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FROM:

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. GB-2455  
 NOV 11 1944  
 Date Rec'd. SA 2 Nov 1944  
 Date of report A-43866

| To  | Room No. | Date   |        | Officer's Initials | Comments  |
|-----|----------|--------|--------|--------------------|---|
|     |          | Rec'd. | Fwd'd. |                    |   |
| 1.  |          | 11/11  | 11/11  | JK                 | Ditto only<br>to be disseminated.   |
| 2.  |          |        |        |                    | NOV 16 1944<br>DISSEMINATED - L.C.H.  |
| 3.  |          |        |        |                    |   |
| 4.  |          |        |        |                    |   |
| 5.  |          |        |        |                    |   |
| 6.  |          |        |        |                    | DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY<br>CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY<br>SOURCES METHODSEXEMPTION 3828<br>NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT<br>DATE 2007 |
| 7.  |          |        |        |                    |   |
| 8.  |          |        |        |                    | RECORDED  |
| 9.  | 1001     |        |        | cts                | OSO Registry<br>AUG 26 1948<br>-43  |
| 10. | 1158     |        |        |                    | 9   |

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.  
 A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.  
 Officer Designations should be used in To column.  
 Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.  
 Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.  
 Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.  
 For Officer Designations see separate sheet.





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as being entirely outside the terms of the Armistice, and as amounting to unwarranted and improper interference in Rumanian internal affairs on the part of the Russians. They state that in spite of this, and for the purpose of getting along with the Russians, they have been willing to give favorable consideration to the demobilization of a greater percentage of the Rumanian forces than they believe to be wise, but that they regard five divisions as being an absolute minimum necessary to maintain order and security throughout the country.

Moreover, they state that for administrative reasons it would be much more preferable to have five divisions instead of three, even if the five divisions are much below full strength. They give as the reason for this the fact that five skeleton divisions could be headquartered at the points where the HQ of the former five Rumanian army corps were located. In this manner the jurisdiction of the Divisional commands would correspond to the jurisdiction of the respective Army Corps, and there would be no need to have a general reassignment and administrative reorganization.

3. As of the afternoon of 26 October, General Radescu, acting on the advice of various members of the Government, had refused to sign the proposed order of demobilization. Pursuant to this order, the demobilization would reduce the strength of the Rumanian army to the divisions fighting at the front and three others. Before refusing to sign, Radescu had referred the order to Mr. Christu, the head of the Rumanian Commission for the application of the Armistice terms, and had been informed by Christu that in his opinion the order was without the scope of the Armistice terms. The Russian ultimatum, which was to have expired at midnight October 26/27, was backed by a threat on the part of the Russians that they would forcibly disarm the entire Rumanian army not fighting at the front, unless the Rumanians themselves should forthwith comply with the ultimatum.

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4. Mr. Starcea stated on the night of 26 October that the Rumanians would refuse to sign the order of demobilization, and would permit the Russians to disarm the Rumanian troops, in order that it could never be said that the Rumanians had taken this step voluntarily. Starcea further stated that if the Rumanian army is to be demobilized, it will be done in such a way that Russia will appear before all the world as having perpetrated this act herself, against the will and without the acquiescence of the Rumanian Government. Starcea remarked that the principal guilt of Rumanian Government officials under the Antonescu regime had been that of kowtowing and giving in to every German demand which was backed by a threat of force; and that in the judgment of the present Rumanian Government the Russians should not be substituted for the Germans as the lords and masters of Rumania's fate.
5. At 9.30 on the evening of 26 October, King Michael stated to source that in order to avoid possible conflict and bloodshed which would result from a forcible disarming of the Rumanian troops by the Russians, General Radescu was giving serious consideration to signing the order as demanded by the ultimatum under protest, that is, if he would sign it, it would be in such a manner as to set forth in the clearest and most positive language the fact that he had done so under duress and coercion, and that such being the case his signing would not be, or be deemed to be, a voluntary act.
6. On the afternoon of 27 October Mr. Buzesti informed Source that General Radescu had signed the demobilization order, with the above indicated protest, on 26 October, presumably in the late afternoon or evening. Mr. Buzesti stated that he had not been informed of this fact until noon on 27 October, and that he personally had advised

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against the signing of the order. On the afternoon of 28 October Mr. Ionitin, the King's secretary, in a conversation with source, confirmed the fact that the order had been signed by General Radeson on 26 October and that the protest had been included. He added that the Russians, upon being informed, appeared not to care one way or the other about the protest, but merely whether or not the order had been signed.