

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

TO: ACTION BRANCH

1. Fill in Sect. 2, on back. Detach back flap and forward *SR/AN 11 41 AM '63*
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/AN

RID/AN *27*

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

*ICC TO WH/2/AR*

*(from Redcap notebook):*  
 1- ~~300~~ *300*: ~~SR/AN 11 41 AM '63~~  
~~SR/AN 11 41 AM '63~~ *KOBYSH*, head of Investiya, arrived Sep 62, has no known RIS connections. *KAZIMIROV*, 1st Secy, arr. Jan 63, associates with known RIS (including GRU) types.  
 Also, as you probably noted, the two were allegedly in NY together, and are presently on apparently friendly terms (att. to *□*).  
 Please coord any outgoing with SR/CI/A.

MICROFILMED  
SEP 20 1963  
DOC. MICRO. SER.

NOTE: According to SR/O/WH, this has been answered long ago by ~~SR/AN~~ *SR/AN* FI/D, and there has been considerable subsequent correspondence on the matter. *fv/10.5.64*

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SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 25X2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

ROUGH SECURITY VIOLATION  
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED	
1. SR/CI/A	5C45	SEP 23 1963	24	<i>JW</i>
2. <i>Julian</i>			24	<i>JW</i>
3. SR/X/WH		25 SEP 1963	28	<i>JAC</i>
4. WS				<i>JW</i>
5.				
6. SR/CG/H/AT		10.3.64	10.3.64	<i>JW</i>
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FILE TITLE

RID/AN

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT INDEX

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74-120-64

*SR/CI/A 509A*

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

DOCUMENT NUMBER

13 Sept 63

□ □

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<b>DISPATCH</b>		CLASSIFICATION <b>S E C R E T</b>	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. [ ] [ ]
TO Chief, SR		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. <b>28</b>	
INFO Chief, WH		DATE <b>13 September 1963</b> ✓	
FROM Chief [ ]		RE "433" - [ ]	
SUBJECT <b>REDWOOD</b> Possible Contacts with Soviets Traveling by Ship.		MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
ACTION REQUIRED Para 7		INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED MICROFILMED QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY	
REFERENCE(S) Ref: [ ] [ ], 19 July, 1963 N/R		<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;"> <b>SEP 20 1963</b>  DOC. MICRO. SER. </div>	
<p>1. Several Soviet officials have departed Rio de Janeiro for Europe via ship. Vladimir KHALIKUTIN and family [ ] [ ] and Boris LUKICHEV and family [ ] [ ] left Rio de Janeiro for Italy aboard the <u>Julius Caesar</u> in July, 1963.</p> <p>2. The reference suggested that it may be possible to exploit Soviet travel aboard non-Bloc ships. Travel aboard non-Bloc ships affords an opportunity for close contact under conditions in which a Soviet target is under less than normal observation and control by other Soviets. The ten days or two weeks aboard ship permit the Soviet sufficient time to re-assess his political philosophy. He may be influenced by the relative ease of shipboard life and the realization that soon he will again be caught in the dull routine of Soviet life.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">← Re FURTHER DISCUSSION →</p> <p>3. It is submitted that it would be of considerable operational interest to place a KUBARK agent aboard ship with Vitaliy <u>KOBYSH</u> ( ) or with Vladimir <u>KAZYMIROV</u> ( ). (Various considerations of KOBYSH as a defection or recruitment target have already been discussed in Station and Headquarters correspondence.) A second example of a potential shipboard target is Vladimir KAZYMIROV. In KAZYMIROV's case it is suggested that contact would best be made by [ ] [ ]. The shipboard phase of the operation would be a continuation of [ ] [ ]'s development of KAZYMIROV. The immediate goal of which is to develop as close a personal relationship with KAZYMIROV as possible. The ten days or two weeks aboard ship would be the "moment of truth".</p> <p>4. Any plan for a shipboard operation obviously depends on the target's traveling via ship. KHALIKUTIN and LUKICHEV left Rio de Janeiro PCS. No home leave travel via ship has been noted. It is possible that no appropriate target will leave Rio de Janeiro by ship in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, it is believed judicious to consider such an operation in the event the opportunity does present itself. It is important that [ ] [ ] be appraised of Headquarters' thinking on this matter. If Headquarters' reaction is favorable, some preparatory work can be done.</p> <p>5. Given Headquarters' encouragement, [ ] [ ] will attempt development of a contact in the local office of the Italian line and will endeavor to obtain advance information on Soviet travel. A close check on Soviet reservations would be initiated in the spring of 1964. The majority of Soviet travel is performed in the spring and summer. It is suggested that Headquarters may wish to check the Italian line, possibly ascertaining if [ ] [ ] has or could develop any assets in the line, particularly aboard the ship <u>Julius Caesar</u> which is on the Rio-Europe run. It would be helpful, for example, to have an agent who could obtain a table or cabin next to that of the Soviet target.</p> <p>6. Should operations reach the point where a KUBARK agent is placed aboard ship with a Soviet, it would be well to plan for the services of a KURIOT technician and back-up man. It would be desirable to have a KURIOT technician in the cabin adjacent to the Soviet target</p>			
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D 10-8-21 (cc Filed in) CS COPY		74-120-64	PAGE NO. 1 of 2
[ ] [ ] (cc Filed in)		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED ROUGH SECURITY VIOLATION NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION	

See [ ] [ ] ca. July 63 (cc in SR/1/A)

CONTINUATION OF  
DISPATCH

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to conduct an audio operation from which it would be possible to ascertain the Soviet's reaction to cultivation and eventual recruitment. [ ] , [ ] , [ ] , would well qualify for such an assignment. He is of Portuguese origin and could easily build a cover story around a visit to Portugal. It is further noted that travel of FBPRIMER's such as [ ] aboard the Italian line would not be suspicious, as no FBPRIME line serves Europe from Rio de Janeiro and it is not uncommon for ODYKERS to travel via Europe on home leave.

7. Headquarters' thoughts on the concept of placing a KUBARK agent aboard ship with a Soviet official are solicited.

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CONTINUED

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