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DISPATCH NO. MGM-A-4900

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TO : Chief, Foreign Division M DATE: 15 February 1951
FROM : Acting Chief of Station, Karlsruhe
SUBJECT: GENERAL - Operational/PEDBIRD
SPECIFIC - Basis for Operational Collaboration Proposed by Belorussian National Council

Reference: MGM-A-4939, LUNIF-2544

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1. Emigre Contact with Belorussia since the War. (The source of the following information is identified in Part B of MGM-A-4939). During the first year and a half of the post-war period, that is to say until about the end of 1946, contact between Belorussian emigres in Western Europe and the resistance movement in the homeland was, in the source's words, "weak". This may be interpreted to mean that there was no direct, or organized, contact and that such reports as were received were at best second-hand. On four separate occasions during this period, groups of agents were dispatched to Belorussia by the provisional Belorussian Committee in Germany, but no word ever came back from any of these men. Early in 1947, a refugee who had belonged to a band of partisans near Bialystok turned up in Western Germany with satisfactory first-hand confirmation of the continued existence of organized anti-Soviet resistance in at least that area. During 1947, the Belorussian Committee in Germany began to organize a network of safe houses in Poland, gradually extending them across the country to Belorussia. The houses were located in Stettin, Breslau, Cracow, Warsaw, Nowy Targ, and Dzialdowo/Soldau (east of Thorn). Unfortunately, the Polish government uncovered the network and destroyed it late in 1947 before it had served the purpose of getting couriers in or out of Belorussia. That same year, 1947, the source conferred with (Col.) Frantisek Kuszal in Regensburg regarding the possibility of getting American aid in organizing the dispatch of agents to Belorussia. Kuszal, who heads the Union of Belorussian Combattants, asserted that American assistance could be had only if the Belorussians worked through the Ukrainians. The source opposed this approach because he wanted to deal directly with the Americans. He balked at the idea of getting himself and the Belorussian Committee involved in the interfaction warfare which divided the Ukrainian emigres. Although the source rejected Kuszal's proposed line of action and dropped out of the picture, Kuszal went ahead and organized the dispatch of two men to Belorussia towards the end of 1947. (Exactly who sponsored the dispatch is not

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clear to the source. Since we have indication that POB is familiar with this case, we will consult them for details.) During the summer of 1950, one of these men, DUDA, turned up again in Regensburg and alleged that he had just returned from Belorussia. POB believes that he never got there and that the amount that he gave of his experiences is merely a re-hash of the case officer's briefing prior to the mission. (See PULLF 1305). However, when the source came to Munich to interview DUDA in early fall, 1950, he got the impression that, though DUDA is overly prone to drink and talk, he actually had had recent contact with partisan elements in Belorussia. While the source was in Munich, he wanted to make use of DUDA to establish contact with the Americans so that he could discuss with them the possibility of collaboration in the recruitment and dispatch of agents into Belorussia, but though the source waited two days for DUDA to make the right connections, things did not work out. The source explains that he exercised caution in attempting to contact U.S. officials because he did not want to risk compromising himself by making indiscriminate contact.

2. The principal reason why leaders of the Belorussian Council want to collaborate with us is that they see in us the means to an end, that end being the support of the resistance movement inside Belorussia. In their eyes, the primary task of any man dispatched to Belorussia will be to bolster resistance, not to gather intelligence. This must be the case, they say, because the men they select for dispatch will not be commercial spies, interested in money, but men who are moved by idealism and a sense of patriotism. This can be taken with a grain of salt, but, even so, there is no reason why, with proper handling, the two goals, partisan support and intelligence work, cannot be co-ordinated. Our chief interests for the present are the establishment of (1) communications and (2) support facilities, and the procurement of (3) documents and operational intelligence, and of (4) spot intelligence. Our first two interests co-incided directly with those of the Council, and the other two targets we have set are not in conflict with Council interests. These interests, or, more properly, the Council program for support and direction of Belorussian resistance is as follows:

a. The re-establishment of communications with the resistance movement in Belorussia through (1) radio and (2) a courier system across Poland in cooperation with Polish resistance groups.

b. The procurement of information regarding the location of Belorussian resistance centers, the leading personalities and the number of men in the resistance movement.

c. The procurement of information regarding the present extent of collaboration between Belorussian resistance and the Balts to the North and the Ukrainians to the South. The Council's aim: mutual aid and co-ordination of resistance in the western section of the Soviet Union.

d. Redirection of resistance efforts. Less raiding and sabotage. More emphasis on establishing non-partisan nets and safe houses.

e. Clarification of American attitudes: (1) America supports the right of self-determination of the small nationalities in the USSR, and (2) the Americans will not try as war criminals those members of the resistance who collaborated with the Germans.

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f. Material aid. After needs are surveyed and a mode of delivery devised, the dispatch of weapons and ammunition, medicine, and articles of clothing.

g. The wherewithall to produce propaganda. Small presses, rubber stamp sets, etc., for turning out leaflets in the Belorussian language with text directly aimed at Belorussians.

3. Method of Recruitment.

a. Likely prospects in the ranks of young Belorussian emigres will be sounded out by the Subject of Part B, HGM-A-4939. The Subject will touch upon the idea of a mission but will make no mention of American sponsorship.

b. If a prospect's reaction is positive, he will be asked to submit a personal history statement following the lines of part I of the PRQ. This will be delivered personally to the case officer by the Council's liaison officer with us. If the statement, plus the liaison officer's remarks, indicate that the man may prove to be suitable, he will be asked to come to the US Zone of Germany for further interviewing. Holding the interview in the US Zone will have two advantages: (1) possible trouble or embarrassment which might arise from recruiting on foreign territory will be avoided; and (2) the prospect will be isolated from close friends to whom he might be tempted to tell all in a beery moment.

c. If the prospect is found suitable and consequently recruited, he will be given his mission briefing by the Belorussian Council here in Germany. He will then be turned over to us for his technical training, indoctrination and briefing. At present, the liaison officer of the Belorussian Council asks that his organization be given the opportunity to give a final briefing to the prospect shortly before he is to be dispatched. The chief objection to this from our point of view is that it would give away the approximate date of dispatch to the Council, even if the briefing were controlled by the presence of a case officer. However, this is a point which no doubt can be worked out without major difficulty.

4. As matters now stand, the liaison officer of the Belorussian Council has stated that he will locate by the beginning of March four suitable prospects for agent dispatch to Belorussia. He suggests that these men be sent to four different areas, two to Western Belorussia and two to the Eastern part of the country. When the men are located the liaison officer will let us know by sending an uncompromising letter to a cover address in Munich. We will answer, asking him to come to Munich for a meeting because a meeting here will have the advantage of being in an area controlled by us and easily accessible to other case officers who might desire to sit in on the proceedings. As stated above, the liaison officer of the Belorussian Council will bring along the personal history statements of the prospects, which will serve as the basis for discussion. If all or a part of the men appear acceptable, our next step will be to have the men themselves come here for interviews.

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5. You will be informed by cable as soon as we have indication from the liaison officer of the Belorussian Council that he is prepared to come here for a concrete discussion of prospects.

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