

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

| FROM: | | ROOM NO. | | | DATE | | OFFICER'S INITIALS |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|--|--------------------|
| | | RECEIVED | FORWARDED | | | | |
| DC/SR/RISB/P 1052 J, x-3339 | | | | | | | |
| 1. | C/SR/RISB/P | | | 3/6/61 | | | |
| 2. | C/SR/RISB | | | 6 MAR 1961 | | | |
| 3. | SR/MC | | | | 9 1961 | | |
| 4. | C/SR/6 SR/COP | 8 MAR 1961 | 9 MAR 1961 | 17 MAR 1961 | | | |
| 5. | C/SR/2 | 20 MAR 1961 | | | | | |
| 6. | C/SR/3 | | 22 Mar | 22 Mar | | | |
| 7. | C/SR/4 | | 18 MAR 1961 | | | | |
| 8. | SR/... | | | | | | |
| 9. | C/SR/9 | 23 MAR 1961 | | 23 Mar | | | |
| 10. | C/SR/10 | | 24 MAR 1961 | 24 Mar | | | |
| 11. | CI/OG | | | 29 | | | |
| 12. | EE/OPS/CI | | | | | | |
| 13. | C/FE/PO/PI | | | | | | |
| 14. | SR/... | 5 - APR 1961 | | 6 - APR 1961 | | | |
| 15. | AF/C/PI | | | 6 APR 1961 | | | |
| 16. | C/WE/PI | | | 6 APR 1961 | 6 - APR 1961 | | |
| 17. | C/WE/PI SR/COP | 10 Apr | | 10 | | | |
| 18. | C/SR | | | 17 APR 1961 | | | |

COMMENTS

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3028
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

| | |
|-------------------|-------|
| SECRET | |
| DECLASSIFIED | |
| RI/AN 7 NOV 1961 | JEP |
| RI/MIS | |
| SR/CE/Rel | -Roll |
| RI/Files | |

BD 2396
Book Dispatch No. 2396

| | |
|-----------------|-------|
| 74-120-64 | |
| ABSTRACT | INDEX |
| | |
| DATE 6 MAR 1961 | |

RECORD COPY

SECRET

13-19-Pls direct E
As add 1 c. FE/Exec
x 10gs distribution.
Pls. charge field list to
E 26 comes, 4.E 3, 4.E
1W - FE/Exec

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

| | | | | | |
|----|---------------------|-------|-------------|-------------|--|
| 4. | SR/RISB/P | | | | |
| 5. | SR/MC | | 18 APR 1961 | 18 APR 1961 | |
| 6. | RID/DP | | 19/4 | | |
| 7. | RID/ME | | | | |
| 8. | RID/DP SR/RISB/P | 1307L | | | |

Please correct patronymic to
Yasilyevich

OK to pouch to NE Stations listed
per telephone conversation with
etc. RID/DP
19/4/61

SECRET

| | | | |
|---|--------------------------------------|---|---|
| DISPATCH | | CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. Book Dispatch No. 2396 |
| TO INFO | Chiefs of Certain Stations and Bases | | HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. <i>6 Mar 1961</i> |
| FROM | Chief, SR | | DATE |
| SUBJECT Operational/REDCAP/LCIMPROVE o Acquisition and Reporting of Information on Soviet Students Abroad | RE: "43-3" -- (CHECK "X" ONE) | | |
| | | MARKED FOR INDEXING | |
| | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | NO INDEXING REQUIRED | |
| ACTION REQUIRED | | INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY | |

REFERENCE(S)

1. One category of Soviet national residing outside the Soviet Union for an extended period of time which has not, in all areas, been afforded the same degree of interest and coverage as REDCAP targets is the Soviet citizen studying abroad. As a result of this relative lack of attention, it is felt that we are missing an opportunity to learn more about Soviet use of such students for intelligence purposes, as well as a chance to have more than usual access to a Soviet outside of an official Soviet installation for more than a very short period of time, in order to weigh any recruitment possibilities.

2. The purpose of this dispatch is to emphasize that the acquisition of information on Soviet students in your respective areas is considered an integral part of the REDCAP program and consequently complete and continuous reporting of such data is expected as a matter of routine procedure. This type of information is processed at Headquarters in much the same manner as that received on REDCAP personalities and procedures for providing the field with Headquarters traces and REDCAP notebook sheets are the same.

3. The interest in Soviet students abroad, as mentioned in paragraph 1 above, is twofold. Information from several areas indicates that certain Soviet students abroad are actively engaged in espionage activities for the Soviet Intelligence Services. Some are RIS staff officers who are members of local residencies, others act as spotters and assessors of potential agents for the RIS. (As you are aware, a priority RIS target, the American student abroad, is one generally well within easy reach of the Soviet student abroad.) In addition, there is some evidence that Soviet intelligence trainees preparing for assignments to illegal as well as legal residencies are sent abroad to pose as students, not so much for the formal education they receive at foreign universities as to increase their language proficiency and acquire area knowledge. One case of recent origin which graphically illustrates the use by the RIS of Soviet students abroad concerns the Soviet national Petr Vasilyevich SMIRNOV who was enrolled at the Institute for Social Studies in The Hague, The Netherlands, during 1959 and 1960. From August 1959 until his agent's arrest in May 1960, SMIRNOV served as RIS case officer for an agent originally recruited by the East German Security Service (MfS) and turned over to the Soviets, apparently for the specific purpose of attempting to penetrate the Netherlands Security Service. SMIRNOV may have been sent to The Netherlands specifically to handle operations of this nature. On the other hand he may only have been intended to act as a "spotter" among students at the institute but was given this assignment on an ad hoc basis because the RIS felt the operation warranted a higher degree of security than would have been achieved had it been handled by members of the legal rezidentura assigned to the local Soviet Embassy.

4. There is also an interest in exploring the possibilities for making recruitment approaches to these Soviet students abroad. Though undoubtedly hand-picked for their political reliability, these students, once exposed for an extended period of time to a segment of the Western world, may well experience varying degrees of doubts about the Soviet system which might make them susceptible to a recruitment approach. Unlike their countrymen who are stationed abroad in an official installation, in many cases the Soviet student would perforce come into close and continuous contact with Western peoples and ways and thus would be subjected to influences of a greater variety and intensity than would the Soviet official.

CS COPY

74-120-64

| | | | | |
|---------------------|--|-------------------------------|---|---------------|
| FORM 10-57 53b (40) | USE PREVIOUS EDITION, REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE. | CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED | PAGE NO. 1 |
|---------------------|--|-------------------------------|---|---------------|

HQ COPY

HQ COPY

5. Although repetitious to an extent of requirements already in your possession, for the sake of emphasis we shall outline the categories of information which we should like to receive on all Soviet students who remain in your respective areas for periods of six months or more: full name; date and place of birth; ethnic origin, e.g. Ukrainian, Armenian, etc.; address in USSR; marital status; military service; prior travel abroad and travel within the country in which he is studying; other Soviet nationals with whom associated; non-Soviet contacts; language, including proficiency and where and how learned; previous educational institutions attended and courses of study; educational institutions attended in your areas; complete physical description; personal traits, e.g. personality, habits, hobbies, extra-curricular activities, etc., political vulnerability, and, date of return to the USSR, or, departure for another country. We would also like to have a photograph and at least one handwriting sample (original preferred) of each student.

6. It is presumed that in most instances the foregoing information will be obtained from your liaison services. It is requested that in those areas where the liaison services have not been providing information on Soviet students along with their reports on REDCAP types, the addressees concerned apprise their liaison services of our requirements in this field. Where applicable, independent assets with access to Soviet students should also contribute to the effort. In addition, you may wish to suggest to your liaison services that the support of local educational institutions might be enlisted in order to obtain some of the information desired (without, of course, mentioning ODYOKE interest to those institutions).

7. It is recognized that, heretofore, many of the addressees have not been involved in the REDCAP Program (i.e., the systematic collection of information on Soviet officials stationed abroad) because there has been no Soviet representation in their areas. However, it was thought desirable to make our requirements known to these Stations in view of the fact that numerous countries have established or are on the verge of establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and because we anticipate an influx of Soviet students even into those areas which have not established diplomatic ties, based on the increased number of cultural exchange agreements which have been concluded between the Soviet Union and such countries.

L

J

94-120-64

