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### ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

*RI/AN*

EXTENSION

NO.

*MGAA-427*

DATE

*20 MAR 52*

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED	
1. <i>RI/D/MIS</i>			<i>RB</i>
2.			
3.			
4.			
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7. <i>RI/FI/SP</i>			
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15.			

*[ ] material*

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RI/AN	<i>ZC</i>
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RI/FILES	

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 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
 SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
 DATE 2008

ABSTRACT	<i>X</i>
DATE	<i>20 MAR 52</i>

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EE

Chief, SR Division  
 Chief, EE Division  
 Chief, of Station, Frankfurt

**KAPOK**

20 March 1952

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 REDNOX/AECOB

Agent Evaluation Reports

1. Transmitted herewith are agent evaluation reports on CANUSO 1, 2 and 3.

2. Comments:

A. CANUSO 1: To be able to assess this evaluation properly one must bear in mind the precise nature of the job the agent is expected to carry out. CANUSO 1's principal task will be to serve as the link, the authenticator to whatever partisan units are encountered in Kurzene. Once he has performed this task he will operate under the close supervision of CANUSO 3. If he is unable to make contact, he will serve as an assistant to CANUSO 3, a look out, generator operator, etc.

B. CANUSO 2: Assessment of the agent in terms of his specific tasks is doubly important in the case of CANUSO 2 who has neither demonstrated communications aptitude nor aggressiveness in physical training. However, because he is better than average in tradecraft, knows the PZ area very well, and will serve as a contact man for work into HIGA, his native city, we feel he occupies an important place on the team.

C. CANUSO 3: Little remains to be said about CANUSO 3 except for the fact that here is an individual who rose very rapidly to meet the demands of the situation in which he found himself. It should be remembered that initially CANUSO 1 was considered as the leader while 3 was the subject of some concern because of his drinking. However, 3 proved that over the long pull he was head and shoulders above the others.

3. Conclusion: The AECOB team appears to be one of the better balanced teams on hand. Any one of the individuals on the team would be found lacking in one of a number of attributes if he were being considered as a singleton but together they make a rather effective group. The factors of leadership, area knowledge, technical ability and personal traits are well mixed.

Dist: Att: 3

- 3 - SR (2 w Att) (Orig. handcarried)
- 2 - COB (w Att)
- 2 - CROB (1 w Att)    2 - CROB/E (w Att)

*file in*

*J. J. J.*

~~KAPOK~~

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REDSOX/AECOB/Agent Evaluation Report: CAMUSO 1

## 1. Training:

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a) Commo Efficiency:

Subject is only barely adequate in Commo efficiency. The chief reason is that his age (41) has been against him all the way. He had a difficult time mastering code and is even now just beginning to build up his speed. As of 29 Feb his speed was sending, 10 WPM and receiving 12 WPM. However he is assimilating cryptography and actual contacts well. The commo section CSOB/K thinks that he will be an adequate W/T operator by dispatch time and with only a little more training could be a good operator.

b) Para-Training commenced on 10 March 1952. Subject is progressing well and as of 18 March he has made 4 jumps (without hesitation) from the 34 ft tower. The airborne section is satisfied with his progress. DZ selection and reception committee work will be taught in the week of 24 March.

c) Sovietation:

Subject has lived 1 year (1940-41) under Soviet occupation in Latvia. He has also fought against the Soviets as a member of the Latvian Legion. He has digested all material available here from the Latvian Radio and Press. But because he has had no actual contact with Soviet conditions for 7 years he can only be rated adequate on Sovietation.

d) Security Awareness:

Subject has a tendency to underrate the necessity for security. But the case officers and RNPILLLOW have constantly stressed its importance and his security awareness has steadily increased. He had the idea that "It can't happen to me" but he soon changed his mind after a few of his private conversations were repeated to him verbatim.

e) Physical Stamina:

Subject appears older than he is with a balding, stooped look but he is actually quite strong. He has had no trouble keeping up with the physical training program. The Subject has spent almost his entire life as a woodworker and is suprisingly durable.

f) Tradecraft:

Subject has assimilated the principles of tradecraft well and has demonstrated intelligence and imagination in practical problems. Due to the shortness of the training program and the huge time demanded for Commo, as much trade-craft as the undersigned would like (especially practical problems) has not been given. Therefore subject can only be rated adequate through no fault of his own.

## 2. Operational Aptitude for Mission:

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a) Ability to Implement Training to Mission:

Throughout training it has been the consensus of the undersigned [ ] and RNPILLLOW that the subject is somewhat headstrong, too quick to act, and too sure of himself. Subject's mission is to contact and assist partisans [ ]

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and through them to get information on the Baltic coast for sea ops. It is felt that the stringent security precautions necessary for the partisans' survival will counter-balance subject's impetuosity. Except for the above mentioned liabilities it is felt that the subject has very good possibilities to implement his training to his mission. He is very familiar with his area, knows how to live in the woods well, has a great deal of physical courage, and is known among Latvian soldiers as a staunch fighter against Communism.

b) Ability to perform Clandestine Commo: is directly contingent upon the statements of para 1.A. above. However since he is progressing so well with cryptography and contacts he must be rated between fair and good.

c) Ability to Carry Cover Story:

He can carry his legend from birth to 1945 well. (A finished copy of this legend will be pouched within a week.) This part of his legend deals with places, dates, and people known to him. But the inherent weakness of the legend from 1945 to present (Returning from Russia) plus his very scant knowledge of Russian, makes it plain that his cover story could not pass a serious interrogation. Therefore one of his first jobs on the operation will be to seek a better cover story and documentation from his contacts.

d) Ability to Influence People:

Subject's self confidence and obvious sincerity would carry a lot of weight among ordinary people. But his impetuosity would quickly be spotted by a discerning person. Therefore, he would probably have a good deal of success in influencing the average person in Courland (his area of operations) but not so much success with a man directing or controlling operations.

3. Morale:

a) Motivation:

Motivation of subject is excellent. He is a Latvian Nationalist and is proud of his record as an active anti-Bolshevik fighter. This gratification of his sense of self-esteem as a true Latvian Nationalist and adding to his history as an anti-Communist fighter is his strongest personal motive. He is not in the least mercenary and is well aware of what he is getting into.

b) Attitude towards his assignment is excellent. He has been trying to get back to Latvia since 1946. He is especially pleased to be working with Partisans. He considers them brothers-in-arms who have not deserted the true course.

c) Moral Resistance (under arrest, etc.):

Subject's history, his observed personal courage, and his dedication to his mission all indicate that his moral resistance would be excellent. However his inordinate self-confidence and his impetuosity might be a disadvantage to him, if he were hard pressed.

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4. Emotional Stability:

Again subjects impetuosity and self-confidence make him an optimist about any course of action that he might pursue. This optimism might almost be called elation. No periods of depression have been noted and, except for his impetuosity, he is a very stable person. Subject likes to drink which adds to his impetuosity and makes him pugnacious. He also talks freely, that is without thinking, when drinking. He will drink to excess but probably would not do so when security is involved. He has a strong propensity for women and is not too fastidious in his choice.

5. Area knowledge:

The subject has an excellent knowledge of the Courland area where he will be working. He is a native of the area, lived there all his life until 1943, and knows the type of people in the area. He is familiar with the area in the immediate vicinity of the drop zone and knows very well the area directly east of the DZ.

6. Case officer evaluation of Agent's ability to successfully complete mission:

Subject has good possibilities for successfully completing his particular mission. However he must be strongly controlled and not allowed much initiative and responsibility. The undersigned seriously doubts his ability to do strictly clandestine work with the absolute discipline that it entails. But because of his excellent knowledge of the area, his high motivation, the strong controlling influence of CAMUSO 3 and the partisan groups, his familiarity with woods living, and his personal courage the undersigned considers him a good calculated risk.

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