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Brind R. P. file

26 February 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: SE/PC/FL and OPS

SUBJECT: Top Secret Memo #66360

In compliance with subject memo, answers to questions (1) through (11), Section V, are submitted in Attachment (A).

[Chief, SE/PC/5]

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

Attachment A.

POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION WITH REGARD TO RUMANIA
IN DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL COLD WAR STRATEGY

1. a. Lack of a truly representative Rumanian government with freedom of action.
- b. Imposition by a foreign power of a Communist regime on Rumania.
- c. Disregard of international agreements, such as the Peace Treaty and guarantees outlined therein with respect to the four freedoms.
2. a. Complete control of public and private life by internal security forces, a militant political organization, and the presence of Soviet military forces.
- b. Soviet control of the Rumanian economy which has been intermeshed with the Soviet-satellite economic system and separated from western economy.
- c. Failure of the refugees, including the King, to achieve unity and to maintain Rumanian prestige in the West.
- d. Growing discouragement among the Rumanian people who feel that the West, as well as the refugees, have abandoned them to the Soviets.
- e. Rumania's position adjacent to the Soviet Union and lack of any free border.
3. a. Lack of popular support of the Communist regime, which is maintained by force against the will of the great majority of the Rumanian people.
- b. Economic hardships caused by subordination of national needs to Soviet demands and reorientation to the Soviet system which does not complement the Rumanian system.
- c. The Rumanian peoples' hope for an early war and susceptibility to action leading to liberation.
4. a. See para 3 above.
- b. Rumania's traditional hatred and fear of the Russians,
- c. Ascendancy of imported

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e. Ascendancy of imported Communists over native ones.

5. a. Although it will be possible to conduct a covert PW program for a time without the support of the refugees, the issue of the refugees and the King should be settled as soon as possible in order that our program may be constructive and have continuity and influence up to and after the overthrow of the Communist regime.

b. The lack of a unified policy for dealing with the Rumanian refugees has resulted in OPC, OSO, the State Department, and NCFE, especially, working sometimes in opposition to each other with the various refugee groups.

c. Further, there should be a clear understanding with the British with regard to the role and use of the King.

6. a. Inability to use Yugoslavia as a base for agent operations.

b. The U.S. might exert pressure on Tito for the right to operate from Yugoslav territory in return for arms, etc.

7. a. Our greatest asset is the Rumanian peoples' hatred of the present regime. This should be encouraged and fortified by a carefully planned PW program coordinated with the establishment of a link with the people and the build-up of an underground organization.

b. The precarious economic situation should not be allowed to become stronger but should be attacked by means of covert economic warfare.

8. a. Policy should be changed from defensive to offensive in matters relating to the MSA and other measures designed for use in the cold war, and it should be made clear that the U.S. does not favor maintaining the status quo.

b. Clarification is needed as to U.S. desires and interests in Rumania after liberation in order that the PW program conform to and not negate U.S. policy.

9. a. The reported agreement between the exiled King and the British may prevent our use of the King.

b. The undue, and unholy, influence in Rumanian affairs exercised by Malaxa has had a detrimental effect on our operations.

c. The strength of the Iron Guard (fascist) group which receives cooperation from our allies and indirectly from the NCFE

will adversely affect

will adversely affect our operations.

10. Consider this an area wide problem.

11. Initiation of a PW program - broadcasts, leaflets, etc. - immediately prior to agent operations; establishment of a small underground organization as a nucleus for the future; mounting a few deception and harassment operations; and settling the refugee problem. Although the Rumanian project is still in the planning and developmental phase, it is considered that capabilities for supporting these actions will be attained.