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 SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2001 2008

SECRET

ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. Wash-Reg-Int-109 F-009-109	SOURCE SITS 530 TSP 756	DATE OF DOCUMENT 9-10 April 1945	ANALYST C J	DA
SUBJECT Conversation with Musy concerning his most recent trip to Germany			10 June 1955	
PERTINENT INFORMATION				
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS QUOTED VERBATIM				
<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>Sternbuch then launched into a somewhat incoherent story about 350,000 Hungarian Jewish deportees who had been shot by the Germans, then switched over to the subject of Becher (the SS man who has carried on negotiations with Saly Mayer for the past any months regarding the Hungarian Jews) whom he stated was now being sent, on written orders from <u>SHELLENBERG</u>, to the camp of Ravensbruck.</p> <p>.....</p> <p>Hitler had immediately taken violent exception to any such step, particularly as regards Jews, and had a few days later (I gathered on either April 3rd., 4th. or 5th.) summoned Himmler, <u>SHELLENBERG</u> and an SS General named Gehrung (I am not sure about this spelling), whom Musy described as "the head of the German concentration camp system", to a special meeting where Hitler definitely vetoed the evacuation or release from Germany of any of these people.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>After having explained that he had, prior to Hitler's meeting, proposed to Himmler that the inmates of the major concentration camps be released (as a grandiose, "Nazi 'Humanitarian" gesture, I gathered) and evacuated through the fighting lines under cover of an especially called truce - a proposal which, he said, Himmler had been willing to consider favorably - Musy maintained that he had continued discussions with Himmler, and particularly with <u>SHELLENBERG</u> and General Gehrung (whom he saw "almost every day during his stay in Berlin"), in an effort to find a way of saving these tens of thousands of detainees from evacuation.</p> <p>.....</p> <p>Eventually Himmler and <u>SHELLENBERG</u> declared themselves willing to give orders (they pointed out to Musy that this was at the risk of their lives since it would be contrary to Hitler's wishes) that all the inmates of some 15 main concentration camps still in Nazi territory not should be kept in their camps and <u>not</u> evacuated.</p> <p>.....</p>				
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<p>In response to the question as to how keeping detainees in their camps could be carried out in practice if it was contrary to Hitler's orders - Misy having previously stated that Hitler was the master and the SS obeyed him- Misy replied that "Hitler now had other more important matters to attend to" and that in such questions of internal SS administration Himmler and SCHELLENBERG would have a free hand.</p> <p>As a direct result of this "change of heart" on the part of Himmler and SCHELLENBERG orders were given not to evacuate or at least to suspend evacuation preparations.</p> <p>Misy explained that Himmler and SCHELLENBERG were willing to take this step on one condition: that they receive formal assurance from the American and the British that all SS guards and administrative personnel found in the concentration camps on arrival of the American or British forces <u>be treated as soldiers and regular prisoners-of-war</u>.</p> <p>Misy seemed pleased with my personal opinion that there was little danger of such concentration camp SS guard being summarily shot and told me that he planned to telephone a message to Konstanz that evening (Sunday) which would be passed on to SCHELLENBERG informing the latter that he, Misy, had delivered the proposition to the Americans and that there was little likelihood that SS guards on concentration camps would be immediately shot.</p> <p>I suggested to Misy, and he agreed, that as a preliminary condition he inform SCHELLENBERG that both SS guards and administrative personnel in their concentration camps should wear their regular uniforms and that under no circumstances should they offer armed resistance.</p> <p>Misy thereupon stressed the urgency of an early reply referring once more to the suspended evacuation of Buchenwald and explaining that General von Schellenberg had estimated on April 5th. that the Allied armies would be in Weimar in 5 to 6 days at the most. Misy further confided to me that it was SCHELLENBERG'S personal opinion that the war would be over in Germany within 5 to 6 weeks.</p> <p>While on the subject of SCHELLENBERG, Misy once more spoke warmly of the man whom he described as "moderate" (modere). SCHELLENBERG was</p>				
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<p>really not a military man, he went on, but a lawyer by training and still only 35 years of age. Musy then told me that he had heard that the Americans had selected and were using some 2 or 300 Germans as a police force in Cologne, intimating that after all since we were doing things like this we ought to be able to use a man of <u>SCHELLENBERG'S</u> qualities.</p> <p>I tried to "pump" Musy on the subject of <u>SCHELLENBERG'S</u> plans for the future. Did he plan to retire into the reduit with the "Gottterdammerung crowd"? Musy was vague on this subject and only willing to intimate that opinions were divided on this score in high German circles and that <u>SCHELLENBERG</u> and Himmler had their own particular followers and would not necessarily have to follow Hitler at the last moment even if it meant armed conflict. (withdrawing into a reduit)</p> <p>.....</p> <p>Regarding the nearness of the Americans and the British in the west to Weimar and the urgency therefore of receiving an answer from them as rapidly as possible, <u>SCHELLENBERG</u> had added that he thought there was no danger from the Russian side (i.e. of their arriving shortly) for the moment since they were too far away.</p>				
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