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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007 31 July 1950

Chief, Foreign Division M
Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

*copy filed
Cachalot*

Stay-behind Radio Operators

MGBA-6472, MGKA-20916

1. On 19 July I visited Cachalot at the request of Carp 2 to discuss with him the proposals made in MGBA-6472. These proposals were discussed by Carp 2 with Cackler, Ollenhauer, and Cachalot, and it was decided that all the reservations of the party on the subject should be discussed by Cachalot with me and would then become the subject of a further discussion of the three top people of the Party Executive. In my opinion Cachalot was chosen for this negotiation because he has had some experience in illegal activity and incidentally is also the gray eminence of the Party.

2. I was surprised at the comparative youth of Cachalot. We entered upon our discussion quickly and I found him to be an extremely capable and versatile negotiator. I started off by pointing out to Cachalot the importance of a political party such as his making plans for every contingency. Such plans should be made for the worst eventuality and should then be adjustable to modifications all along the line. I told him that my discussion with him was not occasioned by the present war jitters in Germany, but was a natural outgrowth of the long-range planning of my organization as well as the result of a year of fruitful cooperation between the Carp organization and my organization.

3. I told Cachalot that if the Russians started a war tomorrow, they would occupy all of Europe within a matter of weeks and it would take years before the liberation of Europe could be brought about. During the period of preparation it would be essential that those elements in Europe capable of resistance should be kept informed on the developments in their own land and help, from the inside, in the fight against the occupying forces. I told Cachalot that this explanation did not try to veil the fact that our prime purpose in contacting him at present was the establishment of intelligence connections on a large scale for what I termed "the worst eventuality". In figures, this would mean that we would want 10 men or

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women of outstanding discretion and of certain capabilities and traits of character, which I would outline to him, which would be pointed out to us and whom we could then proceed to recruit if we saw fit to use them. The Party at the same time would have to drop all connections with these persons since they could no longer be active in politics in any way. Their every action would be guided by the clandestine functions they would fulfill for us. It would also be necessary that the knowledge of these people or their activities and of their interest to the AIS be limited to as few people as possible and that they should not be known to one another.

4. The qualifications of these persons should be along the following lines: "They should definitely be middle-aged, probably even over 50, and have the type of job which would make their conscription labor-wise unlikely. Preferably they should be artisans or specialists who cannot be easily replaced, such as railroad switchmen, carpenters, cobblers, etc. They should be persons of good disposition, solid motivation, willing to do a job without advertising their heroism, and if possible, with a locale that would lead itself to clandestine activity. They should never have been especially active politically - definitely not active in the underground during the Nazi period. Women definitely should be considered, as experience with women in the past has been good. Women picked for such positions naturally should also be the type who would not fall into a general labor draft."

5. Cachalot reiterated several times that he would be completely honest and open with me in this discussion and, on my specific question, indicated that he had not discussed plans of this sort with anyone before and that this discussion would go no further than Carp 2, Ollenhauer, and Cackler. He gave me his reservations, which were built on two arguments. His first argument was built up on the long-range planning of the Party. This long-range planning had drawn certain conclusions from the experiences gathered during the Nazi period. Illegal activity, Cachalot stated, often is the most effective way to eliminate certain party leaders and potential leaders at a time of unrest and general catastrophe. Whereas he, Cachalot, would know that the Party would take this into account in any future illegal activity, he knew that armies fighting a war cannot be guided by long-range personnel planning and cannot commit agents behind enemy lines with a viewpoint of preserving their lives for necessary post-war activity. This was his first and to a certain extent, his most weighty, argument. The second one went into the question of his party's becoming, in the eyes of certain of its members, a tool of the AIS. I refuted this statement by making it plain that the technical nature of the training precluded its being given by a party member and that furthermore, security-wise, we could never see our way clear to entrusting anyone outside of our staff with the basic data on codes, ciphers, signal plans, and the like, since such information even today, if collected on a number of stay-behinds, could easily indicate our long-range planning and bring to naught certain of our emergency facilities.

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6. I told Cachalot that I appreciated his personnel qualms and also saw the importance of keeping his party politically clean from AIS connections. The time would come, however, I added, when the connections of the Party Executive, or that part of it which could flee in time, with the body of the Party, would depend on its radio agents trained by us today. I made it clear that his reservation as to exploitation of agents was not well made, since we would, when the situation arose, put these agents at the disposal of the Party Executive and then work through the party for their integration in our general program. After all, I added, the sources of information will still be entirely under the control of the Party and we will only create the technical link which must be thought of a long time ahead of the actual crisis.

7. This part of my conversation with Cachalot ended by his promising me to discuss the points further with Cackler and trying to find ways and means of making the idea more palatable to the members of the Party who would be chosen, if agreement can be reached, for this special job. At the same time Cachalot requested me to try to find ways and means of reaching a common ground of agreement and I promised him to discuss this with our technical people.

8. The meeting was attended by Carp 2 and [] who did not enter the discussion at any point. Certain other matters were discussed which will be the subject of a separate memorandum.

9. Knowing some members of the Party Executive, I am convinced that all arguments advanced, especially from the way they were advanced, originated entirely with Cachalot and that in all further discussions on this subject between Cachalot and the other three members, Cachalot will argue well for his long-range planning theory. It might be necessary for me to approach Cackler on this question; also Cachalot's full cooperation on this matter, if we want full success, is absolutely necessary. (Cachalot is, after all, for all practical intents and purposes, the head organizer of the Party and by far the most alert and clever tactician in an otherwise unwieldy machinery.)

10. I would appreciate any ideas or reactions from the addressees of this memorandum.

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