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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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C O P Y

SECRET

March 7, 1945

To: 110  
From: 224

Subject: Interview with Heinrich Wilhelm Eggen at Wolfberg on the Bodensee. Present 224, Eggen, and Wolf. Sunday, March 4, 1945.

After an excellent lunch at which Mrs. Wolf was also present and during which the conversation remained general, the three of us proceeded to Wolf's study. Wolf started the conversation by saying that, as a continuation of an earlier meeting with 493, Eggen had come to try to arrange a meeting between 110 and his superior, Schellenberg. I asked why and he replied that Schellenberg wanted to explore jointly with 110 the possibilities of bringing the war to an early conclusion. He, Eggen, continued that it should still be possible to arrange terms between the Americans, and the British in order to prevent the Communization of Germany. I told him that there would be no point in a meeting between 110 and Schellenberg unless the latter were able to suggest a plan that would fit within the framework of the Yalta conference and the recent speech of the President before the joint session of Congress. He replied that in his opinion the President's speech was only for public consumption and, when I assured him that he was in error, he replied that Germany would then have to fight to the bitter end. A surrender without a guarantee of the immediate establishment of a strong central German government would mean chaos and the Communization of Germany because Nazism and Communism are closely related and that, with the exception of the upper ten thousand, Germany was ripe for Communism. I told him that continued resistance was hopeless and that resistance could only intensify the chaos his people feared. The continuing destruction of life and the means of production would only work to the ultimate detriment of Germany. To my surprise he agreed with this. However he claims that it would be impossible for anyone to seize power and then surrender Germany unless guarantees were granted by the Allies. I told him I hoped and believed that somewhere in Germany there must be a man strong enough to seize the power and wise enough to see that unconditional surrender was now the best policy for the German people. Eggen said he would report to Schellenberg but that he had very little hope of success. This ended the specific conversation.

Random notes:

In a more general conversation which both preceded and followed the foregoing, Wolf, who knows Eggen extremely well, told him that the Germans always were too late in making proposals and always failed to understand the point of view of the rest of the world anyhow. This Eggen took in good part.

Eggen mentioned that the recent Russian successes had been greatly aided by small fry members of the July 20th group whom the SS had not bothered to arrest. This policy, he said, had been a serious error.

Wolf and Eggen returned by car with me to Zurich and were dropped in a side street. Eggen had an appointment with Masson on Monday afternoon and was then returning to Berlin by car.

I asked both Eggen and Wolf for a drink before lunch on Monday. At this time I suggested to Eggen that, as part of his duties were maintaining liaison with Jap Intelligence, and that as he had said that he thoroughly despised them, he might at some future date be able to help us in that direction. He didn't answer, but to my surprise, did say that if we wanted anybody or any small thing out of Germany he would arrange it for us.

Eggen stated that the outside duration of the war could not exceed eight months and that the end would probably come much sooner.

Subject of research on atom smashing was casually mentioned and Eggen stated that the Germans were pursuing this subject primarily in order to try to obtain better propulsion powers for airplanes and guns. (I already discussed this with Dr. Chiddick).

Later conversation with Wolf:

1. Wolf states that Eggen has been very useful to the Swiss in having specific people released or exchanged.
2. That he has provided excellent information to the Swiss of a political nature.
3. That Swiss Intelligence will protect Eggen when Germany collapses.
4. That Eggen would most probably arrange for the release of anyone we particularly wanted out.
5. That in his opinion Eggen probably would be willing to give us Jap intelligence.
6. That Eggen would not turn against Germany unless the use of gas were ordered.
7. That Eggen would be back in Switzerland in about ten days or a fortnight.
8. That if it was ever wanted by us a direct channel now exists to Himmler.