

D R A F T

TO: Chiefs of German Stations and Bases

BOOK DISPATCH

FILE no. 74-120-64

FROM: Chief, SA

SUBJECT: REDCAP/Operational

REDCAP Objectives and Reporting

PURPOSE OF DISPATCH

The purpose of this dispatch is to present an up-to-date definition of the REDCAP program and its operational objectives, to categorize the Soviets ~~mainly~~ coming under the ~~main~~ purview of the program, and to instruct the field on reporting procedure.

REDCAP DEFINITION

1. The REDCAP program is the planned collection and collation of information on Soviet personnel posted abroad, in official or quasi-official capacities, for the purpose of operational exploitation of those suspected of susceptibility to operational approach, or who become targets for operational exploitation as will be determined by subsequently collected data or leads.

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2. Two corollaries of the REDCAP Program, secondary in nature but sufficiently important as to be identified by their existence and function, are as follows. One provides liaison services with requested support in terms of REDCAP data as necessary for their internal security work and operational moves. This support strengthens mutual security generally and specifically it provides KUBARK with an exchange item for support received from these liaison services. It also facilitates and fosters a better climate for achieving our overall operational objective.

The second corollary is one which in effect makes KUBARK a repository of

data on foreigners of potential threat to our security. Because of tradition and other demands, it is incumbent on KUBARK as a security organization to perform this function of collection and storage.

REDCAP OBJECTIVES

1. <sup>arising from</sup> The objectives of operational exploitation ~~in~~ the REDCAP program are:

- a) The identification, development, and recruitment of those Soviet nationals who can be used as sources in place, whether inside or outside the USSR.
- b) Similar development of Soviet nationals who can be induced or helped to defect to ODYOKE or to friendly foreign governments.
- c) Similar development of Soviet nationals who can be exploited for covert action ~~or~~ deception purposes.
- d) Similar development of Soviet nationals who can be used on a highly selective basis for counterintelligence and counterespionage purposes.

REDCAP CATEGORIES

1. ~~\*~~ For procedural purposes, a REDCAP target will be properly identified by the REDCAP indicator. Soviets coming under this category are listed below; all other Soviets, e.g., technicians working on engineering projects, tourists, cultural groups, should not be slugged REDCAP but instead should

be handled under other existing pertinent slugs, such as REDSKIN.

2. The REDCAP indicator will be used only in connection with the following, irrespective of the length of time spent abroad:

a) Officers and employees of embassies, legations, consulates general, consulates, and Service Attaches staffs.

b) Officials of ministries visiting official installations abroad on official business.

c) Officers and employees of Ministry of Foreign Trade who are assigned to the Commercial Representations abroad, as for example SOVFRANKHT, MEZHKNIGA, INTURIST, etc.

d) Press and radio representatives, including NOVOSTI.

e) Students ,

f) Members and delegates to international organizations, e.g., United Nations, UNESCO, IAEA, etc.

g) Members of Soviet-run hospitals.

h) Audio technicians, known or suspect.

i) Diplomatic couriers.

REDCAP REPORTING

1. Not all Soviets are or will ever become targets for recruitment, defection or as objects of CA or LCIMPROVE interest. Consequently, interest in and reporting to Headquarters on REDCAP personalities should vary accordingly, depending on the nature of the Soviet target. Therefore, in the case of REDCAP personalities where there is no continuing, specific operational interest known to the station, or developed during his tour, reporting to Headquarters should be limited to basic biographic data.

Any other developmental or investigative material should be retained by the field and only transmitted to Headquarters when and if it is deemed worthy of such handling, i.e., when an operation is anticipated. It is not implied that the field restrict its investigation of REDCAP personalities only to those on whom there is existing operational interest, for in many cases prior operational knowledge may not be available and must still be acquired. However, extreme care should be exercised in determining when a REDCAP personality warrants more elaborate treatment with respect to the information which will be selected for passing to Headquarters.

In this case, as in the case of existing personalities of interest, information should be carefully screened so that that portion destined for Headquarters will have some operational value for immediate or future use, will contribute to research and analysis, and or will be of value at some future date to other field stations should the Soviet be transferred. Thus, while all the facts gathered by the field on any given REDCAP Soviet (including the immediate operational details regarding the steps taken in procuring the information) may have some place in the field's files and, after the departure of the Soviet, may be later screened and passed to Headquarters for inclusion into a 201 file, only certain pertinent facts are required on a current basis by Headquarters. As an aid in determining the type of information which might be of interest to Headquarters on REDCAP personalities who have been identified as possible targets for recruitment, defection, propaganda or political action, or counterintelligence activity, we are forwarding as an attachment a guide suggesting the type of information which should sooner or later be passed to Headquarters, the priority of transmission depending on the operational situation.

2. Headquarters wishes to be informed by cable of the travel to and from your area of the following <sup>types</sup> groups of Soviets. This supersedes the list contained in Book Dispatch No. 451, October 1957.

- a) Identified RIS personnel.
- b) Service Attaches and members of their staffs.
- c) Diplomatic personnel from Ambassadors down through and including attaches.
- d) Chiefs of Commercial Representations.
- e) Members and Alternate Members of the Central Committee of the CPSU, AND OTHER HIGH-RANKING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.
- f) Audio Technicians. See Watchlist of Soviet Audio Technicians.

The cable to Headquarters announcing their departure from your area must also be sent to the station in the area to which the technicians are traveling.

- h) Diplomatic Couriers who are not listed in the latest List of Soviet Diplomatic Couriers (ST-29).

IT IS SUGGESTED THAT

3. Reporting by despatch should be as follows.

- a) A consolidated report should be made periodically (every three months) on the PCS REDCAP Soviet personnel in your country on whom there

is nothing significant to report, as a means of maintaining our continuity on the Soviets in your area, and would also include REDCAP personalities in special delegations, ~~relationships through your country,~~ intended visits or visa requests of <sup>Soviet</sup> ~~high-ranking~~ officials, and other pertinent information which does not warrant separate and more timely reporting.

b) Significant information, as extracted and refined in summary from raw reports, audio tapes, etc., excluding information on the method of acquisition, on any given individual on whom there is something of an operational interest (but not enough for more timely reporting) should be included as an attachment to the above mentioned consolidated report. If more than one such individual is being reported in this manner, separate attachments should be made for each in alphabetical order and including appropriate 201 numbers if available. The attachments should include items of information suggested in this Desk Dispatch, summarized as received from all sources, with proper notations as to the source of each bit of information (as for example, result of audio surveillance, double agent operation, or special contact.) When received at Headquarters,

the consolidated report will be indexed by RID under the appropriate file heading, while <sup>each</sup> ~~the~~ attachments will be separated from the covering dispatch and become an integral part of the Soviet's 201 file.

c) Exceptions to the consolidated reports would be determined by any development wherein an activity takes on a special operational aspect, e.g., ICIMPROVE cases. In these cases, individual reports should be prepared on more frequent basis as their individual attention and operational demands may warrant.

d) Apart from the periodic and other reports mentioned above on PCS Soviets, a monthly report would be desired on REDCAP personalities ~~who transit your area~~ (see paragraph 5 above under DEFINITION) who transit your area and who appear on travel manifests procured by the station, since many field stations must depend on transient points for information on Soviets in their own areas. Since most travel manifests as received from liaison or other assets include all nationalities and types of travelers, many of whom are of no particular interest to Headquarters, you should, if at all possible, screen the manifests and extract from them REDCAP personalities for passing to Headquarters.

OTHER

1. Aside from any operational considerations in the proper selectivity of REDCAP information, there is a matter of streamlining all reporting for the purpose of conserving file space at Headquarters. Tapes, complete tap results, and other bulky accumulation of information as might be received through liaison sources especially contribute heavily to the processing and storage problems in Headquarters, and only rarely can Headquarters review of such basic operational material add to that done in the field. Whenever possible and unless there are some overriding reasons, these bulk items should not be sent to Headquarters, but instead, should be carefully screened and only select portions, if any, transmitted. In fact, this same attention should be paid to all forms of reporting, with unnecessary verbiage excluded.

2. Until such time as a mechanized system can be introduced for the complete processing of REDCAP data, the REDCAP notebook will remain the basic framework of the records system and as a quick reference, while the Soviet's 201 file will be the master dossier containing complete

information on his activities and vulnerabilities. Adherence to the above suggestions and guides will insure that REDCAP record management will be efficient and orderly, and will effectively support the operational aspects of the REDCAP program.

ATTACHMENT TO:

BOOK DISPATCH #

INFORMATION ON SOVIETS OF INTEREST TO HEADQUARTERS UNDER REDCAP

1. Biographic

- a) Full name, DPOB of SUBJECT, spouse, parents of both and children.\*
- b) Passport number including type and date of issuance.\*
- c) Description--be specific, do not use "medium" or "average build," etc.
- d) Personality traits.
- e) Hobbies.
- f) Financial status, personal problems, etc.
- g) Languages.
- h) Photographs.

2. Contacts within the Soviet Community.

- a) Climate in the Soviet group--personal antipathies and friendships.

(Who "pals" with whom; who knew each other in the USSR. This is important for an identification of RIS individual in the connotation of "guilt by association".)

- b) Marital or romantic complications.

3. Contacts with Indigenous Persons.

a) Contacts with indigenous persons are only of interest to Headquarters after the field has determined that a pattern emerges and that the contact appears suspicious.

b) Contact with known Communist party members or known agents of any kind.

c) Contact with indigenous employees if appear of interest.

4. Contacts with Other Diplomats.

a) What appear to be strictly protocol contacts are not of interest to Headquarters.

b) Area contacts--which Soviet seems to be friendly or cultivating other diplomats from the Satellite community, the WE area, NE area, etc.

5. Contacts with Americans.

a) Types of Americans--military, civilian and their occupation.

6. Technical Information.

a) Residences of Soviets outside the installation.

b) Arrival of Soviet audio technicians (any indication of technical

probing of installation), and clandestine photos of audio technicians.\*

- c) Anticipated move of entire installation to new building.\*
- d) Soviet communications--diplomatic pouch, ciphers, cable channels, etc.

7. Other

- a) Possible open code or double talk.
- b) Working hours--absence during regular working hours, late hours.
- c) Overt position versus covert position.
- d) Association with known or suspect RIS individuals.
- e) Frequency of promotions, transfer to other work.
- f) Names of Soviets meeting couriers, delegations.
- g) Freedom or restriction of movement.
- h) Attendance at social affairs, dinner parties, etc.
- i) Travel or attempts to travel within the local country to restricted areas or to areas where military installations exist.
- j) Sudden departures.\*

\*--Information should be cabled. Other information should be pouched unless an operational situation requires more speedy transmission.