

AIR

EQGA-30106

Chief, EE

LB
456

Chief of Base, Berlin

INFO: COS

Operational/CART/CADORY/LUCASOCK

Visit to CAUTERY-1, CABANJO and [] to Frankfurt

Hasis Lobbes *Yaco Saevelke*

Reference: EQGA-728hh

1. Two items remain to be reported in order to round out the record of the visit described in Reference: First, the CAUTERY/ [] version of the incident; second, a letter, postmarked 7 February, from CABANJO to CAUTERY which was intercepted by CIS.

2. Meeting with CAUTERY and [] on 12 February, [] (without mentioning the incident as reported to BOB) asked for an outline of what had happened and their impressions of the visit. CAUTERY then responded with the following narrative:

a. CAUTERY was contacted by [] ([] being on leave) and told that the meeting with [] was to take place in the Cafe Kranzler, Frankfurt, on the afternoon of 3 January. ([] had told CAUTERY that [] should not attend, CAUTERY then phoned [] (vacationing in Munich) to let him know that a meeting with [] would take place and the arrangements for it. [] and CAUTERY gave the following reasons for the former's attendance: 1) He was intensely interested in what CABANJO had to say, i.e. development and shortcomings of the Bonn government. 2) He wanted to participate in the discussion with [] whom CAUTERY had praised very highly. Questioned as to the effect of his presence on CABANJO's inclination to disclose "extremely sensitive" information, [] said he came prepared to absent himself at CABANJO's request during the sensitive part of the discussion.

b. CABANJO, CAUTERY, and [] appeared at the Kranzler at about 1300 and took seats. Shortly after their introduction [] learned that CABANJO also had been a member of the Freikorps "Hessbach" in the '20's. For both this was significant since such membership indicated a specific political viewpoint which [] considers important to this day. Hence, [] and CABANJO got along well and no question was raised about his presence at the meeting with []

APPROVED

20 February 1956/aqp

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32-726-3

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(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods/Sources

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c. After the three had been seated for about an hour, [] approached CAUTERY and drew him aside. He said [] would not be available for a meeting, and asked if CABANJO would be willing to talk to someone else. CAUTERY relayed this question to CABANJO and received an immediate negative reply. Since the requested meeting with [] was apparently impossible, CABANJO left to return to Bonn, and [] returned to Munich.

d. That evening (according to prearrangement made at the Cafe Kranzler) [] picked up CAUTERY at his pension. They drove to [] home where CAUTERY was very surprised to find [] waiting for them. (CAUTERY commented: Unfortunately CABANJO had already left for Bonn and the purpose of the entire exercise was therefore defeated. Hence, the evening discussion was impromptu and had little, if any, connection with the reason for his being in Frankfurt.) One of the first things CAUTERY noticed on entering the room was a tape recorder. He commented on it in a semi-joking tone and asked if their evening's conversation was to be recorded. [] and [] both made a few joking comments about the recorder, but did not answer CAUTERY's question. CAUTERY therefore assumed that his remarks were being recorded and throughout the discussion guarded himself accordingly.

e. The discussion revolved around relatively harmless subjects, e.g. present operations of LUCASSOCE, CAUTERY's transfer from KUTUBE to LUCAGE type activity, and the welfare of CAUTERY's family. With this, the Frankfurt visit was concluded.

3. Both CAUTERY and [] were indignant over the above chain of events. They thought themselves subjected to a bureaucratic run-around, and thought the incident doubly abortive since PAGE had been available for the requested interview after all. [] commented that this impression was understandable, but that they - [] and CAUTERY - had prepared the surprise which caused the interview's miscarriage, i.e. the unexpected appearance of [] at the Cafe Kranzler. (CAUTERY maintained that [] attendance was not decided upon until CAUTERY phoned [] in Munich, after the arrangements had been made through [] and that [] attendance had not been forbidden by KUBARK. However, [] was never informed of this change.)

4. [] commented that KUBARK was left with a very unfavorable impression of [] and CAUTERY as a result of the incident. It appeared as though [] and CAUTERY (and perhaps CABANJO) had dreamed up the sensitive information story solely in hopes of gaining access to a higher

