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2 FEB 1956

TO : Chief, Foreign Division M  
FROM : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe  
SUBJECT: GENERAL - Operational

DATE: 10 July 1950

SPECIFIC: Recruitment of Radio Operators, and Caching of Radio Sets

SYNOPSIS: This memorandum will discuss the difficulty encountered at present in the recruitment of radio operators as well as the difficulty in placing a large enough number of radio sets in areas of continued interest to us. Recommendation is made to avail ourselves of the facilities of both the CARP and the CATALINA organizations for the recruitment of radio operators and the placement of radio sets, and a strong plea is made for the JOAN and ELINOR improved set.

1. Although we have made serious efforts during the last two years to recruit and train radio operators for stay behind operations in Eastern Germany and Berlin, our success to date has been nearly nil. Should war break out tomorrow, we would find ourselves with only one radio operator. Many sources producing good intelligence would have absolutely no way to channel their product out of enemy territory.

2. Since the likelihood of eventual war has increased recently I believe it necessary to resolve this problem under all circumstances, even if the only ways open to us might be considered insecure by the high standards set up by Communications. We must solve the problem of getting a maximum amount of intelligence out of potential enemy territory, regardless of cost, even if a calculated security risk is involved.

3. No doubt the greatest reservoir of resistance in an occupied Germany will be the gros of the political party of CARP. By their past political activity they must fight against the system or go underground in order to survive against their Communist enemies. Therefore they will form the largest and best organized resistance group in this part of the world. At present they are not prepared for such a job, having neither the communication set-up for it, nor having the caches of arms, money, food, equipment, etc., to sustain such an activity. We, therefore, find ourselves neglecting the one great reservoir which would be in a position to give us badly needed OB information in the first stages of a possible war.

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4. Whereas caches of arms, money, food, equipment, etc., can be placed by U.S. personnel in Berlin, and Western Germany, and the recipients eventually can be guided to them, it is impossible or near impossible to provide communications in the number and quality necessary, unless all preparations take place prior to war. We therefore strongly recommend that we be given permission to approach CARP 2 and work out a plan for the recruitment of radio operators through his organization. Such radio operators would be subject to our security approval, trained as our operators and not integrated with any of their operations without prior approval from us.

5. I have already discussed this problem in general terms with CARP 2, and he has promised me to take it up with CACKLER, it probably necessitating a meeting between CACKLER and me to work out the details and get approval for this plan. CARP 2 fully realizes the necessity for such planning, and fully realizes that we must be the only handlers of such agents, subject to our security considerations and subject to our judgment. I pointed out to him that after all his party will have an organization in exile should the worst befall us, in which case it would be essential to keep in touch with the comrades in enemy territory.

6. On the old principle that one should never put all ones eggs in one basket, I believe that we should undertake the same operational precaution with CATALINA's group. I touched upon this problem lightly with CATALINA and he advised me that he would be willing to provide us with personnel for this type of activity, but only if arrangements could be worked out directly with him, and not any member of the party executive. CATALINA does not trust the discretion of the party executive, their particular brand of nationalism does not permit them to cooperate freely with the Americans (a contention born out by CAGE). In CATALINA's case I would suggest the same approach as in the case of CARP 2, all personnel would automatically become our property entirely. No connection is to be kept up with such personnel whatsoever by the German organizations having been in touch with them formerly.

7. The last point to be raised in this discussion is the importance of providing JOAN and ELINOR sets to the Field as soon as possible. This type of equipment is the only one suitable for high level agents, who either cannot or will not permit themselves to be integrated in a set-up of cut-outs, couriers and letter drops. Training personnel in this type of equipment is relatively simple, and I understand the efficiency of the equipment has been increased in the last five years.

8. In considering the above proposals Washington should keep in mind the comparative ease with which such plans can be accomplished at present, and the near impossible difficulties which would be encountered at a later date. This discussion, in my opinion, should be closely coordinated with OPC, who would no doubt have to provide the different caches.