROMEO"; "WALTER"; "FRED"; "SABOR"
DOB: 23 July 1912
POB: Antwerp, Belgium
Belgian National *Cit. Belgique*
Soviet agent
Listed Personality Index of British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 27, 44
88. STOEBE, Ilse
Aliases: "ALTA"; "ALTE"
DOB: 17 May 1911
POB: Berlin, Germany
Press stenographer by profession
Soviet, GRU agent from 1930 to 1942
Listed Personality Index of British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 9, 19, 21
89. *x - ref filed in 200-6-1-2117*
SUKOLOV, Victor (true name also reported as GUREVICH)
Aliases: KENT; Vincente SIERRA; Arthur BARCZA; Simon URWIRTH;
"ARTHUR"; "FRITZ"; "MANOLO"; "CLEMENT"; "DUPUIS"; "LEBRUN"
DOB: 1911/1913
POB: Leningrad area of USSR
Soviet National; Jewish
Red Army Officer; GRU illegal agent
Listed Personality Index of British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Ref: EGQA-81010, 14 Aug 1956, Att. A
EGQA-81163, 17 Aug 1956
EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Atts. A, E, F, G.
EGMA-43172, 14 July 1959, Atts. A & B
Para: 4, 5, 6, 19, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 35, 39, 45, 46, 47,
51, 52, 59, 60, 66, 71, 73, 79, 81, 84, 85, 89, 90, 91, 103

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- X-ref *Book in 200.6-1-121*
90. TREPPER, Leopold or Liebeh (true name also given as TREPER, Leiba ben Zeharya)
Aliases: Adam MIKLER; Jean GILBERT; Vladislav Ivanovich IVANOVSKI; de WINTER; "SOMMER"; "Le Grand Chef"; "Le General"; "L'Oncle"; "Onkel OTTO"; "OTTO".
DOB: reported variously: 23 Feb 1904; 1903 or 1904; between 1900 and 1904.
POB: reported variously as Neumarkt near Zakopane, Poland; Noviterg, Galicia, formerly Austria, now Poland; or Galicia.
Nationality: probably originally Austrian and then Polish Jew; Possessed at various times Polish passport; Palestinian passport; Canadian passport; may have also received Soviet citizenship.
Soviet, GRU illegal agent from ca. 1930 to at least 1956.
Listed Personality Index of British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Ref: EGQA-81010, 14 Aug 1956, Att. A
EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. E
EGMA-42331, 13 May 1959
EGMA-43172, 14 July 1959, Atts. A & B
Para: 4, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 45, 47, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 71, 73, 74, 75, 79, 90.
91. VLIET, Flora van, nee VELARTS
Alias: "Fra" SPRINGER
Belgian National *cit. Belgium*
Mistress of Isidore SPRINGER
Soviet agent
Listed Personality Index of British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 27
92. VOELKNER, Kaethe
Alias: "Blonde KAETHE"
German National from Danzig *cit. Germany*
Soviet agent
Listed Personality Index of British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 39, 40
93. WEISENBORN or WEISENBORN, Guenther *aka*
DOB: 10 July 1902
POB: Velbert, Kreis Mettmann, Rhineland, Germany
Author, dramatist and dramatic critic
Soviet agent during WW II
Listed Personality Index of British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II. >
Ref: EGQA-81010, 14 Aug 1956, Att. A
EGMA-43172, 14 July 1959
Para: 2, 9, 21
94. WENZEL, Johann or Hans
Aliases: "HERMAN"; "PROFESSOR"; "CHARLES"; possibly HEGENBARTH
DOB: 9 Mar 1902
POB: Niedau/Danzig *RIDNER via Hauptstadt - cit. Germany*
(WENZEL, Johann or Hans - cont'd p. 16.)

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16.

EGMA-44213

94. (cont'd - WENZEL, Johann or Hans)
German National
Soviet, GRU illegal agent
Communist from ca 1917; trained in Moscow for Comintern work and
later by GRU.
Listed Personality Index of British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Atts. C & G
Para: 4, 23, 28, 47
95. WESOLEK or WESSELÖCK, fnu
Believed identical with Stanislaus WESOLEK who was arrested together
with his wife Frieda WESOLEK nee HUEBNER in 1942 and both were
condemned to death by Germans in 1943. He was son-in-law of
Emil HUEBNER, also condemned in 1943.
Soviet agent
Listed Personality Index of British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 9, 21
- x. ref. found in 200-6-1-139
96. WINTER, Georgiana de
Nationality unknown; first husband possibly American
Soviet agent
Mistress of GRU illegal agent Leopold TREPPER during WW II and had
child by him.
Listed Personality Index of British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Atts. C & G
Para: 61, 62, 64, 67, 70
- ZR 206, 4029
97. WINTERNICK or WINTERLINK, Anton or "Tino"
Dutch National and Dutch Communist. *ca. Netherlands*
Soviet agent
Listed Personality Index of British Rote Kapelle Study, Part II.
Para: 29, 47