

SC PASTIME

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SECRET/CONTROL
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 16 September 1948

TO : Chief, Foreign Branch "B"
FROM : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe, Germany
SUBJECT: GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Implementation and progress report on PASTIME Program for Berlin.

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to summarize in general terms the PASTIME operational plans of SC Branch, Berlin Operations Base. Included herein are a list of agents presently operated by SC, a general description of PASTIME activities planned for Berlin and what is now the Soviet Zone of Germany by agents presently under the control of the SC Branch, and a list of agents, now active, whose overt activities have compromised them to such extent that they will have to be evacuated. With one or two exceptions we plan to utilize our evacuated agents in the Western Zones. It is suggested that this memorandum be read in conjunction with DISPATCH B-250, dated 24 August 1948. It is assumed that the SC - FR distinction, would all but disappear under PASTIME conditions. (Our reason for this assumption will be explained under separate cover.) Accordingly, as soon as it is believed that PASTIME conditions are imminent, steps will be taken to coordinate all scheduled PASTIME operations, particularly with regard to communication facilities.

2. Following is a tabulation of the information contained in the description of agent operations presently handled by SC, SCB.

a. Scheduled to operate in Berlin or the Soviet Zone of Germany under PASTIME:

* CARBOY (CARAVAGE), TALBOT, CEMISADE, LINCOLN, ESSEX, PUSKOBILN, LAYBACH, LAYBACH 2, and possibly several sub-sources of LAYBACH now under consideration.

Distribution:

- 2 - FBI
- 1 - CGS
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
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* See BERLN-760 - evacuation recommended. Wash-CIA-Pro-712

b. To be evacuated:

✓ CANLETT, ✓ CANARY, ✓ CAMISE, ✓ CAMBERT, ✓ CAMLETT, ✓ CAMBERT, ✓
 { DODGE, DODGE 2.
 CARAVAN

Of these, it is believed the following could render valuable services in the Western Zones: CANARY, CANLETT, CAMBERT, CAMISE.

c. To be dropped in Berlin: No presently active agent.

d. Too early to tell: TERRAPLANE. - CARBURETOR

3. Breakdown by Agents

ced a. CAMISADE, case officer []

This agent, run for many months as a "double", has outlived his usefulness as a furnisher of counter-intelligence information. It is planned to utilize CAMISADE as a radio-operator and coordinate his activities with those of a contemplated chain. CAMISADE has some radio training, which, coupled with his musical talent and excellent memory, should make him a good candidate for radio training.

ced b. CAMISE, case officer []

This agent's background and present overt activities necessitate evacuation from Berlin in case of an Allied withdrawal. Preparations have been made to utilize CAMISE's services in Western Germany and the agent has been promised a position as assistant editor on one of the leading Western German newspapers by the owner of the publication.

ced c. CAMLETT, case officer []

As a result of recent changes in the political picture of the Eastern Zone, this agent is no longer in a position to provide information. Past performance and exemplary discretion justify evacuation. CAMLETT owns (through her late husband) a fair-sized restaurant and hotel in the Rhineland and also a small trucking firm in Cologne. Eventual utilization of these facilities for our purposes is being considered.

ced d. CAMBERT, case officer []

Formerly an official of the German Administration of the Interior, CAMBERT was dismissed recently in connection with the current purge of the police in the Soviet Zone. While there was no indication

that CAMBERT's cooperation with us was at all suspected, he has now moved from the Soviet to the American Sector of Berlin. CAMBERT expects to obtain a leading position with the pro-Western Berlin City Administration in the near future. Should the situation become critical we propose to evacuate CAMBERT to the Western Zone, where he could presumably obtain a high position in government or police. In any case, we plan to maintain contact with CAMBERT although his intelligence value in the immediate future is problematical.

ced e. CAMLET, case officer []

As publisher of the largest and most influential anti-communist German newspaper, CAMLET is definitely persona non grata with the Soviets. His usefulness as contributor of political intelligence would, in the West, be probably greater than was the case in Berlin. CAMLET is not necessarily dependent on our facilities for evacuation, but we prefer that it be done under our auspices, to strengthen control and emphasize our continuing interest in him. We envisage CAMLET as one of the key figures in a possible intelligence operation aimed at the Tri-zonal government.

ced f. CANTILEVER, case officer []

This agent was recently dismissed in connection with the purge of the police in the Eastern Zone. Her current intelligence value is insignificant. CANTILEVER expects to obtain a position with the Berlin Police Praesidium in the very near future. Past performance and value entitle this agent to evacuation and resettlement in Western Germany should the necessity arise.

ced g. CANARY, case officer []

One of the key anti-communist figures in Berlin today, CANARY may be expected to obtain a similar position in the Western German government. His evacuation under our auspices (on which CANARY is not dependent) would definitely strengthen our intelligence potential in Trizonia.

ced h. DODGE, case officer []

It is anticipated that this operation will have to be terminated prior to EASTIME. DODGE may possibly be utilized within the framework of the UMPIRE project. DODGE's evacuation will also include DODGE 2 and a 7-year old child.

ced i. ESSPX, case officer []

This agent, an official of the German Administration of the

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Interior, appears to be of some promise for PASTIME purposes. While a member of the SPD for a short period in 1945, he is now an SED member in good standing and feels confident of his ability to weather the various police surges. RUSSEK appreciates the importance of "stay-behind agents" and, motivated by a basic, religion-inspired, ideological opposition to communism, has agreed to act in such capacity under PASTIME conditions. It is planned to coordinate his activities with the CAPOTE organization.

ced j. WUPMOBILE, case officer []

Originally recruited as a double agent, WUPMOBILE's CE contributions have gradually become of less and less interest. This is believed to be primarily due to a consistent reluctance on WUPMOBILE's part to cooperate wholeheartedly with his Soviet case officer -- a reluctance which can easily be understood since the Soviet case officer wanted to develop WUPMOBILE into an abduction expert. Although WUPMOBILE is still used by the LGB, the relationship has developed into a perfunctory one. However, through his Soviet case officer, WUPMOBILE was employed some two months ago as a purchasing agent for Kabelwerk Oberspreewitz, and since that time has furnished, in varying quantities, interesting positive intelligence. Originally motivated by a distaste for the RIG and communist tactics, as well as by a desire to earn his way to the Western Zones of Germany, WUPMOBILE is now willing to serve as a PASTIME agent. It is recommended that under PASTIME conditions WUPMOBILE should be integrated with an agent chain for direction and contact.

ced k. LINCOLN, case officer []

An official of the German Administration of the Interior, LINCOLN will probably be retained in any reorganization of that agency. An SED member with a strongly nationalistic background, LINCOLN volunteered his services to us as an informant in order that he could later prove that he was an unwilling member of what he perceives will develop into a "Gestapo" organization. An excellent report writer, LINCOLN will need only a letter drop to continue in the business. Should there be continued mail traffic between the Eastern and Western Zones under PASTIME conditions, LINCOLN might function even without a letter drop, using ordinary mail and secret ink.

Dropped MAYBACH, case officer []

A professional intelligence agent, MAYBACH was recruited with PASTIME conditions in mind. Motivated by a variety of reasons (distaste for dictatorship, economic considerations, hope for emigration from Germany) MAYBACH is a capable organizer who can probably be relied on to supply a flow of information which, while not perhaps of great

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importance, would be very useful under PASTIME conditions. MAYBACH claims to be a radio operator, but would, of course, need additional training. He is an official of the communist-dominated VVN (Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes) organization and has little to fear under PASTIME. MAYBACH was only recently recruited and cannot as yet be said to enjoy our full confidence. It is deemed essential that the MAYBACH operation should not be integrated or coordinated with any other operation. For that reason it is recommended that communications with MAYBACH should be either by radio, or via couriers selected by MAYBACH.

ced m. MAYBACH 2, case officer []

This agent was introduced to us by MAYBACH, but since then taken over and handled directly by the case officer. An employee of the Russian-controlled Berliner Rundfunk, MAYBACH 2's position brings her into close contact with the Russian officers attached to Berlin Radio. She is presently engaged in promoting the defection of a high-ranking Soviet officer. It cannot yet be decided whether or not she would be suitable for PASTIME.

ced n. PONTIAC, case officer []

A penetration agent, PONTIAC has, in slightly less than a year worked himself well up into the higher echelons of the SED. A German Army officer during the war, PONTIAC has a good, substantial record in private employment before and after the war and is half-owner of an agricultural news letter. Intelligent and emotionally well-balanced, PONTIAC is believed to be motivated exclusively by patriotism and ideological opposition to communism. He has been promised a position in the significant Central Control Commission (ZKK) of the German Economic Commission (DWK). His mother is being moved to the vicinity of Wiesbaden to live with a communist friend of PONTIAC's, and it is believed this will give PONTIAC a suitable excuse for line crossing in the event of PASTIME conditions.

ced o. TALBOT, case officer []

An employee of the Soviet-overt Berlin daily Taegliche Rundschau, TALBOT has good Russian contacts. Ideologically opposed to communism and filled with a typically German feeling of superiority over all Slavs, TALBOT is in a good position to supply interesting information. Unfortunately, while willing, TALBOT is not sufficiently intelligence-conscious to be able to operate satisfactorily on her own. A determined effort is being made to develop TALBOT into a more systematic and enterprising source of information, but for the present her use under PASTIME conditions remains problematical.

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p. TERRAPLANE, case officer []

The Berlin phase of the TERRAPLANE operation is expected to be terminated during October 1948, which, we hope, will be sometime before development of FASTIME conditions. The TERRAPLANE operation has definite long-range possibilities but is independent of Berlin FASTIME operations and no planning at present is required to meet future (and very problematical) phases of the project.

4. While we are confident, in view of U.S. Government declarations to that effect and lack of contrary information from our own headquarters, that FASTIME conditions will not arise in Berlin, all measures are taken to establish and develop reliable sources of information capable of operating under FASTIME. We are naturally handicapped by lack of reliable indication of future U.S. policy. Unless we receive reliable indications as to what German governmental organization the U.S. authorities expect to develop following our forced or voluntary evacuation from Berlin our FASTIME planning cannot be anything more than tentative. Obviously, it would make a tremendous difference in our planning if we knew that U.S. Forces were to stay in Western Germany, following the loss of Berlin, in sufficient strength to resist any likely Soviet threat. At any rate this is the premise our FASTIME planning is based on. It seems virtually impossible to plan, at the present stage, for the contingency of an American withdrawal from Western Germany and/or the possibility of a basically anti-American Western German government. Another serious obstacle to really efficient FASTIME planning is the continued lack of technical facilities* (radio, concealment devices, secret inks, etc.) and the necessary instructor personnel.

5. Monthly reports on FASTIME developments, including changes in the status of different agents, will be submitted.

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Chief SC Berlin

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Cable to Karl, BRN