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4 February 1949

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Wisner

FROM: [ ] [ ]

SUBJECT: [ ] Dispatch NGW-A-60 — Ref to E/100

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

1. I agree that this dispatch is altogether subjective and un-specific, and I should have been more impressed by it if it had listed a single instance in which General Hall had refused [ ] necessary support. As it stands I can see nothing in General Hall's attitude, assuming that [ ] correctly interprets it, which can not be easily explained in the light of three factors:

a. General Hall's preoccupation with his own problems of reorganization and his newness on the job;

b. The General's natural caution in dealing with a new and untried organization;

c. The ill-coordinated and frequently ill-advised series of moves which resulted in the premature establishment of [ ]'s activity in Germany and a consequent series of operational misfires.

2. From what I know of the situation it appears to me that [ ] has, up to this point, obtained all the support from Theater which he has requested or required. I am sure that, if he needs further support as the operations progress, he will obtain this either voluntarily from Hall and Clay or through our own intercession at the proper levels. I feel, if [ ]'s operations do progress soundly and carefully, he will have no difficulty in explaining to General Hall the need for such support as seems to him advisable.

3. It is true that the unfortunate series of circumstances surrounding the Greenwood Project caused a certain amount of hard feeling in the Theater but this was primarily at the level of the functional commands which did a lot of work on this project without being fully aware of the reasons for having started it in the first place or for later abandoning it. Inasmuch as General Walsh supported the concept of the old UMPIRE operation and was, to a large extent, responsible for the rush orders which went out on Greenwood, it is possible that his briefing of General Hall on this subject was unsympathetic to our present point of view; however, that is purely speculative. I

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am sure that General Clay fully understands the scope of our present planning and is altogether in sympathy with it. I doubt that General Hall's real attitude, whatever it may be, arises from any misinformation or lack of information conveyed to him by General Clay.

4. It is true also that OPC--OSO relations are not yet firm and specific and neither are our relations with the Theater G-2. The future form of such relations, it seems to me, will depend very largely upon the soundness of the judgment with which they are worked out in the field. That I conceive to be a very important part of [ ] job, if not the most important part at this stage.

5. I share your feeling that [ ] is tending to overdo the separation of OPC and OSO functions in the field, particularly in view of the fact that we are so largely dependent at this stage upon OSO facilities and upon the reservoir of goodwill which OSO has built up in the Theater. I think it would be well to draft a dispatch to [ ] outlining in quite specific terms the relationship we expect him to maintain with OSO in the field, stressing the ~~need for separating the need for separating the two activities~~ from the standpoint of operations and cover, but emphasizing that such separation can not be accomplished without complete and cordial cooperation between himself and the various OSO Mission Chiefs. I am sure that such cooperation exists at this point between [ ] and [ ], and I am desirous that it continue without being marred by unnecessary misunderstandings. More light will be shed upon this point when we receive the joint [ ]-[ ] cable which is mentioned in subject dispatch.

6. I see no particular point in your going to Germany at this time. I do think, however, it would be well for you to have a thorough discussion of Theater problems with [ ] as soon as possible after he reports to duty as head of OSO. If such a conversation discloses any serious friction between [ ]'s outfit and Theater G-2, that can be dealt with as it may appear advisable. If it discloses any actual misunderstanding of our mission on Hall's part, it might be that a semi-informal letter from [ ] to Hall would clear it up.

7. [ ]'s reaction is interesting. In the course of a conversation on other matters I asked him casually if [ ] had mentioned to him any difficulties with General Hall and whether in his judgment Hall, being new on the job, was giving our operations adequate support. He replied that [ ] had mentioned no difficulties whatever, and that it was his personal opinion that Hall had been extremely cooperative and cordial - more so even than [ ] had been. He remarked that [ ] tended to be more careful and conservative than either General Walsh or General Hall, and he expressed belief that [ ]'s attitude was fully justified.

JEB/njh

cc: OPC File OPC Chrono JEB Chrono

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