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<b>DISPATCH</b>		CLASSIFICATION <b>S E C R E T</b>	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. OSMA-12,913
TO Chief, WE	INFO Chief, IO Chief, SR	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 200-124-39/3 65-300-1	
FROM Acting Chief of [ ]	DATE 20 September 1961		
SUBJECT QKACTIVE/AEVIRIGIL/AEFLAG/AEPOLE Transmittal of [ ] report on Radio Nacional		RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)	
ACTION REQUIRED For your information		<input type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED <input type="checkbox"/> INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY	
REFERENCE(S)  <p>Transmitted herewith is a report on Radio Nacional prepared at the request of identity A. It summarizes in brief my opinion of the operations of the Spanish National Radio's Eastern-European section at present and contains certain suggestions and observations concerning future negotiations between QKACTIVE and the Spanish government for time on the QKACTIVE station. There are certain comments also included on the AEVIRIGIL, AEPOLE, AEFLAG agents involved at Radio Nacional. It is essentially a summary of the views that I expressed to identities B &amp; C in recent months.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">[ ]</p> <p>15 September 1961</p> <p>✓ Attachment:          1. Report on Radio Nacional REC'D RID/AN <u>6 OCT 1961</u>          2. Identities under separate cover</p> <p>Distribution:          3 - Chief, WE, w/att. 1 &amp; 2          2 - Chief, IO, w/att. 1 &amp; 2          2 - Chief, SR, w/att. 1 &amp; 2</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block;">         DOC FORWARDED W/O S/C          BY RED/AN 6 OCT 1961       </div> <p><i>Copy &amp; attachment filed in 7.1.2.54</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;">DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY          CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY          SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3026          NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT          DATE 2007</p>			
FORM 10-57 53 (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION <b>S E C R E T</b>	PAGE NO. <input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED

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Notes on the Spanish National Radio (Radio National Espana - RNE)

1. Spanish Government policy on broadcasting to the Soviet Bloc.

Essentially no policy exists. This is in accordance with the basic attitude of the government which, so far as I can see, is one that attempts to deny that the Soviet Bloc exists. The Spanish Government wants no contact with the Soviet Bloc and has no serious interest in developments within it. This attitude is significantly modified due to the increasing importance for Spain of Soviet Bloc trade. That trade is, however, conducted in the most discreet and obscure manner possible with the aim of keeping up the pretense that not even commercial relations exist. As consequence of this absence of policy, the Spanish Government has no interest in furthering any particular attitude in the population of the Soviet Bloc other than one of total rejection of the Communist system. There is no policy guidance concerning the types of broadcasts that RNE should produce nor is there, so far as I know, a serious interest in what it says beyond that it be anti-Communist. The government supports the eastern broadcasts, so far as I know, only because it feels its prestige is enhanced by doing so and because it is attacked heavily by Communist Bloc radios and therefore feels a natural urge to respond. Because of this attitude, one cannot predict what propaganda line the radio may take at any particular time. Government policy is not involved in the selection of one line or another, so long as the content is not overtly pro-Communist and high officials appear to be indifferent to what it says.

2. Current situation in the Eastern-European section of RNE.

a. The Russian Desk

At present the Russian Desk is functioning better than it has since the departure of Sr. CASTRO Farinas in 1958. This development is due exclusively to fortuitous circumstance. Until last December the Russian Desk had been headed by a semi-literate and semi-senile Georgian, who was responsible for such broadcasts as the eulogy of Adolph Hitler shortly after the visit of President Eisenhower to Madrid and a vitriolic attack on the February Revolution as nothing more than the first step in the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia. (Once he was stopped in the nick of time from putting out over the air an announcement that the Polish and Yugoslav Communist Parties had formed an alliance. The grounds for this assumption was the Georgian's belief that Lublin, the city where the Poles were going to have their Party Congress, was identical with Ljubljana in Yugoslavia.) Fortunately this man died last December and has been replaced by an inoffensive old emigre who is a Lieutenant (in spite of his years) in the Spanish Army and whose only concern is doing as little as possible. He happens to be a good friend of AEVIRGIL/106 and welcomes AEVIRGIL material because having it avoids his having to write himself. For one reason or another the rest of the regular members of the staff are, by and large, also either too lazy to do their own work or innocuous. One important recent change, also dating from last Fall, is the different attitude now displayed by the chief of the Eastern-European section toward AEVIRGIL/106. This is the result of 106's inviting the chief to an AEVIRGIL conference in Munich. This again reflects no particular change in policy or attitude, but simply the chief's current feeling of obligation toward AEVIRGIL because they invited him on the trip. One of the complications which still persists on the Russian program is that it is the only program under the control of the East-European section for which a specific amount of money (200 pesetas) is paid for each five-minute script used. The other East-European programs are produced by people who receive, if anything, a small monthly salary and no extra money is paid for scripts. The Russian program, unfortunately, is looked upon as an important source of income by a large number of people who know nothing about the Soviet Union, are completely ignorant of Communism, and have only one object in mind in writing for the program, the acquisition of 200 pesetas a script. At present, there are several emigre Rumanians, friends of the director of the East-European section, who write articles in French which are translated into Spanish and then later into Russian for the Russian program and are usually of a violently anti-Russian rather than anti-Communist nature.

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There are many other "hangers-on" who also make money this way. This is an endemic problem in the Russian section and will never be solved until payments for scripts are no longer made. The other desks of the East-European section of the radio include a Belorussian Nationalist program, sponsored by the Belorussian National Council, and a Ukrainian program run by two Ukrainians from the Stetsko Ukrainian Nationalist Organization. Broadcasts to the Soviet Union are also made in the languages in the three Baltic countries. All the minority nationality broadcasts are violently anti-Russian in character, particular Belorussian and Ukrainian programs. The content of these programs is beyond our control and probably have a more negative than positive value, particularly Belorussian, in view of the weakness of Belorussian nationalist sentiment in Belorussia. Baltic programs are better in content and are becoming less violently anti-Russian and more anti-Communist, due to KUBARK influence. Each of the Baltic programs has a KUBARK agent working with others to prepare the program. In addition to programs in the languages of the Soviet Union, there are also programs in Polish, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, Rumanian, Bulgarian, Croat and probably Serbian. The contributors to these programs represent a wide spectrum of political ideologies and attitudes toward Russians. The Poles are apparently an able and enlightened group who produce generally good programs and to have managed to keep more or less abreast of modern history. Most of the rest of the groups are composed of former officials of puppet governments set up by the Germans during WW II, although there are some exceptions such as the Bulgarians. I know little about the content of their program, but suspect that it is not remarkably appealing to their prospective audiences. There is no general line, no coordination among the programs of the groups and a great deal of remarkably contradictory information and opinions produced. I doubt that any Spanish official would even attempt to try to produce some order in this chaos and that were programs produced by the Eastern-European section to be broadcast over the AMCOMLIB station, it would be up to AMCOMLIB to insist on improved content.

3. Observations concerning negotiations in the future.

The main interest of the Spaniards directly concerned with the programs of Radio National and probably with any future program broadcast over AMCOMLIB would be money. They would certainly view any proposal to expand programming to the point of view of how many friends could be provided with jobs through it. Therefore, I suggest that negotiations begin at a level too high to be involved in hiring and firing, with the Minister of Information and Tourism, perhaps. To avoid tampering with the proposal by those interest in jobs for brothers-in-laws, the proposal should be concrete and detailed, I believe, and as much as possible on a take-it or leave-it basis. There are able men in Spain, the former head of the Eastern-European section, CASTRO Farinas, for one, who might serve effectively as the Spanish chief for a new group to produce programs to be broadcast by AMCOMLIB. At any rate, I feel that the Spanish chief to head this effort should be nominated ahead of time by AMCOMLIB before the proposal is made. A counter-proposal, with the exception of certain requests for featherbedding, is not likely, in my opinion, and if one were made it would probably turn on questions of personalities involved rather than on policy. (Although I mentioned to CASTRO Farinas above; he might well not be politically acceptable. He apparently was relieved of his job in the East-European section due to suspicions of his being overly pro-American.)

4. Suggested moves prior to beginning negotiations.

a. Prior to beginning negotiations, I would recommend that the FEIS monitor RNE Eastern-European broadcasts to provide samples of the material used in all of the languages that might be involved in broadcasts over the AMCOMLIB station. This would be necessary because the content of many of the programs is almost unknown to us at present. We have extensive information only on the Russian program and on the programs from the Baltic countries. Probably nobody in the Spanish Government knows anything about what goes out over the air in any language other than Russian and very little about it. The monitoring report might be rather surprising to send to top-level people, might provide a good arguing point in insisting on only a properly organized program being put out over AMCOMLIB station.

- b. As to a specific proposal to make to the Spanish to head off a request from them for time on the AMCOMLIB station, one that might be very welcome would be a broadcast series aimed specifically at answering Radio Espana Independente (REI). The Caudillo is personally interested in combating REI, though the method he has chosen to date, program B of the Russian section, is a farce. It is supposed to originate in some secret redout of the Czarists underground. Each program begins with the phrase, "Attention Gentlemen!". Due to the lack of material it often encounters, frequent resort is made to playing records, sometimes for as much as half of the program. A proposal to monitor and expose REI, deriding its falsifications and attacking the USSR for the same faults REI finds in Spain, might find a response from the Spanish Government and be of genuine propaganda value. For such a project, almost none of the current staff of the Russian Desk of the radio would serve. AEVIRGIL/106 could work in such a project with effect, but none of the others could. In addition to other advantages, a proposal to have a "special" program with a definite goal—giving the lie to REI—would have the advantage of separating that program from the Eastern-European section of RNE. Although I don't know how the Ministry of Information works nor the personalities involved in its upper level, I suspect it would be feasible to present this as a special project that should depend directly from the chief of the General Directorate of Information and have no further contact with the lower echelons of the Ministry.

#### 5. Miscellaneous Notes

- a. Degree to which the Spanish would be interested in AMCOMLIB radio time.

I have forgotten if Howland Sergeant told me whether the Spanish Government had already asked specifically about radio time for their programs. If to date the subject has not yet been brought up in any form other than vague references to some future development of this sort, I would suggest going slow in bringing it up. If possible, efforts should be made to find out in friendly conversation and elicitation whether there is any real interest in requesting time on the part of top-level officials in the government. Although I believe it is very wise to plan for this eventuality and ultimately to make a proposal to the Spanish before they make one to AMCOMLIB, having given some thought to the matter since talking to Sergeant and Meyer, I have come to wonder whether the Spanish are seriously interested in requesting time. As mentioned above, the only reasons I can see for their wanting it would be national prestige, which is a considerable reason I grant, and employment for friends and relatives. For that reason I would be careful that the advance planning of a proposal to be made by AMCOMLIB to the Spanish be done in such a way as not to raise their attention. Once the idea is suggested, they are certain to grab hold of it and demand that it be implemented. If, of course, they have made a fairly firm statement to the effect that they would desire time on the radio, then these considerations do not apply.

- b. Programs in languages other than those directed to the Soviet Union.

Producing programs in Russian would be difficult enough in view of the limited man power resources available to the Spanish. Producing programs in other languages would necessitate their relying on the current contributors to the East-European section of RNE for material and announcers. I believe it would be extremely difficult then to assert any careful control or guidance over program content. It may be, when the results of a monitoring sample are available, that certain of the minority nationality or Eastern-European satellite programs are of such excellent quality (the Polish program may be) that they can be transmitted over AMCOMLIB station without difficulties. However, pending evidence to the contrary, I believe that Spanish programs in the languages of the Eastern-European satellites are likely to prove to be distinctly embarrassing to the United States and to the American Committee. So far as I know, the political ideology of most of the contributors holds Radio Free Europe in as great contempt as it does the Communists.

c. Cost Considerations

One factor in making the proposal that must be borne in mind is that it will cost money. If the proposal that I have suggested, a program in Russian to answer REI, were made AMCOMLIB should be prepared to foot most of the bill for its preparation. This would probably include the services of two or three monitors, a couple of editors and a couple of announcers at the very least. And that in addition to the cost of the necessary technical equipment. In my experience, any proposal made to the Spanish Government that it act in a certain matter implicitly includes the assumption that we will pay for it. From a purely economic point of view, therefore, it would be much cheaper to accept tapes prepared by RNE and play them over the AMCOMLIB station. If this were done, however, they would almost certainly be the same tapes that were put out over RNE, with perhaps certain additions, but probably not significant ones and certainly not necessarily improving ones. In addition to the other factors that I have mentioned above, I believe this would be the case because the resources of the Spanish Government to produce propaganda material in the Eastern-European languages do not adequately cover their current endeavors and I cannot imagine that they will be able to make more money available.

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